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Abstract 
 
Like its predecessor, Basel II has profoundly shaped bank capital adequacy regimes 
across the world. However, there has been little systematic research on the state of 
Basel II implementation across developed and developing countries, and the factors 
that promote or hinder the implementation of these voluntary standards are 
particularly under-researched. By drawing on a new global dataset of Basel II 
implementation across 150 countries compiled by the author, this thesis evaluates 
the state of Basel II implementation at the global level and investigates why 
countries implement Basel II. Three novel channels of policy diffusion formed 
across supervisory authorities, global banks and financial sectors were specifically 
constructed to study the diffusion of Basel II policies using a mixed-method research 
design. A quantitative study tests the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II 
implementation across four distinct channels of diffusion formed by inter-
supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of international banks, 
competition between financial sectors and the nexus of international economic 
exchange. This is complemented by in-depth case studies that unpack the causal 
process through which policy diffusion shaped the national implementation of Basel 
II in Chile, Hong Kong, Korea and Malaysia. I find that the state of Basel II 
implementation at the global level is highly uneven and clustered, and show that 
Basel II policy decisions in countries are highly interdependent on the policy 
decisions of other countries with which those countries are closely interconnected. 
Policy diffusion not only promotes the degree of convergence with Basel II, but also 
reinforces partial, gradual and delayed implementation. The diffusion of 
implementation policies can thus be a curse and a blessing for the future of Basel II 
and the broader global financial regulatory architecture due to its double-edged 
power to promote as well as hinder the degree of regulatory convergence with 
international financial standards.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Why do countries implement Basel II? 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 triggered a string of financial regulatory 
reforms. In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basel 
Committee”) developed a comprehensive set of reform measures at the behest of the 
G20 to strengthen global regulatory standards for bank capital, liquidity and 
macroprudential regulation. These new standards, called Basel III, constituted the 
centrepiece of the G20‟s agenda on global financial reform and were regarded as a 
“decisive breakthrough” that would strengthen the resilience of banking systems 
around the world (Hannoun 2010:1). In the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010, 
the G20 Leaders “endorsed the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS [Basel 
Committee] on the new bank capital and liquidity framework” and committed “to 
take action at the national and international level to raise standards, and ensure 
that… national authorities implement global standards developed to date, 
consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the top and avoids 
fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage” (G20 2010:2).  
The shift in policy priorities at the international level from the agreement of 
new global financial regulatory standards to the national implementation of those 
standards signified a crucial turning point. This is because, Basel III, which includes 
Basel II, consists of non-binding best practice standards unlike the multilateral rules 
governing international trade. Although the Basel III negotiations were challenging 
and its agreement represented a feat in itself, the voluntary implementation of Basel 
II/III by national supervisory authorities from around the world constitutes a more 
challenging yet crucial next step. Beyond perhaps the non-binding policy 
commitments made in G20 meetings since 2010, there is no a priori reason to expect 
4 
 
the full, timely and consistent implementation of Basel II/III.
1
 As the Chairman of 
the Basel Committee warned, implementation can be challenging because 
“memories fade quickly. Regardless of how tough the new standards are and how 
we expect them to increase the resilience of bank and banking systems, they must be 
effectively implemented and enforced” (Wellink 2010:5). The global financial 
regulatory framework risks being undermined if regulatory reforms at the 
international level are not followed up with robust voluntary implementation at the 
national level, but instead partial, inconsistent or non-implementation. According to 
the Basel Committee, the stakes are very high since the “[f]ull, timely and consistent 
implementation of Basel III [which builds on the implementation of Basel II] is 
fundamental to raising the resilience of the global banking system, in maintaining 
market confidence in regulatory ratios and in providing a level playing field. The 
benefits of the recent round of regulatory reforms will not be realised without 
implementation.” (BCBS 2012:1) 
Thus, from a policy point of view, understanding the degree of global 
regulatory convergence with Basel II and the factors that explain why countries 
implement Basel II has become even more critical as countries embark on the 
implementation of Basel III.
2
 This is more so the case due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, the new global financial regulatory framework that emerged following the 
global financial crisis of 2007-8 builds on the implementation of Basel II. While 
Basel II was intended to replace the Basel Accord of 1988 (“Basel I”), Basel II 
constitutes a core component of Basel III, which is additive to Basel II. However, 
there is evidence of considerable variations in the implementation of Basel II across 
countries, providing a key motivation for this thesis. Secondly, Basel II is a 
voluntary standard that was never intended to have legal force and the Basel 
Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority. Given 
                                                 
1
 Basel II is formally called the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A revised Framework” (BCBS 2004) 
2
 The transition to Basel III is expected to commence in 2013 and end in 2019 (BCBS 2010a). 
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the lack of formal international coordination concerning the national implementation 
of Basel II, it is important to understand why countries implement Basel II.  
In addition to being a question very pertinent to policymakers and banks 
around the world in the post-global financial crisis regulatory environment, 
understanding how and why countries implement Basel II is important as a topic for 
academic research. This is because the Basel Capital Accords have profoundly 
shaped bank capital adequacy regimes across the world over the past two decades. 
According to the Basel Committee, “during the 1990s the Accord [Basel I] became 
an accepted world standard, with well over 100 countries applying the Basel 
framework to their banking system” (BCBS 2001:11). Similarly, when Basel II was 
published in 2004, more than one-hundred countries indicated their intentions to 
implement it, creating expectations that Basel II would also become the next global 
standard for bank capital regulation like its predecessor (FSI 2004). The Basel 
Committee, IMF and World Bank were alarmed by the overly keen response of non-
Basel Committee countries‟ intent to implement Basel II, prompting them to warn 
countries against the risks of premature implementation (BCBS 2004a; IMF 
2005a).
3
 Although the delayed and partial implementation of Basel II turned out to 
be a greater problem several years later, supervisors in the G10 at that time were 
particularly concerned that there was “a serious risk that many countries will begin 
to adopt the advanced IRB approach, because they think this is the global standard 
to which they must aspire, when it may not be appropriate for their banks at their 
current stage of development” (Davies 2005:249; GRR 2004; Le Pan 2008:20).  
                                                 
3
 References to the membership of the Basel Committee throughout this thesis refer to the G10, 
unless otherwise stated as the expanded membership of the Basel Committee. This is because the 
examination of the implementation of Basel II in this thesis mostly occurred before the membership 
was expanded. As discussed in the overview of the Basel Committee in Chapter Two, the 
membership of the Basel Committee was expanded to 27 countries in 2009. The G10 consists of 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States and Luxembourg. 
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Despite being an important topic for academic research in light of the 
profound impact the Basel Accords have had on governing bank capital across 
developed and developing countries, there are two significant gaps in the 
International Political Economy (IPE) literature on the political economy of 
international finance and financial regulation with respect to Basel II.
4
 Firstly, 
empirical research on the actual state of Basel II implementation is scarce and 
patchy and the state of implementation in developing countries is particularly under-
researched. A preliminary data gathering exercise of Basel II implementation 
conducted in the beginning of this research project indicated considerable cross-
national variations in implementation contrary to expectations that prevailed when 
Basel II was agreed amongst the G10 and published in 2004, undermining the extent 
to which Basel II had become globally accepted standards for regulating bank 
capital like its predecessor. Given the substantial differences between Basel I and 
Basel II, extrapolating how countries will implement Basel II based on their 
implementation of Basel I is likely to be invalid and unreliable. This is more so 
considering that even in the case of Basel I, the adoption of “domestic regulatory 
standards elaborated in a non-legally binding international arrangement among a 
dozen countries… by more than 100 countries that did not participate in the 
formulation of the standards” was a “development that [was] unusual if not 
unprecedented” (Tarullo 2008:65-6). 
The second major gap in the literature is the lack of understanding of the 
factors that promote or hinder the national implementation of Basel II across 
developed and developing countries. Why did countries that were not members of 
the Basel Committee voluntarily implement Basel II, an arrangement they were not 
party to and took no part in formulating? Moreover, why have countries 
implemented Basel II in different ways? As discussed in the literature review in 
Chapter Two, the literature is far from offering a convincing answer to why 
                                                 
4
 These gaps also exist in other literatures such as international law, finance and public policy. 
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countries around the world implemented Basel I, let alone Basel II. The untested 
theory which has become to be accepted as conventional wisdom is that Basel I was 
reputationally binding for non-members of the Basel Committee (see Simmons 
2001:602; Tarullo 2008:65; Goodhart 2011:186). Some have anecdotally argued that 
“[t]he same perceptions seem to surround adoption of the revised Basel II 
framework” (Simmons 2006:11), although none have empirically tested the factors 
that promote or hinder the national implementation of Basel II in the literature. 
 
1.2 Research question and central explanatory framework 
A systematic study of how and why countries implemented Basel II across 
developed and developing countries has not been undertaken in the literature despite 
the real-world importance of these questions for policy and as a topic for academic 
research. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the following research 
question. Why do countries implement Basel II? This question is answered in two 
steps as it is necessary to first establish how countries implemented Basel II before 
investigating why. Two sub-questions have been formulated accordingly. First, what 
is the state of Basel II implementation across the world? Second, what explains the 
degree of convergence with Basel II across the world? In answering the main 
research question, policy diffusion is adopted as the central explanatory framework. 
Policy diffusion is based on the premise that policy decisions in countries are 
interdependent on the policy decisions of other countries with which those countries 
are closely interconnected instead of being made independently across countries. It 
entails the adoption of policies in an interdependent yet uncoordinated way. Hence, 
this thesis examines whether Basel II policy decisions in a given country are 
systematically conditioned by the Basel II policy choices of other countries with 
which that country is closely interconnected to economically, politically or socially 
while controlling for the independent effects of economic and political conditions at 
the national level on countries‟ decisions to implement Basel II. 
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Policy diffusion was adopted as the main explanatory framework for the 
following four empirical and theoretical reasons. First, empirical research on policy 
diffusion is often motivated by the observation that countries adopt similar policies 
or institutions within a fairly circumscribed period of time, resulting in temporal and 
spatial clusters of policy change (Elkins and Simmons 2005:34). In a preliminary 
data gathering exercise, clusters of cross-national variations in the implementation 
of Basel II were also observed across countries in East Asia, South Asia and Latin 
America. There seemed to be a high degree of regulatory convergence amongst 
certain groups of countries that adopted similar implementation strategies. However, 
different groups of countries exhibited different levels of convergence with Basel II, 
producing a highly uneven and clustered state of Basel II implementation at the 
global level. These preliminary observations were complemented by findings in the 
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) surveys on countries‟ plans to implement Basel II, 
which showed variations in regional trends (FSI 2004; 2006; 2008).
5
 Although the 
identity of the countries that responded to the FSI surveys were not disclosed on 
confidentiality grounds, and countries‟ plans to implement Basel II in some regions 
turned out to be considerably different to how Basel II was actually implemented, 
combined with the observations from the preliminary data gathering exercise, the 
clustering of Basel II implementation policies across countries that had or were 
planning to implement Basel II provided sufficient prima facie evidence to merit the 
adoption of policy diffusion as a possible causal explanation. However, policy 
diffusion provides one possible explanation of why policies may have converged 
across countries and is by no means the only plausible explanation. Independent yet 
similar policy responses of countries that face similar economic or political 
conditions or cases of explicit policy coordination amongst countries also provide 
                                                 
5
 Implementation plans in Europe, excluding members of the Basel Committee, and Asia tended to be 
front-loaded as most countries envisaged an early and full transition onto Basel II, while those in the 
Caribbean were significantly back-loaded. Countries in Latin America and the Middle East planned 
to implement Basel II gradually. 
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plausible competing explanations to policy diffusion. Hence, in testing the effects of 
policy diffusion, it is necessary to control for these competing explanations. 
 Secondly, upon examining the policy making process to identify how 
countries implemented Basel II in the preliminary data gathering exercise, it was 
evident that in domestic policy debates, supervisors often referred to supervisory 
policies adopted by their regional peers or by leading global financial centres. This 
indicated that national policy decisions were not made in isolation from that of their 
foreign counterparts. However, there is a difference between learning and diffusion, 
and whether learning about policies in other countries had any systematic casual 
effects on national policy decisions is unknown and has to be tested. If policy 
decisions are indeed interdependent on the policy decisions of other countries, 
attempting to explain Basel II implementation with only the independent effects of 
domestic economic and political factors or international factors alone will fail to 
capture the uncoordinated yet interdependent process of policy making amongst 
supervisory authorities around the world. In this respect, the policy diffusion theory 
offers a conceptually different explanation to those that assume that countries make 
policy decisions independently of each other. The simple yet compelling theory of 
policy diffusion, namely, countries‟ policy choices are shaped by those of other 
countries with which they are closely interconnected to economically, politically and 
socially when making their own policy decisions, provides a convincing theory to 
explain how and why countries implemented Basel II. 
Thirdly, there are no a priori reasons to expect countries to implement Basel 
II in any particular way. Basel II is a voluntary standard and the Basel Committee 
does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority over its members 
and non-members to require countries to implement Basel II. Had Basel II been a 
legally binding agreement to which non-G10 countries were party to, or had 
implementation across the world been formally coordinated by the Basel Committee, 
the potential scope for policy diffusion to explain variations in policy 
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implementation across countries may be limited because policy diffusion by 
definition is characterised as a process of interdependent yet uncoordinated policy 
adoption. The lack of formal international coordination concerning the national 
implementation of Basel II provides a highly relevant context to investigate policy 
diffusion on theoretical grounds. 
 Fourthly, the investigation of Basel II implementation addresses significant 
gaps in the policy diffusion literature in addition to the literature on the political 
economy of international financial regulation. As discussed in the literature review 
chapter, policy diffusion is a burgeoning area of research in IPE. However, whilst 
policy diffusion has been applied to explain the diffusion of various financial 
policies such as capital account and interest rate policies, it has not been applied to 
explain bank capital policies. Furthermore, although the diffusion of various 
standards, such as environmental and labour standards has been studied, financial 
regulatory standards have not. Hence, the investigation of the diffusion of bank 
capital standards, namely Basel II, makes an original contribution to the portfolio of 
policies investigated in the policy diffusion literature.
6
  
In this thesis, a mixed-method research design is adopted to investigate both 
the effects of policy diffusion at the global level as well as the underlying process of 
policy diffusion in specific country cases. The policy diffusion hypotheses tested in 
the quantitative study and case studies are discussed in the next section, which 
outlines the overall research design of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Overall research design 
This thesis consists of three main building blocks. The first is a global dataset of 
Basel II implementation across 150 countries, the second is a quantitative study that 
tests the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II implementation across the world, and 
the third consists of six in-depth case studies that aim to unpack the causal process 
                                                 
6
 The contributions of this thesis to the policy diffusion literature are summarized in section 8.3.2. 
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through which policy diffusion shaped the national implementation of Basel II. This 
is summarized in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The three main building blocks of this thesis 
 
This section explains how the above three building blocks each contribute to 
answering the research question posed in this thesis. 
 
1.3.1 A global dataset of Basel II implementation 
To answer the first of the two sub-questions, a global dataset of Basel II 
implementation across 150 countries is compiled by the author in order to measure 
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and evaluate the state of Basel II implementation at the global level. The 
implementation of Basel II is operationalized according to the scope and pace of 
implementation. To capture the scope of implementation, the dataset measures 
whether key components of Basel II, namely the six approaches of Pillar 1 for 
calculating regulatory capital for credit and operational risk, Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 had 
been implemented across 150 countries. The dataset then records the year in which 
the above components of Basel II were implemented to capture the timing of 
implementation. Measures of the scope and pace of convergence with Basel II for 
each country are then coded and weighted to construct a composite Basel II 
implementation score. Doing so provides a single pragmatic measure that reflects 
the core structure of Basel II while summarizing how countries implemented Basel 
II in a comparable way across 150 countries. In addition to enabling the assessment 
of the state of Basel II implementation at the global level, the Basel II 
implementation dataset provides vital building blocks to answer the second 
component of the research question, that is, what explains the degree of convergence 
with Basel II? The dataset not only provides the underlying data to construct the 
dependent variable for the quantitative study, but also aids the selection of case 
studies by providing information on the population of candidate cases. 
 
1.3.2 Quantitative study: Testing the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II 
implementation across the world 
The quantitative and qualitative studies are the second and third building blocks of 
this thesis and their aim is to investigate why countries implemented Basel II. A 
mixed-method approach is adopted in this thesis based on the recognition that 
certain aspects of the research question are more adequately addressed by statistical 
methods and others by the case study method. In contrast to the effects-of-causes 
approach adopted in the quantitative analysis that aims to test the average effects of 
policy diffusion on Basel II implementation across countries, the case studies are 
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firmly grounded on the causes-of-effects approach aimed at explaining specific 
implementation outcomes at the country-level (Mahoney and Goertz 2006:230). The 
benefits of methodological triangulation may be particularly high precisely because 
statistical analysis and case studies embody distinct and often contrasting 
methodological orientations that can produce unique synergies if combined 
effectively into the overall research design. 
The objective of the quantitative study is to test whether on average policy 
diffusion systematically affects the degree of Basel II implementation across the 
world. Variables representing four distinct channels of diffusion are constructed to 
model how policies diffuse across channels formed by inter-supervisory authority 
networks, the cross-border structure of international banks, competition to attract 
international capital and the nexus of international economic exchange. Each policy 
diffusion variable consists of a unique connectivity matrix that describes how and to 
what extent each and every country are interconnected to all other countries across 
each channel of diffusion to test the following four policy diffusion hypotheses. First, 
inter-supervisory authority networks are hypothesized to reinforce the state of 
regulatory convergence amongst countries that are interconnected to one another, 
but at different levels of convergence with Basel II across different supervisory 
networks. There are more than a dozen established networks of banking supervisors, 
some dating back more than fifty years. Most supervisory networks organize regular 
meetings, conferences and training sessions, while some engage in achieving more 
ambitious goals such as formulating regional financial standards. Supervisory 
networks are expected to foster the diffusion of policies by serving as important 
channels of communication for supervisors to share experiences and policy ideas 
and learn about Basel II as well as each other‟s implementation policies.  
The second policy diffusion variable investigates the diffusion of Basel II 
across channels of diffusion formed by the cross-border structure of international 
banks. International banks are hypothesized to promote the degree of regulatory 
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convergence with Basel II in the host country they operate in if the international 
bank had implemented Basel II in its home country, or otherwise hinder 
implementation if the home country of the international bank had not implemented 
Basel II. This is because Basel II implementation decisions by the parent bank at the 
banking group level, which is a function of implementation decisions made by the 
home supervisor, may have implications on the way Basel II is implemented across 
its subsidiaries in host jurisdictions. 
Thirdly, competition between financial sectors to attract international capital 
and banking business are hypothesized to translate into competitive pressures 
amongst policymakers to implement Basel II, leading to its diffusion amongst rivals. 
When a country‟s foreign competitors implement Basel II, investors may be drawn 
to that location since implementation may enhance financial stability, incentivize 
advancements in risk management or reduce compliance costs for international 
banks that want to adopt their preferred approaches of Basel II globally. 
Anticipating this outcome, countries may come under competitive pressures to 
match their rivals‟ Basel II policy, and they too may implement Basel II in response. 
As a result, Basel II policies are expected to diffuse amongst financial sectors that 
compete for capital. 
Finally, the structure of international economic exchange may serve as a 
channel through which Basel II policies diffuse across countries. Greater levels of 
economic exchange between trading partners is hypothesized to lead to the diffusion 
of Basel II policies and reinforce the degree of regulatory convergence between 
them. Several studies in the literature have used bilateral trade flows to measure the 
spatial distance between countries. The level of economic exchange may reflect the 
degree to which two countries are likely to interact extensively, to be aware of each 
other‟s public policies, and to serve as prominent referents to each other, thus 
leading to the diffusion of policies due to emulation (Lee and Strang 2006:894). 
Other studies have used bilateral trade flows to model the structure of economic 
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competition, whereby countries decide to match the policies of those countries with 
which they trade relatively more with (Simmons and Elkins 2004:178-179). Both 
motivations are likely to be inter-related in practice. 
These four channels of diffusion were devised based on the following 
considerations. First, they are intended to complement one another by contributing 
to distinct dimensions of analyses in terms of how policies diffuse not only due to 
interdependencies formed between countries at the level of national economies and 
financial sectors, but also at the level of supervisors and banks, both of which are 
key actors in the process of implementation. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Examining policy diffusion at different levels of analysis 
          
With this distinction, it may be possible to discern whether policy diffusion is most 
effective due to interdependencies formed across countries via the nexus of bank 
supervisors, banks, financial sectors or economies. Secondly, the channels of policy 
diffusion formed by the way banks and supervisors are interconnected to one 
another respond to a major weakness in the policy diffusion literature. Increased 
interest in policy diffusion has developed alongside growing criticisms of the weak 
empirical basis and theoretical underpinnings of the diffusion process, especially in 
relation to the channels through which policies diffuse and the role of key agents 
involved in the process of diffusion. The imprecise specification of the channels of 
Level of diffusion Diffusion channel
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National economies
Nexus of international 
economic exchange
Financial sectors
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 Inter-supervisory 
authority networks
Low
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international banks
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diffusion, which are often only vaguely related to the specific policies that are 
hypothesized to diffuse, produce very generic channels of diffusion that make the 
tests of policy diffusion less convincing and not very relevant to the policy under 
investigation. The analysis of policy diffusion across the cross-border structure of 
international banks and inter-supervisory authority networks are innovative channels 
of policy diffusion that are tailored to highlight the role of key actors in 
implementing Basel II, namely, banks and supervisors and their interdependent 
relationships with their foreign counterparts in forming the paths through which 
policies diffuse across countries. These novel channels of diffusion mark original 
contributions to the policy diffusion literature as they have not been studied 
elsewhere. To provide a stronger empirical test of policy diffusion, the quantitative 
study systematically controls for several economic and political variables. These 
variables control for two competing explanations to policy diffusion, that is, 
independent responses to similar economic or political conditions and explicit policy 
coordination amongst countries. 
 
1.3.3 Six country case studies: Unpacking the process of policy diffusion  
Notwithstanding the strengths of quantitative methods in testing the effects of policy 
diffusion, a key weakness is their lack of ability to offer in-depth accounts of the 
process through which policies diffuse across the channels of diffusion modelled in 
the analysis. This limitation is addressed in the third building block of this thesis by 
adopting the case study method, the aim of which is to build on the results of the 
quantitative study by unpacking the causal process through which policy diffusion 
reinforces convergence with Basel II in some countries whilst reinforcing partial, 
gradual or delayed implementation in others. Case studies allow the attainment of 
high levels of conceptual validity by enabling the identification and measurement of 
indicators that best represent the concepts that is intended to be measured, and thus 
help to mitigate the risk of “conceptual stretching” associated with statistical studies 
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that lump together dissimilar cases to obtain a larger sample (George and Bennett 
2005:19). 
 The case studies in this thesis combine within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study to exploit the strongest means of drawing causal 
inferences from case studies (ibid. p18). Detailed within-case analysis employing a 
variant of the process tracing method is conducted to unpack the casual process of 
policy diffusion in six case studies, which consist of three pairs of cases from Chile, 
Korea, Malaysia and Hong Kong. Each pair of cases investigate the process of 
policy diffusion and Basel II implementation across each of the three channels of 
diffusion formed by inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure 
of international banks and competition for capital.
7
 Then, the cross-case comparative 
method of controlled comparison is undertaken for each pair of case studies to 
investigate how policy diffusion reinforces the degree of regulatory convergence 
with Basel II in some countries while reinforcing lower levels of convergence with 
Basel II in others. To ensure that the most theoretically, empirically, and 
methodologically relevant cases are selected, a rigorous case selection procedure 
involving three selection steps are applied to the population of candidate cases. 
These selection steps take into account binding scope conditions that may apply to 
the theory of policy diffusion, cases of explicit policy coordination and 
methodological considerations that aim to maximize variations in the policy 
diffusion variable under investigation, while controlling for the effects of other 
diffusion channels and statistically significant explanatory variables from the 
quantitative study.  
The first pair of case studies examines the diffusion of Basel II across inter-
supervisory authority networks in Malaysia and Chile. The supervisory authorities 
implementing Basel II, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) in Malaysia and the 
                                                 
7
 The fourth diffusion channel modelled by the structure of international economic exchange in the 
quantitative study is not investigated in the case studies due to the lack of variation in its effect on 
Basel II implementation. This point is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
18 
 
Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) in Chile, belong to 
different supervisory networks in East Asia and the Americas respectively. The 
policy choices of BNM and SBIF regarding when and how to implement Basel II in 
Malaysia and Chile are hypothesized to be systematically conditioned by, and thus 
interdependent on the policy choices of other supervisors with which BNM and 
SBIF are closely interconnected to via inter-supervisory authority networks. Stated 
generally, countries that are interconnected to other countries that have attained a 
high level of convergence with Basel II across channels of diffusion formed by 
inter-supervisory authority networks are also expected to adopt implementation 
policies that attain a high level of convergence with Basel II, and vice versa. In order 
to uncover the process through which policy diffusion led to convergent Basel II 
policies amongst supervisory authorities within the same supervisory network, but at 
divergent levels of convergence with Basel II across different supervisory networks, 
the case studies first examine the initial formative years of BNM and SBIF‟s 
implementation strategy and their participation in supervisory networks. This is 
followed by an examination of how supervisory networks function as channels 
through which policies diffuse.  
 The second pair of case studies investigates the diffusion of Basel II across 
channels of diffusion formed by the cross-border structure of international banks in 
Korea and Malaysia.
8
 Whilst Malaysia‟s banking sector was more protected and 
foreign players maintained a non-negligible yet stable share of the banking sector, 
Korea experienced an abrupt surge in the number of foreign players to levels 
unprecedented in the domestic banking sector, producing a contrasting configuration 
in the way Malaysia and Korea were interconnected to the rest of the world when 
Basel II was implemented. The cross-border structure of international banks are 
expected to form powerful channels of diffusion by creating very specific and direct 
                                                 
8
 Both countries are selected from the same supervisory network to control for its effects when 
investigating policy diffusion across international banks. 
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linkages between the host and home countries of global banks. These linkages are 
expected to not only provide information to host supervisors regarding who their 
competitors are, but also facilitate the cross-border transfer of implementation 
capabilities. Furthermore, aided by the international supervisory architecture that 
defines the rules of the game between home and host supervisors, the influence of 
global banks and home supervisors are expected to be even more compelling in host 
countries. Countries that are interconnected to the home countries of international 
banks that have attained a high level of convergence with Basel II are hypothesized 
to adopt implementation policies that also attain a high level of convergence with 
Basel II, and vice versa. To uncover the process of policy diffusion, the case studies 
first investigate the diffusion paths formed by the network of international banks that 
link Basel II policies in Korea and Malaysia to those of other countries. Then, the 
way international banks shaped various steps in the implementation process, from 
the initial policy consideration of whether to implement Basel II to the supervisory 
approval process of allowing banks to adopt the advanced approaches, are examined. 
 The third pair of cases studies examines how implementation policies in 
Hong Kong and Korea were shaped by the Basel II policies of financial sectors they 
competed with to attract international capital and banking business.
9
 Countries may 
come under competitive pressures to match their rival‟s financial regulatory policies, 
leading to the cross-border diffusion of Basel II. However, because Hong Kong and 
Korea compete with different financial sectors around the world, different Basel II 
policies are expected to diffuse in these countries. Put generally, financial sectors 
that compete for capital with other financial sectors that have attained a high level of 
convergence with Basel II are hypothesized to adopt domestic implementation 
policies that also attain a high level of convergence with Basel II, and vice versa. To 
uncover the process of policy diffusion, the case studies first trace the paths through 
                                                 
9
 Two countries that are in the same supervisory network and where the level of foreign bank 
presence is generally high in both cases have been selected to control for the effects of policy 
diffusion across different supervisory networks and the cross-border structure of international banks. 
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which policies diffused across financial sectors that competed for capital, before 
investigating how policy choices in Hong Kong and Korea were shaped by the 
policy choices of these financial sectors.  
For each pair of case studies, comparative analyses with respect to what, how 
and why policies diffused is undertaken to understand how and why policy diffusion 
reinforces convergence with Basel II in some cases, whilst reinforcing partial, 
gradual or delayed implementation in others. The next section explains how the 
above three building blocks are presented in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Chapter plans and summary of main arguments 
The chapter plans and the main arguments in each chapter are outlined in this 
section. This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two presents the literature 
review, which is conducted in four steps. First, a brief history of the Basel 
Committee is provided followed by an overview of Basel I and Basel II. Then the 
empirical literature on the Basel Accords, which is the literature that this thesis 
primarily aims to contribute to, is reviewed to understand the questions that have 
been addressed in relation to why countries implemented Basel I and Basel II, 
including the theoretical explanations tested in these empirical studies. In order to 
select a relevant theory to explain why countries implemented Basel II, the third and 
fourth steps of the literature review focus on the theoretical literature. A review of 
six general theories of compliance with international norms is undertaken in order to 
understand the core tenets of each approach in explaining compliance outcomes and 
their implications for understanding the implementation of Basel II. Then, a 
comprehensive overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on policy 
diffusion is conducted. Policy diffusion offers a fundamentally distinct theory in 
contrast to other general theories of compliance because it is based on the premise 
that policy decisions are not made independently across countries, but instead, as a 
function of one another. The strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical and 
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empirical literature on policy diffusion are also discussed in this chapter in order to 
formulate a research design that maximizes the strengths and addresses the 
weaknesses of this literature. The subsequent five chapters constitute the empirical 
chapters of this thesis devoted to investigating the state of Basel II implementation 
across the world and answering the question of why countries implemented Basel II. 
 Chapter Three examines Basel II implementation at the global level. The aim 
of this chapter is twofold. The first is to measure and assess the degree of regulatory 
convergence with Basel II across 150 countries and the second is to investigate the 
factors that explain the implementation of Basel II, in particular, by testing the 
effects of policy diffusion on implementation. Issues relating to the measurement of 
Basel II implementation and the methods used to compile the Basel II 
implementation dataset are discussed, followed by an examination of the state of 
implementation across the world. The findings suggest that the degree of regulatory 
convergence with Basel II at the global level is limited by considerable cross-
national variations in implementation, from early-comprehensive adopters to late-
partial adopters and non-implementers. These variations produce a highly uneven 
and clustered global regulatory landscape for bank capital regulation, where 
convergence and divergence coexist. There is a high degree of regulatory 
convergence amongst groups of countries that adopted similar implementation 
policies. However, different groups of countries exhibit different levels of 
convergence with Basel II. Furthermore, the unevenly clustered global regulatory 
landscape is more permanent than transitional as a large proportion of developing 
countries were either late-partial adopters or non-implementers. Since the aim of this 
thesis is to investigate how and why countries implemented Basel II, an assessment 
of the effects of implementation on policy objectives such as financial stability, 
financial sector development or levelling the playing field are not conducted. Hence, 
arguments about whether more or less implementation is good or desirable are not 
made in this respect. Not only is it too early to reliably assess the effects of Basel 
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II/III implementation, a systematic study of how and why countries implemented 
Basel II across developed and developing countries has not been undertaken  yet. 
To investigate the cause of the highly uneven and clustered global regulatory 
landscape, regression analysis is undertaken to test whether Basel II policy decisions 
in countries are interdependent on the policy decisions of other countries with which 
those countries are closely interconnected while controlling for the effects country-
specific economic and political conditions may independently have on national 
decisions to implement Basel II. The results provide strong and consistent evidence 
to support the policy diffusion hypothesis tested in the analysis. There is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the level of Basel II implementation 
in one country, and the average implementation score of those countries with which 
that country is closely interconnected to across channels of diffusion formed by 
inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of international 
banks, competition for capital, and the structure of international economic exchange. 
Furthermore, countries that are not developing countries, have a sizeable and 
developed banking sector, maintain lower levels of regulatory capital in the banking 
system, experienced a systemic banking crisis and have adopted international 
accounting standards are on average associated with higher levels of Basel II 
implementation than those that are not. 
The findings and methods of the quantitative analysis are put to an even 
stronger test in the subsequent four chapters that aim to unpack the process through 
which variations in the type and strength of policy diffusion reinforces convergence 
with Basel II in some countries whilst reinforcing partial, gradual or delayed 
implementation in others. Chapter Four outlines the overall design of the case 
studies, which combines detailed within-case analyses with cross-case comparative 
analyses, and the case section procedure, which consists of three case selection steps. 
A truth table is constructed to methodologically organize the vast amount of 
information on all candidate cases and apply the case selection steps in a systematic 
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way.
10
 Three pairs of cases from Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Hong Kong are 
selected to investigate the process of policy diffusion and Basel II implementation 
across three channels of diffusion formed by inter-supervisory authority networks, 
the cross-border structure of international banks and financial sectors that compete 
for capital. The case studies highlight considerable variations in implementation, 
from late-partial adopter Chile, to gradual comprehensive adopter Malaysia and 
early comprehensive adopters Korea and Hong Kong. 
Chapter Five examines how the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and 
Chile was shaped by the diffusion of Basel II across inter-supervisory authority 
networks. Supervisory networks emerged as powerful channels of diffusion that 
promoted convergence in implementation policies amongst countries by shaping the 
formation of implementation norms amongst supervisors from very early in the 
implementation process, thus, changing the trajectory of how countries implemented 
Basel II. Both BNM and SBIF extensively shared experiences and ideas on various 
aspects of Basel II with their foreign counterparts when formulating their own 
national implementation policy. However, divergent implementation policies 
diffused across supervisory networks in East Asia and the Americas. In Malaysia, 
policies diffused not only at the strategic level in terms of deciding on the speedy 
pace and comprehensive scope of implementation, but also at the more detailed 
tactical level. In contrast, whether supervisors should implement Basel II at all was 
an open question amongst policymakers in ASBA, which decided to adopt a more 
gradual and layered approach. Although divergent implementation policies diffused, 
the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and Chile were strongly shaped by 
considerations of how their supervisory peers were implementing Basel II as there 
were pros and cons for not moving ahead with the rest of one‟s peers in the case of 
Malaysia, and moving ahead without the rest of one‟s peers in the case of Chile. 
                                                 
10
 The truth table sorts the data into different combinations of the independent variables and their 
associated outcomes, producing a cross-tabulation of causes and effects for 150 countries. See 
Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Six investigates how the implementation of Basel II in Korea and 
Malaysia was shaped by the diffusion of Basel II across the cross-border structure of 
international banks. The case studies found two channels of diffusion within the 
cross-border structure of international banks to be particularly important. Firstly, the 
way one country was interconnected to another at the level of banks had significant 
implications on the degree of convergence with Basel II attained in the host 
countries. In some cases, convergence with Basel II was facilitated as foreign banks 
that benefited from their Basel II-knowledgeable parent banks were the first to adopt 
the advanced yet operationally onerous approaches of Basel II in Korea and 
Malaysia. In other cases, foreign banks hindered the full and timely implementation 
of Basel II due to delays and uncertainty in implementation in the home country. 
Secondly, international banks also created a channel of diffusion between home and 
host supervisors, which tended to promote convergence in line with the home 
supervisors‟ Basel II policies, except for some areas where host country-specific 
divergences were reinforced. 
In Chapter Seven, the diffusion of Basel II policies between financial sectors 
that compete for capital is investigated. The practice of evaluating how 
implementation in Hong Kong and Korea compared with that of other financial 
sectors was systematically embedded into the policy making process of the HKMA 
and FSS. However, differences in the financial sectors Hong Kong and Korea 
competed with created distinct paths through which policies diffused, contributing to 
differences in the way they implemented Basel II. The case studies found that policy 
diffusion not only promoted convergence with Basel II, but also explained 
implementation delays and divergences from Basel II in Hong Kong and Korea. 
These divergences and delays were not only based on careful evaluation of how 
one‟s main competitors were implementing Basel II, but also provided an outlet to 
accommodate domestic constraints and challenges in implementation, which in part 
emanated directly from supervisors‟ efforts to match the policies of their 
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competitors in the first place. This highlighted that both divergences from and 
convergences with international financial standards were inseparable consequences 
of policy diffusion. 
In addition to finding compelling evidence in support of policy diffusion, the 
findings also underscored the importance of the level of development. The 
quantitative study suggested that on average, developing countries were constrained 
by their level of development when implementing Basel II. In the case studies, even 
relatively developed countries such as Hong Kong and Korea faced capacity 
constraints of various sorts. A closer examination of implementation across 
countries suggested that the capacity to implement Basel II was a necessary but 
insufficient condition for Basel II policies to diffuse. No matter how strong the 
effects of policy diffusion in encouraging high levels of implementation, policy 
diffusion mechanisms were unable to overcome low capacity constraints. Moreover, 
less developed countries were rarely exposed to strong policy diffusion effects that 
encouraged convergence with Basel II across the channels of diffusion in the first 
place. Thus, when the level of development was low, the prospects for converging 
with Basel II were even poorer as policy diffusion tended to reinforce low levels of 
Basel II implementation. 
In Chapter Eight, the main empirical findings of this thesis and their 
contributions to the IPE literature on the political economy of international financial 
regulation and policy diffusion are discussed. Three key policy implications that 
follow from the findings are also presented, followed by a discussion on how this 
thesis informs the wider debate on power in the world economy. In the world of 
global standard setting, it is widely accepted that the “great powers”, namely the US 
and EU, “remain the primary actors writing the rules that regulate the global 
economy” (Drezner 2007:5). This was also true for the Basel standards, where they 
had a monopoly in setting the rules governing bank capital. This thesis sheds light 
on the implications of power on the implementation of Basel II, in particular, 
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regarding whose policies diffuse and how. Although Basel II was not formally 
enforced and remained a voluntary standard outside the G10, implementation in the 
EU and US had repercussions on how other countries implemented Basel II around 
the world because both the EU‟s full and timely implementation and the US‟s 
delayed and partial implementation diffused. Moreover, it is argued that the 
influence of the EU and US permeates through the process of diffusion at a deeper 
level by shaping the channels of diffusion, and in doing so, have indirectly, but 
profoundly shaped the global regulatory landscape for bank capital regulation. In 
sum, not only are the EU and US “great powers” in setting international standards, 
they are also leading powers in shaping the implementation of Basel II around the 
world. 
 Overall, this thesis finds strong and consistent evidence that Basel II policy 
decisions in countries are highly interdependent on the policy decisions of other 
countries with which those countries are closely interconnected. Inter-supervisory 
authority networks, the cross-border structure of international banks and competition 
for capital proved to be effective channels through which policies diffused and 
national supervisors and banks, key agents of policy diffusion. Even though the way 
one country is interconnected to another may change over time as countries 
reconfigure the way they integrate into the global economy, the dynamics of policy 
diffusion that underlie these channels of diffusion are expected to persist and shape 
the international regulatory landscape on an on-going basis as long as countries 
operate in a globalized world economy, where one country is interconnected to 
another economically, politically and socially. To this end, it is argued that the 
dynamics of policy diffusion constitute the very fabric of the globalized world 
economy, and that this can be a curse and a blessing for the future of Basel II and 
the broader global financial regulatory architecture due to the double-edged power 
of policy diffusion to reinforce as well as to hinder the degree of regulatory 
convergence with international financial standards. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review presented in this chapter is conducted in four steps. First, a 
brief history and summary of the main activities of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (“Basel Committee”) is presented followed by an overview of Basel I 
and Basel II to provide a background to the global financial regulatory framework 
for bank capital and highlight the differences between Basel I and II. This is 
followed by a review of the empirical literature on the Basel Accords, which is the 
literature that this thesis primarily aims to contribute to. This literature is reviewed 
with the aim of understanding the questions that have been addressed in relation to 
why countries implemented Basel I and Basel II and the theories that have been 
tested in these studies. As the first step of selecting a relevant theory to test in 
explaining why countries implemented Basel II, the third and fourth steps of the 
literature review focus on the theoretical literature that could help explain the 
implementation of Basel II. A literature review of six general theories of compliance 
with international norms is undertaken in step three to understand the core tenets of 
each theory and examine their implications for explaining why countries 
implemented Basel II. This is followed by a review of the policy diffusion literature, 
which offers a fundamentally distinct theory from other general theories of 
compliance. The reasons for adopting policy diffusion as the central explanatory 
framework in this thesis were discussed in Chapter One. The review conducted in 
this chapter complements those arguments by providing a comprehensive overview 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on policy diffusion. The literature is 
reviewed with the aim to first define policy diffusion and explain how policy 
diffusion mechanisms are hypothesized to work. Then the empirical literature is 
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reviewed with a particular focus on the methodology utilized to operationalize 
policy diffusion. The strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical and empirical 
literature are also discussed in order to formulate a research design that builds on the 
existing literature and maximizes its contribution to the policy diffusion literature.  
This chapter proceeds in the following order. An overview of the Basel 
Committee, Basel I and Basel II is presented in section 2.2. This is followed by a 
review of the empirical literature on the Basel standards in section 2.3. Then the six 
general theories of compliance are discussed in section 2.4, followed by a 
comprehensive review of the policy diffusion literature in section 2.5. 
  
2.2 The Basel Committee, Basel I and Basel II 
2.2.1 The Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the 
Group of Ten (G10) countries in the aftermath of severe disturbances in 
international currency and banking markets following the failure of Bankhaus 
Herstatt in West Germany.
1
 Until 2009, the membership of the Basel Committee 
consisted of the G10, namely, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and 
Luxembourg.
2
 The Basel Committee provided a forum for regular cooperation 
                                                 
1
 This section primarily draws on the „History of the Basel Committee and its Membership‟ by the 
Basel Committee (2009). 
2
 Spain was invited to join the Basel Committee in 2001. References to the membership of the Basel 
Committee throughout this thesis refer to the G10, unless otherwise stated as the expanded 
membership of the Basel Committee. Following the global financial crisis of 2007-8, the Basel 
Committee and its governing body, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision, 
decided at its March 2009 meeting to expand its membership and invite representatives from 
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia to join the Basel Committee at the behest 
of the G20 (BIS 2009). In June 2009, the Basel Committee‟s membership was broadened further to 
include major international financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore, and countries from 
the G20 that were not already represented in the Basel Committee, namely, Argentina, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. The membership of the Basel Committee doubled in size to 
27 jurisdictions as a result. (BIS 2009a) 
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between member countries on banking supervisory matters and initially focused on 
modalities to close gaps in the international supervisory net for internationally active 
banks. The Basel Concordat of 1975, which aimed to ensure that no international 
bank escaped adequate supervision, marked one of the most important earlier 
achievements of the Basel Committee.
3
 The Basel Committee‟s “wider objective has 
been to improve supervisory understanding and the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide” by exchanging information on national supervisory arrangements, 
improving the effectiveness of techniques for supervising international banks, and 
most importantly, by setting minimum supervisory standards (BCBS 2009:1). To 
this end, the Basel Committee has produced more than one-hundred documents 
providing supervisory standards and guidance on a wide range of supervisory topics. 
 Of the supervisory standards formulated by the Basel Committee, the Basel 
Committee “is best known for its regulations on capital adequacy requirements, 
CARs. The 1988 Accord, or Basel I, as it became more widely known, put the 
BCBS on the map for banks and policy-makers” (Goodhart 2011:194). According to 
the Basel Committee, “[t]he merits of the Accord [Basel I] were widely recognised 
and during the 1990s the Accord became an accepted world standard, with well over 
100 countries applying the Basel framework to their banking system” (BCBS 
2001:11). By the time Basel II was agreed, over 140 countries claimed to have 
implemented Basel I (Barth et al 2008). The Basel Committee decided to undertake 
a thorough revision of Basel I in 1998, and after six years of intense negotiations, 
Basel II was published in June 2004. There were strong expectations that Basel II 
would succeed its predecessor and become the next global standard for capital 
regulation when more than 100 countries indicated their intentions to implement 
Basel II in 2004 (FSI 2004). However, as countries were transitioning onto Basel II, 
                                                 
3
 In 1983, the Concordat was revised to establish principles for sharing supervisory responsibilities 
for banks‟ foreign branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures between host and home supervisors. 
These principles were revised in 1990 to improve the cross-border flow of prudential information 
between supervisors and were reformulated into minimum principles in 1992. 
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the Basel Committee was yet again at the centre of reforming global financial 
regulatory standards, but this time at the behest of the G20 following the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8. The Basel Committee formulated a set of new global 
regulatory standards for bank capital, liquidity and macroprudential regulations, 
collectively called Basel III. 
In addition to developing standards for regulating bank capital, the Basel 
Committee also produced standards in other areas, such as the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs), which also received almost universal 
acceptance. The BCPs were “conceived as a voluntary framework of minimum 
standards for sound supervisory practices” and consisted of twenty-five “principles 
that are needed for a supervisory system to be effective” (BCBS 2006b:2).4 Since its 
publication in 1997, the BCPs have become “the de facto minimum standard for 
sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems” around 
the world (BCBS 2012b:1). Moreover, according to Goodhart, the BCPs represented 
“a radical change in the Committee‟s relationships with the rest of the World” as the 
Basel Committee “emerged upon the world stage as the institution responsible for 
establishing norms for the regulation of banking systems… right around the world” 
(2011:299). 
The emergence of the Basel Committee as the pinnacle of authorities for 
establishing standards for regulating banking systems around the world has occurred 
under quite unique circumstances.  
“The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory 
authority. Its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal 
force. Rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and 
recommends statements of best practice in the expectation that individual 
                                                 
4
 The BCPs “have been used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their 
supervisory systems and for identifying future work to be done to achieve a baseline level of sound 
supervisory practices… [and] have also been used by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program to assess countries‟ banking supervision systems and 
practices.” (BCBS 2006b:1) 
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authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements – 
statutory or otherwise – which are best suited to their own national systems. In 
this way, the Committee encourages convergence towards common 
approaches and common standards without attempting detailed harmonisation 
of member countries‟ supervisory techniques.” (BCBS 2009:1)  
Despite the lack of formal supranational supervisory authority over its members and 
non-member countries, the Basel Committee‟s voluntary standards have had 
profound effects in shaping national regulatory regimes across the world. In 
particular, the Basel Capital Accords, which are explained next, have had far 
reaching implications for national and international banks and supervisors across 
developed and developing countries. 
 
2.2.2 Basel I 
In the early 1980s, the Basel Committee became concerned that the capital ratios of 
the main international banks were deteriorating at a time when international risks, 
notably those vis-à-vis heavily-indebted Latin American countries, were growing. 
The two principal aims of Basel I were “to ensure an adequate level of capital in the 
international banking system and to create a “more level playing field” in 
competitive terms so that banks could no longer build business volume without 
adequate capital backing” (BCBS 2001:11). Members of the Basel Committee 
resolved to halt the erosion of capital standards in their banking systems by working 
towards greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. This resulted 
in the emergence of a broad consensus on a weighted approach for measuring risks 
both on and off the balance sheet. Following comments on a consultative paper 
published in December 1987, Basel I was approved by the G10 Governors and 
released to banks in July 1988. 
Basel I was a regulatory capital measurement system that required 
internationally active banks from G10 countries to hold a minimum ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets of 8% by 1992. Two tiers of capital were distinguished 
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depending of their ability to absorb losses. Tier 1 included shareholders‟ equity and 
retained earnings and Tier 2, supplementary internal and external capital resources 
such as general provisions and subordinated debt. To measure risk-weighted assets, 
assets were classified into four buckets, 0%, 20%, 50% and 100%, according to their 
riskiness, which in the case of Basel I varied by who the debtor was. Capital was not 
required against government assets such as Treasury Bills and bonds whist claims on 
banks attracted a 20% weight, which translated into a capital charge of 1.6% of the 
value of the claim. Claims on the non-bank private sector generally received the 
standard 8% capital requirement.
5
 Basel I was supplemented a number of times 
mostly to deal with the treatment of off-balance-sheet activities, although the most 
significant amendment was made in 1996 with the Market Risk Amendment. This 
required the removal of trading positions in bonds, equities, foreign exchange and 
commodities from the credit risk framework in place for explicit capital charges 
related to the bank‟s open position in each instrument. Basel I is generally seen to 
have succeeded, “brilliantly” according to Goodhart, in achieving its goals of raising 
capital levels and moving towards a level playing field, and “has largely, though 
recently less so, stood the test of time” (Goodhart 2011:195). 
 
2.2.3 Basel II 
Due to rapid developments in financial markets, the simple and ad hoc bucket 
approach in Basel I created incentives for banks to move high quality assets off the 
balance sheet, thus reducing the average quality of banks, and became increasingly 
outdated as regulatory capital requirements conflicted with sophisticated internal 
measures of economic capital. The rationale of Basel II was to reduce the scope for 
regulatory arbitrage and make regulatory capital requirements more risk-sensitive by 
incorporating advances made in banks‟ internal risk management practices in 
                                                 
5
 Off-balance sheet exposures through guarantees, commitments and forwards were converted into a 
credit equivalent amount through a scale of conversion factors and then weighted according to the 
counterparty‟s risk weighting. 
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calculating regulatory capital requirements. The „International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A revised Framework‟, known as Basel 
II, was agreed in 2004 and consisted of three pillars corresponding to minimum 
regulatory capital requirements in Pillar 1, the supervisory review process in Pillar 2 
and market discipline in Pillar 3 (BCBS 2004).  
The first Pillar sets out a menu of approaches to determine minimum capital 
requirements for credit, operational and market risk. For credit risk, there are three 
options that allow banks and supervisors to choose from depending on the 
sophistication of banks‟ activities and internal controls. The standardized approach 
(“SA”) draws a distinction between the type and riskiness of an exposure in an effort 
to improve the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. Fixed risk weights are 
established for different types and riskiness of exposures. To assess the credit 
quality of borrowers, banks can use external credit assessments by rating agencies. 
Where an external rating is not applied to an exposure, the SA mandates a risk 
weighting of 100%, equivalent to a capital requirement of 8%. Compared to Basel I, 
an expanded range of credit risk mitigants, such as collateral, guarantees and credit 
derivatives are recognised based upon which capital requirements could be reduced. 
Furthermore, the SA provides special treatment for retail exposures, whereby the 
risk weights for residential mortgage exposures and other retail exposures were 
reduced relative to Basel I. Also, loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) received retail treatment, enabling them to receive lower risk weights. 
 Under the IRB approaches, risk weights, and hence capital charges, are 
determined through the combination of quantitative inputs provided by banks‟ own 
risk estimates and formulas specified by the Basel Committee. The formulas, or risk 
weight functions, translate a bank‟s inputs into a specific capital requirement. They 
are based on modern risk management techniques that involve quantitative 
assessments of risk. The IRB approaches utilize four quantitative risk inputs. The 
probability of default (PD) measures the likelihood that a borrower will default over 
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a given time horizon, loss given default (LGD) measures the proportion of an 
exposure that will be lost if a default occurs, exposure at default (EAD) measures 
the amount of a facility that is likely to be drawn if a default occurs, and maturity (M) 
measures the remaining economic maturity of an exposure. The IRB approaches 
consist of the Foundation IRB (“FIRB”) and Advanced IRB (“AIRB”) approaches. 
The FIRB approach utilizes banks‟ own estimates of PDs whilst using supervisory 
values set by the Basel Committee for LGD, EAD and M. In contrast, the AIRB 
approach utilizes banks‟ own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD and M as quantitative 
inputs in calculating the risk weight of assets. The latter is generally considered “the 
fundamental innovation of Basel II that breaks with the Basel I method” (Tarullo 
2008:139). For the treatment of credit mitigants, different types of collateral are 
reflected in the supervisory values for LGD for FIRB banks, whilst greater 
flexibility is accorded to AIRB banks to assess the value of collateral. For retail 
exposures, there is only a single AIRB approach and no FIRB alternative. The key 
inputs in the IRB retail formulas are PD, LGD and EAD, all of which are based on 
banks‟ internal estimates for pools of similar retail exposures rather than for 
individual exposures. 
 In addition to capital requirements for credit risk, the Basel Committee 
created a new capital charge for operational risk in Basel II. Operational risk is 
defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events” (BCBS 2004:137). There are three 
approaches for calculating operational risk capital charges in a continuum of 
increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity. These are the Basic Indicator 
Approach (“BIA”), Standardized Approach (“TSA”) and Advanced Measurement 
Approach (“AMA”). In the BIA, banks are required to hold capital for operational 
risk equal to a fixed 15% of the average positive annual gross income over the 
previous three years. In the TSA, banks‟ activities are divided into eight business 
lines and the capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying the 
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gross income of each business line by a factor ranging from 12% to 18%.
6
 In the 
AMA, banks are allowed to use their own internal method for assessing their 
exposure to operational risks, as long as it is sufficiently comprehensive, systematic 
and meets the quantitative and qualitative criteria set out in Basel II. 
 The supervisory review process of Pillar 2 requires banks to develop an 
internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) and set capital targets to 
ensure that banks have adequate capital to support their risks beyond the core 
minimum requirements. Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are 
assessing their capital needs relative to their risks and to intervene where appropriate. 
Pillar 2 consists of the following four key principles. 
Table 1: Pillar 2 principles 
 
Principle 1 requires bank to undertake a comprehensive assessment of risks, 
including those not explicitly captured in Pillar 1, such as interest rate risk in the 
banking book, credit concentration risk and liquidity risk. Principles 2 and 3 
empower supervisors to review and intervene when necessary and require banks to 
hold capital above the minimum requirement per Pillar 1. Pillar 3 sets out market 
disclosure requirements in relation to the scope of application, capital structure and 
adequacy, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and the overall capital 
adequacy of banks. The intention is “to encourage market discipline by developing a 
                                                 
6
 The eight business lines and betas (in parentheses) are corporate finance (18%), trading and sales 
(18%), payment and settlement (18%), commercial banking (15%), agency services (15%), retail 
banking (12%), asset management (12%) and retail brokerage (12%). 
Pillar2: Four key principles of supervisory review
Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to
their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels.
Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks‟ internal capital adequacy assessments
and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital
ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result
of this process.
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios
and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.
Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling
below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should
require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored.
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set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key 
pieces of information” (BCBS 2004:175). 
Basel II significantly overhauled the definition and method for calculating 
risk-weighted assets, that is, the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio, and 
introduced a capital requirement for operational risk and Pillars 2 and 3 for the first 
time. However, it also retained key elements of Basel I. The minimum capital ratio 
of 8%, the definition of eligible regulatory capital (i.e. the numerator of the capital 
adequacy ratio), and the 1996 Market Risk Amendment remained unchanged.
7
 
Regarding the minimum 8% requirement, the Basel Committee decided to “broadly 
maintain the aggregate level of such requirements, while also providing incentives to 
adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches” in the form of slightly lower 
capital requirements for banks adopting the IRB approaches relative to the SA 
(BCBS 2004:4). However, to avoid excessive reductions in capital requirements 
following implementation, capital requirements for banks using the IRB approaches 
or the AMA were subject to capital floors as part of a transitional arrangement. 
The implementation plan envisaged in Basel II for its members was for Basel 
II to be available for implementation as of year-end 2006, except for the most 
advanced approaches, which were to be made available for implementation as of 
year-end 2007. Parallel calculations for banks adopting the FIRB approach was to 
start from 2006 and banks moving directly from Basel I to the advanced approaches 
for credit or operational risk were subject to parallel calculations or impact studies 
from 2006 and parallel calculations from 2007 (BCBS 2004:58). For non-member 
countries, Basel II was “circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view 
to encouraging them to consider adopting this revised Framework at such time as 
they believe is consistent with their broader supervisory priorities” (BCBS 2004:1). 
Basel II also states that the Basel Committee “acknowledges that moving toward its 
adoption in the near future may not be a first priority for all non-G10 supervisory 
                                                 
7
 These components were substantially revised in Basel 2.5 and III. 
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authorities in terms of what is needed to strengthen their supervision. Where this is 
the case, each national supervisor should consider carefully the benefits of the 
revised Framework in the context of its domestic banking system when developing a 
timetable and approach to implementation” (ibid.). Hence, although there were clear 
expectations that Basel II would be implemented by national supervisors in the G10 
and that Basel II would become the new global standard for regulatory practice 
elsewhere (FSI 2004), Basel II remained a non-legally binding framework for 
members of the Basel Committee and a voluntary standard for the rest of the world. 
The next section examines the empirical literature on the Basel Accords. 
 
2.3 The empirical literature on the Basel Accords 
The concepts of implementation, compliance and effectiveness are defined before 
reviewing the empirical literature on the Basel Accords because some studies 
examine implementation while others examine compliance or the effectiveness of 
compliance. Implementation can be defined as “measures that states take to make 
international accords effective in their domestic law. Some accords are self-
executing; that is, they do not require national legislation to become effective. But 
most international accords require national legislation or regulations to become 
effective” (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998:4).8 On the other hand, “[c]ompliance 
goes beyond implementation. It refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the 
provision of the accord and to the implementing measures that they have instituted.” 
(ibid.)
9
 Put another way, compliance is a broader concept that “includes 
                                                 
8
 Other scholars offer similar definitions. According to Shelton “[i]mplementation of international 
norms refers to incorporating them in domestic law through legislation, judicial decision, executive 
decree, or other process” (2000:6). Raustiala and Slaughter define implementation as “the process of 
putting international commitments into practice: the passage of legislation, creation of institutions 
(both domestic and international) and enforcement of rules” (2002:539). 
9
 Young provides the most widely cited definition in the literature, namely, that “[c]ompliance can be 
said to occur when the actual behavior of a given subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and 
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implementation” (Shelton 2003:5). To this end, implementation can be seen in terms 
of “compliance to opt in” to international norms and thus “a precondition for 
compliance” (Ho 2002:650). Other scholars however, argue that although 
“[i]impelemtation is typically a critical step toward compliance… implementation is 
conceptually neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for compliance” 
(Raustiala and Slaughter 2002:539). This is because, “compliance can occur 
automatically without implementation; that is, without any effort or action by a 
government or regulated entity” (ibid.), or conversely, because implementation may 
not necessarily result in compliance and be incomplete or contrary to the prescribed 
goals (Raustiala 2000:391-399). Effectiveness, which refers to “whether the goals of 
the norm are achieved” (Shelton 2003:6), “is related to, but is not identical with, 
compliance” because countries may be in compliance with an international norm, 
but the norm may nevertheless be ineffective in attaining its stated objectives, and 
even international norms that are effective in attaining their stated objectives may 
not be effective in addressing the problems they were intended to address (Brown 
Weiss and Jacobson 1998:5).
10
 
 
2.3.1 The empirical literature on Basel I 
Different empirical studies offer competing explanations of how and why Basel I 
was agreed and implemented in the G10 and subsequently in non-G10 countries. On 
the one hand, Kapstein attributes Basel I to international policy coordination, but 
one which “reflected the interplay of knowledge and power” because “the 
development of consensual knowledge regarding systemic risks, combined with 
decisive leadership on the part of the United States and Great Britain” were 
important factors in explaining Basel I (1989:324). This view is also held by 
                                                                                                                                          
noncompliance or violation occurs when actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed 
behavior” (1979:3). 
10
 The definitions of implementation and compliance adopted in this thesis are consistent with those 
outlined in this section. 
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Goodhart, who argues that although Basel I was initially borne out of a “general 
agreement on the need for a common framework” (2011:151), when major countries 
dissented and the Basel Committee was in a deadlock over the negotiations, “it was 
essentially a power play, to overcome resistance at the BCBS which was based on 
consensus” (ibid. p170).These arguments are based on the standard theory of 
international cooperation, where G10 policymakers were seen to have collective 
interests to realize joint gains by adopting minimum capital standards to address 
rising systemic risks and the erosion of regulators‟ capacity to ensure the soundness 
of national banking systems in the face of financial globalization (Singer 2007:534; 
Oatley and Nabors 1998:35).  
On the other hand, Oatley and Nabors contend that the “creation of the Basle 
Accord corresponds more to a redistributive rent-seeking than to a market-failure 
logic” (1998:42). They argue that efforts to reconcile US voters‟ demand by raising 
capital standards in the US without imposing costs on US commercial banks relative 
to their more competitive foreign competitors led Congress to initiate an 
international agreement on capital that satisfied voters‟ demands whilst preserving 
the ability of US commercial banks to compete against foreign banks, in particular 
Japanese banks. The Basel Accord essentially represented a forced wealth transfer 
from foreign banks to US banks because other “G-10 policymakers confronted a 
choice between a costly multilateral accord and an even more costly bilateral accord.” 
(ibid. p49) The domestic political origins of Basel I is also highlighted in Singer‟s 
(2007) account of Basel I. Singer argues that regulators, willing to preserve their 
policy autonomy from the legislature, were incentivized to create international 
regulatory standards as a way of solving the dilemma caused when the domestic 
financial sector lost international competitiveness vis-à-vis their foreign rivals and 
domestic public confidence in financial stability declined. 
Although the aforementioned studies provide different accounts of why 
Basel I was created, they all agree that the market power of the US and the tacit 
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threat of exclusion to the US market played a decisive role in getting the rest of the 
G10 to agree and implement the Basel Accord. Implementation was induced through 
“an Anglo-American “zone of cooperation” that would prompt other countries to 
sign on lest they be excluded… The tacit threat being made was that foreign bank 
activity could be reduced in the U.S. and U.K. markets unless these banks adopted 
the new risk-based standard.” (Kapstein 1989:340-1)11 US financial market power 
and the implicit threat of market punishment are thus central to understanding the 
agreement and implementation of the Basel Accord amongst the G10. This, 
combined with the unique market conditions at the time when “Japanese banks were 
intent on expanding their activities in New York and London” are critical in 
understanding how the implicit threat of the US “had to be taken seriously” by the 
Japanese (ibid.). 
Explanations based on US financial power and coercion, however, are not 
very helpful in understanding why countries outside the Basel Committee 
implemented Basel II. The role that a financially dominant US could have played in 
coercing countries to implement Basel II is limited. According to Goodhart, 
although “the special, almost hegemonic, role of the USA, with the British playing a 
subsidiary role in achieving international financial cooperation via the BCBS” 
emphasized by Kapstein “was largely true in the case of the 1988 Accord, this was 
an a-typical occasion, a once-off from the normal affairs of the BCBS.” (Goodhart 
2011:195) In the case of Basel II, the US was the last in the Basel Committee to 
implement Basel II. Rather than playing a leading role, the US struggled to 
                                                 
11
 Similarly, Goodhart argues that “[t]he choice of the British as the key bilateral partner was not only 
that they were amenable to the main principles and approaches that the US authorities wanted to 
adopt, but also, indeed probably rather more so, that London was the main international financial 
centre besides New York. If the British and the Americans would, as they might, refuse to accept 
foreign banking establishments into London/New York unless they agreed to abide by the UK/US 
requirements, then all the international banks would have to do so, willy-nilly, whatever their own 
national regulations might require. In short, it was essentially a power play, to overcome resistance at 
the BCBS which was based on consensus. (2011:170) 
41 
 
implement Basel II domestically, which was delayed and only partially implemented 
even by the standards of many non-members of the Basel Committee. 
For countries that were not Basel Committee members, the theory which has 
become conventional wisdom is that Basel I was reputationally binding. Tarullo 
contends that “[t]he voluntary implementation of an arrangement to which these 
states were not party appears to have been motivated by the expectation that both 
capital markets and other banks would look less favourably upon banks that did not 
meet the Basel minimum ratios” (2008:65). Likewise, Goodhart argues that “right 
from the outset the BCBS found that recommendations and standards developed and 
intended only for large G10 international banks became regarded by all other 
countries, and their banks, as reputationally binding” (2011:186). Simmons (2001) 
develops a more formal argument along similar lines in which the hegemonic role of 
the US is central. Simmons argues that “strong incentives exist to emulate the 
standards adopted in the dominant financial center” because “once the dominant 
financial center has adopted a clear standard, there is very little incentive to reduce 
standards and risk developing a reputation as “poorly regulated” as most banks are 
simply in no position to forgo reputational concerns and compete for international 
business on price alone.” (Simmons 2001:602; 2006:11) Simmons goes further to 
argue that “[t]he same perceptions seem to surround adoption of the revised Basel II 
framework” (2006:11). 
The arguments based on reputational repercussions appear particularly 
convincing in light of the high implementation rates for Basel I. In particular, 
Simmons‟ framework helps explain why countries around the world might be keener 
to implement Basel I compared to other financial standards such as accounting or 
anti-money laundering standards. However, they do not provide much insight in 
explaining variations in the implementation of the Basel standards across countries. 
Although countries around the world may face strong incentives to implement Basel 
II, incentives alone do not explain the considerable variations in national 
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implementation. Different countries have implemented Basel II in different ways, 
and more importantly, certain groups of countries have implemented Basel II in 
different ways. The question of why some non-G10 countries are more susceptible 
than others in responding to such pressures point to the role of country-specific 
explanatory variables. Moreover, there are several other obstacles in applying the 
above explanations to understand the implementation of Basel II amongst non-G10 
countries. The hegemonic role of the US is taken as given in the case of Basel I. 
This central assumption may be questioned in the context of explaining the 
implementation of Basel II as the US did not play a hegemonic role and struggled to 
implement Basel II domestically. It may well be the case that the role of the US 
constitutes an explanatory variable rather than being an assumption, whereby the 
lack of progress in implementation in the US can be expected to have repercussions 
on the implementation of Basel II across the world. Hence, to explain cross-national 
variations in implementation outcomes, it may be necessary to expand Simmons‟ 
framework by relaxing the assumption about the exogenous and dominant role of the 
US and incorporate country-specific explanatory variables or policy diffusion to 
explain why and how countries implemented Basel II. 
 In this regard, although there are no studies on the diffusion of Basel I, Ho 
(2002) and Quillin (2008) test a number of domestic-level variables using different 
measures of the dependent variable. Ho uses a binary measure of Basel I 
implementation as at 1999 from data compiled by Barth et al (2001) to test whether 
bank and national preferences explain countries‟ decision to implement Basel I. 
Banks‟ exposure to international markets was hypothesized to be positively related 
to implementation since the reputational costs of noncompliance would be higher 
and the benefits greater. The analysis also controls for several macroeconomic and 
institutional variables that could condition preferences to implement Basel I (ibid. 
p655). The results showed that indicators of openness, namely, financial exposure 
and trade, were consistently insignificant, disconfirming the author‟s hypothesis. 
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However, the level of democracy consistently outperformed all other explanatory 
variables across the models. According to Ho, these findings gave credence to 
democratic legalist theories of international law in explaining compliance with 
voluntary international financial standards (ibid. p676).
12
 Ho concludes that 
“[e]conomic interests and capacity variables alone cannot explain the variation in 
Basle Accord implementation. Institutional variables that reflect the domestic 
regulatory and legal environment, as well as the capacity of states to commit to 
international legal obligations must be taken into account to explain implementation 
with soft law” (ibid. p683). 
Ho‟s research makes an original contribution to the literature by testing 
domestic-level variables in a systematic way across developed and developing 
countries. However, there are three critical shortcomings that undermine his findings. 
First, the binary measure of Basel I implementation fails to capture when and how 
countries implemented Basel I, reducing the validity of the measure. Also, the self-
reported nature of the original survey in which the dependent variable was derived 
from makes the measurement of Basel I less reliable. Secondly, the empirical test is 
considerably weakened by the lack of variation in the dependent variable. Of the 118 
countries in the original dataset, only seven countries had not adopted risk-weighted 
assets in line with Basel I and five countries had minimum capital ratio requirements 
below 8% (Barth et al 2001), which Ho defined as being noncompliant.
13
 As the 
author points out, with only ten countries that are arguably peripheral to the 
international financial system classified as noncompliant, the small degree of 
variation in the dependent variable make it particularly difficult to assess the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables (Ho 2002:682). Thirdly, the causal link 
                                                 
12
 Support is also found for measures of economic development, corruption and government 
fragmentation, but not for bank concentration, government and foreign ownership and use of IMF 
credit. 
13
 The former category includes Lesotho, Cambodia, Bhutan, Burundi, Philippines, Bahrain and St. 
Kitts, and the latter, Lesotho, Cambodia, Rwanda, Ghana and Kenya. 
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between the key explanatory variables and Basel I implementation is empirically 
weak, especially the empirical relationship between democracy and Basel I 
implementation. The causal mechanism through which the lack of democratic 
institutions in Bhutan and Bahrain hindered the implementation of Basel I is not 
specified. Ho‟s argument that the findings support democratic legalist theories of 
international law can also be questioned as it is not obvious why the rule of law 
argument should apply to voluntary international standards. Until a convincing 
empirical relationship between the key explanatory variables and Basel I 
implementation is established, it is difficult to make strong causal claims based on 
the findings of the statistical analysis alone. 
Quillin‟s study of compliance with Basel I draws “heavily on Ho‟s study of 
the implementation of the Basel Accord” (2008:36), but makes significant 
improvements on two fronts. First, more variance in the dependent variable is 
created by constructing a composite measure of Basel I implementation based on the 
stringency of national interpretations in six areas amongst Basel Committee member 
countries (except Italy), Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and New 
Zealand. Secondly, Quillin builds on Ho‟s hypotheses to test more specific theories 
of implementation, such as whether path-dependency measured by the difference 
between Basel I and existing national standards, the degree of market supervision or 
economic instability explained why countries adopted more strict or lax 
interpretations of Basel I.
14
 More relevant to this thesis were the hypotheses that 
countries will adopt similar interpretations to other countries in the same region and 
that countries will follow the interpretation of the US (ibid. p45). These hypotheses 
resonate with the policy diffusion hypotheses tested in this thesis.  
Notwithstanding the limitations associated with using a sample size of 
eighteen countries for a quantitative study, Quillin finds the strongest support for the 
                                                 
14
 The path-dependency hypothesis is that “[b]anks with relatively lax (strict) pre-Basel CARs or 
subject to weak capital adequacy standards will be more likely to support a lax (strict) interpretation 
of the Accord” (Quillin 2008:39). 
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path-dependency hypothesis and mixed results for the market supervision and 
economic instability hypotheses. However, “fairly weak evidence was found for a 
regional clustering effect” and “no support was found for the hegemonic argument 
in the qualitative or quantitative tests” (ibid. p170). The latter result is particularly 
interesting as it disagrees with Simmons‟ argument (2001). The weak evidence on 
clustering may be due to the lack of variation in the independent variable of 
predominately Western developed countries and their offshoots. Moreover the small 
sample size does not allow a meaningful test of policy diffusion that can be 
generalized across countries. The case studies of the US, France, Germany and 
Japan further reinforce the path-dependency hypothesis leading Quillin to argue that 
“the Accord may not have impacted state behavior as much as believed” (2008:168). 
Although interesting, this finding in part reflects the fact that Basel I was formulated 
to accommodate various aspects of individual countries‟ existing practices into the 
final agreement, a compromise which Herring refers to as “a remarkable feat of 
financial diplomacy” that was necessary to break out of the deadlock in the 
negotiations due to the dissent amongst Basel Committee members that may have 
delayed or blocked the agreement on Basel I altogether (2007:413). In other words, 
Basel I itself was to some extent a path-dependent Accord. 
Some studies have taken the concept of compliance further by distinguishing 
substantive compliance from formal compliance by measuring the quality of 
compliance, albeit in a smaller number of cases. For example, Walter (2008) tests a 
theory to explain mock compliance with international financial standards, including 
the Basel standards in East Asia.
15
 Mock compliance is expected to be more likely 
“when private sector compliance costs are high, when the costs of outright 
noncompliance are high, and when outsiders find it difficult to monitor the true 
quality of compliance with international standards” (ibid. p43). Walter finds 
                                                 
15
 Mock compliance occurs when government, bureaucratic and private sector actors formally signal 
compliance when in fact their underlying behavior is inconsistent with the adopted standards 
(Raustiala and Slaughter 2002:539). 
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considerable variations in gaps between formal rules and substantive compliance 
across different international financial standards and across the four East Asian 
countries studied.
16
 The former arises because different international standards entail 
varying compliance and monitoring costs, and the latter, due to variations in 
domestic interests and institutions across countries that affect the costs of 
compliance. In the case of compliance with the BCPs, which includes the 
implementation of Basel I in Principle 6, compliance was mixed across countries 
and most improved in Korea. 
Chey (2006) studies compliance with Basel 1 in Japan and finds that the 
Japanese government was able to manipulate the implementation of Basel I to help 
banks formally comply with its explicit provisions whilst still allowing them in 
practice to defect from the objectives of Basel I as a way of responding to domestic 
opposition against Basel I. Chey calls this “cosmetic compliance” as opposed to 
“comprehensive compliance” and argues that the former occurs when the high costs 
of complying with Basel I can be diverted from banks to other sectors of the 
economy. If the sectors negatively affected by banks‟ compliance are politically 
important or influential, and the damage substantial, the likelihood of political 
intervention to oppose substantive compliance is expected to increase, leading to 
cosmetic compliance outcomes that reduce the effectiveness of Basel I (ibid. p275). 
Thus, the domestic distributional consequences of Basel I is seen to affect the 
political capacity of national authorities to ensure that banks complied with Basel I. 
Both studies by Walter and Chey highlight the importance of domestic political 
causes of noncompliance and argue that while external pressure from other states or 
market actors may induce formal compliance, it is sometimes ineffective in inducing 
“substantive” or “comprehensive” compliance with international financial standards. 
 
                                                 
16
 Compliance with the IMF‟s Special Data Dissemination Standards, BCPs, the OECD‟s Principles 
of Corporate Governance and International Financial Reporting Standards are examined in the cases 
of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea. 
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2.3.2 The empirical literature on Basel II 
In contrast to the literature on Basel I, the literature on Basel II is much less 
developed. The Basel II negotiations during 1999 and 2004 are documented by 
Wood (2005), Tarullo (2008) and Claessens et al (2008a). These studies provide 
only indirect insights for explaining why countries outside the G10 implemented 
Basel II since most of the analyses focus on the negotiations that took place within 
the G10 to develop Basel II rather than to test a theory on implementation. Outside 
the academic literature, the IMF conducted assessments of Basel II implementation 
in Australia (2009) and the US (2010) in the form of a technical note to the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) country reports, but is not expected to conduct 
any assessments in non-advanced countries. In the EU, a detailed legal review of the 
transposition of the CRD was conducted by a law firm at the request of the 
European Commission (DLA Piper 2009). Despite the relatively high level of 
convergence amongst EU member states in the global context, the review revealed 
divergences in implementation arising from the transposition of the CRD. There 
were evidence of gold-plating resulting from national regulators elaborating on the 
CRD as well as divergences in interpretation resulting in ambiguous terminologies 
and concepts at the national level. Although the EU is an exceptional case since 
member states were required to implement Basel II, the findings highlight a range of 
interesting motivations on the part of national supervisors that may help explain 
variations in national implementation more generally. These include the motivation 
to ensure continuity by adopting an evolutionary approach rather than a 
revolutionary approach, to adopt a more conservative approach on prudential 
grounds, and to reduce the regulatory burden on banks by minimizing the legal 
complexity of regulations (ibid. p24-72).  
 While these studies document how countries implemented or were 
implementing Basel II, they are not theory testing studies that aim to explain why 
countries implemented Basel II the way they did. There are only a few country-level 
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studies that aim to explain the driving factors behind the implementation of Basel II, 
although they primarily focus on members of the Basel Committee. In explaining 
the bifurcated approach to implementation adopted by the banking authorities in the 
US, Herring (2007) argues that three unanticipated obstacles led to the erosion of 
crucial pre-deal understandings, which threatened to derail the implementation 
process in the US. These were the perceived competitive inequalities in the US 
between large and small banks, the low and variable capital charges revealed from 
quantitative impact studies and the request for permission to implement the simpler 
SA by four leading US banks that were mandated by the Federal Reserve to 
implement the AIRB approach. In the case of the EU, Ayadi (2008) examines the 
institutional rule-making process that was involved in recasting the CRD to 
implement Basel II, which was then applied to approximately 8,000 banks and 2,000 
investment firms across the EU. 
In short, empirical research on the state of regulatory convergence with Basel 
II is scarce and patchy and implementation in developing countries is particularly 
under-researched. Moreover, the factors that promote or hinder the implementation 
of Basel II across developed and developing countries are not well understood. In 
fact, a systematic study of Basel II implementation has not been undertaken in the 
literature despite the real-world importance of understanding why countries 
implement Basel II for policy and as a topic for academic research. This has created 
major gaps in the IPE literature on the political economy of international finance and 
financial regulation. This thesis is the first systematic study of Basel II 
implementation across developed and developing countries and to this end 
represents an original contribution to the literature. In order to select relevant 
explanations of why countries implemented Basel II, a literature review of six 
general theories of compliance with international norms is undertaken in the next 
section. 
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2.4 The theoretical literature: Explaining compliance with international 
norms 
There are several theories in the literature that aim to explain compliance with 
international norms, but like many theories in IPE, they tend not to be mutually 
exclusive and often share as many commonalities as differences. Nonetheless, some 
derive from long-standing theoretical traditions and continue to inform our 
understanding. Given the interdisciplinary nature of this topic, scholars in IPE have 
drawn on a range of related disciplines, including international relations, 
comparative politics, international law, public policy and institutional economics. 
Six theories of compliance are reviewed in this section, the aim of which is to 
understand the core tenets of each approach in explaining compliance outcomes and 
examine their implications for explaining why countries implement Basel II. 
  
2.4.1 The state-based enforcement approach 
The enforcement approach is rooted in the political economy tradition of game 
theory and collective action theory. States are conceived as rational actors that make 
compliance decisions based on cost-benefit calculations. Thus, noncompliance is a 
premeditated and deliberate violation because states have incentives to free-ride and 
take advantage of other states‟ compliance by defecting from a regime. If all states 
faced incentives to defect, regimes would not be sustainable or be ineffective, hence, 
coercive enforcement measures are required to deter defections and compel 
compliance. Enforcement theorists argue that “[a] punishment strategy is sufficient 
to enforce a treaty when each side knows that if it cheats it will suffer enough from 
the punishment that the net benefit will not be positive” (Downs et al 1996:385). 
Coercive measures can take the form of economic, political or military sanctions, 
and exposing defectors by monitoring and imposing sanctions that raise the cost of 
defection are deemed to constitute key elements of an enforcement strategy. These 
strategies are expected to work effectively if the costs to the states imposing 
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sanctions on defectors are not high and the sanctions can be specifically targeted at 
violators. 
In the absence of a punishment mechanism or an ad hoc enforcer, it is difficult 
to apply the enforcement model. Basel I and Basel II are voluntary standards that do 
not have any “teeth” built into the framework and the Basel Committee does not 
possess any supranational authority to enforce compliance. The role of power and 
economic coercion exercised by a dominant financial centre that acts like an ad hoc 
enforcer may be pertinent to explaining the agreement on Basel I as discussed above. 
However, this is less so the case with Basel II. Although the absence of formal 
enforcement measures in Basel II or that available to the Basel Committee to draw 
on had remained the same across Basel I and II, the role of a dominant financial 
centre in enforcing compliance across countries is much less pronounced in the latter. 
The US is arguably a defector rather than an enforcer in implementing Basel II and 
the EU, which led the way in implementation, has not enforced compliance on other 
non-implementing countries outside the EU. Hence the enforcement approach 
provides limited explanatory leverage in explaining why countries around the world 
implemented Basel II. A different source of external pressure may be exerted by 
market actors, which provide a distinct “enforcement” mechanism from that 
envisaged here. 
 
2.4.2 The market-based approach 
Market forces can facilitate compliance with international norms if market actors 
monitor compliance and penalize noncompliance or reward compliance. 
International financial standards may provide a focal point for market participants to 
evaluate banks‟ competitiveness or how well they are managed, and noncompliance 
may be penalised if noncompliant banks are considered uncompetitive or poorly 
regulated. For example, Simmons argues that there was considerable market 
pressure to adopt “global standards” because when “[r]ules regulating capital 
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adequacy may convey important information on the quality of a firm… appropriate 
prudential regulations are a competitive advantage that other jurisdictions have an 
incentive to copy… to avoid the risk of developing a reputation as “poorly regulated” 
as most banks are simply in no position to forgo reputational concerns and compete 
for international business on price alone” (Simmons 2001:602; 2006:11).  
 There are a number of caveats to market-based explanations. First, market 
forces may not always operate to ensure compliance with international regulatory 
standards. Moreover, credible market enforcement mechanisms depend on market 
participants embracing the regulatory standards as part of their decision-making 
process since “[o]nly where markets provide governments with clear incentives to 
follow standards will governments adopt and comply with them.” (Mosley 
2003:333)
17
 Secondly, the source of market pressures for compliance may derive 
from national regulatory enforcement if market participants pressure banks to 
comply with international financial standards not because they perceive it as 
increasing the quality of banks, but because they expect noncompliant firms to be 
penalized by national regulatory authorities (Chey 2007:296). The latter underscores 
the importance of domestic factors in inducing market pressures. 
 
2.4.3 The managerial approach 
In contrast to the state-based enforcement or market-based model where external 
pressure from states or market actors was required to induce compliance, the 
managerial approach is based on the premise that there is a general propensity of 
countries to comply with their international obligations and that noncompliance is 
inadvertent. According to Chayes and Chayes (1998), the propensity to comply 
derives from concerns about saving transaction costs, the assumption that parties‟ 
interests were secured by entering into a treaty in the first place and a fundamental 
                                                 
17
 Mosley argues that market pressures failed to provide a credible enforcement mechanism because 
market participants were slow to embrace the IMF‟s Special Data Dissemination Standard (2003:333). 
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normative obligation to comply with international laws, namely, pacta sunt servanda, 
that treaties are to be obeyed (ibid. p3-9). They contend that “the Realist argument 
that national actions are governed entirely by a calculation of interest is essentially a 
denial of the operation of normative obligation in international affairs.” (ibid. p8) 
According to Chayes and Chayes, noncompliance is seen to arise from ambiguity 
and indeterminacy of treaty language, limitations on the capacity of parties to carry 
out their understandings, and the temporal dimensions of social, economic, and 
political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties (ibid. p10). Hence, they argue 
that if “the principal source of noncompliance is not wilful disobedience but the lack 
of capability or clarity or priority, then coercive enforcement is as misguided as it is 
costly” and a strategy for managing compliance by ensuring transparency, 
establishing a dispute settlement mechanism, capacity building or the use of 
persuasion is more effective (ibid. p22). 
The causes of noncompliance such as capacity constraints or the complexity 
of agreements are highly relevant for explaining how countries implemented Basel 
II. However, the underlying assumptions relating to why countries have a propensity 
to comply, which is the main building block and presumption of the managerial 
approach, does not fully apply to non-Basel Committee countries that did not 
participate in the standard setting process. If countries do not have a natural 
propensity or have different propensities to comply, the managerial approach 
provides limited insights into explaining why these countries might voluntarily 
decide to implement Basel II in different ways. Hence, the reasons for 
noncompliance and the policy prescriptions to induce compliance lay on weak 
foundations, at least in terms of how the managerial approach conceives 
noncompliance. This is a significant limitation in applying this theory to explain the 
implementation of Basel II.
18
 
                                                 
18
 Haas argues that the lawyers‟ dictum that „most treaties are complied with most of the time‟ is 
premature and exaggerated because studies of compliance find variations in compliance. Moreover, 
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2.4.4 Functional institutionalism 
Neoliberal institutionalists contend that international institutions, defined as 
“persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989:3), 
shape patterns of compliance to international norms. They share the core assumption 
with the managerial approach that “states already desire to cooperate (or comply) 
and merely require reinforcement to indulge their initial inclinations” (Haas 
2003:54). However, the reasons why countries may want to comply are more 
narrowly defined in terms the efficiency argument, that is, the possibility to reduce 
transaction costs and realize joint gains as opposed to the emphasis on the normative 
obligations in the managerial approach. To this end, to induce states to comply, 
neoliberal institutionalists seek to design “powerful” institutions that perform the 
functions of monitoring and verifying compliance, providing capacity-building 
resources and mobilizing public opinion, as well as having a high public profile 
within a dense horizontal network of other institutions (ibid. p54-58).  
Although neoliberal institutionalism sheds light on the features of 
international institutions that promote compliance across different institutions, it is 
not very effective in explaining variations in compliance outcomes across countries 
for a given international institution, such as the Basel Committee‟s Basel II. That 
Basel II is associated with weak monitoring, verification and capacity-building 
functions, making it a relatively weak international institution, does not help explain 
country-level variations in compliance outcomes across countries, other than that 
one might expect low levels of compliance overall. Institutional analysis is thus 
insufficient on its own to account for considerable variations in national compliance. 
The possibility of varying national sensitivities to institutional incentives invariably 
leads one to turn to domestic-level variables or ideational factors. 
                                                                                                                                          
“[e]ven if a state believes that signing a treaty is in its best interest, the political calculations 
associated with the subsequent decision to comply with international agreements are distinct and 
different.”(Haas 2003:44-5) 
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2.4.5 Role of ideas 
In contrast to the enforcement and market-based explanations that rely on external 
pressure to induce compliance and the institutionalists‟ approach that highlight the 
role of institutional design, but building on the normative aspects of the managerial 
approach, constructivists emphasize the role of ideas. Constructivists view shared 
norms and legitimacy as the primary drivers of compliance with international norms 
(Ruggie 1998). Modernist constructivists argue that “norms matter in a constitutive, 
interest-shaping way not captured by rationalist arguments” (Checkel 2001:554). 
Hence, it is necessary to focus on the process of norm internalization, after which 
“compliance was not an issue of choice in any meaningful sense; agent behavior was 
governed by rules and driven by certain logics of appropriateness.” (ibid. p557) The 
spread of norms may be facilitated via technocratic, knowledge-based networks of 
authoritative experts known as epistemic communities that transfer ideas and best 
practices (Haas 1992).
19
 Social mobilization and social learning have been identified 
as causal mechanisms through which social actors comply with norms. The causal 
pathway envisaged in the former has parallels with rationalists‟ account to the extent 
that “state compliance is a function of coercion (social sanctioning) and instrumental 
calculations (strategic social construction)” whereas the latter is a process of 
“complex social learning, a process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped 
through and during interaction”, particularly through persuasion, that is, “convincing 
someone through argument and principled debate” (Checkel 2001:561-2).  
According to Walter, however, “[t]hese conditions are more likely to be met 
in the international standard-setting process than in the domestic compliance process. 
                                                 
19
 Haas argues that norms spread due to the “role that networks of knowledge-based experts – 
epistemic communities – play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, 
helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific 
policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation.” (1992:2) Hence, “control over knowledge and 
information is an important dimension of power… [because] the diffusion of new ideas and 
information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of 
international policy coordination.” (ibid.) 
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International standard-setting bodies may be composed of relatively like-minded 
experts who meet frequently over long periods of time, engage in persuasive 
argumentation and information sharing, and acquire loyalties to the network” 
(Walter 2008:35). Hence, the extent of norm internalization may be limited and vary 
across non-members of the Basel Committee that had no or very limited 
involvement in the standard setting process. Moreover, it may be the case that “[f]or 
elites, the answer is clear: Norms are not internalized, they merely constrain 
behavior. Rationalist models easily explain elites‟ compliance because they view 
social structures in this behavioral, constraining sense.” (Checkel 2001:557) 
Delineating constructivism from rational explanations is thus empirically 
challenging, and constructivism may be insufficient on its own to account for why 
non-G10 countries implemented Basel II. 
 
2.4.6 Domestic-level explanations 
A single theory for domestic-level explanations does not exist, but instead a 
collection of economic and political explanations have been explored in the 
literature to understand why countries implement and comply with international 
norms. One branch of domestic-based explanations contends that domestic 
administrative and technical capacities may affect compliance outcomes. According 
to Jacobson and Brown Weiss, “administrative and bureaucratic capacity is essential 
for implementing accords… The greater the capacity of the political unit to 
implement the accord, the more likely it is that it will comply.” (1998:11)20 Capacity 
depends not only on economic resources, but also involves education, technical 
training, skills and attitudes. Hence, “while states may wish to comply, not all are 
capable” because administrative and technical capacities such as knowledge and 
training, adequate authority and financial resources, and access to relevant 
                                                 
20
 Weiss and Jacobson (1998) examine how eight countries and the EU implemented and complied 
with five international environmental accords and conclude that administrative and technical 
capacities such as knowledge, financial resources and access to information are crucial to compliance. 
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information may limit compliance (Haas 2003:46). Capacity issues are particularly 
crucial for achieving compliance with positive obligations where states have to take 
action that “may have costs that are absent when states are merely obliged to refrain 
from certain actions” (Shelton 2003:15). The implications of domestic capacity 
constraints may be significant as it could limit the effects of the normative logic of 
appropriateness or enforcement by third parties. The view that countries may wish to 
comply but face limitations due to capacity constraints is consistent with the 
managerial approach. However, there are differences in that although administrative 
and bureaucratic capacity is essential for implementing accords, they are seldom 
treated as sufficient conditions to explain implementation and compliance outcomes. 
This is because the ability to comply does not mean that countries are willing, and 
thus will comply. To this end, it may not be the economic costs of implementation 
per se that matters most, but the political costs associated with compliance or non-
compliance. Walter (2008) outlines a theory based on domestic political costs to 
explain when mock compliance outcomes with international regulatory standards are 
likely to emerge. When the cost of private sector compliance, outright 
noncompliance and third party monitoring costs are high, domestic policymakers are 
likely to pursue mock compliance strategies (Walter 2008:43). 
Other domestic-level theories emphasize the role of political institutions or 
domestic regimes in understanding compliance with international norms. 
Governments that are based on the rule of law and maintain independent judicial 
branches are expected to be more likely to comply with international obligations 
than those that are not (Slaughter 1995). Slaughter argues that democratic states 
regularly comply more willingly with international laws because the rule of law is 
ingrained in them and the transparency of their governmental structure operates to 
ensure that they will implement the provisions of treaties ratified by domestic due 
process (Slaughter 1995). This argument is developed in democratic legalist theories 
of international law. Democracies are more likely to implement and comply with 
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international norms because leaders face powerful pressures exerted through public 
opinion and the electoral process to comply with the decisions of international 
institutions, especially those that are perceived to be legitimate by the public 
(Slaughter 1995; Simmons 2000). Building on the role of electoral pressures, Dai 
(2007) argues that compliance with international agreements is enhanced through 
new information generated by treaty bodies and monitoring systems that inform and 
empower domestic voters to punish governments for actions voters disapprove. 
Hence, a large pro-compliance constituency and an international agreement that 
provides significant new information on the government‟s compliance record are 
expected to induce governments not to violate international norms. However, as 
noted above in discussing whether Ho‟s findings gave credence to democratic 
legalist theories of international law, it is not obvious why the above arguments 
should apply to voluntary standards. 
Economic variables such as the degree of international economic integration 
measured by the value of international trade or financial flows to GDP may also 
shape countries‟ compliance with international norms. 21  Rising levels of 
international integration can increase the functional needs to create international 
institutions as Keohane (1989) would suggest in light of rising systemic risks, raise 
reputational considerations to become an accepted member of the international 
system as Chayes and Chayes suggest (1993:27) or increase the influence of market 
pressures emanating from international market actors. 
In contrast to the above theories, policy diffusion offers a fundamentally 
distinct theory to explain the implementation of Basel II. It is based on the premise 
that decisions to implement policies are not made independently across countries, 
but instead, in consideration of the policy choices of other countries with which 
countries are closely interconnected to economically, politically and socially. There 
                                                 
21
 This relationship is not linear if countries have the ability to resist international economic pressures. 
For example, Lukauskas and Minushkin (2002) highlight government‟s bargaining power vis-à-vis 
international actors and domestic groups with respect to financial policies in middle-income countries. 
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are several distinct policy diffusion mechanisms that may lead to policy diffusion, 
namely, competition, learning, emulation and coercion, which have many parallels 
with the aforementioned theories of compliance except for the fundamental 
difference that policy decisions are interdependent on the decisions of other 
countries. The policy diffusion literature is discussed next. 
 
2.5 The policy diffusion literature 
2.5.1 Policy diffusion: definitions and features 
Diffusion refers to the process by which the “prior adoption of a trait or practice in a 
population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 
1991). Policy diffusion can thus be defined to occur “when government policy 
decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices 
made in other countries… what theorists of diffusion explicitly reject is the notion 
that processes of policy change can adequately be understood by conceiving of 
national governments as making decisions independently of each other” (Simmons, 
Dobbin and Garrett 2006:787). There are several notable properties of policy 
diffusion that distinguish this concept from others. Policy diffusion is characterized 
by interdependent, but uncoordinated decision making, or in short “uncoordinated 
interdependence” (Elkins and Simmons 2005:35). Governments are independent as 
they make their own policy decisions without formal cooperation or coercion. Yet, 
they are interdependent because governments take the policies of other governments 
into account when making their own policy decisions.  
Furthermore, policy diffusion is not an outcome but a process, and a cause 
rather than effect. This creates a crucial distinction between diffusion and 
convergence. Policy convergence, defined as a significant increase in policy 
similarity across countries (Holzinger and Knill 2005), can, but need not follow 
from diffusion. Diffusion entails the adoption of policies in an interdependent and 
voluntary way. However, policy choices may converge if, for instance, policies are 
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imposed on countries. Diffusion is only one reason why policies may converge 
(Knill 2005). Hence, although research on policy diffusion is often motivated by 
observations that countries choose similar policies or institutions within a fairly 
circumscribed period of time, resulting in temporal and spatial convergence in 
policy reforms (Elkins and Simmons 2005:34), an examination of policy diffusion 
requires examining the process of policy adoption, that is, the interdependent policy 
making process rather than the extent of convergence that can result from it.  
Conceptualized this way, there are two main competing explanations to policy 
diffusion that nonetheless may lead to convergence in policies across countries. First, 
countries that face similar economic or political conditions may independently 
respond in similar ways to Basel II implementation. For example, convergence in 
Basel II implementation policies could be an independent response to a common 
external shock such as a financial crisis. Alternatively, similarities in 
implementation across countries may reflect the degree of banking sector 
development that can also cluster in time and space. The underlying assumption here 
is that policy decisions are made independently by national supervisors in response 
to the political and economic conditions they face without regards to the behaviour 
of other states‟ Basel II implementation decisions. Secondly, countries may adopt 
similar policies as a result of explicit policy coordination by a group of countries, a 
hegemonic power or an international organization. Explicit policy coordination to 
achieve policy harmonization can be found in the case of the EU, where the 
implementation of Basel II was coordinated amongst member states. In order to 
develop a stronger empirical test of the effects of policy diffusion on regulatory 
convergence, it is important to control for these competing explanations. 
 
2.5.2 Four policy diffusion mechanisms: How do policies diffuse? 
Although different diffusion theorists share the view that policy choices of one 
country are shaped by the choices of others, there are several distinct theories 
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concerning the mechanisms through which policies diffuse. The emerging consensus 
in the literature is that most policy diffusion mechanisms can be grouped into four 
broad categories consisting of competition, learning, emulation and coercion 
(Dobbin el al 2007:450). In this section, the policy diffusion literature is reviewed 
thematically according to these four diffusion mechanisms. The aim of this section 
is three-fold. The first is to define the four policy diffusion mechanisms and provide 
a theoretical explanation of how each mechanism is hypothesized to work. The 
second is to review the empirical literature, in particular, the methodology utilized to 
operationalize each policy diffusion mechanism. Thirdly, in order to maximize the 
contribution of this thesis to the policy diffusion literature, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theoretical and empirical literature on policy diffusion are 
discussed so that they can be taken into account in formulating a research design that 
maximizes the strengths and addresses the weaknesses of the literature. 
First, in competition-based diffusion mechanisms, policy changes that give 
the implementing country a competitive edge may lead others to follow suit as 
governments compete to attract international capital or gain market share for their 
domestic goods and services. When a government from a competing jurisdiction 
breaks ranks and undergoes policy reforms that give it a competitive edge, other 
governments will come under strong pressure to follow accordingly for fear of large 
scale losses in investment, income or jobs, even if those countries would have 
preferred not to have adopted them, ex ante in a world of independence rather than 
interdependence. As a result, policies are expected to diffuse across competing 
jurisdictions. (Simmons et al 2006:792) Two types of competition-based diffusion 
can be distinguished depending on whether the most important relationships 
amongst competing countries are horizontal or vertical. In horizontal models, 
policies are expected to “spread most readily among units that are similar on 
important competitive dimensions, among the Davids and among the Goliaths but 
not necessarily from the Goliaths to the Davids of the world” (Simmons et al 
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2006:793). In contrast, vertical models assume a hierarchical relationship, whereby 
policies diffuse due to competition between countries with disproportionate market 
power, that is, between the Goliaths and the Davids of the world. 
 Simmons and Elkins (2004) test whether the diffusion of liberalization in 
capital account, current account and exchange rate policies across the world can be 
attributed to the competition-based diffusion mechanism. Competition in export 
markets and capital markets are operationalized by measuring bilateral trade flows 
and similar sovereign credit ratings to capture competition between countries that 
compete for the same pool of international capital. They find that economic 
competition, most notably competition for global capital, has the most pronounced 
effect, and argue that policymakers “clearly tend to liberalize when their competitors 
do” and “the desire to attract capital is a far more powerful motive than trade 
competition” (p182). In another study, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) 
investigate the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and argue that 
potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have also done 
so. This is because BITs allow governments to credibly commit themselves to 
protect investors‟ property rights, which lowers risks and increases expected returns 
to investments, making that jurisdiction more attractive to invest relative to its 
competitors. To measure the “competitive distance” between countries, they 
measure the degree to which governments compete in the same foreign export 
markets, export the same basket of goods and have similar educational and 
infrastructural resources. They find “fairly consistent and convincing evidence of the 
importance of competition for capital among developing countries in explaining the 
proliferation of BITs over the past four decades. In all cases, higher rates of BIT 
signing among competitors (however measured) appear to have increased the rate at 
which a given country itself enters into a BIT at statistically significant levels.” (ibid. 
p836) Competition-based diffusion has also been used to explain the diffusion of tax 
policies, in particular the reduction in corporate tax rates during 1998 and 2006 (Cao 
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2010). Competition is operationalized using measures of bilateral portfolio 
investment flows, competition for export markets and FDI inflows. Strong evidence 
is found for the first two measures, based upon which it is argued that tax policies 
diffuse due to international competition for mobile capital, which induces national 
governments to lower corporation tax rates in order to make domestic markets more 
or no less attractive than those of competitor countries. 
Secondly, policy diffusion through learning can be defined to occur “when 
governments in one country draw lessons from the experiences of others, and apply 
these lessons in designing their own policies” (Simmons et al. 2008:25).22 However, 
learning does not necessarily lead to convergence in policies if countries learn to 
adopt policies contrary to those adopted in other countries. Learning entails “an 
improved understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships of policies in light of 
experience” (Meseguer 2009:11). 23  The process through which information is 
gathered and interpreted constitutes central issues in learning models. Three 
learning-based diffusion mechanisms can be distinguished. First, the generation of 
social knowledge may spur the diffusion of policies as “policy innovation spreads in 
the wake of the diffusion of a shared fund of often technical knowledge among elites 
about what is effective” (Simmons et al 2006:795).24 Epistemic communities can 
play a critical role in the development of social knowledge and can be especially 
influential in the policymaking process. Secondly, changes in policymakers‟ 
                                                 
22
 There are parallels between learning-based diffusion and the concept of policy transfer in public 
policy analysis. The latter refers to “the process by which knowledge about how policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political 
setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000:5). 
23
 Learning can also be defined as “a change in beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one‟s beliefs) 
or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation 
of experience” and can take place at both the simple tactical level about how to better achieve a 
particular goal and at a deeper level in terms of what goals to pursue (Levy 1994:293-286). 
24
 Knowledge can be defined as “the sum of technical information and of theories about that 
information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as 
a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal.” (Haas 1980:367-8) 
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individual beliefs may shape policies in institutionally thin environments where 
decision makers have the ability to act on their own beliefs. Thirdly, Bayesian 
learning is a rational process through which actors are assumed to make optimal use 
of available information. From an initial state of high uncertainty, individuals add 
new information to prior knowledge and beliefs to revise their behaviour 
accordingly. Consequently, greater certainty about an assessment is expected to 
solidify in light of subsequent rounds of new information over time. 
Meseguer adopts a model of policy learning based on rational updating, 
which “presumes that policy makers scan for information around the world, draw 
conclusions about what works and what does not, and finally make policy choices 
consistent with what they have learned from the available evidence” (2009:215). 
This model of learning is applied to explain the diffusion of market-oriented policies 
that include decisions to adopt an export-oriented development strategy, liberalize 
the trade regime, privatize, liberalize the capital account and enter into agreements 
with the IMF.
 
Meseguer finds that “rational learning played a significant role in the 
adoption of all policy decisions. Yet, when it comes to comparing the magnitude of 
the effects, it is clear that rational learning was particularly relevant in the adoption 
of privatization.” (ibid. p220-221)25 
However, the process of learning may not be rational. Some studies in the 
literature adopt the behavioural assumption that policymakers are bounded rational 
actors or “cognitive misers” as they have difficulty assessing the consequences of 
various policies (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Consequently, policymakers do not look at 
all available information, do not process the available information in the same way, 
and acquire a series of cognitive biases when analyzing the flow of information 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1988). Due to bounded rationality, actors rely on a set of 
cognitive heuristics to make sense of complicated policy choices. Weyland (2007) 
                                                 
25
 Rational learning had a marginal effect on decisions to liberalize the capital account and less so in 
decisions to keep it open and “fell somewhere in between in the decisions to change development 
strategies and to liberalize trade… and enter into agreements with the IMF” (Meseguer 2009:221). 
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examines the role of representativeness heuristics where policymakers 
overemphasize initial success, availability heuristics where policymakers turn to 
experiences that are close and relevant to them, and anchoring heuristics whereby 
the same policy innovation is adopted in countries with very different functional 
needs to explain the diffusion of the radical Chilean model of pension privatization 
and the moderate spread of health reforms in Latin America in the 1990s. In another 
study, the aforementioned heuristics are used to explain the diffusion of 
revolutionary attempts following the French Revolution (Weyland 2009). 
The third mechanism is emulation-based diffusion, which embodies the core 
tenets of constructivism. The diffusion of policies is regarded as a matter of ideology 
reflecting shifting normative and socially constructed consensus about the optimal 
means to achieve economic objectives. Although policymakers believe they can, 
should and do adopt the best practices in a given policy area, they are unable to 
accurately judge which policy is best or an improvement upon the status quo. 
Instead, theory and rhetoric serve as a basis of decision making. Policy decisions are 
thus driven by certain “logics of appropriateness” rather than the logic of 
consequences (Checkel 2005). Broad consensuses on what is “appropriate” in terms 
of actors, policy goals, and the means for achieving those goals are expected to 
diffuse across countries (Simmons et al 2006:799). 
A number of causal processes fit into the emulation category. Epistemic 
communities may influence governments to adopt new policies by advocating a 
given policy through the provision of seemingly disinterested and objective analysis 
of their benefits (Simmons et al 2006:800). Policies may also diffuse because 
countries embrace new norms for symbolic reasons, even if they cannot put them 
into practice (Strang and Chang 2003).
 26
 Strang and Chang argue that ratification of 
the ILO convention “may have intrinsic value” not only by providing a “more 
                                                 
26
 This may not represent bad faith so much as the power of new international norms even in 
countries that are not developmentally capable of implementing them (Simmons et al 2006:800). 
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favorable international image and enhance its ability to speak with authority in the 
international community” but also by “serve[ing] to symbolically move policies out 
of the realm of zero-sum, partisan politics and into the realm of fundamental, 
universally recognized rights” (2003:242). Another emulation-based approach draws 
on reference group theory in social psychology. Policymakers may emulate the 
behaviour of their self-identified peers even when they cannot ascertain that doing 
so will be in their best interests. At the international level, socio-cultural linkages 
such as common language, history and religion may contribute to “psychological 
proximity” among countries. For example, Elkins et al (2006:831) use predominant 
religion, colonial heritage and predominant language as measures of the cultural 
distance between countries to explain the diffusion of BITs, although the authors do 
not find these variables to be significant. Simmons and Elkins also test the diffusion 
of capital account, current account and exchange rate policies across cultural 
reference groups and find the effects of religion to be significant while common 
language and colonial heritage were not (2004:185). 
Finally, in coercion-based diffusion mechanisms, policies diffuse top-down 
because powerful countries impose their policy preferences on weaker states by 
explicitly or implicitly manipulating the opportunities and constraints they encounter. 
Coercion may involve the use of coercive tools such as the threat or actual use of 
physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and benefits or the 
monopolization of information or expertise in order to influence policy changes in 
other countries (Simmons et al 2008:11-12). As many as there are ways to 
manipulate actors‟ interests there are variations in coercion-based diffusion 
mechanisms. Coercion mechanisms can be distinguished depending on whether the 
manipulation of incentives is explicit, implicit or absent. Coercion can be applied 
explicitly when powerful governments or the intergovernmental organizations they 
dominate, use a strategy of formal conditionality that link policy reforms to political 
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membership or use economic assistance in a quid pro quo fashion.
27
 Coercion can be 
informal where there is no explicit quid pro quo, but weaker actors expect that they 
will receive benefits by making the policy change favoured by the more powerful 
actor. Finally, coercive diffusion may occur in the absence of explicit and implicit 
conditionality. For example, “go-it-alone power” refers to the ability to unilaterally 
influence a government‟s policy choice by altering the nature of the status quo it 
faces and shaping the choice set of other governments (Gruber 2000). This is a 
passive yet profound form of coercion among countries with asymmetric power 
since the powerful government need not worry about enforcement and the credibility 
of threats. To test coercion empirically, studies have examined whether countries 
that seek assistance from the IMF have adopted policies it prescribed (Meseguer 
2009; Elkins et al 2006). 
 
2.5.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the policy diffusion literature 
The empirical studies cited above are a small sample of a burgeoning research 
agenda in IPE and IR.
28
 Policy diffusion has been applied to explain the spread of a 
diverse range of policies or phenomena other than those mentioned above, from 
social expenditure rates (Jahn 2006), interest rate liberalization (Way 2005), double-
taxation treaties (Barthel and Neumayer 2012), labour rights (Greenhill, Mosley and 
Prakash 2009), market-oriented infrastructure reform (Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 
2005), legal systems (Kelemen and Sibbitt 2004), environmental standards (Prakash 
and Potoski 2006), central bank independence (Polillo and Guillén 2005), higher 
education (Schofer and Meyer 2005), regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005), 
democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006) and even mass revolutions (Weyland 2009) 
                                                 
27
 The characterization of conditionality as being coercive can be questioned in cases where 
governments accept conditionality because they want the conditions imposed on them and not the 
other way round (Drazen 2002). 
28
 That the theme of the 2013 ISA Convention was “The politics of international diffusion: Regional 
and global dimensions” is just one example showing the increasing interest in policy diffusion. 
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and suicide terrorism (Horowitz 2010). The subjects of policy diffusion include not 
only specific policies, but also institutions, events and even policy principles that 
represent paradigmatic shifts. Indeed, one of the key strengths of the policy diffusion 
literature is the wide range of issues to which policy diffusion had been applied. The 
high applicability of policy diffusion in part underscores the importance of the 
dynamics of policy diffusion in constituting the very fabric of the globalized world 
economy by capturing the simple yet compelling idea that countries do not make 
policies in isolation from one other. Interdependencies that lead to policy diffusion 
are likely to be more powerful than ever in the economically, politically and socially 
interconnected world that we live in. However, although the diffusion of various 
financial policies such as capital account and interest rate policies has been studied 
in the literature, the diffusion of bank capital policies has not. Furthermore, the 
diffusion of various standards such as environmental and labour standards has been 
studied, but not financial standards. Hence, there is a clear gap in the policy 
diffusion literature that could be addressed by investigating the diffusion of bank 
capital standards, namely Basel II. To this end, the study of the diffusion of Basel II 
in this thesis makes an original contribution to the portfolio of policies investigated 
in the policy diffusion literature. 
Another key strength of the policy diffusion literature is how it refines and 
advances the debate on the impact of globalization on domestic policies theoretically 
and empirically. Earlier studies focused on levels of economic or financial openness 
measured by, for example the proportion of trade or FDI to GDP to operationalize 
globalization (see for example Garrett 1999; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). However, 
the diffusion literature makes the decisive step of unpacking the specific ways in 
which countries are economically, politically and socially interconnected to the rest 
of the world. Hence, it is not only the aggregate level of international integration that 
matters in shaping domestic policies, but the way countries integrate with the rest of 
the world that matters since this shapes who a country competes with, learns from 
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and shares norms with.
29
 For example, more accurate indicators of international 
competition as opposed to generic measures of economic openness enables a more 
precise analysis of the underlying competition dynamics that shape policy decisions. 
This shift from general openness towards specific patterns of interdependence 
results in a more accurate conceptualization and analysis of the nature and 
consequences of globalization (Jahn 2006).  
 However, increased interests in policy diffusion and its mechanisms have 
developed alongside growing criticisms of the weak empirical basis and theoretical 
underpinnings of the diffusion process, especially in relation to the channels through 
which policies diffuse and the role of key agents involved in the process of diffusion. 
There are several other weaknesses. First, although the four policy diffusion 
mechanisms are conceptually different, they are not mutually exclusive and have 
overlapping assumptions and predictions. For example, differences between learning 
and emulation boils down to a few theoretical assumptions, while the process of 
diffusion may be very similar such that distinguishing learning from emulation may 
be far from simple and clear cut. The difficulty in delineating different policy 
diffusion mechanisms are often exacerbated when several mechanisms may be at 
work simultaneously. Competitive pressures may be coercive and involve learning 
or emulation about the policies of one‟s competitors. 
 Secondly, the challenge in clearly delineating one policy diffusion 
mechanism from another conceptually is often translated into weaknesses in 
empirical studies. Empirical studies “more often… suggest different mechanisms to 
explain diffusion processes but fail to prove, in the quantitative studies that are 
emblematic of diffusion research, that their favored mechanism is at work… Perhaps 
the most frustrating empirical tendency across these studies is that champions of 
                                                 
29
 This idea is at the core of the debate on the political economy of global value chains and economic 
development where the way countries integrate into the global economy via global value chains has 
significant consequences on their prospects for economic development (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon 2005). 
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each theory often take simple evidence of diffusion to be adequate to prove their 
particular theory.” (Dobbin et al 2007:436). As discussed in more detail in the 
section on the limitations of the quantitative study undertaken in Chapter Three, this 
is particularly the case in quantitative studies because the structure of 
interdependencies between countries as specified by the connectivity matrix is 
assumed to be known a priori to the researcher and not estimated in the regression 
model. Furthermore, measuring the process of policy diffusion with the structure of 
interdependencies across observations significantly simplifies and standardizes a 
complex process of diffusion into a single quantifiable variable, making it even 
more difficult to attribute a structure of interdependencies to a policy diffusion 
mechanism. 
Finally, the way empirical studies have operationalized the channels through 
which policies diffuse can be criticized on empirical grounds. The use of country-
level measures that are only indirectly related to the specific policies that are 
hypothesized to diffuse in specifying the connectivity matrix produce very generic 
and imprecise measures of policy diffusion channels. Also, the same generic channel 
of diffusion is often used to test the diffusion of different policies or to test different 
policy diffusion mechanisms. Although this is partly due to the lack of available data 
on bilateral relationships between countries, the imprecise specification of the 
channels of diffusion and their arbitrary application across different policy areas 
make the tests of policy diffusion less convincing. For example, Simmons and 
Elkins (2004), Elkins et al (2006) and Cao (2010) all use bilateral trade flows in 
their studies to operationalize channels of diffusion due to competition. The findings 
of these studies suggest the diffusion of quite disparate policies across the channel of 
diffusion formed by bilateral trade flows, ranging from capital and current account 
policies, signing of BITs to corporate tax rates. Furthermore, Lee and Strang use 
measures of bilateral trade flows not to operationalize the diffusion of policies due 
to competition, but instead emulation-based diffusion. As a result, these empirical 
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studies are subject to the following limitations. Firstly, other than that countries are 
interdependent trading partners, bilateral trade flows do not reveal much about 
which policies have and have not diffused across this channel of diffusion. Secondly, 
a generic channel of policy diffusion does not reveal much about why policies 
actually diffused, whether it was due to competition, emulation or both. Thirdly, 
operationalizing international interdependencies at the country level does not shed 
light into how policies diffused, especially in terms of who the key actors were and 
what they did to facilitate the diffusion of policies. Bilateral trade flows are used 
only as an example. The above limitations apply to any generic method for 
operationalizing international interdependencies using macroeconomic indicators, 
common religion or language, geographical proximity or any other variable which 
may not be empirically relevant to the policy under examination.  
This thesis aims to address some of the weaknesses of the policy diffusion 
literature in the following ways. First, the empirical basis of the paths through which 
policies are hypothesized to diffuse is strengthened by devising innovative channels 
of diffusion that are empirically relevant to the policy under investigation. This may 
be challenging conceptually and operationally as the bilateral relationships of each 
and every country in the world will need to be specified, but may nonetheless be 
worth the effort if interdependencies between countries can be specified more 
precisely. This will make the test of policy diffusion more convincing. Secondly, 
this thesis aims to strengthen the empirical underpinnings in relation to the key 
agents of policy diffusion. In the empirical chapters of this thesis, novel channels of 
diffusion are constructed to highlight the role of key actors in implementing Basel II, 
namely, banks and bank supervisors and their interdependent relationships with their 
foreign counterparts, in forming the paths through which policies are hypothesized 
to diffuse. Thirdly, to strengthen the overall empirical foundation of this thesis and 
overcome several methodological limitations associated with the use of quantitative 
methods, a mixed-method research design is adopted. This will contribute to 
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understanding both the effects of policy diffusion at the global level as well as the 
underlying process of policy diffusion in specific country cases, which combined, 
will provide a rich yet comprehensive account of how Basel II diffused across 
countries. The benefits of methodological triangulation may be particularly high 
precisely because statistical analysis and case studies embody distinct and often 
opposing methodological orientations than can produce unique synergies if 
combined effectively into the research design. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter started with an overview of the history of the Basel Committee and the 
two Capital Accords it produced. This was followed by a review of the empirical 
literature on the Basel Accords, which is the literature that this thesis primarily aims 
to contribute to. Despite the importance of the Basel standards in profoundly 
shaping bank capital adequacy regimes around the world, empirical research on this 
topic does not extend very far. In the case of Basel I, there has been some advances 
in investigating its implementation, although primarily in developed countries and in 
East Asia while the implementation of Basel II outside these countries has not 
received much academic attention. Empirical research on the state of regulatory 
convergence with Basel II is scarce and patchy, and the state of implementation in 
developing countries is particularly under-researched. Moreover, the factors that 
promote or hinder the implementation of Basel II across developed and developing 
countries are even less well understood. In fact, a systematic study of Basel II 
implementation has not been undertaken in the literature despite the real-world 
importance of this issue for policy and as a topic for academic research. These are 
major gaps in the IPE literature, which this thesis will aim to contribute to. This 
chapter also examined the theoretical literature that could help explain why 
countries implemented Basel II. A review of six general theories of compliance was 
followed by a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on policy diffusion. 
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Policy diffusion offered a fundamentally distinct theory in contrast to other theories 
of compliance because it was based on the premise that policy decisions in countries 
were interdependent on the policy decisions of other countries, rather than being 
independent of each other. Such dynamics are expected to help explain why 
countries implemented Basel II in different ways. The subsequent chapters consist of 
the quantitative and qualitative empirical studies that investigate the global 
implementation and diffusion of Basel II. 
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Chapter Three 
Basel II implementation at the global level: 
A quantitative analysis of Basel II implementation and its diffusion 
across 150 countries 
 
 
3.1 Introduction1 
Despite the importance of the Basel standards in profoundly shaping bank capital 
adequacy regimes across the world, empirical research on the state of Basel II 
implementation across developed and developing countries is scarce and patchy and 
the factors that promote or hinder the implementation of these voluntary standards 
are particularly under-researched. The aim of this chapter is thus two-fold. The first 
is to measure and assess the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II across 
the world. A global dataset of Basel II implementation measuring the pace and scope 
of Basel II implementation across 150 countries is compiled by the author in order to 
evaluate the state of Basel II implementation at the global level. The second aim is 
to investigate the factors that explain the implementation of Basel II across the 
world, in particular, by testing the effects of policy diffusion on implementation. 
Regression analysis is undertaken to test whether Basel II implementation decisions 
in a given country are systematically conditioned by the policy choices of other 
countries with which that country is closely interconnected. To model how Basel II 
policies diffuse, four distinct policy diffusion variables are constructed to describe 
how bank supervisors, banks, financial sectors and economies are interconnected 
with their foreign counterparts, thereby producing distinct channels of diffusion. 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter was selected as one of the Top Ten Essays in the „International 
Centre for Financial Regulation–Financial Times Research Prize 2010 Competition‟. Earlier versions 
were also presented at the International Centre for Financial Regulation PhD Network on Financial 
Regulation hosted by the Bank of England in 2012 and the International Studies Association 
Convention in San Diego (2012) and Montreal (2011). This chapter has benefited significantly from 
the comments of several discussants, in particular, Professor Miles Kahler and Dr Iain Hardie. 
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Furthermore, to devise a strong empirical test, the model controls for 
macroeconomic, banking sector and political variables to address two contending 
explanations of policy diffusion that may also explain the state of international 
regulatory convergence. 
This chapter proceeds in the following order. The methods used to measure 
the implementation of Basel II and compile the Basel II implementation dataset is 
discussed in section 3.2. This is followed by an examination of the state of Basel II 
implementation across the world. Section 3.3 presents the statistical model used to 
test the effects of policy diffusion on the implementation of Basel II. The 
hypothesized effects of the policy diffusion variables that model four distinct 
channels of diffusion and control variables that take into account country-specific 
economic and political conditions are also discussed in this section. The findings of 
the quantitative analysis are presented in section 3.4. Notwithstanding the value of 
the quantitative study in testing the effects of policy diffusion, four methodological 
weaknesses that limit its explanatory power are discussed in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 A global overview of Basel II implementation 
3.2.1 Measuring Basel II implementation across 150 countries 
To measure and assess the degree of regulatory convergence across 150 countries, 
Basel II implementation is operationalized according to the scope and timing of 
implementation. As explained in Chapter Two, Basel II consists of three Pillars. 
Pillar 1 includes a menu of approaches from the relatively simple approach that 
utilizes external credit ratings to the more complex approaches that utilize banks‟ 
own internal risk assessments as key inputs for calculating regulatory capital 
requirements for credit risk. Likewise, the standards for calculating capital 
requirements for operational and market risks also consists of a menu of approaches 
from the basic approaches based on the use of standard indicators to the 
sophisticated approaches that utilize quantitative inputs from banks‟ internal models. 
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Pillar 1 is complemented by Pillar 2, which consists of standards on supervisory and 
internal capital review processes, and Pillar 3 on market disclosures. In order to 
devise a measure of Basel II implementation that reflects the structure of Basel II, 
the dataset measures whether and when the above key components of Basel II were 
implemented across 150 countries. First, to capture the scope of implementation, the 
dataset measures whether domestic legislation or regulations implemented (a) the 
Standardised Approach (SA), Foundation and Advanced Internal Ratings-Based 
(FIRB and AIRB) approaches for credit risk, (b) the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), 
Standardised Approach (TSA) and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) 
for operational risk in Pillar 1, (c) Pillar 2 and (d) Pillar 3 as at December 2010. 
Second, to measure the timing of implementation, the dataset records the year in 
which (a) the SA, FIRB and AIRB approaches for credit risk, and (b) the BIA, TSA 
and AMA for operational risk were implemented for Pillar 1, and likewise for Pillars 
2 and 3.
2
 For example, Table 2 shows the information captured in the Basel II 
implementation dataset for Pakistan and the Philippines. This method produces 1200 
data points across 150 countries.  
Table 2: Sample of Basel II implementation dataset 
 
Although the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to Basel I was retained in Basel II, it 
was not measured in the dataset because its pre-dates the publication of Basel II in 
2004. The 1996 Market Risk Amendment is among several other key elements of 
Basel I that were retained in Basel II, such as the minimum required capital 
adequacy ratio of 8% and the definition of eligible regulatory capital. The Basel II 
framework negotiated and agreed amongst the G10 in 2004 does not cover these 
components. In order to make the analysis of the data feasible, measures of the 
                                                 
2
 Basel Committee members were due to implement Basel II published in 2004 from year-end 2006. 
SA FIRB AIRB BIA TSA AMA
Pakistan 2010 2010 2010 2008 2008 N/A 2009 2008
Philippines 2007 2010 2010 2007 2007 2010 2011 2007
Pillar 1
Pillar 2 Pillar 3Credit Risk Operational Risk
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scope and pace of implementation for each country are coded and equally weighted 
to construct a composite Basel II implementation score ranging from zero to forty. 
Doing so provides a single pragmatic measure that summarizes how countries 
implemented Basel II in a comparable way across 150 countries. The method for 
computing the implementation composite score, which is also used as the dependent 
variable for the quantitative analysis, is explained in the analysis of the dependent 
variable in section 3.3.2. 
The Basel II implementation dataset was compiled by gathering information 
from a diverse range of sources. To ensure the reliability and validity of the data, a 
pecking order for the sources of information was adopted during the data 
compilation process depending on whether the information was from official public 
sources, namely, documents published by supervisory authorities responsible for 
implementing Basel II and disclosed to the public, non-official public sources or 
private sources as listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Pecking order of information sources 
Order 
Type of 
source 
Detail of information 
source 
Pros and Cons 
 
1 
 
Official 
public 
sources 
 
Regulations 
implementing Basel II. 
Reliable and comprehensive, but regulations 
only published when Basel II is implemented 
and often not translated into English. 
Annual reports of 
supervisory 
authorities. 
Reliable but information generally available 
if Basel II was being implemented. Difficult 
to find information if Basel II was not 
implemented. Updated annually. 
Website of supervisory 
authorities. 
Generally reliable, but difficult to determine 
publication date. Press releases, speeches and 
conference materials can be inaccurate, 
partial and out of date. 
 
2 
Non-
official 
public 
sources 
 
Studies by academics, 
rating agencies and 
professional firms. 
Generally reliable, but limited country 
coverage. Often out of date as information is 
not updated. Mostly relies on the above 
sources of information. 
 
3 
Media sources (e.g. 
newspaper articles). 
Widely available, but often unreliable. Heavy 
reliance on the above sources of information. 
 
4 
Private 
sources 
Private sources of 
information from 
banks. 
Difficult to verify, but often only source of 
information to confirm the non-
implementation of Basel II. 
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In keeping with this pecking order, the majority of information was sourced from 
supervisory authorities‟ annual reports, supervisors‟ websites and national 
regulations. Where public information was not readily available, which was often 
the case when countries had not implemented Basel II, private sources of 
information were also used to confirm the non-implementation of Basel II, that is, 
the negative outcomes. Articles from the media were not used in the construction of 
the dataset due to their low reliability and heavy reliance on information sources that 
are higher up in the pecking order. 
 In addition to the dataset compiled by the author, there are now three 
alternative datasets that measure Basel II implementation, namely, the World Bank‟s 
research dataset on Bank Regulation and Supervision (Barth et al 2001; 2008), the 
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) survey of implementation amongst non-Basel 
Committee countries (FSI 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012), and the Basel 
Committee‟s survey of members‟ implementation (BCBS 2011; 2012a). The World 
Bank‟s research dataset includes a question asking supervisors whether they planned 
to adopt the various approaches of Basel II in the form of a yes or no answer. This 
was of no use to this thesis as the dataset did not capture whether countries had 
actually implemented Basel II or when they were intending to implement it. 
Furthermore, the self-reported nature of the survey made the data prone to errors, 
reducing the overall reliability of the survey.  
The FSI conducted biennial surveys of Basel II implementation in non-G10 
countries since 2004. Although these surveys were global in scope as responses 
were received from 133 jurisdictions, including members of the Basel Committee, 
the identity of the countries that responded to the survey or the forty-four countries 
that did not respond were not disclosed on confidentiality grounds (FSI 2010). Only 
the aggregated results of six regions were disclosed. Hence, the surveys were not 
useful for the purpose of academic research because it was impossible to investigate 
how individual countries had implemented Basel II and why. It was only in July 
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2012, several years after the author had first compiled the Basel II implementation 
dataset that the FSI disclosed information on the seventy non-Basel Committee 
countries that responded to its survey.
3
 Nevertheless, the Basel II implementation 
dataset used in this thesis is superior in terms of the coverage of countries since the 
2012 FSI survey measures implementation across only seventy countries and the 
same level of detail is measured as the FSI survey, that is, when the various 
components of Basel II were implemented.
4
 The highly consistent methodology 
used to measure Basel II implementation in the 2012 FSI survey and the Basel II 
implementation dataset compiled by the author to some extent validates the method 
of measurement used in this thesis, based upon which the state of Basel II 
implementation was assessed, econometric analysis was conducted and case 
selections were made. The FSI survey also potentially complements the Basel II 
implementation dataset used in this thesis by providing an update as of July 2012.  
Similarly, it was only after the 2007-8 global financial crisis that the Basel 
Committee published reports on the implementation of Basel II in its member 
countries. The domestic rule-making process was measured by classifying the status 
of implementation into four categories, namely, draft regulation not published, draft 
regulation published, final rule published and final rule in force (BCBS 2011:2). The 
coverage of countries and measurement method used by the Basel Committee falls 
short of that adopted in the dataset compiled by the author as the implementation of 
the different components of Basel II were not distinguished. The latter two datasets, 
which combined offers the most comprehensive country coverage, did not exist in 
the public domain let alone in academia when the Basel II implementation dataset 
was compiled and statistical analysis was conducted for this thesis.  
                                                 
3
 The July 2012 survey represents a significant advancement in terms of public disclosure of 
information and is in line with greater disclosures by other international economic organizations such 
as the World Bank and IMF, which have been asked to do so by the G20. 
4
 The FSI survey is based on self-reported responses from supervisory authorities rather than being 
centrally compiled in a systematic way as was done for this research project. 
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3.2.2 The state of Basel II implementation across the world 
Considering that over 140 countries claimed to have implemented Basel I (Barth et 
al 2008), and that over 100 countries indicated their intentions to implement Basel II 
(FSI 2004; 2006), the actual state of regulatory convergence with Basel II at the 
global level is limited and highly uneven. The world map in Figure 3 provides an 
illustration of the overall state of Basel II implementation as of year-end 2010. 
Countries are colour-coded according to their Basel II implementation score, with 
the darker tones representing higher levels of convergence with Basel II than the 
lighter tones.  
Figure 3: World map of Basel II implementation 
 
Whilst around thirty countries fully transitioned onto Basel II according to the 
timeline stipulated in Basel II for members of the Basel Committee, around half the 
world made minimal progress in implementing Basel II. In between these extremes 
however, are considerable cross-national variations in the degree of regulatory 
convergence with Basel II, from early-comprehensive adopters that fully 
implemented all the approaches of Pillar 1, Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 at a timetable 
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comparable with most Basel Committee members, to late-partial adopters that 
gradually and selectively implemented Basel II. 
To complement the depiction of the overall state of implementation across 
the world, countries are grouped into six stylized categories to highlight the different 
ways in which they implemented Basel II in Table 4. Depending on the pace and 
scope of Basel II implementation, countries are categorized into early-
comprehensive, gradual-comprehensive, late-comprehensive, early-partial, late-
partial or non-implementers.
5
 Countries that implemented both the basic and 
advanced approaches of Pillar 1 as well as Pillars 2 and 3 at a timetable consistent 
with that prescribed in Basel II for members of the Basel Committee are categorized 
as early-comprehensive adopters. This group includes the likes of Australia and 
Hong Kong. Countries that have implemented the basic approaches of Basel II and 
Pillars 2 and 3 at a timetable consistent with Basel II but have implemented the 
advanced approaches of Basel II more gradually over a longer time horizon are 
classed as gradual-comprehensive adopters. There are variations within this group 
depending on the gradualness of implementation where countries like India adopted 
a more prolonged implementation timetable than Malaysia. In contrast, countries 
that initially delayed implementation for several years before embarking on the 
implementation of Basel II, but nonetheless has prepared to implement both the 
basic and advanced approaches of Basel II are called late-comprehensive adopters. 
Countries that delayed the implementation of Basel II and have also selectively 
implemented elements of Basel II are categorized as late-partial adopters, whereas 
countries that have implemented only the basic approaches of Pillar 1 or only Pillars 
2 and 3 at a timetable consistent with Basel II but will not implement the advanced 
approaches of Basel II are categorized as early-partial adopters. The former 
includes the likes of the US and China whereas the latter includes most countries in 
                                                 
5
 Gradual-partial adopters do not exist by definition since countries have either partially implemented 
Basel II early or at a later time. 
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the Middle East. The non-implementers include countries that have not yet 
implemented Basel II or have made minimal progress, including countries that 
drafted regulations to implement Basel II that have not come into effect. 
Table 4: A classification from early-comprehensive adopters to late-partial adopters 
 
The following subsection provides a more detailed descriptive account of the 
state of Basel II implementation on a regional basis, highlighting the different ways 
countries implemented Basel II, starting from those that made the least progress. 
Africa  
Of the thirty-five African countries surveyed, although most authorities publically 
announced plans to implement Basel II since 2004, the degree of convergence with 
Basel II actually attained is very low. Only two countries implemented Basel II. 
South Africa implemented all the components of Basel II in 2008, thus being the 
Early-
comprehensive 
Gradual-
comprehensive 
Late-
comprehensive 
EU27 Brazil Bangladesh 30 countries in Africa Jordan
Australia India Central African Rep. Afghanistan Kazakhstan
Canada Indonesia Chad Albania Kosovo
Croatia Israel Chile Anguilla Kyrgyz Republic
Gibraltar Malaysia Egypt, Arab Rep. Antigua and Barbuda Macao, China
Guernsey Mexico Macedonia, FYR Armenia Moldova
Hong Kong Pakistan Nigeria Azerbaijan Mongolia
Iceland Philippines Peru Bahamas Montenegro
Isle of Man Saudi Arabia Russian Federation Barbados Montserrat
Japan Sri Lanka Turkey Belarus Netherlands Antilles
Jersey Thailand Belize Nicaragua
Korea, Rep. Bhutan Palestine
Liechtenstein Bolivia Panama
New Zealand Bosnia and Herzegovina Papua New Guinea
Norway British Virgin Islands St. Kitts and Nevis
Singapore Brunei St. Lucia
South Africa Cambodia St. Vincent 
Switzerland Colombia Suriname
Taiwan Cook Islands Syrian Arab Republic
Costa Rica Tajikistan
Dominica Trinidad and Tobago
Bahrain Argentina Dominican Republic Ukraine
Kuwait Aruba El Salvador Uruguay
Mauritius Bermuda Fiji Vanuatu
Morocco Cayman Islands Grenada Venezuela, RB
Nepal China Guatemala Vietnam
Oman Ghana Guyana
Qatar Lebanon Honduras
UAE Maldives Jamaica
United States
Non-implementers
Early-partial 
adopters
Gradual-partial 
adopters
Late-partial 
adopters
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only early-comprehensive adopter in the region and Morocco adopted a gradual 
strategy by implementing the basic approaches of Basel II in 2007. The rest are late-
partial adopters. Implementation is significantly back-loaded and partial because less 
than half the countries planning to implement the basic approaches intended to 
implement the advanced approaches. There are numerous episodes of delayed 
implementation across Africa, highlighting the significant implementation 
challenges countries face. For example, the Reserve Bank of Malawi embarked on 
an ambitious plan to implement Basel II in 2005, viewing Basel II as “new breeds of 
animals to be tamed by supervisory authorities”, only to abandon this plan the 
following year after realizing that priority should be placed towards compliance with 
the BCPs instead (Reserve Bank of Malawi 2006:6-35). The Central African 
Banking Commission‟s 2003 plans to implement Basel II gradually for countries in 
the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa was also postponed to 
2015 following advice from the IMF and World Bank (COBAC 2009). Similarly, 
the Bank of Uganda decided to adopt a wait-and-see approach to implementation 
according to a resolution adopted by the Monetary Affairs Committee for East 
African Countries to “continue studying Basel II… pending full implementation of 
Basel II in the region” (Bank of Uganda 2008:49). This shows how regional 
integration may reinforce regulatory convergence amongst countries, but at low 
levels of convergence with Basel II.  
Europe (Non-EU) 
The degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II in Europe outside the European 
Union (EU) is limited. None of the countries except Croatia and the British Crown 
Dependencies implemented Basel II, although progress was underway. Key 
differences distinguished this group of non-implementing EU neighbours to the rest 
of the world. Countries indicated plans to implement the EU‟s Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) to implement Basel II although they were not members of the EU. 
This in part reflected the EU‟s effort to promote regulatory convergence with its 
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standards, in particular, amongst countries preparing for EU accession, which 
requires harmonization with the acquis communautaire, as well as in neighbouring 
countries that do not have any prospects of EU membership but strong economic ties 
with the EU. In the latter case, the EU offered its closest neighbours deeper 
economic integration through the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was 
conditional on making progress towards various reform objectives, including the 
“enhancement of a prudential regulatory framework for financial services and 
supervision equivalent to that existing in the EU” (EC 2007:5-6). The EU monitored 
and supported these reforms through various forms of EC-funded financial and 
technical assistance. As a result, although the degree of regulatory convergence with 
Basel II in this region was low, the implementation of the CRD was kept in motion 
as the EU incentivized convergence by monitoring the progress of implementation 
and offering some financial and technical assistance. 
The Middle East  
Most countries in the Middle East are early-partial implementers of Basel II. Kuwait 
and Qatar moved onto Basel II earlier than any other country in the world by 
implementing the basic approaches of Pillar 1 in 2006. This early transition was 
hailed as an achievement by the Central Bank of Kuwait, which claimed that Basel 
II was implemented “one year ahead of the date scheduled by the Basel Committee 
for its application”, making it also the first Arab country to apply Basel II (Central 
Bank of Kuwait 2006:13). Other countries in this region converged with the basic 
approaches of Basel II during 2007-8. However, despite the initial speedy move to 
implement the basic approaches, the degree of convergence with Basel II is partial, 
and will remain so because the advanced approaches for calculating capital for credit 
and operational risks will not be implemented in this region (FSI 2010:53-55). 
South Asia 
Regulatory convergence amongst South Asian countries is high due to the similar 
adoption of a gradual yet comprehensive approach to implementation across 
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countries. The basic approaches of Pillar 1 were implemented in 2008, followed by 
the gradual implementation of the advanced approaches. India, Pakistan, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka moved onto Basel II by adopting the basic approaches for credit and 
operational risk in 2008, whilst the Maldives and Bangladesh followed in 2009 and 
2010, respectively. Meanwhile, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh planned to 
implement the IRB approaches after 2013 but before 2015, while Pakistan 
implemented the IRB approaches in 2010. The planned implementation of the 
advanced approaches of Pillar 1 before 2015 distinguishes implementation in South 
Asian countries from that of the Middle Eastern countries. 
Americas  
Canada converged with Basel II in 2007. Implementation in the US remained in flux. 
Although the advanced approaches were mandatory for some large banks, the SA 
remained as proposals and it was unclear when the US would fully transition onto 
Basel II (IMF 2010:6-7). Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, 
Colombia and Peru are gradually moving towards full implementation with various 
local adaptations. Countries in the Caribbean have not implemented Basel II, some 
after suspending implementation plans following the 2007-8 financial crises. 
However, offshore financial centres such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands 
implemented the basic approaches of Pillar 1 in 2009 and 2011, respectively. 
East Asia Pacific 
The scope and pace of Basel II implementation in Hong Kong and Singapore was 
consistent with that in Japan, the only original non-western member of Basel 
Committee. This was followed closely by the transition of Australia and New 
Zealand onto Basel II in 2008 and Korea in 2008-9. The next group of countries that 
implemented Basel II were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. These 
countries adopted a more gradual approach, with convergence with the advanced 
approaches of Basel II being achieved after 2009. The key feature of implementation 
in this region was that all three pillars of Basel II, including the basic and advanced 
85 
 
approaches of Pillar 1, were implemented at a timeframe that was generally 
comparable to that of most G10 countries. Ten out of thirteen countries in this 
region implemented the basic approaches by 2008 and most countries implemented 
the IRB approaches by 2010. Pillars 2 and 3 were implemented concurrently with 
Pillar 1, except in the Philippines and Malaysia, where Pillar 2 implementation 
continued until 2011. Countries in this region exhibited a relatively high degree of 
regulatory convergence with Basel II as well as producing a high degree of regional 
convergence by adopting similar implementation strategies.  
European Union 
The CRD implemented Basel II across the twenty-seven EU member states in two 
stages, the first in 2007 for banks applying the basic approaches for credit and 
operational risk and the second in 2008 for banks applying the advanced approaches. 
This implementation timetable was consistent with that prescribed by the Basel 
Committee for its members. Furthermore, the CRD applied to all credit institutions 
and investment firms irrespective of their size, scope of activities or level of 
sophistication. Implementation in the EU is unique because, first, the decision to 
implement Basel II was made at the EU-level and adopted as an EU directive by 
means of recasting the existing CRD, which is legally binding in member states. 
Secondly, the institutional framework of the EU facilitated regulatory convergence 
across member states. In particular, the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS), established by the European Commission (EC) as part of Level 
3 of the Lamfalussy Process, was formally charged “to deliver convergence of 
supervisory practices, and to contribute to the level playing field in Europe” (CEBS 
2005:4). The EC also set up the CRD Transposition Group to facilitate the correct 
and coherent transposition of the CRD in member state‟s legislation. Thirdly, 
although the CRD largely retained the same provisions contained in Basel II, 
variations were incorporated to accommodate the Single Market context. Thus, the 
high degree of convergence across member states and the high convergence as a 
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group with Basel II was a clear outcome of policy coordination aimed at attaining 
policy harmonization.  
In short, the state of regulatory convergence at the global level is highly 
uneven and clustered, whereby convergence and divergence coexist. There is a high 
degree of regulatory convergence amongst some groups of countries that adopted 
similar implementation strategies. However, different groups of countries exhibited 
different levels of convergence with Basel II. Furthermore, the uneven 
implementation of Basel II appears to be more permanent than transitional for a 
large proportion of developing countries that were either non-implementers or late-
partial adopters. To investigate the cause of the fragmented global regulatory 
landscape and the considerable variations in the way countries implemented Basel II, 
regression analysis is undertaken in the next section. 
 
3.3 Testing the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II implementation 
The objective of the quantitative study is to test whether on average policy diffusion 
systematically affects the level of Basel II implementation across the world. This 
section presents the model used to test the effects of policy diffusion, followed by an 
explanation of how the dependent variable that measures Basel II implementation 
was constructed. Then, the hypothesized effects of the policy diffusion variables and 
control variables that take into account country-specific economic and political 
conditions are discussed. The findings are presented in section 3.4. 
3.3.1 The Model 
Policy diffusion occurs when Basel II implementation decisions in a country are 
systematically conditioned by the Basel II policy choices of other countries. Hence, 
Basel II policy decisions depend not only on country-specific economic and political 
conditions, but also on the policy decisions of other countries. A spatial lag model is 
used to capture how Basel II implementation policy decisions in one country affect 
those in others because it provides ways to test and accommodate various forms of 
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interdependencies between observations (Beck et al 2006; Franzese and Hays 2007). 
The feedback between the dependent variable in spatial lag models reflects how 
diffusion mechanisms work. A unit change in the independent variable has an 
impact on Basel II implementation in one country, which then feeds through to how 
Basel II is implemented in all the other countries through the spatial lag, and these 
then feed back to the current country, until the feedback effects in the second and 
subsequent round of adjustments get subsequently smaller (Beck et al 2006:34). The 
spatial lag model has the following form. 
yi = β xi + kwi y + εi 
The dependent variable yi represents the level of Basel II implementation in country 
i. x is the vector of the non-diffusion regressors with coefficient β. The spatial lag 
variable consists of the product of wi, the i
th
 row of the connectivity matrix denoted 
by W, y, the vector of values for y denoting Basel II implementation in all other 
countries and k, the spatial autoregressive coefficient. The connectivity matrix, W, 
specifies the nature and degree of interdependencies between each and every 
observation. The spatial lag variable is thus the weighted average of the dependent 
variable with which observation i is interdependent to and can be written in the 
following form where yj is the dependent variable for country j. 
 
The structure of dependence between observations as specified by the connectivity 
matrix is assumed to be known a priori to the researcher and is not estimated in the 
regression model (Beck et al 2006:28). Thus, defining and operationalizing each 
channel of policy diffusion from a theoretical concept to a connectivity matrix that 
makes sense in the context of the implementation of Basel II is a critical empirical 
task in the application of the spatial lag model. Each of these variables is discussed 
in turn next. 
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3.3.2 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is constructed by drawing on the Basel II implementation 
dataset used in the previous section to measure and assess the state of Basel II 
implementation across the world. It is constructed in two steps. First, the six options 
for calculating regulatory capital for credit and operational risk in Pillar 1 are 
individually coded from zero to five depending on the year in which a particular 
approach was implemented. A score of five is assigned to the implementation of an 
approach at the date prescribed in Basel II for members of the Basel Committee, that 
is, 2007 for the SA, FIRB approach, BIA and TSA, and 2008 for the AIRB approach 
and AMA. The coding decreases by a one-point scale for each successive delay in 
the year of implementation, and implementation planned during 2011-15 was 
discounted further and given a score of 0.5. This coding method produces six scores 
that measure the implementation of the different approaches to compute regulatory 
capital requirements for credit and operational risk. Similarly, the implementation of 
Pillar 2 and 3 are coded by assigning a value between one and five depending on the 
year of implementation. A score of five is assigned to the implementation of Pillar 2 
and 3 in 2007, which decreases by a one-point scale for each successive delay in the 
year of implementation. The second step involves aggregating the sub-scores for the 
different approaches of Pillar 1, Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 using equal weights to produce 
a single summary score of Basel II implementation for each and every country. 
Whilst the coding for each of these components capture the pace of implementation, 
the aggregation of these scores across the key components of Basel II capture the 
scope of implementation. The coding scheme for the implementation of the three 
pillars of Basel II is summarized in Table 5. To put the magnitude of these values 
into context, a five-point reduction in the Basel II implementation score for example 
is equivalent to an outright non-implementation of Pillar 2 (i.e. partial 
implementation) or delaying the move onto the basic approaches of Basel II, that is, 
the SA, BIA and Pillars 2 and 3, by approximately a year. 
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Table 5: Basel II implementation score coding scheme 
 
The scale and weighting provides a pragmatic measure of Basel II implementation. 
There are infinite ways to scale and weight the Basel II implementation dataset, 
although the above method has the advantages of being simple and easy to 
understand, preserving the way Basel II implementation was operationalized, 
reflecting the core structure of Basel II and most importantly, making more sense on 
empirical grounds. The coding reflects the way policymakers actually tended to 
compartmentalize the implementation of Basel II into the above components in 
practice.
6
 
 
3.3.3 Policy diffusion variables 
Four spatial lag variables test whether and to what extent the policy choices of one 
country are shaped by the choices of others. Each spatial lag variable consists of a 
unique connectivity matrix that describes how and to what extent each and every 
country in the world are interconnected to all other countries across channels of 
policy diffusion formed by inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border 
business structure of international banks, competition between financial sectors to 
attract capital and the nexus of international economic exchange. The specification 
                                                 
6
 Other weighting schemes were also tried, for example, by weighting the implementation of all three 
Pillars of Basel II equally. This did not substantially change the ordinal properties of the Basel II 
implementation score, but more importantly, it was more difficult to justify on empirical grounds. If 
all three pillars were weighted equally, the weighting of the implementation of Pillar 3 by a factor of 
six relative to the implementation of the SA would not reflect the way Basel II was actually 
implemented in practice because countries could choose to implement only the SA to implement 
Pillar 1. Hence, it makes more sense to equally weight the implementation of Pillar 3 and the SA. 
Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding Year Coding
2007 5 2007 5 2008 5 2007 5 2007 5 2008 5 2007 5 2007 5
2008 4 2008 4 2009 4 2008 4 2008 4 2009 4 2008 4 2008 4
2009 3 2009 3 2010 3 2009 3 2009 3 2010 3 2009 3 2009 3
2010 2 2010 2 2011 2 2010 2 2010 2 2011 2 2010 2 2010 2
2011-15 0.5 2011-15 0.5 2012-16 0.5 2011-15 0.5 2011-15 0.5 2012-16 0.5 2011-15 0.5 2011-15 0.5
Pillar 2 Pillar 3SA Foundation IRB Advanced IRB BIA SA AMA
Basel II implementation Score
Pillar 1 implementation sub-score
Pillar 2 Pillar 3
Credit Risk Operational Risk
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of each spatial lag variable and their hypothesized effects on Basel II 
implementation are discussed next. 
Inter-supervisory authority networks 
As discussed in section 1.3.2, national bank supervisors are interconnected to their 
counterparts in other countries via inter-supervisory authority networks. Most 
countries belong to at least one of eleven inter-supervisory authority networks and 
several are members of multiple networks. Descriptive data on the average and 
standard deviations of Basel II implementation scores by inter-supervisory authority 
networks is presented in Table 6.
7
 Two features characterize how policy diffusion 
may reinforce convergence in implementation policies amongst supervisors that are 
interconnected with one another across supervisory networks. First, some inter-
supervisory authority networks have on average attained a higher level of Basel II 
implementation than others. Basel II implementation in countries in the EMEAP 
Working Group on Banking Supervision is relatively high with an average Basel II 
implementation score of twenty-nine whilst the degree of regulatory convergence 
with Basel II in supervisory networks across Africa or the Caribbean is very low. 
Second, lower standard deviations in supervisory networks that attained a high or 
low level of Basel II implementation suggest higher degrees of convergence 
amongst countries within such networks. There is greater variation in 
implementation amongst countries that belong to supervisory networks that have on 
average neither attained a very high or low level of Basel II implementation. Thus, 
inter-supervisory authority networks are hypothesized to positively reinforce the 
state of regulatory convergence amongst countries that are interconnected to one 
another, but at different levels of convergence with Basel II, and more so in 
supervisory networks that have attained high and low levels of Basel II 
implementation. 
                                                 
7
 Supervisory groups organized by language or religion are not modelled due to the considerable 
overlap between these and regional supervisory groups, but the Basel II implementation scores are 
presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Basel II implementation by supervisory networks 
 
To test whether Basel II policies diffused across inter-supervisory authority 
networks, a connectivity matrix describing how supervisors are interconnected with 
their foreign counterparts across eleven established inter-supervisory authority 
networks is constructed. The Basel II implementation scores of countries that belong 
to the same supervisory network are weighted positively, whilst the implementation 
scores of countries that do not belong to the same network are not. 
The cross-border structure of international banks 
The second policy diffusion variable tests the diffusion of Basel II across channels 
of diffusion formed by the cross-border structure of international banks. Foreign 
banks are hypothesized to promote regulatory convergence with Basel II in host 
countries if the foreign banks had implemented Basel II in their home countries, or 
otherwise hinder implementation if the home countries of foreign banks had not 
implemented Basel II. The spatial lag variable is constructed using data on foreign 
banks presence compiled by Claessens et al (2008) and Barth et al (2008). Since the 
Name of international regional supervisory group
Average 
score
Standard 
Deviation
Number of 
countries
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 40.0 0.0 27
Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP) Working Group on Banking Supervision
29.1 8.0 11
Group of Banking Supervisors from Central and Eastern 
European Countries
22.8 19.2 21
        (excluding EU member states) 4.0 8.1 10
South East Asia, New Zealand, Australia (SEANZA) Forum of 
Banking Supervisors
21.3 12.7 20
The Arab Committee on Banking Supervision 10.9 10.2 19
Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA) 5.2 9.7 35
SADC (Southern African Development Community) 
Subcommittee of Bank Supervisors (SSBS)
4.6 11.0 14
        (excluding South Africa) 1.6 5.1 13
Regional Group on Banking Supervision of Transcaucasia, 
Central Asia and the Russian Federation
0.9 2.2 9
Committee of Banking Supervisors of West and Central Africa 0.8 1.7 25
Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors 0.5 1.4 16
Association of Financial Supervisors of Pacific Countries 
(AFSPC)
0.0 0.0 9
Islamic Financial Services Board 14.6 10.7 20
Group of French-Speaking Banking Supervisors 11.8 17.5 33
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors 15.6 16.9 16
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former dataset comprise of banking sectors in 103 developing countries, foreign 
bank presence in developed countries is drawn from the latter dataset. The average 
Basel II implementation score across developing countries is computed and 
weighted according to the proportion of the host countries‟ banking sector assets 
owned by banks from developing countries. Then, the average Basel II 
implementation score of developed countries is computed and weighted by the 
proportion of domestic banking sector assets owned by banks from developed 
countries. Domestic banks‟ assets are unweighted. 
Competing for capital 
Competition among financial sectors to attract international capital and banking 
business are hypothesized to translate into competitive pressures to implement Basel 
II, leading to its diffusion. Hence, the spatial lag variable tests whether and to what 
extent countries respond to the Basel II implementation policies of other countries 
they compete with for investments and capital when devising their own Basel II 
implementation policies. The operationalisation of policy diffusion across countries 
that compete for capital follows the method adopted by Simmons and Elkins 
(2004:179).
8
 The connectivity matrix describes how countries that compete for the 
same pool of capital are interconnected with one other. According to standard 
portfolio theory, where investors allocate assets according to the level of risk, 
countries that pose similar levels of risk are assumed to be close substitutes from 
investors‟ point of view. For example, the US with a AAA sovereign credit rating 
may compete with the UK, which also has a AAA rating, but not with Brazil with a 
BB rating or Ecuador with a CCC rating. Thus, from the perspective of countries 
that are potential investment destinations, countries in the same risk category are 
seen as rivals that compete for the same pool of international capital. Regulatory 
policies are expected to diffuse amongst such rivals rather than across non-rivals. 
                                                 
8
 Two other methods are adopted in the case studies in Chapter Seven. See section 7.2.1 for a more 
detailed discussion on the plausibility of using sovereign risk ratings to measure one‟s competitors. 
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Standard & Poor‟s long term sovereign foreign credit ratings for 126 
sovereign governments have been used to construct the spatial weights matrix, 
which weighs the Basel II implementation scores of those countries with the same 
sovereign credit rating as one, or zero otherwise before row-normalizing. Credit 
ratings as of year-end 2005 are used to capture the state of competition before 
countries formally started to implement Basel II and to avoid credit ratings being 
influenced by Basel II implementation. Table 7 provides a descriptive overview of 
Basel II implementation scores by credit ratings. 
Table 7: Basel II implementation scores by credit ratings 
 
Countries with higher credit ratings tend to be associated with higher levels of Basel 
II implementation whilst countries with lower ratings are associated with lower 
levels of implementation. The distinction in the level of Basel II implementation is 
most apparent between investment and non-investment grade countries. The 
Mean S.d.
AAA Extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments.
38.1 5.1 19
AA Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments. 36.0 8.2 10
A Strong capacity to meet financial commitments but 
somewhat susceptible to adverse economic conditions 
and changes in circumstances.
23.8 16.1 23
BBB/B
BB-
Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but 
more subject to adverse economic conditions / 
considered lowest investment grade by market 
21.0 16.1 12
BB+/B
B
Considered highest speculative grade by market 
participants / Less vulnerable in the near-term but 
faces major on-going uncertainties to adverse business, 
financial and economic conditions.
6.2 9.4 23
B More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and 
economic conditions but currently has the capacity to 
meet financial commitments.
2.6 6.3 33
CCC Currently vulnerable and dependent on favourable 
business, financial and economic conditions to meet 
financial commitments.
0.0 0.0 3
CC Currently highly vulnerable. n/a n/a 0
C A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action 
taken, but payments of financial commitments are 
continued.
n/a n/a 0
D Payment default on financial commitments. n/a n/a 0
2.6 7.4 27Unrated
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standard deviation of the Basel II implementation scores is lowest amongst countries 
in the highest and lowest end of the credit rating spectrum, indicating that the degree 
of competition, and hence the degree of regulatory convergence may also be highest 
amongst countries that compete for capital in these groups. 
International economic exchange 
The structure of international economic exchange measured by bilateral trade flows 
may serve as channels through which Basel II policies diffuse across countries. 
Following Lee and Strang‟s operationalization of measuring economic distances 
between countries, the connectivity matrix consists of the value of imports between 
all countries in the world (2006). For a given country, the spatial lag variable 
consists of the Basel II implementation score of all other countries weighted by their 
relative value of imports to that country. Countries that engage in extensive 
international economic exchange with one another are expected to be more 
interdependent when formulating their Basel II implementation policies. 
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
To develop a strong empirical test of the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II 
implementation, it is necessary to control for two competing explanations. First, 
countries that face similar economic and political conditions may independently 
respond in similar ways to Basel II implementation. If Basel II implementation is an 
uncoordinated response to common features of the economy or the banking sector, 
these control variables are expected to exhibit strong effects to the extent that they 
also cluster in time and space. Secondly, clustered policy making may result from 
formal policy coordination. These competing explanations are taken into account 
through the inclusion of the following control variables. 
Economic variables 
The level of economic development is hypothesised to be positively associated with 
the degree of convergence with Basel II because it proxies for countries‟ capabilities 
95 
 
to implement Basel II. Basel II was originally designed to establish minimum levels 
of capital for internationally active banks in the developed economies of the G10 
(BCBS 2004:3). Banks from developing countries may not have the capabilities to 
implement the advanced approaches, which require them to run internal risk models 
similar to those used by large international banks in the G10. According to the Vice 
Chairman of the Basel Committee, “there is a lot of difference in the starting point 
of individual banks and supervisors within and outside of the G-10… The advanced 
approaches under Basel II are not appropriate for a wide range of banks and banking 
supervisory systems in the world today. Even getting to the standardised approach 
and Pillar 2 should not be the priority for a range of countries” (Le Pan 2008:20). In 
addition to banks, supervisory authorities from non-Basel Committee countries may 
also face capacity constraints in implementing Basel II. In a survey conducted by the 
FSI in 2004, supervisors from non-G10 countries indicated that implementing Basel 
II would require new training for approximately 9,400 supervisors (FSI 2004:10). 
This demonstrates the significant scale of up-skilling required on the part of 
supervisors to implement Basel II. However, despite warnings against the risks of 
premature implementation (BCBS 2004a, IMF 2005), and the view of the Basel 
Committee that “[y]ou can‟t buy advanced or even foundation approaches under 
Basel II „off the shelf‟ in a box” (Le Pan 2008:20), it may still be possible that 
“many countries will begin to adopt the advanced IRB approach, because they think 
this is the global standard to which they must aspire, when it may not be appropriate 
for their banks at their current stage of development” (Davies 2005:249). Hence, the 
effect of economic development on Basel II implementation is tested. 
Experiencing a systemic banking crisis may subsequently lead to greater 
regulatory convergence in line with international standards, as crises may produce 
strong domestic political pressures that act as a catalyst to reform domestic banking 
regulations in line with international best practice standards, especially if the cause 
of a crisis is attributed to failures in prudential regulation or the absence of adequate 
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risk management practices in banks. For example, following the Asian financial 
crises, “many important actors… saw the adoption of international standards as a 
means of importing superior regulatory practices and restraining what they saw as 
destructive behaviour in their domestic political economies” (Walter 2007:95; 2008). 
Conversely, countries may delay implementing Basel II due to relatively higher 
implementation costs in the aftermath of a crisis or adopt a protracted 
implementation timetable by adopting lenient phase-in arrangements with long 
transitional periods to enable banks to meet new standards while supporting 
economic recovery. The empirical question of whether systemic banking crises 
affect Basel II implementation positively or negatively is tested through the 
inclusion of the banking crisis variable. However, given the possibility that financial 
crises can also occur across interconnected countries, the results that drop the crisis 
variable are also reported. The literature on financial crises highlight how crisis can 
spread across countries due to spillover effects created by bank lending (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), trade linkages (Eichengreen et al 1996) or “fast and 
furious” contagion effects (Kaminsky et al 1998) in addition to being caused 
amongst countries that share common domestic macroeconomic fundamentals or 
experience common external shocks. Finally, the extent to which economic 
integration into the world economy, an important facet of economic globalization, is 
a driver of regulatory convergence with international standards is also investigated 
by measuring the level of countries‟ international trade. Countries that are highly 
integrated into the global economy are expected to converge with Basel II earlier 
and fully. 
Banking sector variables 
The size of a banking system, measured by the value of private credit to GDP, is an 
important dimension of banking sector development. This variable measures the 
asset side of a bank‟s balance sheet and captures the relative importance of credit 
allocation by the banking sector in the economy. Banking sector size is expected to 
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be positively associated with the degree of convergence with Basel II. Where credit 
intermediation through banks is relatively less important for the economy, the pace 
and scope of convergence with Basel II is expected to be lower. The presence of 
foreign banks is also expected to be an important driver of Basel II implementation 
in host countries. This is partly because “most subsidiaries of global banks… will be 
in a better position to adopt the more sophisticated versions of Basel II once they are 
allowed by domestic regulations, as they can leverage on the progress made by their 
European and U.S.-based parents” (Standard & Poor‟s 2007). Indeed, the FSI found 
that “[o]ne of the major drivers for moving to Basel II in non-BCBS jurisdictions 
seems to be the intended implementation of this framework locally by foreign-
controlled banks or local branches of foreign banks” (FSI 2004:1). However, its 
effect may be conditional on whether international banks have implemented Basel II 
in their home country and implementation costs not being prohibitively high due to 
the lack of basic banking infrastructure to support implementation in host countries. 
Governments with large stakes in the banking sector may have considerable 
effects on Basel II implementation, although whether they promote or hinder 
implementation is unclear. For example, state-owned banks are major providers of 
credit in China and India (Mihaljek 2006:42-43). Despite the lack of financial sector 
development, India was one of the first developing countries to implement the basic 
approaches of Basel II and China implemented the advanced approaches, but not the 
SA (CBRC 2007). On the other hand, in Uruguay, because government-owned 
banks retained a 50% share in the financial system, while the remaining half was 
predominantly controlled by Basel II-knowledgeable global banks, market players 
either fell in the category of little risk management sophistication or up-to-date risk 
management practices. However, due to the relatively more influential government-
owned banks, the regulators‟ choice was to implement only the basic approaches of 
Basel II. (Standard and Poor‟s 2007) The effect of market concentration on Basel II 
implementation is expected to be positive since a few large banks are likely to 
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possess the necessary resources to implement Basel II and benefit from greater 
economies of scale from the high upfront investments required for implementing 
Basel II. Furthermore, for supervisors, the presence of a few large banks that are of 
systemic importance to the financial system may act as an added incentive to 
encourage systemic banks to enhance risk management standards by implementing 
Basel II. The bank concentration ratio is measured by the assets of the three largest 
banks as a share of total commercial banks‟ assets. 
To test whether the level of capital in the banking system prior to the 
implementation of Basel II affects the level of Basel II implementation, regulatory 
measures based on Basel I and non-regulatory measures of capital to asset ratios are 
included in the regression analysis. Countries with higher capital ratios are 
hypothesized to implement Basel II earlier and adopt the IRB approaches. This is 
based on the expectation that incentives to save capital costs will drive convergence 
with Basel II. The IRB approaches were calibrated by the Basel Committee to 
produce lower capital requirements compared to Basel I and the SA as a way of 
incentivising banks to adopt more sophisticated risk management practices. The 
incentives to save capital may be greater for countries, especially emerging 
economies, where supervisors have historically required regulatory capital adequacy 
ratios above the Basel minimum of 8% and banks have held capital buffers above 
the already higher regulatory requirements. 
Variables measuring the development of infrastructure, in particular, those 
that are seen as prerequisites for implementing Basel II are also included. Countries 
may face similar practical constraints that lead them to adopt similar implementation 
policies. The IAS dummy variable captures the adoption of internationally accepted 
accounting standards, which is seen by the Basel Committee as a precondition to the 
effective implementation of Basel II because it increases the transparency and 
consistency of capital ratios and thus their comparability across countries (BCBS 
2004a:6). The adoption of internationally accepted accounting standards may also 
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proxy for countries‟ general propensity to adopt international financial standards. 
Secondly, since SA implementation in most countries is the first step towards 
implementing Basel II, the availability and access to credit information is potentially 
a significant precondition towards achieving convergence with Basel II and is thus 
captured in the regression analysis.  
Political variables  
In a study of Basel I implementation, Ho (2002) finds that the measure of 
democratic institutions was the most robust variable affecting the likelihood of 
implementation and gives credence to democratic legalist theories of international 
law which contend that democracies are more likely to comply with international 
agreements. To test whether this is also the case for Basel II, Polity IV (2009) is 
used to compute the POLITY 2 score, a unified polity scale ranging from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). In addition, the effects of party 
orientation and the proportion of seats held by the government in office are also 
incorporated in the analysis. Party orientation tests whether right of centre 
governments tend to favour the implementation of Basel II on grounds that it 
represents international best practices that may enhance the functioning of the 
domestic banking market, or are against the regulation of private enterprise 
compared to leftist governments. 
Regulatory policies may also converge across countries not due to policy 
diffusion, but because governments are responding to pressures from powerful 
creditors such as the IMF to strengthen prudential standards for regulating bank 
capital. The official position of the IMF was that countries would not be criticized 
for not implementing Basel II and that it would not push countries to implement 
Basel II or any of the specific approaches in Pillar 1 (IMF 2005). However, there is 
also some anecdotal evidence to suggest that although not explicitly required by the 
IMF, borrowing countries may feel under pressure to commit to undertake policy 
reforms which they believe will please the IMF (i.e. implicit coercion). For example, 
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some countries, such as Ghana, have expressed their intent to implement Basel II in 
their Letters of Intent to the IMF (IMF 2009a; 2010a).
9
 Although not explicitly 
coerced, persuasion, especially amongst sympathetic national elites, may foster the 
diffusion of policies (Chwieroth 2009). To test for any effects that borrowing from 
the IMF may have on the degree of convergence with Basel II, countries in receipt 
of IMF credit have been coded with a dummy variable to proxy IMF pressure. 
Finally, it is necessary to control for cases where Basel II implementation 
was explicitly coordinated among countries. The CRD is legally binding in EU 
member states, necessitating the need to control for EU membership. Since the 
implementation of Basel II in the EU is an exceptional case of explicit policy 
coordination, the regression analysis also tests whether treating the EU as one 
observation rather than twenty seven individual observations makes any difference 
to the results. In addition, G20 membership may be another instance of policy 
coordination. The London summit declaration stated that “all G20 countries should 
progressively adopt the Basel II capital framework” (G20 2009), and a 2011 
deadline was attached in the subsequent Pittsburgh Summit (G20 2009a:8). 
However, when these commitments were made, most non-Basel Committee 
members of the G20 had already implemented Basel II and of the countries that had 
not, G20 policy commitments merely repeated implementation plans already in 
place and did not conflict with measurements in the dataset. Hence, a variable 
controlling for G20 membership is not included considering the direction of 
causality between these variables. Table 8 summarizes the variables and data 
sources.   
                                                 
9
 Countries such as Georgia (IMF 2012), Mozambique (IMF 2012a), Malawi (IMF 2012b) and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (IMF 2012c) have also indicated their intents on implementing Basel II in 
their letters of intent to the IMF.  
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Table 8: Summary of Variables and Data Sources 
 
Description Data Source
Basel II 
implementation
Based on Basel II implementation dataset compiled by 
the author
Basel II implementation dataset
Networks of bank 
supervisors
Membership of 11 established international supervisory 
groups. 
Report on International 
Developments in Banking 
Supervision (BCBS 2006); Basel II 
implementation dataset.
Cross-border bank 
structure
Percentage of foreign bank presence in the domestic 
banking sector.
Claessens et al (2008); Barth et al 
(2008); Basel II implementation 
dataset.
Competition for 
capital
Standard & Poor's long term sovereign foreign credit 
ratings for 126 sovereign governments.
RatingsDirect: Sovereign Ratings 
And Country T&C Assessments 
(Standard and Poor's 2009); Basel 
II implementation dataset.
International 
economic exchange
Imports in US dollars. IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Database (IMF 2010); Basel II 
implementation dataset.
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population in constant U.S. dollars in 
thousands.
World Bank national accounts data 
(WDI).
Systemic banking 
crisis
Dummy variable to indicate occurrence of a systemic 
banking crisis during 1996-2007.
Laeven and Valencia (2010).
Trade (% of GDP) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of GDP.
World Bank national accounts data 
(WDI).
Private credit / GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and bank-like 
other financial institutions to GDP.
IMF‟s International Financial 
Statistics (2008).
Bank capital to 
assets ratio (% per 
Basel I)
Actual risk-adjusted capital ratio in banks using Basel I 
as of yearend 2005 (only Nigeria and Venezuela had 
indicated that risk weights were not in line with Basel 
I)
Barth et al (2008).
Market 
concentration
Equals the ratio of the three largest banks‟ assets to 
total banking sector assets in 2005
Fitch's BankScope database.
Government 
ownership
Fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that 
are government owned.
Barth et al (2008).
Foreign ownership Fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that 
are foreign owned.
Claessens et al (2008).
IAS adoption Adoption of accounting practices for banks in 
accordance with International Accounting Standards.
Barth et al (2008).
Credit depth of 
information index
Measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and 
quality of credit information available through public or 
private credit registries (0=low to 6=high).
World Bank, Doing Business 
project.
Democracy The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the 
AUTOC score from the DEMOC score.
Polity IV (2009).
Partisanship Right to Centre party orientation with respect to 
economic policy. EXECRLC variable,
DPI (2010).
Government 
fragmentation
Fraction of seats held by the government. DPI (2010)
EU membership Dummy variable to indicate 27 EU Member States and 
Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway which implemented 
EU's CRD as part of EEA membership.
http://europa.eu
Political variables
Variables
Dependent variable
Policy Diffusion Variables
Macroeconomic variables
Banking sector variables
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The variables are measured as at year-end of 2005 to avoid them being affected by 
Basel II implementation rather than the other way round, and to reflect the 
circumstances when countries were formulating their Basel II implementation 
policies. 
 
3.4 Findings 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 9. Models (1)-(6) show 
the results of models including the spatial lag variables that test the effects of policy 
diffusion across inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of 
international banks, competition for capital and the structure of international 
economic exchange. Models (7)-(10) regress only the non-diffusion explanatory 
variables. In the model selection process, government ownership, market 
concentration and international trade from Models (8)-(9) were dropped because 
they were persistently statistically insignificant. The results presented here are that 
of the spatial ordinary least squares (OLS) model, or the S-OLS model, where the 
coefficients are OLS estimates. The estimation of spatial lag models using S-OLS in 
Models (1)-(6) could lead to inconsistent estimates of the regression parameters 
because spatial models exploit the dependence structure between observations, 
resulting in the regressors and the error term being correlated (Beck et al 2006; 
Franzese and Hays 2007). However, Franzese and Hays show that S-OLS “performs 
acceptably under low-to-moderate interdependence strength and reasonable sample 
dimensions” (2007:140). Jahn argues that “S-OLS is most effective when diffusion 
is significant but not dominant” (2006:412; see also Swank 2006; Cao 2010).10 The 
S-OLS and maximum likelihood estimation should not make much difference and 
perform reasonably well for the following reasons.
11
  
                                                 
10
 See Franzese and Hays (2007) for a summary of the statistical debate. 
11
 Comments provided by Dr Eric Neumayer (LSE) and Dr Steve Gibbons (LSE). 
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Table 9: Results of Regression Analysis 
Policy Diffusion Variables
Supervisory networks 0.36 *** 0.24 ** 0.34 ***
Cross-border bank structures 1.08 *** 0.70 ** 0.89 ***
Competition for capital 0.64 *** 0.39 **
Economic exchange 0.41 ** 0.16
Macroeconomic variables
GDP per capita 0.45 *** 0.39 ** 0.16 0.42 *** 0.25 0.43 *** 0.44 *** 0.57 ***
Systemic banking crisis 3.73 * 6.01 *** 3.52 * 5.06 ** 3.98 * 4.70 ** 4.95 ** 4.59 ***
International trade 0.01
Banking sector variables
Private credit to GDP 7.55 ** 9.41 *** 1.90 7.75 ** 2.41 7.51 ** 9.78 ** 18.37 ***
Foreign ownership 0.06 ** -0.23 ** 0.03 0.04 -0.14 -0.17 * 0.05 0.11 **
IAS 3.26 5.50 ** 5.93 ** 3.93 6.37 *** 5.16 ** 3.63 10.14 ***
Credit information 0.46 1.00 0.73 1.18 * 1.05 * 0.82 0.66 1.81 **
Bank capital to assets ratio -37.63 -37.03 * -33.98 * -34.77 * -37.01 ** -40.14 ** -36.38 * -65.75 **
Government ownership 0.02
Market concentration 1.97
Political variables
EU 12.89 *** 20.20 *** 14.41 *** 17.73 *** 9.16 ** 12.53 *** 21.30 *** 25.70 *** 28.16 ***
Democracy -0.13 -0.36 -0.22 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.24 0.36 *
IMF Coercion -0.27 0.56 1.92 -1.40 2.53 1.04 -1.41 -7.38 ***
Rigth-Centre government -3.62 * -3.10 -7.68 *** -4.43 * -4.75 ** -2.59 -4.79 ** 1.25
Majority -3.53 -6.71 -13.49 ** -5.99 -11.17 ** -5.94 -5.31 4.00
 R-squared 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.73 0.57 0.68
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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First, the degree of contagion is not very strong because the coefficient of the spatial 
lag variables are not high and between 0.36 and 0.64 (except in Model (2)), in which 
case the S-OLS and maximum likelihood estimation does not make much difference. 
Secondly, the S-OLS should not be far off since the degree of contagion is not 
strong on empirical grounds. This is because the adoption of a particular Basel II 
policy in one country does not automatically or necessarily translate to changes in 
implementation policies in other countries. Finally, the degree of endogeneity may 
not be severe since the variables and the connectivity matrices are lagged in time, a 
chronology that makes more sense for the causal logic of diffusion as well (Elkins, 
Guzman and Simmons 2006:830). 
 
3.4.1 The effects of policy diffusion  
The statistical results provide strong and consistent evidence to confirm the 
hypothesis that on average, policy diffusion is an important driver of regulatory 
convergence with Basel II around the world. The coefficients of all spatial lag 
variables are positively associated with Basel II implementation and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in models (1)-(3) and at 5% in model (4). The magnitude 
of these effects are moderate at the global level in the sense that countries on 
average do not over-react to policy changes in other countries by responding 
disproportionately more to such changes, but instead match their policies at most. Of 
the four channels of diffusion modelled in the analysis, the diffusion of Basel II 
across the cross-border structure of international banks appear to have the largest 
effect on the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II.  
The effect of policy diffusion across networks of bank supervisors in Model 
(1) is statistically significant at the 1% level and provides strong evidence that 
policy diffusion is positively associated with the level Basel II implementation 
across this channel of diffusion. The magnitude of the diffusion effect is positive and 
0.36, suggesting that the Basel II implementation score increases by that amount on 
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average in a given country for a point increase in the average Basel II 
implementation score amongst other supervisors in the same supervisory network. 
The spatial lag variable representing the diffusion of Basel II across the cross-border 
structure of international banks in Model (2) is also statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient is positive and the largest in magnitude compared to the other 
spatial lag variables, indicating that the effects of policy diffusion across global 
banks is strongest in driving Basel II implementation. When foreign banks have the 
capacity to implement Basel II because their parent bank in the home jurisdiction 
had already done so, the host jurisdictions respond to the policies of the foreign 
banks‟ home jurisdiction almost on a like-for-like basis. Furthermore, in developing 
countries, international banks potentially provide the most powerful channel for high 
levels of Basel II implementation to diffuse because diffusion across bank 
supervisors and financial sectors tend to reinforce only low levels of implementation.  
Model (3) provides strong evidence that competition among financial sectors 
to attract international capital may lead to the diffusion of Basel II and hence 
promote the degree of Basel II implementation at the global level. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.64 suggests policymakers believe that the 
implementation of Basel II will provide a positive competitive edge for the 
implementing country relative to their rivals. This may motivate other countries that 
compete for the same pool of international capital to follow suit in implementing 
Basel II. The results in Model (4) show that the effect of policy diffusion across the 
structure of international economic exchange is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. On average, a country increases its Basel II implementation score by 0.41 in 
response to a point increase in the average Basel II implementation scores of those 
countries with which that country has relatively extensive economic ties.  
All the spatial lag variables are combined in Model (5). The connectivity 
matrices should be sufficiently different, and not contain entirely overlapping 
information in order to reduce the degree of endogeneity (Beck et al 2006:31). Table 
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10 presents the correlations of the spatial lag variables. The diffusion of Basel II 
across inter-supervisory authority networks and countries that compete for capital 
appear to be moderately correlated.  
Table 10: Correlation between spatial lag variables 
 
The parameter estimates in model (5) suggest that the spatial lag variables 
representing supervisory networks, international banks and competition for capital 
are statistically significant at the 5% level although the variable for international 
economic exchange is insignificant. The first two variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level when the variable representing competition 
for capital is dropped in Model (6). In this model, the diffusion of policies across the 
cross-border structures of international banks has a stronger impact on Basel II 
implementation than diffusion across networks of bank supervisors. These results 
also indicate that the diffusion of Basel II due to interdependencies formed at the 
actor-level, that is, the way banks and bank supervisors are interconnected to their 
foreign counterparts, has stronger and more convincing effects on the 
implementation of Basel II than the effects of policy diffusion at the financial sector 
or economy-level. Diffusion channels at the industry sector- or economy-level may 
be too blunt to capture the way countries are interdependent with one another in 
explaining the timing and scope of Basel II implementation relative to the diffusion 
of policies across interdependencies formed at the actor-level. To this end, the more 
precise and empirically relevant specification of the channels of diffusion in relation 
to the policy that was hypothesized to diffuse produced stronger results in favour of 
the policy diffusion hypothesis. 
Supervisory 
networks
Cross-border 
bank structure
Competition 
for capital
International 
economic 
exchange
Supervisory networks 1.000
Cross-border bank structure
Competition for capital
International economic exchange        0.404                0.118                0.400                1.000
       0.186                1.000
       0.598                0.041                1.000
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3.4.2 The effects of control variables 
The regression analysis underscores the significance of the effects of economic 
development on Basel II implementation across the world. Economic development 
measured by GDP per capita has relatively consistent and statistically significant 
effects on Basel II implementation across the estimated models. Evidence that low 
income countries tend to be associated with lower levels of Basel II implementation 
highlights the challenges developing countries face in implementing Basel II to the 
extent that economic development reflects the implementation capabilities of banks 
and supervisors in those countries. In countries where credit intermediation through 
banks is relatively more important for the economy and the credit market more 
developed, the pace and scope of convergence with Basel II is greater. Of the 
variables that measured banking sector infrastructure, adopting internationally 
accepted accounting standards is statistically significant in several models. The 
positive and large point estimates suggest a potentially sizeable effect on Basel II 
implementation, equivalent to a country that has not adopted IAS to delay 
implementing the basic approaches of Pillar 1 and Pillars 2 and 3 by a year on 
average. This may be evidence that countries that meet the preconditions for 
implementing Basel II do indeed implement Basel II earlier and in full or be a 
reflection of countries that generally have a higher propensity to adopt international 
standards. The coefficient of the variable measuring the average level of regulatory 
capital in the banking system based on Basel I prior to the implementation of Basel 
II was statistically significant and negative. This disconfirmed the expectation that 
potential capital incentives to benefit from lower capital requirements arising from 
the implementation of the advanced approaches of Basel II motivated the timely and 
full implementation of Basel II across countries. In the face of high upfront 
implementation costs, it may be the developed banking systems that also tend to 
maintain lower capital levels than emerging and developing countries that attain 
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higher levels of convergence with Basel II. The results also provide support to the 
argument that experiencing a systemic banking crisis prior to the implementation of 
Basel II promotes greater regulatory convergence in line with international standards. 
The magnitude of the partial effect of experiencing a systemic banking crisis is 
approximately 5. This is equivalent to implementing the basic approaches of Pillar 1, 
Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 approximately one year earlier on average in countries that 
experienced a systemic banking crisis. Conversely, countries that did not experience 
a crisis may adopt a more protracted implementation timetable. Furthermore, 
dropping the crisis variable to account for the possibility that crises could occur 
amongst interrelated countries did not affect the robustness of the results. The 
coefficients of the spatial lag variables were positively associated with Basel II 
implementation and statistically significant at the 1% level in models (1)-(3) and at 
10% in model (4) without the crisis variable. The size of the coefficient increased 
marginally to 0.42, and 0.71 in models (1) and (3), and decreased marginally to 0.71 
and 0.4 in models (2) and (4).
 
The results provide mixed support to the hypothesis that the overall level of 
foreign bank presence promotes Basel II implementation. This may be due to the 
following countervailing factors. Subsidiaries of global banks tend to be better 
prepared to adopt the advanced approaches of Basel II by leveraging the progress 
made by their Basel II-knowledgeable parent banks, and hence can promote Basel II 
implementation. Furthermore, the marginal cost of implementation is likely to 
decrease as international banks roll-out centrally developed Basel II models and 
processes across a greater number of jurisdictions with minimum divergences, and 
this could give them an advantage against local banks for which implementation 
costs could be higher. Yet, despite potentially possessing the resources and 
capabilities to implement Basel II, their effect is conditional on whether the home 
country supervisor had implemented Basel II and implementation costs not being 
prohibitively high due to the lack of basic banking infrastructure to support 
109 
 
implementation in host countries. The coefficient of the government ownership 
variable was statistically insignificant despite anecdotal evidence of the effects 
government-owned banks had on the way Basel II was implemented. This may 
indeed be due to the lack of regularities across countries in relation to the role of 
government-owned banks as discussed in the cases of China, India and Uruguay. 
As for the political variables, the party orientation variable suggests that right 
of centre governments tend to disfavour introducing more extensive regulations by 
implementing Basel II, and do not see Basel II as representing international best 
practices that may enhance the functions of the banking market. Leftist governments 
may be more willing to regulate banks by implementing Basel II. The coefficient 
estimates for the level of democracy is not statistically significant in explaining 
Basel II implementation across the world. This contradicts Ho‟s argument that 
democracies are more likely to comply with international standards. There is also no 
evidence to support the argument that IMF coercion via conditionality had 
systematic effects on the implementation of Basel II. However, EU membership is 
highly significant as expected. From the perspective of understanding the drivers of 
convergence across the world, the EU is probably the single most significant factor 
in explaining the degree of convergence with Basel II, since outside the EU, 
convergence with Basel II is limited.
 
Considering the importance of the EU variable 
and that it is an exceptional case of explicit policy coordination to achieve policy 
harmonization, the regression analysis also tested whether treating the twenty-seven 
EU member states as one observation made any difference to the results. Doing so 
did not affect the variables that were statistically significant. That EU membership 
explains a significant proportion of the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel 
II at the global level suggests that formal institutions and explicit policy 
coordination, rather than policy diffusion, is more effective in promoting 
convergence with Basel II. This in turn underscores the limitations of the current 
global regulatory framework, which consists of voluntary standards, in producing 
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convergence at the global level. Policy diffusion is a compelling driver of regulatory 
convergence, but with limitations in achieving the degree of convergence that 
legally binding arrangements are able to achieve. 
 
3.5 Limitations of the quantitative analysis 
To ensure the results of the quantitative analysis were robust, alternative weighting 
schemes were used to construct the Basel II implementation score and the twenty-
seven EU member states were treated as a single observation to account for the 
effects arising from formal policy coordination. Furthermore, the crisis variable was 
dropped in light of the possibility that financial crisis may also occur amongst 
interrelated countries. The results proved to be robust. There are however, more 
fundamental methodological problems to address. Although the quantitative analysis 
is highly informative in terms of assessing the average effects of variables on the 
degree of Basel II implementation across the world, it provides very limited insight 
into the policy making process at the country-level where policies actually diffuse 
across the various channels of diffusion modelled in the analysis. Statistical models 
tend to have clear and specific boundaries in terms of what can and cannot be 
explained and the spatial lag model is no exception. The following section discusses 
four limitations of the quantitative study and potential ways to overcome them in the 
case studies that are conducted in the subsequent three chapters. 
Firstly, to assess the degree of global regulatory convergence, measurements 
of the scope and timing of implementation were scaled and weighted to construct the 
Basel II implementation score. The objective of this measure was to devise a 
pragmatic measure of implementation that succinctly summarized, albeit with major 
simplifications, how countries implemented Basel II in a consistent and comparable 
way across 150 countries. This was by no means a comprehensive measure of Basel 
II implementation due to the highly simplified and standardized method for 
measuring implementation. This poses a significant drawback since there are no two 
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countries in the world that have implemented Basel II in exactly the same way. Even 
within the EU, there were variations in the way member states transposed the CRD 
into national legislation in the form of gold plating, non-implementation or partial 
implementation of the CRD (DLA Piper 2009) although these variations were less 
significant in the context of larger variations across the world. In order to attain a 
higher level of validity in the measurement of Basel II implementation, it is 
necessary to measure the substance of implementation, that is, the content of the 
regulations that implemented the three pillars of Basel II, albeit in a smaller number 
of cases. To this end, case studies allow the attainment of high levels of conceptual 
validity by enabling the identification and measurement of indicators that best 
represent the concepts that are intended to be measured and thus help to mitigate the 
risk of “conceptual stretching” associated with statistical studies that lump together 
dissimilar cases to get a larger sample (George and Bennett 2005:19). 
Secondly, the structure of interdependence between observations as specified 
by the connectivity matrix is not estimated in the regression model but instead 
assumed to be known a priori to the researcher (Beck et al 2006:28). Different yet 
equally justifiable specifications of the connectivity matrix can threaten the validity 
and reliability of inference by leading to differing results (Plümper and Neumayer 
2010:419). Defining and operationalizing each channel of policy diffusion from a 
theoretical concept to a connectivity matrix in the context of Basel II 
implementation is therefore a critical empirical task. For example, did policies 
actually diffuse across the network of supervisors and was this due to competitive 
pressures or learning from other supervisors? The challenge in convincingly arguing 
that a particular diffusion mechanism was driving policy diffusion is exacerbated by 
the fact that in practice, diffusion mechanisms “are sometimes commingled, and 
sometimes the lines between them are blurred” (Dobbin et al 2007:450). 
Corroborating the validity and reliability of the connectivity matrices with empirical 
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evidence from case studies would strengthen any causal claims attributable to policy 
diffusion in the quantitative study. 
Thirdly, the spatial model provides an efficient way to formally test the 
effects of policy diffusion by compressing an abundant amount of information about 
how each and every one of the 150 countries are interconnected with the rest of the 
149 countries in the dataset. However, this specification entails a trade-off since it is 
an attempt to measure the process of policy diffusion as reflected by the structure of 
interdependencies across observations. This is typical of large-N statistical methods, 
which generally tend to bias theory away from processes and toward structures 
(Odell 2001:170). The structural representation of a process significantly simplifies 
and standardizes a complex process of policy diffusion into a single quantifiable 
variable. Moreover, that countries are closely interconnected per se is not a 
sufficient condition for policies to diffuse in practice. Although the transformation 
involving the structural representation of a process is necessary to conduct 
regression analysis, if the research goal is to gain a detailed and contextual 
understanding of the causal process that drives Basel II implementation in a 
particular country, the structural representation of a process significantly falls short 
of examining the process of diffusion directly in case studies since Basel II 
implementation and policy diffusion both pertain to complex processes. Case studies 
are generally better than other methods for documenting processes, and the 
technique of process tracing in particular possesses a comparative advantage in 
unveiling complex causal processes that operate in individual cases. 
Finally, to model how policies diffuse, all four connectivity matrices were 
row normalized in order to capture the relative importance of other observations in 
influencing policy decisions rather than the absolute magnitude of interdependencies 
between observations. Thus, the spatial lag model does not test the effects that 
absolute levels of economic, political or social interdependencies may have on 
policy diffusion. For example, if bilateral trade flows are used to measure the degree 
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of influence trade partners Country C and D have on the policy choices of Country 
A and B, even if the absolute value of trade with Country C and D is $1 and $4, and 
$2billion and $8billion in country A and B respectively, policy decisions in country 
D is assumed to be four times more important than Country C to both Country A and 
B. The assumption that the effects of policy diffusion in small countries and large 
countries are uniform may be challenged on empirical grounds. Irrespective of the 
magnitude of interactions, as long as countries are interconnected to one another, 
policies are assumed to diffuse in the statistical model no matter how weak the 
interdependent relationship in absolute terms. This assumption may overestimate the 
effects of policy diffusion and does not take into account that different countries can 
have varying sensitivities to the effects of policy diffusion. The case study method 
offers potential solutions to overcome some of these methodological limitations. The 
next chapter outlines the design of the case studies and the case selection procedure 
in order to build on and complement the methods and results of the statistical 
analysis rather than to replicate them with a smaller number of cases. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. The first was to measure and assess the state of 
Basel II implementation across the world, and the second was to investigate the 
factors that explained how and when countries implemented Basel II, in particular, 
by testing the effects of policy diffusion. The degree of regulatory convergence with 
Basel II at the global level was limited by considerable cross-national variations in 
implementation, from early-comprehensive adopters to late-partial adopters and 
non-implementers. These variations produced a highly uneven and clustered global 
regulatory landscape for bank capital regulation, where convergence and divergence 
coexisted. There was a high degree of regulatory convergence amongst groups of 
countries that adopted similar implementation policies, although different groups of 
countries exhibited different levels of convergence with Basel II. Furthermore, the 
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uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape appeared to be more permanent 
than transitional for a large proportion of developing countries.  
To investigate what may have caused the uneven and clustered global 
regulatory landscape, quantitative methods were utilized. A test of the effects of 
policy diffusion on how and when countries implemented Basel II provided strong 
and consistent results to support the policy diffusion theory. There was a positive 
and statistically significant correlation between the Basel II implementation scores 
of countries, and the average Basel II implementation score of other countries with 
which those countries were closely interconnected to across channels of diffusion 
formed by supervisory networks, global banks, competition between financial 
sectors and the structure of international trade. Furthermore, countries that were not 
developing countries, had a sizeable and developed banking sector, maintained 
lower levels of regulatory capital in the banking system, experienced a systemic 
banking crisis and adopted international accounting standards prior to 
implementation were on average associated with higher levels of Basel II 
implementation than those that were not. Notwithstanding the many strengths of the 
quantitative study in testing the effects of policy diffusion, there were several 
methodological weaknesses that limited its explanatory power. These are addressed 
in the following four chapters, which are specifically devoted to unpacking the 
causal process through which policy diffusion reinforces convergence with Basel II 
in some countries whilst reinforcing partial, gradual or delayed implementation in 
others. 
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Chapter Four 
Case study design and case selection 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the design of the case studies conducted in the subsequent 
three chapters of this thesis. The aim of the case studies is to build on the results of 
the quantitative study conducted in the previous chapter by unpacking the causal 
process through which policy diffusion reinforces convergence with Basel II in 
some countries whilst reinforcing partial, gradual or delayed implementation in 
others. In contrast to the effects-of-causes approach adopted in the quantitative 
analysis that aimed to test the average effects of policy diffusion on Basel II 
implementation across the world, the case studies are firmly grounded on the causes-
of-effects approach aimed at explaining specific implementation outcomes at the 
country level (Mahoney and Goertz 2006:230). The mixed-method approach was 
adopted based on the recognition that certain aspects of the research question were 
more adequately addressed by statistical methods and other aspects by the case study 
method since case studies are generally strong precisely where statistical methods 
are weak and vice versa (George and Bennett 2005:19). In particular, “case studies 
remain much stronger at assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the 
outcome than at assessing how much it mattered” (ibid. p25). As a result, they offer 
potential solutions to overcome some of the methodological limitations discussed at 
the end of the previous chapter. The benefits of methodological triangulation may be 
particularly high precisely because statistical analysis and case studies embody 
distinct and often contrasting methodological orientations that can produce unique 
synergies when combined effectively into the research design. 
The case studies conducted in this thesis combine within-case analysis and 
cross-case comparisons within a single study to exploit the strongest means of 
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drawing causal inferences from case studies (George and Bennett 2005:18). Three 
pairs of case studies from Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Hong Kong are selected to 
investigate the process of policy diffusion and Basel II implementation across three 
different channels of diffusion formed by inter-supervisory authority networks, the 
cross-border structure of international banks, and competition between financial 
sectors to attract capital. The fourth channel of policy diffusion modelled by the 
structure of international economic exchange in the quantitative study is not 
investigated in the case studies due to the lack of variation in its effect on Basel II 
implementation, a point which is discussed in detail in the case selection section in 
4.3.2. To ensure that the most theoretically, empirically and methodologically 
relevant cases are selected, the three pairs of case studies are selected from the 
population of candidate cases using three case selection steps. These steps reflect 
binding theoretical scope conditions that may apply to the theory of policy diffusion, 
empirical considerations that take into account cases of explicit policy coordination 
and methodological considerations that aim to maximize variance in the policy 
diffusion variable under investigation, whilst controlling for the effects of other 
channels of policy diffusion and explanatory variables shown to be statistically 
significant in the quantitative study.  
This chapter proceeds in the following order. In section 4.2, the case study 
methods utilized in the within-case and cross-case analyses and the case selection 
procedures are discussed. This is followed by the application of the case selection 
procedure on the population of candidate cases and an overview of the three pairs of 
cases that are selected for the case studies in section 4.3. 
 
4.2 Case study design and methods 
The case studies are conducted by employing the within-case method of process 
tracing and the cross-case method of controlled comparison. Detailed within-case 
analysis employing the analytical explanation variant of the process tracing method 
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is conducted to unpack the casual process through which policy diffusion drives 
regulatory convergence in six case studies. These consist of three pairs of cases that 
investigate the diffusion of Basel II policies across three channels of policy diffusion 
formed by inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of 
international banks and competition for capital. Based on the within-case analyses, 
the cross-case comparative method of controlled comparison is undertaken for each 
pair of countries to investigate how the three channels of diffusion reinforced the 
degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II in one country whilst reinforcing 
partial, gradual or delayed implementation in the other. To conduct controlled 
comparisons, two cases that are comparable across several statistically significant 
explanatory variables, except for the key causal explanatory variable, whose 
variance may account for the different outcomes on the dependent variable, are 
selected for each of the three channels of policy diffusion. To reduce selection bias 
and maximize the validity of causal inferences, the case studies have been carefully 
selected from the population of cases for each of the three channels of diffusion 
according to a rigorous case selection procedure. The main design features of the 
case studies, that is, the within-case method of process tracing, cross-case method of 
controlled comparison and the case selection procedures, are discussed next. 
 
4.2.1 The within-case method of process tracing 
The process tracing method is used to unpack the casual process through which 
Basel II policies diffused and shaped the national implementation of Basel II in six 
cases. Process tracing involves uncovering the intervening causal process between 
independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and 
Bennett 2005:153,206). Its aim “is to establish which of several possible 
explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from 
hypothesized cause to observed effect. The power of process-tracing arises from the 
fact that it requires continuity and completeness in explaining a case (although there 
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are pragmatic limits on the ability or need to examine the infinite “steps between 
steps” in a temporal process).” (Bennett 2004:22-23) Of the several types of process 
tracing methods, the analytical explanation method is employed in this study. In this 
method of process tracing, historical narratives are converted into analytical causal 
explanations couched on explicit theoretical forms, resulting in an explanation that is 
“deliberately selective, focusing on what are thought to be particularly important 
parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation” (George and Bennett 2005:211). 
Adopting such method helps to focus the scope of process tracing on the particular 
channels of diffusion under investigation in each case study. 
Process-tracing is “fundamentally different from statistical analysis because 
it focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case, not on 
correlations of data across cases” as a source of causal inference (ibid. p13). 
Consequently, process tracing can “contribute in ways that statistical methods can 
only do with great difficulty (and it is often worthwhile even when sufficient cases 
exist for the concurrent use of statistical methods)” (ibid. p224). In fact, the distinct 
and often contrasting methodological orientations embodied in statistical analysis 
and the case study method can produce unique synergies when combined effectively 
into the research design. To this end, “one way to think about process tracing is a 
cross-check, a triangulation, that can be – and ought to be – applied to all results 
gained through formal methods… [P]rocess tracing, when employed in an adjunct 
fashion, is not intended to bear the entire burden of an empirical study. It offers 
supporting evidence.” (Gerring 2007:185)  
To ensure the acquisition of comparable data to conduct structured, focused 
comparisons across cases, a general framework consisting of the following three 
components is adopted in the within-case analysis. The framework helps to address 
the questions of what, how and why policies diffuse between the cases in a more 
systematic way in the comparative analysis. The first component involves specifying 
the paths through which policies diffuse by identifying the structure of 
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interdependencies between the country under investigation and the rest of the world 
formed by each channel of diffusion. The second component highlights the domestic 
policy making process, in particular, how national policy decisions are shaped by the 
policy decisions of other countries that are interconnected to the case under 
investigation via the channels of diffusion identified in the first component. The 
third component focuses on the areas of Basel II implementation that are shaped by 
the process of policy diffusion. This is summarized in Table 11.  
Table 11: General framework for within-case analysis 
Process of policy diffusion 
(1) The structure of interdependence (2) Domestic policy making process 
 Specifying the paths through which 
policies diffuse: identifying the 
counterparties (“significant others”) 
the country under investigation is 
interconnected to. 
 Reasons why significant others matter 
across the channels of diffusion 
 Nature of relationship and type of 
interaction (e.g. competitive, 
collaborative or coercive, ideational or 
material). 
 How and to whom the significant others 
matter in the domestic policy making 
process. 
 Areas of Basel II implementation 
influenced by significant others. 
 Key domestic considerations that affect 
implementation decisions as opposed to 
the effects of policy diffusion. 
 
 
 
 
 Effects of policy diffusion on national implementation 
(3) Areas of Basel II implementation shaped by the process of policy diffusion 
 Overall timetable and scope of implementation (e.g. which approaches to implement 
and how) 
 Content of Pillar 1 
 Content of Pillar 2  
 Content of Pillar 3  
 
Focusing the case studies on the above components helps to address some of 
the weaknesses of quantitative methods discussed in Chapter Three in a more 
purposeful way, and thus helps strengthen any causal claims attributable to policy 
diffusion. Empirical evidence from the first component can help corroborate the 
validity and reliability of the connectivity matrices, which are not estimated in the 
regression model, but instead assumed to be known a priori to the researcher. The 
second component addresses the empirical void between the independent variable 
120 
 
and the policy diffusion variable that resulted from measuring the process of policy 
diffusion with a structure of interdependencies (i.e. the structural representation of a 
process). Furthermore, empirical evidence will help evaluate the validity of the 
assumptions regarding the uniform effects of policy diffusion across small and large 
countries that followed from the row normalization of the connectivity matrices. 
Finally, measuring the substance of implementation, that is, the content of the 
regulations and policy measures that implemented the three pillars of Basel II in the 
third component will help to attain a higher level of conceptual validity in the 
measurement of Basel II implementation, albeit in a smaller number of cases.  
 
4.2.2 The cross-case method of controlled comparison 
The logic of Mill‟s method of difference is integral to the strategy of controlled 
comparison and involves comparing similar cases that are comparable in all respects 
except for the key causal explanatory variable, whose variance may account for 
differences in the outcome. The logic of elimination is employed to exclude 
conditions present in both cases as candidate causes for the variance in the outcome. 
Since a condition present in both cases cannot account for the difference in the 
outcomes, a cause or condition that survives this method of elimination can be 
regarded as associated with the outcome. (George and Bennett 2005:156) In order to 
unravel the process through which Basel II policies diffused across the channels of 
diffusion formed by supervisory networks, global banks and competition between 
financial sectors, two cases are selected for each channel of diffusion to undertake 
controlled comparisons such that the variance in the policy diffusion variable is 
maximized. The effects of the level of economic and banking sector development, 
EU membership and the channels of diffusion other than the one under investigation 
are held as constant as possible between the two cases. Maximizing variance in the 
key explanatory variable whilst holding constant other competing explanations helps 
to maximize the validity of casual inferences. 
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George and Bennett contend that the method of controlled comparison based 
on Mill‟s methods is most effective when combined with within-case methods such 
as process tracing because together, they provide one of the strongest means of 
drawing causal inferences from case studies (2005:18). This is because there are 
several demanding assumptions that constrain and limit the usefulness of Mill‟s 
methods in identifying underlying causal relations. For example, when there is 
uncertainty that all possibly relevant independent variables have been identified or 
that the study has included a sufficient variety of cases of the phenomenon, 
inferences in both methods of agreement and difference could be spurious and 
invalid (ibid. p156). Process tracing can greatly reduce the risks of inferential errors 
that could arise from the isolated use of controlled comparison based on Mill‟s 
method of comparison and act as a safeguard that provides an additional check on 
the results of cross-case comparisons (ibid. p223). Moreover, when it is not possible 
to find cases similar in every respect but one, which is the basic requirement of 
controlled comparisons, process tracing can help to assess whether each of the 
potential causal variables in the imperfectly matched cases can or cannot be ruled 
out as having causal significance (ibid. p215). The next section outlines the case 
selection procedure that has been devised to apply the method of controlled 
comparison effectively. 
 
4.2.3 Case selection procedure 
The following three case selection steps are applied to the population of candidate 
cases to ensure that the most theoretically, empirically and methodologically 
relevant case studies are selected. First, for the purpose of devising a more stringent 
test of how policies diffuse, the case selection takes into consideration possible 
scope conditions that may limit the explanatory power of a theory. Scope conditions 
should be expanded or narrowed because a theory‟s failure to explain a particular 
case may be due to “contextual conditions that rendered the theory inapplicable 
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(which would require only a narrowing of the theory‟s scope conditions)… While 
theories need to be developed into a testable form, a theory should not be forced into 
predictions beyond its scope; this lead to the creation of an easily discounted “straw 
man” version of the theory” (George and Bennett 2005:116). Scope conditions 
relating to countries‟ basic capacity to implement Basel II as reflected by the level of 
development are incorporated into the case selection procedure to avoid refuting the 
policy diffusion theory decisively and too quickly on the basis of a handful of cases 
that fall outside the scope of the policy diffusion theory. Such cases are eliminated 
from the population of cases since no matter how strong the effects of policy 
diffusion in promoting the implementation of Basel II, capacity constraints as 
reflected in the low state of development may override the effects of policy diffusion 
and hinder the implementation of Basel II. 
In the second step, cases where Basel II implementation was formally 
binding or subject to explicit expectations are eliminated from the remaining 
population of cases on the basis that the aim of the cases studies is to unpack the 
causal process through which policy diffusion, a process of uncoordinated yet 
interdependent policy adoption, reinforces high, medium or low levels of Basel II 
implementation. The third step of the case selection procedure follows the “purist 
advice” for case selection, which suggest that “the best “intentional” design selects 
observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variables (and any control 
variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables” in order to reduce 
the potential for introducing bias in inference (King et al 1994:140). Furthermore, in 
order to avoid suffering the effects of omitted variable bias, the case selection should 
control for variables that are not of primary interest, but nonetheless have a 
substantial effect on the dependent variable (ibid.). The rich data and results of the 
regression analysis from the previous chapter are utilized to assist the case selection 
process in this regard such that the maximum explanatory leverage can be gained. 
Two cases that are comparable in all respects except for the key causal explanatory 
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variable are selected for each of the three channels of diffusion investigated in the 
case studies. The statistically significant variables from the regression analysis are 
used to determine the control variables that constitute the most similar aspects of 
cases in the controlled comparison.  
Since the case studies are selected from the population of cases, the four 
channels of diffusion across 150 countries correspond to 600 data points, whilst 
there are over a thousand observational values of statistically significant control 
variables. To aid the case selection procedure, a truth table is constructed to 
methodologically organize the vast amount of information and select cases in a 
systematic way. The truth table sorts the data into different combinations of the 
independent variable and their associated outcomes (Ragin 1987:87). Each logical 
combination of values on the independent variables is represented as one row of the 
truth table and an output value is assigned to each row. This produces a cross-
tabulation of causes and effects in addition to the distribution of the 150 country 
observations for each configuration of cause and effect, thus assisting the selection 
of cases based on the explanatory variables. Moreover, cross-tabulating the cause 
and effect focuses investigators to “get very close to their data and become familiar 
with their cases as they try to pinpoint key differences between cases. The search for 
invariance encourages greater specificity in casual arguments and often leads to the 
development of important distinctions between subtypes of social phenomena.” 
(Ragin 1987:51-52) In the following section, the method for constructing the truth 
table is explained before the three case selection steps are applied. 
 
4.3 Case selection  
4.3.1 Construction of the truth table  
In the truth table shown in Table 12, countries are sorted into fifty-four causal paths 
that represent different combinations of three explanatory variables corresponding to 
policy diffusion, the state of development and EU membership, and the outcome 
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variable. The logical combinations of these variables are created by first converting 
the policy diffusion variable, development variable and output values used in the 
quantitative study from nominal-scale measures to categorical variables consisting 
of three equally sized categories, except for EU membership which is binomial, 
according to the following four steps. First, to construct the policy diffusion column, 
the four policy diffusion variables used in the quantitative study are each divided 
into equal sized high (“H”), medium (“H”) and low (“L”) categories depending on 
the value of the spatial lag variable. In the H category, where the value of the spatial 
lag variable is between forty and twenty-eight, policy diffusion is expected to 
promote a high level of Basel II implementation since countries in this category are 
interconnected to other countries that have on average attained a high level of Basel 
II implementation. In the M category, where the spatial lag variable is between 
twenty seven and thirteen, countries are interconnected to other countries that have 
on average implemented Basel II gradually or partially. In the L category, where the 
spatial lag variable is between zero and twelve, countries are interconnected to 
others that have on average attained a low level of Basel II implementation.  
Secondly, the level of development is measured across the dimensions of 
economic and banking sector development. For the level of economic development, 
the World Bank 2006 income classification of high, middle and low income 
countries are used to group countries into high, medium and low development 
categories. The level of financial sector and banking sector development is measured 
by the relative development of capital markets to the banking sector, and the size of 
the banking sector relative to the economy. These measures are divided into three 
equal sized groups representing high, medium and low development categories to 
obtain a measure of the average level of development. A score of two is assigned to 
countries with a high state of development, one to a medium state of development 
and zero to a low state of development for each of the three dimensions of 
development and then averaged to produce a measure that summarizes the overall 
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level of development of a country into high, medium and low categories. Thirdly, 
EU and non-EU countries are distinguished in the EU column. Finally, three equally 
sized categories have been constructed to represent high, medium and low levels of 
Basel II implementation in the same way as countries were categorized for the 
policy diffusion variables to complete the cross-tabulation of the independent and 
dependent variables. 
Fifty-four causal paths based on different combinations of the explanatory 
variables and outcomes are presented in Table 12. Different combinations of policy 
diffusion, development and EU categories that each represents a possible causal path 
are assigned an output value indicating the level of Basel II implementation. The EU 
rows at low and medium levels of Basel II implementation are collapsed as they are 
empty sets. The four letters for each category in the first column summarize a 
particular casual path and outcome. For example the HHYH category in the first row 
of Table 12 are cases where countries are subject to the effects of policy diffusion 
that promote high levels of Basel II implementation (H---), are highly developed (-
H--), members of the EU (--Y-) and have attained a high level of Basel II 
implementation (---H). The distributions of the 150 countries for each of the four 
channels of diffusion are indicated in the count of countries columns. There are 
twenty-one, one, fourteen and twenty cases in this category for each of the four 
channels of diffusion. Likewise, there are thirty-five, twenty-seven, thirty-six and 
one cases in the LLNL category in the last row, which refers to the distribution of 
cases that are not a member of the EU (--N-), interconnected to countries that 
attained a low level of Basel II implementation (L---), have a low level of 
development (-L--) and have attained a low level of Basel II implementation (---L) 
for each of the four channels of diffusion.  
The overall distribution of cases for each channel of diffusion shown in the 
last four columns provide evidence that is largely consistent with the policy 
diffusion theory in explaining Basel II implementation. The high number of cases in 
126 
 
the LLNL and LMNL categories suggests that countries that are interconnected to 
other countries that have attained low levels of implementation have also attained 
low levels of implementation. Likewise, Basel II implementation tends to be gradual 
or partial when policy diffusion also promotes gradual or partial implementation. 
Table 12: Distribution of countries based causal paths 
 
The causal paths that are theoretically possible, but not observable in practice, that is, 
the categories with zero observation counts, are particularly revealing and will help 
define the scope conditions of the policy diffusion theory, whereby the effects of 
policy diffusion on Basel II implementation may cease to be effective.  
Policy 
diffusion
State of 
development
EU 
membership
Supervisory 
networks
International 
bank 
structure
Competition 
for capital
International 
economic 
exchange
HHYH High High Yes High 21 1 14 20
HHNH High High No High 0 1 9 6
MHYH Medium High Yes High 0 7 7 1
MHNH Medium High No High 6 2 2 5
LHYH Low High Yes High 0 13 0 0
LHNH Low High No High 5 8 0 0
HHNM High High No Medium 0 0 1 6
MHNM Medium High No Medium 2 0 7 3
LHNM Low High No Medium 7 9 1 0
HHNL High High No Low 0 0 0 0
MHNL Medium High No Low 0 1 2 4
LHNL Low High No Low 5 4 3 1
HMYH High Medium Yes High 6 0 1 6
HMNH High Medium No High 0 0 0 1
MMYH Medium Medium Yes High 0 4 5 0
MMNH Medium Medium No High 1 0 0 0
LMYH Low Medium Yes High 0 2 0 0
LMNH Low Medium No High 0 1 1 0
HMNM High Medium No Medium 0 0 0 5
MMNM Medium Medium No Medium 7 4 4 8
LMNM Low Medium No Medium 6 9 9 0
HMNL High Medium No Low 0 0 0 25
MMNL Medium Medium No Low 12 10 7 28
LMNL Low Medium No Low 41 43 46 0
HLYH High Low Yes High 0 0 0 0
HLNH High Low No High 0 0 0 0
MLYH Medium Low Yes High 0 0 0 0
MLNH Medium Low No High 0 0 0 0
LLYH Low Low Yes High 0 0 0 0
LLNH Low Low No High 0 0 0 0
HLNM High Low No Medium 0 0 0 0
MLNM Medium Low No Medium 0 0 0 0
LLNM Low Low No Medium 0 0 0 0
HLNL High Low No Low 0 1 0 11
MLNL Medium Low No Low 1 8 0 24
LLNL Low Low No Low 35 27 36 1
Cat.
Key causal explanatory variables
Level of Basel 
II 
implementation
Count of countries by policy diffusion channels
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4.3.2 Application of the case selection steps 
Cases are selected from categories in the truth table that survive the following three 
case selection screening steps.  
Screening Step One 
The effects of policy diffusion on Basel II implementation may not extend across the 
entire development spectrum. At very low or high levels of development, applying 
the policy diffusion theory to explain regulatory decisions may be akin to creating 
an easily discountable straw man version of the theory. Refuting the policy diffusion 
theory with cases that fall outside the scope of a theory may be too easy or too hard 
and thus bias causal inferences. To devise a meaningful test that investigates the 
inner workings of the process of policy diffusion, it is necessary to take into account 
boundary conditions of the policy diffusion theory. A boundary condition may be 
binding when no matter how strong the effects of policy diffusion in encouraging 
high levels of Basel II implementation, policy diffusion mechanisms are unable to 
overcome the low capacity constraints owing to the low state of development (e.g. 
HLNL and HMNL). The positive count of countries in the HLNL category is 
consistent with evidence that less developed countries face significant capacity 
constraints in implementing Basel II. Furthermore, there are no cases in the HLNH 
category across all four channels of diffusion, suggesting that although this causal 
path is theoretically possible, observable evidence does not exist to support the 
argument that the effects of policy diffusion are strong enough to overcome the lack 
of development and encourage global regulatory convergence with Basel II.
1
  
                                                 
1
 There are also no cases in the less stringent categories of HL-M and ML--. The lack of cases in 
these categories can also be interpreted as suggesting that in practice, cases of mock compliance may 
not be observed in the most obvious and predictable places. This may be because sustainable mock 
compliance strategies can only be pursued when market or public actors find it difficult to detect and 
punish mock compliance (Walter 2008:5). 
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The truth table reveals an intriguing point about implementing Basel II in 
developing countries. Not only are developing countries constrained by their state of 
development to implement Basel II, less developed countries are rarely exposed to 
strong policy diffusion effects that encourage convergence with international 
regulatory standards across all four channels of diffusion in the first place.
2
 Some 
developing countries are interconnected to countries that have attained a high degree 
of convergence with Basel II, but only via the structure of international economic 
exchange, which tends to have a positive effect across all countries due to the 
overall directional flow of world trade where most countries trade relatively more 
with a few large advanced economies. Therefore, when the level of development is 
low, the prospects of converging with international standards are even poorer as 
policy diffusion tends to reinforce low levels of Basel II implementation.
3
 This is 
evidenced by the high frequency of countries in the LLNL category across the 
various channels of diffusion.  
Hence, cases from the lowest development category are not selected since a 
higher level of development may be required for policy diffusion to explain 
variations in Basel II implementation. When this prerequisite is not satisfied, policy 
diffusion may not provide a compelling explanation since it does not matter what the 
effects of policy diffusion are. Therefore, to devise a more stringent test of the 
casual process through which policy diffusion reinforces high, partial, gradual or 
low degrees of regulatory convergence with Basel II, cases from the lowest 
development category are excluded. The elimination of thirty six countries from the 
                                                 
2
 In other diffusion channels, only Lesotho is exposed to the effects of policy diffusion that promotes 
high levels of Basel II implementation due to its proximity with South Africa. 
3
 In developing countries, international banks potentially provide the most powerful channel for 
policy diffusion other than international economic exchange. Several African countries such as 
Ghana, Cameroon and Mozambique constitute the positive count in the MLNL category, although 
their level of Basel II implementation is very low. 
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low development category reduces the number of potential country case studies 
from 150 to 114.
4
 
Screening Step Two 
The twenty-seven EU member states, which include twenty-one countries in the 
high development category and six in the medium category, are excluded to control 
for cases of explicit policy coordination. Of the countries that remain, twenty-five 
are in the high development category with an average Basel II implementation score 
of twenty-three.
5
 In the mid-development category, several countries in South Asia, 
East Asia, and Latin America have implemented Basel II to a level comparable to 
some developed countries, although the majority have attained a low level of 
implementation. The remaining non-European members of the Basel Committee, 
namely, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United States, are also excluded to 
control for explicit expectations on the part of supervisors to implement Basel II. In 
total, thirty-three countries have been eliminated from the second case selection step. 
Screening Step Three 
In order to select cases on the explanatory variables, the degree of variation in the 
key explanatory variable for countries in the medium and high development 
categories are examined. The lack of variation in the key explanatory variable poses 
a challenge in investigating the causal process through which policy diffusion 
reinforces the uneven state of regulatory convergence using the method of difference. 
To this end, the diffusion of Basel II across the structure of international economic 
exchange is not investigated in the case studies because of the lack of variation in its 
effect on Basel II implementation. This policy diffusion channel tends to promote 
                                                 
4
 From the perspective of theory development, it is necessary to incorporate such boundary conditions 
to the policy diffusion theory and its predictions. Although binding boundary conditions may reduce 
the scope of generalizations that can be made, they allow narrower and well specified contingent 
generalizations to be made. The generalizability of policy diffusion as a causal factor may not extend 
across the entire development spectrum, but instead be limited to medium to high levels of 
development where countries have implementation capacities. 
5
 Norway and Iceland, which implemented EU‟s CRD as members of the EEA, are also excluded. 
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only high levels of Basel II implementation around the world, and this is partly due 
to the directional characteristics of international trade where most countries 
primarily trade with a few large developed countries. Furthermore, the lack of 
variation in the key explanatory variable amongst countries in the mid-development 
category precludes the investigation of the process through which policy diffusion 
may promote high levels of Basel II implementation. This is evidenced in the nil 
sub-totals of the HMNH, HMNM and HMNL categories across the policy diffusion 
channels in Table 12, except again, for the diffusion channel produced by 
international economic exchange. Thus, in order to uncover the process through 
which policy diffusion drives regulatory convergence using the method of controlled 
comparison, cases are selected from the high development category where the 
variation in the key explanatory variable is the greatest. The following cases have 
been selected from the remaining nineteen countries. 
 
4.3.3 Case selection for the controlled comparisons 
Three pairs of countries have been selected to investigate the process of policy 
diffusion across three channels of diffusion formed by inter-supervisory authority 
networks, the cross-border structure of international banks and competition for 
capital. For each policy diffusion channel, two cases are selected such that one 
country in interconnected to countries that have attained a relatively high level of 
Basel II implementation and the other is interconnected to countries that have 
attained a lower level of implementation while controlling for the effects of the other 
channels of diffusion, EU membership and the level of development. The policy 
diffusion channel under investigation is expected to reinforce the degree of 
regulatory convergence with Basel II in one country, whilst reinforcing partial, 
gradual or delayed implementation in the other. The cases that are compared are 
circled in Table 13, where the scores that summarize the strength of the effects of 
policy diffusion range from zero to forty. 
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Table 13: Case selection of comparative case studies across three policy diffusion 
channels 
 
The Malaysia-Chile Comparison  
A comparative analysis of Chile and Malaysia is conducted to uncover the causal 
process through with Basel II policies diffuse across inter-supervisory authority 
networks. As shown in Table 13, the similarities across the level of development and 
other channels of diffusion make Chile and Malaysia comparable cases to apply the 
method of controlled comparison. The effects of policy diffusion through the cross-
border structure of international banks, competition for capital and structure of 
international economic exchange are comparable. With respect to the level of 
development, Chile and Malaysia are both in the lower end of the high development 
category. However, Chilean supervisors are interconnected to bank supervisors in 
other countries that attained a relatively low level of Basel II implementation, 
whereas Malaysian supervisors are interconnected to supervisors in other countries 
that implemented Basel II relatively early and fully. By comparing these cases, the 
aim of the case study is to investigate whether the diffusion of policies across 
different supervisory networks can explain why the implementation of Basel II in 
countries clustered around different levels and forms of implementation, for 
example in clusters of early-comprehensive or late-partial adopters.  
The Korea-Malaysia comparison 
The aim of the comparative analysis of Korea and Malaysia is to uncover the 
process through which Basel II policies diffuse due to the presence of foreign banks 
Supervisory 
networks
Structure of 
international 
banks
Competition for 
capital
Economic 
exchange
Chile 7 9 25 28 H 4
Malaysia 24 5 24 28 H 20
South Korea 24 16 24 24 H 31
Hong Kong 23 23 39 27 H 35
Country
Channels of policy diffusion
Level of 
development
Basel II 
implementation 
score
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and the cross-border structure of international banks that they are part of, which 
define the way Korea and Malaysia are interconnected to the rest of the world. Since 
both countries are in the same supervisory network, it is possible to control for the 
effect this may have when investigating whether and how policy diffusion across the 
cross-border structure of international banks led to differences in the implementation 
of Basel II in Korea and Malaysia. Moreover, there is also a high degree of 
comparability between Korea and Malaysia in terms of the effects of policy 
diffusion from competition for capital and international economic exchange and 
across measures of development. The way one country is interconnected to another 
via the cross-border structure of international banks is expected to have significant 
implications on the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II attained in the 
host country. In the case of Korea, being interconnected to countries that have 
attained a high level of Basel II implementation is expected to promote higher levels 
of implementation, whereas the converse is expected in Malaysia.  
The Hong Kong-Korea Comparison 
The aim of the controlled comparison of Hong Kong and Korea is to investigate how 
competition between financial sectors to attract capital and international financial 
business may lead to the diffusion of Basel II. When a country‟s foreign competitors 
implement Basel II, countries may come under competitive pressures to match their 
rival‟s policies, leading to the diffusion of Basel II. Since Hong Kong and Korea 
compete with different financial sectors, different Basel II policies are expected to 
diffuse in these countries. In contrast to the other case studies that examine how 
policy diffusion led to early-comprehensive or late-partial adopters across different 
inter-supervisory authority networks and the cross-border structure of international 
banks, two relatively developed countries that are in the same supervisory network 
and where the level of foreign bank presence is generally high in both cases are 
examined, thus allowing these effects to be controlled. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to outline a case study strategy that complemented the 
results of the quantitative study by unpacking the causal process through which 
policy diffusion reinforced convergence with Basel II in some countries whilst 
reinforcing partial, gradual or delayed implementation in others. The case studies are 
conducted by employing the within-case method of process tracing and the cross-
case method of controlled comparison. Three pairs of case studies from Chile, Korea, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong were selected to investigate the process of policy diffusion 
amongst countries that were interconnected via three distinct channels of diffusion, 
namely, inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of 
international banks and competition for capital. These case studies were selected 
from the population of candidate cases after considering binding theoretical scope 
conditions, empirical considerations that took into account cases of explicit policy 
coordination and methodological considerations that aimed to maximize variance in 
the policy diffusion variable under investigation, whilst controlling for the effects of 
policy diffusion across other channels of diffusion, the level of development and EU 
membership. These steps ensured that the most theoretically, empirically, and 
methodologically relevant cases were selected for the case studies.  
 The next three chapters implement the case study design outlined in this 
chapter. Chapter Five examines how the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and 
Chile was shaped by the diffusion of Basel II policies across different inter-
supervisory authority networks in East Asia and the Americas. Chapter Six 
investigates how the diffusion of Basel II across the cross-border structure of 
international banks shaped the implementation of Basel II in Korea and Malaysia. In 
Chapter Seven, the diffusion of Basel II policies across financial sectors that 
competed for capital is investigated in the cases of Hong Kong and Korea. For each 
pair of case studies, comparative analyses with respect to what, how and why 
policies diffused is undertaken. 
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Chapter Five 
The diffusion of Basel II across inter-supervisory authority networks:  
A comparative analysis of Malaysia and Chile 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Can the diffusion of policies across different inter-supervisory authority networks 
explain why the implementation of Basel II in countries clustered around different 
levels and forms of implementation, for example in clusters of early-comprehensive 
adopters or late-partial adopters? The findings of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 
Three suggested that there was a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between the Basel II implementation score of one country and the average Basel II 
implementation score of those countries that that country was closely interconnected 
to via common membership in supervisory networks. Based on this result, it was 
argued that inter-supervisory authority networks provided a channel though which 
supervisory authorities could communicate and share experiences on Basel II 
implementation and monitor each other‟s implementation, which in turn led to the 
diffusion of Basel II policies amongst countries that were closely interconnected, but 
not amongst countries that were not. Indeed, the findings seem plausible since 
supervisors do not operate in isolation to their foreign counterparts, but in a dense 
web of established supervisory networks, some which have existed for over fifty 
years. According to the Basel Committee, there are at least twelve established 
supervisory groups and the vast majority of countries across the world are member 
to at least one (BCBS 2006a).
1
 
The findings of the quantitative analysis, although plausible in the context of 
examining the average effects of policy diffusion across the world, are put to a 
stronger test in this chapter by examining the process of how and why policies 
                                                 
1
 See section 3.3.3 for details of supervisory networks. 
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diffused across inter-supervisory authority networks in two specific country cases. 
The case studies focus on the following two lines of inquiry to achieve their overall 
aim of uncovering the process through which policy diffusion may reinforce 
convergent Basel II policies amongst supervisory authorities in the same supervisory 
network, but at different levels of convergence with Basel II across different 
supervisory networks. First, what do inter-supervisory authority networks do to 
facilitate the diffusion of Basel II? How do they act as channels through which 
policies diffuse and reinforce convergence in policies? Second, how did the 
diffusion of Basel II shape the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and Chile? 
The supervisory authorities responsible for implementing Basel II in these two 
countries, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) in Malaysia and the Superintendency of 
Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) in Chile, belong to different supervisory 
networks formed amongst supervisors in East Asia and the Americas respectively. 
That countries in the East Asian supervisory network have on average attained a 
higher degree of convergence with Basel II than those in the Americas begs the 
question of which policies had diffused, as much as the question of how and why 
policies diffused across countries. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are case studies of 
how the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and Chile were shaped by the 
diffusion of Basel II policies across different inter-supervisory authority networks. 
In order to uncover the process of policy diffusion, the case studies first examine the 
initial formative years of BNM and SBIF‟s implementation policy and how initial 
responses to implementation were formulated in supervisory networks. This is 
followed by an examination of the main activities of supervisory networks that can 
facilitate or deter the diffusion of Basel II policies, including how supervisors shared 
experiences and learnt about Basel II and each other‟s implementation policies. 
Diffusion at both the strategic and tactical level is examined in the case of Malaysia, 
whilst diffusion at the strategic level is examined in the case of Chile where 
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implementation did not progress further.
2
 A comparative analysis of Malaysia and 
Chile is undertaken in section 5.4 around the three questions of which, how and why 
Basel II policies diffused across the two supervisory networks before concluding. 
 
5.2 Policy diffusion and Basel II implementation in Malaysia 
5.2.1 East Asian inter-supervisory authority networks and their response to 
Basel II 
According to BNM, “[w]ith rapid changes in the financial environment, particularly 
with the New Basel Capital Accord… continuous training and exposure to keep pace 
with the developments taking place globally to ensure that Malaysia is at par with 
international best practices” was seen as a “pre-requisite for effective supervision” 
(BNM 2003:121). BNM‟s preparation to implement Basel II was not solely a 
domestic affair that occurred in isolation from their foreign counterparts. Instead, 
BNM claimed that “[i]n meeting the challenges of the New Accord, bank 
supervisors [were] being equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills… 
[through] participation in regional and international training programmes, dialogues 
with other supervisory agencies and international bodies on implementation issues 
and discussions with the banking industry” (ibid.). In particular, two inter-
supervisory authority networks were pivotal in facilitating the exchange of 
information and sharing of experiences and policy ideas on various aspects of Basel 
II amongst supervisory authorities in East Asia on a regular basis throughout the 
process of implementation in Malaysia.
3
 BNM was “particularly involved in the 
                                                 
2
 Levy distinguishes learning that takes place at the tactical level about how to better achieve a 
particular goal and the strategic level involving modification of goals and means, which he refers to 
“simple” and “complex” learning, respectively (1994:286). 
3
 Established in 1991, EMEAP is a network of central banks from eleven countries, namely, Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. The Asian Bond Fund Initiative is regarded as one of EMEAP‟s major achievements. 
EMEAP is a three-tiered forum, structured at the levels of governors, deputy governors and working 
groups. There are three working groups on banking supervision, payment and settlement systems and 
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work of the Executive Meeting of East Asia Pacific (EMEAP) Working Group on 
Banking Supervision, focusing on Basel II related issues that are common among 
member countries” (BNM 2005:125). Moreover, BNM regarded the SEACEN 
Centre as the “premier training institution in the region” (2002:215) that played an 
“important role in providing training to facilitate the implementation of Basel II” 
(2005:230). Despite their low public profiles outside the banking supervisory 
community, both the EMEAP Working Group on Banking Supervision (“EMEAP 
WBGS” or “WGBS”) and SEACEN Centre were the primarily vehicles through 
which supervisors engaged with their foreign counterparts. They defined the set of 
countries Malaysia was most closely interconnected to, and thus, are important for 
understanding the paths through which Basel II policies may have diffused. 
Analysing the phase of policy diffusion preceding the formal announcement 
of BNM‟s implementation plan in 2004 is important both for analytical and 
empirical reasons. As for the sequence of events, the EMEAP WGBS and SEACEN 
focused their activities on Basel II since 2001, several years before BNM and other 
supervisory authorities publically announced their approach to implementation, and 
more critically, before any kind of formal implementation, such as the drafting and 
publication of national regulations that implemented Basel II commenced. From an 
analytical point of view, that interactions between supervisory authorities took place 
in supervisory networks before Basel II was formally implemented precludes the 
                                                                                                                                          
financial markets and an IT directors' meeting. Supervisory agencies are represented in the WGBS. 
The SEACEN Centre is a training and research centre for central bankers and supervisors in the 
region. It started to operate on an informal basis in 1972 by relying on the resources of member 
central banks, notably those of BNM‟s Staff Training Centre (SEACEN 2011:51). In 1982, the 
SEACEN Centre was established as a legal entity in Malaysia with eight members, which had grown 
to seventeen. BNM, Bank Indonesia and the Bank of Thailand were among the most active users of 
SEACEN‟s training by the number of participants (ibid. p34). South East Asia, New Zealand and 
Australia (SEANZA) Forum is another regional network set up in the 1950s to provide training and 
advisory services to central bankers in Southeast Asian countries, but is “in many ways a moribund 
remnant of an earlier era of cooperation, based around a subset of the old British Commonwealth” 
(Grenville 2004:32). Its “role was largely taken over by SEACEN” (Hamilton-Hart 2007:176), which 
offered training to SEANZA members since 2005 (SEACEN 2011:10). 
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possibility of reverse causality, where countries discuss implementation and learn 
about each other‟s implementation after they had taken steps to formally implement 
Basel II. Moreover, BNM was a founding member of both the EMEAP WGBS and 
SEACEN, whose membership had remained relatively stable throughout the process 
of Basel II implementation. This precludes another possibility of reverse causality 
occurring due to self-selection. Countries which had already decided on an approach 
towards Basel II implementation did not self-select into pre-existing supervisory 
networks according to the Basel II implementation approach countries in that 
particular supervisory network had adopted.
4
 
From an empirical point of view, the early phase of policy diffusion laid the 
groundwork that subsequently shaped how Basel II was implemented in Malaysia in 
two important ways. Firstly, a stable channel through which policies could diffuse 
was established when the issue of Basel II and its implementation was placed at the 
core of the agenda in supervisory networks. This created an on-going forum for 
supervisors to engage with their foreign counterparts on a regular basis as Basel II 
implementation progressed over time. Secondly, the process of discussion, 
information exchange and policy learning within supervisory networks resulted in 
converging national responses on several fundamental issues relating to the Basel II 
framework itself, its implications and how countries ought to approach its 
implementation.  
According to BNM, the EMEAP “Working Group on Banking Supervision 
focused mainly on the proposed new Basle Accord” since 2001 (BNM 2001b:199), 
as it emerged as an effective „self-help‟ or „problem-sharing‟ network that helped 
officials understand and grapple with policy challenges that Basel II posed.
5
 The 
                                                 
4
 EMEAP WGBS‟s membership had not expanded since it was established in 1991. Since 2000, the 
following countries joined SEACEN (year of accession): Brunei (2003), Fiji (2004), Papua New 
Guinea (2005), Cambodia (2006), Vietnam (2006) and China (2011).  
5
 Woods and Martinez-Diaz draw a distinction between self-help networks and advocacy networks. 
They argue that advocacy networks “aim to mobilize support for a certain cause, standard or 
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WGBS gathered in Seoul in April 2001 to receive an update on how the 
development of Basel II was progressing from the Basel Committee Secretariat and 
discuss the Basel Committee‟s second consultative document (CP2) issued earlier 
that year. The discussions culminated in a regional response to Basel II, initially in 
the form of a letter to the Basel Committee representing the “concerns of banking 
supervisors in this Region” (EMEAP 2001). The comments from the EMAP WGBS 
was the “only one to represent the collective views of regional central banks” from 
the 250 comments submitted to the Basel Committee (Yoshikuni 2004:294). 
According to one central bank practitioner closely involved with EMEAP and the 
Basel Committee, this represented an “evolution of the Basel Process” that 
attempted to reconcile global standards with regional interests by incorporating a 
regional perspective into Basel II (ibid.).  
On the one hand, the response to CP2 from supervisors in the WGBS 
exhibited considerable levels of convergence overall at this pre-implementation 
stage. Although some comments pertained to the concerns of “some members”, 
especially those with relatively less developed banking systems, most were put 
forward as region-wide issues, for example, on credit risk mitigation techniques of 
“banks in the region”, the conventional nature of business in “most banks in the 
[r]egion” and that many “banks in the region” were likely to adopt the SA for which 
they should not be penalized by market participants (EMEAP 2001). Moreover, the 
views contained in the WGBS‟s letter were explicitly endorsed by BNM in its 
separate comments to the Basel Committee, which said that it had discussed issues 
in the WGBS, in addition to which BNM was providing further comments on the 
Basel II proposals following feedback from banks in Malaysia (BNM 2001a). Not to 
mention the overlaps in the two letters, both letters highly complemented each other, 
showing that a close alignment of views between BNM and other members of the 
                                                                                                                                          
behaviour… [and] are primarily involved in agenda-setting, norm-setting and diffusion and 
consensus-building” whereas self-help or problem-sharing networks “focus on improving the 
capacity of the network‟s member governments to make policy and address problems” (2009:10). 
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WGBS on the content of Basel II had emerged from very early in the 
implementation process. 
On the other hand, not all members of the WGBS agreed on what they 
disagreed with, particularly on the more detailed aspects of CP2. Some supervisory 
authorities expressed their reservations concerning the national implementation of 
Basel II, perhaps the most critical coming from Australia‟s APRA. The APRA was 
highly critical about implementing Basel II suggesting that although their 
“preference is to continue operating as much as possible within an internationally 
agreed framework, we [APRA] would find it difficult to implement both the 
standardised and IRB approaches as they currently stand” (APRA 2001:1). 6 
Likewise, the Bank of Thailand stressed that because Thailand was “just beginning 
to recover from an economic crisis... certain principles contained in the New Capital 
Accord – however appropriate they may be – may be difficult or impossible to 
implement at this time” (BOT 2001:1). Although the Korean FSS‟s post-crisis 
policy rhetoric to comply with international standards made it difficult to avoid 
committing to the implementation of Basel II altogether, the FSS was nonetheless 
concerned that implementing Basel II “could impose [a] strain on the economy, still 
recovering from the financial crisis” (FSS 2001a). Members with less developed 
banking systems such as the Philippines and Indonesia also expressed their 
reservations by highlighting the lack of preparedness of their banking systems. 
At the same time however, despite being critical about Basel II, BOT was 
equally worried that “banks may not be able to comply with the Accord when it is 
implemented in 2004” (BOT 2001). Likewise, the FSS was concerned of being 
penalized for not implementing Basel II per the G10 timetable, and thus requested a 
“grace period” for implementation in emerging economies (FSS 2001a). Similarly, 
Bank Indonesia argued that the Basel Committee should not “apply [a] tight time 
                                                 
6
 That said, the APRA was one of the first amongst the EMEAP WGBS to formally commit to 
implementation in 2004. 
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limit for implementation” like the G10 (BI 2001). Hence, there was little doubt 
amongst supervisory authorities in the WGBS that Basel II would become the next 
global standard for capital adequacy regulation when adopted by the G10, by which 
time Basel I would become outdated and so too the supervisory frameworks of those 
countries that remained on it. The following excerpt by the Governor of Bank 
Indonesia, in the context of explaining the reasons for deciding to implement Basel 
II, is illustrative of how supervisors, amidst doubts, felt compelled to maintain 
consistency with global standards at least at a level consistent with their regional 
counterparts. 
“I wondered whether a regulatory framework based on Basel II for a banking 
system still in the development stage, such as in Indonesia, would be the 
proper step to take. Would this not be a hurried move? In the end my doubts 
were put to rest. Basel II is a set of best practices that we cannot ignore if we 
as a nation are to deal with global trends. These trends mean that we bring 
ourselves to the level of our partners if we are to be accepted and respected 
in our dealings with others. Needless to say, we have no desire to be 
regarded as an „Achilles heel‟ in the global financial order, particularly in the 
complex network of relationships in the banking industry. It is Bank 
Indonesia‟s desire for the national banking industry to speak the same 
language as bankers in other countries, at least with our regional neighbours.” 
(Abdullah 2006) 
Maintaining consistency with global standards at least at a level on par with their 
regional counterparts meant that supervisory authorities had limited but some 
leeway. This was partly a function of the preparedness of their banking systems as 
emerging economies, but also a function of how their regional counterparts were 
intending to implement Basel II.  
In 2002, BNM envisaged a gradual approach to implementation, stating that 
“[t]aking into consideration that emerging countries like Malaysia would require 
more time to develop the capabilities of their domestic banking sector to comply 
with the requirements under Basel II… efforts would continue to be taken by Bank 
Negara Malaysia to upgrade the capabilities of the industry players so that they 
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would be in a position to comply with these new requirements within a reasonable 
period of time.” (BNM 2002:132, italics added). Monitoring and learning about how 
its supervisory peers were implementing Basel II was critical in guiding the specific 
pace and scope of implementation in Malaysia, such as what a “reasonable period of 
time” meant in practice and when to implement the advanced approaches of Basel II, 
more so because there was no hard and fast rule about when and how BNM ought to 
implement Basel II. This in part underscored BNM‟s concern about the potential for 
competitive implementation strategies amongst Malaysia‟s peers. Although the 
question of whether BNM would implement the basic or advanced approaches of 
Basel II was formally left open during this initial phase, preparations to implement 
the latter ensued in BNM. Until the formal announcement to implement Basel II 
came in 2004, BNM extensively shared experiences and policy ideas on various 
aspects of Basel II with its supervisory peers across the WGBS when formulating 
the specifics of its own national implementation policies. This occurred at both the 
most senior levels of staff in supervisory authorities in the EMEAP WGBS, as well 
as the level of mid- to senior-level staff in the SEACEN Centre as examined next.  
 
5.2.2 Policy diffusion at the strategic level and BNM’s implementation policy 
Policy learning amongst supervisors became more focused and systematic in the 
years following 2002, especially when BNM “was appointed as chairman of the 
EMEAP Working Group of Banking Supervision in May 2002 for a two-year period. 
As the chairman, Bank Negara Malaysia organised and chaired the 13th Meeting of 
the EMEAP Working Group in Kuala Lumpur which focused on issues relating to 
Basel II” (BNM 2002:132). In these meetings, “it was agreed that Bank Negara 
Malaysia would conduct a survey on EMEAP member countries‟ required 
timeframe for the implementation of the new Basel II capital requirements” (ibid. 
p220). This produced timely and reliable information on how countries were 
intending to implement Basel II across the supervisory network, which was used by 
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BNM as critical policy inputs in formulating Malaysia‟s Basel II policy. Moreover, 
when the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) assumed the chairmanship in 
2004, a series of consultations with members were conducted to reaffirm the core 
objectives of the EMEAP WGBS. Members agreed to focus on two key issues, 
namely, Basel II implementation and macro-surveillance, and functionally, to focus 
on leveraging on mutual experiences, facilitating the adoption of international 
standards in the region and contributing to the development of international banking 
supervision standards (BCBS 2006a:52). To take the discussions further in a more 
systematic way, five interest groups on Basel II home-host issues, External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (“ECAIs”), operational risk, stress testing and macro-
surveillance were established. According to the Basel Committee‟s 2006 biennial 
report on international developments in banking supervision, “[a]s the momentum of 
Basel II implementation intensified, there was a desire among members for more 
sharing of experiences and policy thinking on various aspects of Basel II. In this 
regard, the Basel II Home-Host Interest Group conducted surveys among EMEAP 
countries on the exercise of Basel II national discretions, implementation timelines 
and transitional approaches.” (ibid. p52-3) This interest group also developed a 
“toolkit” paper on Basel II supervisory colleges to share amongst its members 
general considerations, useful lessons learnt from actual home-host working 
arrangements and ideas on the practical application of some of the Accord 
Implementation Group principles. Furthermore, to help develop domestic policies 
for the implementation of the SA, the ECAI Interest Group prepared a paper on the 
supervisory process for recognizing ECAIs. Supervisors also shared their respective 
approaches to Pillar 2 implementation in a survey and subsequent discussions and 
“[i]n response to keen interest among members, the WGBS also established a Basel 
II contact list to promote communication and sharing among relevant experts from 
member countries.” (ibid.) 
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The activities of the SEACEN Centre was highly complementary to that of 
the EMEAP WGBS as it provided an on-going forum for upper-middle and senior 
supervisors responsible for implementing Basel II to learn about Basel II and how 
others were implementing it through seminars, training and research. These 
activities provided critical inputs that informed supervisors‟ spatial awareness in 
terms of their national implementation policies vis-à-vis others in the region. 
According to BNM, “[c]o-operation in capacity-building and training continued to 
feature prominently in the regional fora in 2002. The SEACEN Research and 
Training Centre, a premier training institution in the region, continued to provide 
specialised training on policy and operational aspects of central banking, in 
particular on banking supervision. During the year, SEACEN also targeted its 
training in areas relevant to the current challenges facing central banks, such as 
credit risk management and Basel II capital requirements.” (BNM 2002:219).  
In particular, there were two series of seminars that provided regular and 
dedicated time for supervisors to learn not only about the technical aspects of Basel 
II, but also about how countries were implementing Basel II. This promoted 
convergence at both the technical and strategic level. The “SEACEN-FSI Regional 
Seminars for Bank Supervisors and Regulators” were targeted at upper-middle to 
senior level bank supervisors and regulators. As the list of SEACEN-FSI Seminar 
topics in Appendix 1 illustrates, the central theme of the first sixteen gatherings 
during 2000 and 2008 focused on Basel II (after which the attention shifted to issues 
pertinent to the global financial crisis and Basel III). As these seminars were 
provided in collaboration with the FSI, experts were drawn from the FSI, BIS, G10 
supervisory authorities, global banks, accounting firms and rating agencies 
depending on the topic of discussion. For example, to “assist supervisors in the 
implementation of Pillar 2, particularly the supervisory policies and practice”, the 
eleventh SEACEN-FSI seminar in 2006 aimed at “providing a platform for speakers 
and participants to discuss implementation and practical application issues related to 
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the supervisory review process under Basel II and its implementation.” (SEACEN 
2006:18) This particular seminar involved working through case studies, discussions, 
and group work, and drew speakers from the FSI, BIS Asian Representative Office, 
the Belgian supervisory authority and a European global bank, while participants 
came from fourteen countries including Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand (ibid.).  
Complementing the SEACEN-FSI Regional Seminars were the „SEACEN 
Seminar on Basel II: Preparation for Implementation in the Asia-Pacific Region‟ 
series. These gathering were organized back-to-back with the SEACEN-FSI 
seminars and were effective in internalizing the training and discussions from the 
SEACEN-FSI seminars in a regional context. The structure of the meeting was more 
horizontal and member-oriented as they “aimed to provide a forum for central 
bankers and commercial bankers to share their experiences on the preparation of 
implementation of Basel II in their countries as well as in the region. The 
programme was interactive, comprising individual country experiences on the status 
of implementation of Basel II and panel discussions on the challenges of its 
implementation” (SEACEN 2006:17). Due to the focus on sharing members‟ 
experiences, speakers were drawn from member supervisory authorities and the 
participants included supervisors and commercial bank officers responsible for 
implementing Basel II (ibid.). During these meetings, supervisors extensively 
compared notes about each other‟s implementation plans, including why they were 
implementing Basel II, their overall approach and timeframe for implementation, 
results of national implementation surveys, key policy steps taken and to be taken in 
the implementation process and the various implementation challenges countries 
experienced. For example, in the third SEACEN Basel II seminar, there was a panel 
discussion on “Challenges of Implementation of Basel II in Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Philippines” which focused on sharing country experiences in 
implementing Basel II (SEACEN 2006a:16). The actual notes that supervisory 
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authorities shared with each other in discussing the timeframe for implementing the 
various approaches of Basel II in Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia at 
this meeting are illustrated in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Sharing notes on implementation amongst supervisors 
 
An examination of these gatherings suggests that policy related information had 
been exchanged amongst supervisory authorities in considerable depth and breadth. 
Moreover as the implementation of Basel II progressed, the activities of the EMEAP 
WGBS and SEACEN incorporated more detailed aspects of implementation. Not 
only did learning at the strategic level continue as supervisors continuously 
evaluated their implementation plans and progress against that of other supervisory 
authorities in order to maintain consistency with each other, but learning about how 
Notes: Name of presentation and presenter, from the first quadrant going clockwise: „Preparation for Basel II: 
Implementation in Indonesia‟ Director, Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation, Bank Indonesia, 
„Preparation for Implementation of Basel II: Malaysia‟s Perspective‟ Director, Bank Supervision 2, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, „Roadmap to Basel II: Philippine Experience‟ Managing Director, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, „Preparation of the implementation of Basel II in Thailand‟ Prudential Policy Department, Bank of 
Thailand. 
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to implement the more detailed aspects of Basel II, namely tactical learning, became 
a predominant element. Areas of tactical learning and the diffusion of more specific 
elements of Basel II are discussed next.  
 
5.2.3 Policy diffusion at the tactical level as implementation progressed 
Two specific areas of national implementation where BNM incorporated the lessons 
and decisions of their supervisory peers were in dealing with the potential 
procyclical impact of Basel II and defining the scope of applying the IRB 
approaches. BNM believed that the main improvement of Basel II from Basel I was 
the greater risk-responsiveness of capital requirements achieved through more 
refined measurements of risk (Aziz 2004:2; Khalid et al 2008:71). Yet, this was also 
potentially a significant weakness since the pro-cyclical tendencies of risk sensitive 
capital requirements could amplify business cycle fluctuations, and thus contribute 
to, rather than negate the likelihood of systemic crises (ibid.). Having experienced a 
dramatic rise in the scale and scope of corporate credit rating downgrades during the 
Malaysian financial crisis, BNM was particularly concerned that reliance on external 
ratings to determine regulatory capital requirements could disrupt the process of 
credit intermediation during economic slowdowns or financial crises when 
downgrades become more prevalent and sustaining credit intermediation becomes 
more important for the economy (BNM 2001a:3). BNM stressed that it was critical 
that “the potential impact of the framework during periods of economic crisis or 
downturn would need to be adequately assessed to ensure the framework does not 
precipitate greater instability to the financial system” (ibid. p1). The extent to which 
Basel II exacerbated procyclicality would depend on the mitigating measures 
supervisors were willing to introduce under Pillar II. Moreover, although the risks 
associated with Basel II‟s procyclical impact were highly plausible theoretically, the 
actual impact of Basel II was hard to predict not least because Basel II was new, but 
also because empirical evidence in Malaysia or elsewhere in the world did not exist.  
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The SEACEN Centre took on the critical role of information production on 
this issue by undertaking practical policy-oriented research in the form of a 
collaborative research project in 2007 that pooled expertise and data from nine 
central banks. As “most SEACEN member countries [were] moving towards Basel 
II in the near-to-medium term, many national regulators face[d] potential problems 
in implementing the new Accord. One important concern [was] the possibility of the 
pro-cyclicality impact that may have adverse effects on the economy following the 
implementation of the new capital accord” (SEACEN 2008:iii). These supervisory 
authorities aimed “to analyze the pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II in the SEACEN 
Countries” and develop a “discourse on the intrinsically difficult issues of how risks 
move over the course of a business cycle” (ibid). To ensure consistency in 
methodology and comparability of empirical findings across countries, common 
specifications of data was used and the “methodology chosen and processes 
involved in this study were largely derived from the discussions within the group of 
members involved in this research project” (Khalid et al 2008:72).  
Countries initially believed that the procyclical impact of Basel II was severe 
but varied from country to country and that countries with less developed banking 
systems and less sophisticated countercyclical monetary policy frameworks would 
be worse off (SEACEN 2007a). However, the conclusions reached suggested 
otherwise. The unanimous conclusion from all nine country cases was that the 
procyclical impact of Basel II was not significant. The researchers from BNM‟s 
Prudential Financial Policy and Supervision Department found that there were 
“insignificant effects in terms of procyclicality of the Basel II implementation to the 
Malaysian economy” (Khalid et al 2007:85). The findings on Malaysia were 
reinforced by empirical findings from other countries that were comparable to 
Malaysia, such as Taiwan and Indonesia, who also confirmed that the procyclical 
impact of Basel II was insignificant, as did the findings from those countries that 
were less developed, such as the Philippines. The overarching conclusion across 
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nine countries converged on the assessment that there was “no strong evidence that 
there is pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II implementation” (SEACEN 2008:x). The 
potential risk became less of a concern and did not become a significant obstacle 
that deterred the progress of implementation in Malaysia and other countries despite 
the initial grave concerns. The existing macroprudential framework was maintained 
to counter any possible adverse procyclical effects from the implementation of Basel 
II.
7
 BNM instead concentrated on ensuring the use of through-the-cycle risk 
parameters for the IRB approaches, which they believed was more suited than the 
SA for achieving less procyclical capital ratios. Supervisory networks, by producing 
and sharing information on Basel II‟s potential procyclical effects and reinforcing a 
converging assessment of this issue facilitated the diffusion of a convergent 
response in dealing with the issue of procyclicality in implementing Basel II. 
 The second issue relates to the East Asian version of “IRB permanent partial 
use”. This represents a deviation from Basel II but became widely accepted as 
standard practice based on the rationale that implementation should be adapted to 
local conditions. There are two components to BNM‟s deviation. The first involved 
expanding the scope of permanent IRB exemptions, and the second, applying a 
blanket zero risk weight to sovereign exposures in domestic currency. To prevent 
cherry-picking the approaches for credit and operational risk that offered a lower 
regulatory capital requirement for any given exposure, Basel II requires that “[o]nce 
a bank adopts an IRB approach for part of its holdings, it is expected to extend it 
across the entire banking group” (BCBS 2004:57), subject to two exceptions. The 
provision for IRB permanent exemptions state that “[s]ome exposures in non-
significant business units as well as asset classes... that are immaterial in terms of 
size and perceived risk profile may be exempt from the requirements” and 
transitional arrangements allowed a phased rollout of the IRB approach across assets 
                                                 
7
 Some progress was already made in introducing prudential measures such as loan-to-value ratios on 
real estate loans and macro-surveillance of the financial system to monitor aggregate risks following 
the Asian financial crisis. 
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(ibid.). Similarly, BNM‟s regulations also stated that “[o]nce a banking institution 
within a banking group adopts the IRB approach, the entire banking group would be 
expected to adopt a similar approach, except for those permanently exempted asset 
classes in paragraph 3.4. This is to avoid cherry-picking of assets to be put under the 
IRB approach.” (BNM 2011:para.B.3.1) However, a wider scope of asset classes in 
paragraph 3.4 was adopted by BNM, to which a generalized zero risk weight was 
applied to some of those assets.  
Rather than permitting permanent IRB exemptions based on immateriality, 
exposures to “sovereigns, central banks, banking institutions and public sector 
entities” and equities held for “socio-economic” purposes were permanently exempt 
from the IRB approaches (Para. B.3.4) and determined according to the SA (Para. 
B.3.5). The rationale was that “it would be unduly burdensome for the banking 
institution to implement a rating system for these counterparties” (ibid.). Such 
deviation had gained currency across the supervisory network based on the view that 
implementation should be adapted to accommodate local conditions. As a result, of 
the banks that adopted the IRB approaches, exposures for the above have all 
remained on the SA, whereas the IRB approach was used for retail exposures and 
residential mortgages only. These were asset types where Basel II requirements were 
lowered compared to Basel I and hence where the scope to benefit from lower 
capital requirements was the greatest. This was the case across countries in the 
supervisory network where banks had moved onto the IRB approaches, such as in 
Malaysia, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, with the exception of Australia. Hence, 
banks concurrently used the SA and IRB approaches, moving onto the IRB approach 
where it was least costly in terms of implementation costs and most favourable in 
terms of reduced capital requirements, but as a result, reducing the degree of 
convergence with Basel II in these countries. 
 The second aspect of BNM‟s deviation from Basel II is related to the use of 
national discretion accorded to supervisors to provide a lower risk weight for 
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exposures to their sovereign or central bank (BCBS 2004:15). The application of 
this national discretion was extended in Malaysia by allowing sovereign exposures 
to remain on the SA as explained above, and then, stipulating a flat zero risk weight 
to exposures to the Federal Government of Malaysia and BNM denominated and 
funded in Malaysian ringgit (BNM para.2.16-18). This contradicts the Basel II 
standards in two significant ways. Firstly, the blanket zero risk weight does not 
allow for a meaningful differentiation of sovereign risk and is in effect, a reversion 
to the risk-insensitivity of Basel I‟s treatment of sovereign risk. Secondly, in contrast 
to the SA, which allows a zero risk weight to be applied to AAA and AA- rated 
sovereigns (equivalent to AAA to AA- in Standard and Poor‟s credit rating scale) 
and higher risk weights for lower credit ratings, a blanket risk weight underestimates 
Malaysia‟s sovereign risk. Malaysia‟s local currency rating was A+ when Basel II 
was implemented in 2005, which corresponds to a risk weight of 20%, not 0%. 
Malaysia‟s local currency rating was downgraded to A in 2011 and any further 
deterioration in its sovereign rating below A- would require a risk weight of 50%. 
However, this would not be reflected in the amount of capital banks would have to 
hold against their claim as Malaysia‟s regulations were insensitive to the increase in 
sovereign credit risk.
8
 This practice was initially devised to accommodate the Single 
Market context in the EU.
9
 Implementing such divergences outside the Single 
Market unilaterally in order to enable the Malaysian government and banks to 
                                                 
8
 The extent to which Malaysia‟s Basel II implementation substantively diverges from Basel II in this 
respect depends on the extent of divergence between Malaysia‟s credit rating and that of a risk-free or 
AAA-rated asset. Also, following the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, “[m]arkets are questioning the 
risk-free status of debt issued by a number of governments worldwide” (Caruana 2011), as even the 
highly rated sovereign debt of G10 countries are no longer seen as risk-free assets. 
9
 To accommodate the Single Market, the CRD assigned a risk weight of 0% for “exposures to 
Member States‟ central government… denominated and funded in the domestic currency of that 
central government” (CRD 2006:Article 89(1)(d); Annex VI Part 1). Instead of confining the zero 
risk weight to the SA, they applied a one-size-fits all zero risk weight to the sovereign debt of all EU 
member states, which, according to the Deputy General Manager of BIS, was “equivalent to a mutual 
and unqualified exemption of certain sovereign risks from capital charges, an exemption inconsistent 
with Basel II‟s risk-sensitive framework” (Hannoun 2011:13-14). 
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benefit from favourable risk weightings would have been difficult for the BNM to 
justify unless Malaysia‟s peers were deviating collectively, making deviations from 
Basel II standard practice amongst supervisory peers in East Asia. 
 The case of Malaysia demonstrated that the implementation of Basel II by 
BNM was shaped by considerations of how its supervisory peers were implementing 
Basel II both at the strategic level of deciding when and which approaches of Basel 
II to implement, but also at the tactical level of how to deal with the potential 
procyclicality of Basel II and in deciding the scope of applying the IRB approaches. 
As a result, supervisors across the supervisory network adopted very similar 
approaches towards the implementation of Basel II. This contrasts sharply to the 
implementation of Basel II in Chile, which is examined next. 
 
5.3 Policy diffusion and Basel II implementation in Chile 
5.3.1 American inter-supervisory authority networks and their response to 
Basel II 
The supervisory authority network in the Americas is not well known and somewhat 
overshadowed by the network of monetary authorities, the Centre for Latin 
American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), which has attracted a greater deal of public 
attention following the Latin American debt crisis (Coates 2009). Nonetheless, inter-
supervisory authority networks in the Americas have a long history that can be 
traced to the Commission of Banking Supervision and Regulation Agencies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean established in 1982, which consisted of twenty-one 
supervisory authorities. In 1991, it was renamed the Commission to the Association 
of Banking Supervision Agencies of Latin America and the Caribbean (ASBALC) 
and membership was expanded to thirty-five countries. ASBALC subsequently 
become the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA) in 1999.
10
 
                                                 
10
 ASBA is organized into five regional groups that include the following countries (in parentheses): 
the Southern Cone Group (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay), the Andean Region 
153 
 
As the principal supervisory network in the Americas, ASBA‟s aim was to develop, 
disseminate and promote banking supervisory practices in line with international 
standards and to support the development of banking supervisory capabilities and 
resources through the provision of training and technical services (ASBA 2004:6). 
The Chilean supervisory authority, SBIF, considered participation in ASBA 
an integral part of its policy to internationally integrate its supervisory activities with 
those of its foreign counterparts (SBIF 2002a:13).
11
 According to SBIF, the 
international integration of supervisory activities was necessary to address the 
challenges posed by the globalization of finance and the consequent blurring of 
geographic borders in banking (SBIF 2002b). Like their East Asian counterparts, the 
Basel II proposal was at the centre of debate amongst ASBA members, who said 
they had “very closely followed the evolutionary process of the proposal leading to a 
new international agreement in the regulation of capital adequacy” (ASBA 2003:1). 
ASBA presented their views on “issues that the supervisory community in the 
Americas considers most relevant” to the Basel Committee in response to CP3 in 
early 2003 (ibid.). However, in contrast to their East Asian counterparts, supervisory 
authorities in the Americas were more subdued and sceptical about Basel II from the 
start. ASBA stated that they were not ready to implement Basel II since there was 
“widespread sentiment in the region in the sense that the proposal raises numerous 
challenges… [and] require countries to have in place a series of regulatory and 
supervisory practices without which, it is not feasible to envisage a sound 
implementation of the new capital framework”. To this end, enhancing compliance 
with BCPs was considered a priority over Basel II implementation, which was to 
progress very gradually by adopting a “step-by step action plan that would pave the 
                                                                                                                                          
Group (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), the North America Group (Canada, United 
States of America and Mexico), the Central America Group (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic) and the The Caribbean 
Group (includes sixteen countries). (ASBA 2005a) 
11
 For example, the agreement to establish the permanent headquarters of ASBA in Chile in 2002 was 
highlighted as a key achievement and manifestation on SBIF‟s commitment and support for ASBA. 
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way for the implementation of the proposed new accord at some point in the future”. 
ASBA envisaged some members would “stick to the broad G10 guideline”, others to 
implement Basel II “at a later date”, whilst “[s]ome jurisdictions openly envisage[d] 
full implementation on or after 2010.” (ibid. p1-3) 
Within weeks of the publication of Basel II in 2004, ASBA organized a 
seminar to discuss the implications of Basel II for the region.
12
 The gathering, which 
lasted two days, brought together representatives from supervisory authorities and 
the banking industry, as well as the Chairman of the Basel Committee, who 
participated as Governor of the Bank of Spain. The extensive discussions amongst 
supervisory authorities only reaffirmed their scepticism towards Basel II and the 
notion that Basel II should be implemented gradually. This gradual approach, 
however, was not a clear sequential approach where countries first aimed to comply 
with the BCPs followed by the implementation of the basic approaches of Basel II 
and subsequently the advanced approaches. It instead envisaged gradually 
implementing various policies consistent with Basel II on a capital adequacy regime 
based on Basel I. The Chairman of ASBA argued that “[r]emaining on Basel I may 
be the best choice for some countries and, in fact, it may be appropriate for the 
majority of banking organisations worldwide” (GRR 2004). To some extent, 
ASBA‟s Chairman, who double-hatted as director of banking supervision in the US 
Federal Reserve Board, was reiterating a key message from top regulators and 
officials in the Basel Committee, IMF and World Bank, that no country should think 
of implementing Basel II unless it was already compliant with the BCPs (IMF 2005, 
World Bank 2005). Speaking in a similar vein regarding Brazil‟s position on Basel 
II, Latin America‟s largest economy and banking sector, the Deputy Governor for 
Supervision at the Central Bank of Brazil stressed that “Brazil is as yet undecided 
with respect to the date of implementation or the timetable to be followed” and that 
                                                 
12
 “The New Basel Capital Accord: Challenges and Opportunities for the Americas” was co-
organized with FELEBAN and CEMLA (July 2004, Mexico City). 
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that there were “more pressing priorities for Brazilian supervision at present” such 
as the recently implemented risk-based and consolidated supervision. He added that 
the “New Accord will be most likely implemented in Brazil in a gradual manner, the 
new rules co-existing for a while with the old ones”. (Cavalheiro 2004:1-2)13  
Similarly, the banking industry, represented by the Latin American 
Federation of Banks (FELABAN), was no more eager to transition onto Basel II. 
FELABAN‟s president stressed that the challenges and risks faced in implementing 
Basel II in Latin America were not only greater, but distinct from those of developed 
countries (Risk Net 2004). Furthermore, FELABAN was not only highly critical 
about the potential macroeconomic impact of Basel II on the volatility and volume 
of capital inflows to Latin American countries (FELABAN 2004), but also the 
impact on local banks in the region since Basel II could increase capital 
requirements and regulatory costs for banks, and raise the cost of credit to corporates, 
SMEs and sovereigns (González 2007:173-177). FELABAN emphasized that 
implementation was not a regulatory race, and looked disapprovingly on some 
supervisors who proudly claimed they were closer than others in the region in 
meeting the Basel II standards, citing that Basel II was met with criticisms in the US 
and other emerging countries like China and India (ibid. p170). Against the 
lukewarm reception towards Basel II from supervisory authorities and industry 
representatives, it was the chairman of the Basel Committee who tried to convince to 
no avail that “[f]inancial institutions in Latin America are not paying attention to the 
most important issues of Basel II–namely the incentive to improve risk management” 
adding that “[w]e want banks to manage risk correctly, not to manage Basel II 
correctly, and hope the Accord will catalyse dialogue about risk management in 
                                                 
13
 According to Cavalheiro, small banks would be allowed to stay on Basel I or a simplified SA for 
credit risk and “at best” be required to use the BIA or otherwise not be explicitly required to hold 
capital for operational risk. For large banks, only the FIRB approach would be allowed at first since 
“more time will be necessary” for the AIRB approach and only the alternative TSA was to be 
available for operational risk and the AMA would “have to wait a while longer”. (2004) 
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Latin America” (Risk Net 2004). The regional response to prioritize BCP 
compliance over the implementation of Basel II shaped the pace and scope of Basel 
II policies that diffused across the supervisory network in the Americas. 
 
5.3.2 Policy diffusion at the strategic level and SBIF’s implementation policy 
ASBA stated that the “most important activity” it undertook during 2004-6 was 
divided between two areas, compliance with BCPs and preparations to implement 
Basel II (BCBS 2006a:30). However, ASBA‟s preoccupation with BCPs as a way of 
preparing for Basel II implementation, rather than directly implementing Basel II, 
dominated ASBA‟s main activities in the following ways. First, ASBA‟s 
Continental Training Program (CTP), which aimed to promote knowledge on 
banking supervision and regulation, attracted participation from over five hundred 
supervisors from the Southern Cone and Central America each, and three hundred 
supervisors from the Andean region during 2003-05 (ASBA 2005:6). The CTP 
benefited from the expertise of the US and Canadian banking authorities who 
provided much of the training. However, the abundance of technical support in some 
ways was a curse in disguise for some countries that were receiving the training and 
had limited control over its content as the content of the training primarily focused 
on issues related to BCPs, hampering momentum among supervisors to implement 
Basel II. The recipients of the training were dissatisfied to the point that formal 
requests were made to ASBA to revise the training program to include more 
advanced courses on risk management relevant to Basel II. (BCBS 2006a:31) 
Moreover, ASBA promoted horizontal “cooperation activities between its members 
by facilitating support from agencies with recognised expertise on special issues to 
peers” suggesting that “[t]his form of cooperation can accelerate the implementation 
of sound practices in the region” (ibid. p31). SBIF received visits from supervisors 
in Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador (SBIF 2004:32), but this did not spur the diffusion 
of Basel II as none of these countries were preparing to implement Basel II. 
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Secondly, ASBA established the Research and Implementation Unit (RIU) in 
2004 to collect and report relevant information to support ASBA‟s activities. It was 
initially tasked to assess the degree of BCP compliance to help assess the state of 
readiness to implement Basel II. The RIU concluded that “the region needs to make 
greater efforts to increase its level of compliance with the BCP, especially in the 
areas of risk assessment, consolidated supervision, and independence of bank 
supervisory authorities” (BCBS 2006a:32). In short, the region was deemed not 
ready for Basel II. This diagnosis shaped the types of projects ASBA subsequently 
undertook. In 2006, ASBA and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
initiated a five-year joint project to enhance compliance with BCPs stating that 
“bank supervisors in LAC [Latin American Countries] have a pending 
implementation agenda of the sound bank supervision practices reflected in the Core 
Principles” (IDB 2006:2). Moreover, they believed that Basel II “clearly presents a 
critical challenge to the LAC banking industry and its regulators… [T]o secure 
proper implementation of the new capital requirements, the setting of a solid bank 
supervision framework is necessary, and this is reached through the adequate 
implementation of the BCP. In this respect, the region still shows weaknesses.” 
(ibid.) 
 Furthermore, ASBA established technical working groups in 2005 on credit 
risk and operational risk “to identify and assess the adoption of sound credit and 
operational risk practices in the region and to make recommendations on the best 
practices identified in the region.” (ASBA 2005:5).14 The report on credit risk aimed 
to document “best supervision practices in credit risk management” and provided an 
extensive review of credit risk management policies across supervisory authorities in 
Latin America. However, no more than a few brief mentions on how countries such 
                                                 
14
 This was part of ASBA‟s wider and longer term strategy to form several technical working groups 
comprised of specialists from member countries to promote the implementation of regulatory 
frameworks in line with international standards. Other technical working groups were set up for 
issues such as consolidated supervision, bank insolvency and corporate governance (ASBA 2004:10). 
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as Brazil, Columbia, Peru and Chile had introduced policies in line with Basel II 
were made. (ASBA 2008) Likewise, the document on operational risk highlighted 
the dissimilar progress countries made in incorporating operational risk into their 
supervisory frameworks, but not as part of Basel II implementation (ASBA 2009). 
Divergent supervisory policies and practices amongst countries in the America‟s 
were extensively documented. Supervisors planned to implement Basel II gradually, 
only after establishing national supervisory frameworks for managing credit and 
operational risks according to regional best practices. 
The dissimilar and generally sluggish progress on the part of supervisors is 
also reflected in a survey of 132 banks across Latin America and the Caribbean 
conducted by IDB/MIF and FELABAN in May 2006. The survey concluded that 
banks “still have a long way to go and many obstacles to remove” to implement 
Basel II as most banks had not even started implementing Basel II. (IDB/FELABAN 
2006) The following statistics from the survey highlight the contrast between banks‟ 
plans to implement Basel II and their lack of actual progress. On the one hand, 
eighty percent of banks decided to implement Basel II and regarded it as one of their 
top priorities. Sixty percent of banks intended to implement Pillar 1 by 2008, after 
which Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 implementation was to follow. However, actual progress 
was minimal as sixty-two percent of banks were still in the pre-study or initial phase 
of Pillar 1 implementation. Moreover, ninety-two percent of banks had not 
calculated the amount of investments to be made in relation to banks‟ annual 
expenditure to implement Basel II. These supposedly contradictory results indicate 
that the vast majority of banks had taken a very gradual approach to implementation 
and envisaged implementing only the most basic approaches of Basel II that did not 
require investments to upgrade existing risk systems and processes. 
The approach to implementation that diffused across ASBA was that of 
gradualism as countries did not envisage implementing Basel II in the short run. 
Hence, pressures on SBIF to match the Basel II policies of its peers were absent as 
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was the case for BNM. Although there were no push factors, SBIF‟s implementation 
decisions provide an interesting case to examine how policy diffusion reinforces low 
levels of convergence with Basel II. According to the Superintendent of SBIF, “[i]t 
has become a cliché that Chile holds a leading position among emerging economies, 
particularly regarding banking and financial development. However, in terms of the 
country‟s readiness for Basel II, this cliché contains a great deal of truth.” (Marshall 
2004:8) Chile‟s preparedness to implement Basel II was evident across several 
dimensions.  
First, in terms of meeting the prerequisites for implementing Basel II as 
embodied in the BCPs, Chile‟s FSSA revealed that its compliance level reached 
83%, which was comparable to that in developed countries where the degree of 
compliance was on average 90%, as opposed to 60% in emerging and developing 
countries (Marshall 2007:7, IMF 2004). Hence, in terms of satisfying the 
prerequisites of implementation as reflected in the BCPs, SBIF viewed Chile‟s level 
of compliance as constituting a solid foundation for the banking sector to transition 
onto Basel II (SBIF 2005:3).
15
 Secondly, as part of a long term agenda to enhance 
regulation and supervision in line with modern concepts of prudential regulation and 
effective supervision following the Chilean financial crisis in the eighties, Chile was 
“already treading a road that points in the direction of Basel II” on its own initiative 
(Marshall 2004:9; Marshall 2006; Betancour et al 2006). For example, SBIF 
introduced a risk-based supervisory framework and made enhancements to market 
disclosure requirements in line with Pillars 2 and 3, and initiatives were underway to 
gradually align accounting practices with internationally accepted standards. Thirdly, 
quantitative impact studies of Basel II on capital levels in the Chilean banking 
system suggested a slight reduction in capital requirements instead of an increase 
                                                 
15
 Of the twenty-five BCPs, Chile was deemed “materially non-compliant” for Principle 6 on capital 
adequacy, largely due to the omission of market risk in regulatory capital requirements, and 
Principles 1.2, 15 and 20 on supervisory independence, money laundry and consolidated supervision. 
Chile was non-compliant regarding legal protection of supervisors. (IMF 2004) 
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that would have made implementation costly for the banking sector. Fourthly, the 
Chilean banking system was well capitalized with an average CAR of 13.4% during 
1999 and 2005. This was well above Basel I‟s 8% minimum requirement and the 
market standard of 10% that was required by institutional investors to hold bank 
securities. (Marshall 2007:7) According to the Superintendent of SBIF, “Chile‟s 
single most important advantage in the transition to Basel II… [was] the prudential 
approach it ha[d] taken to the capital adequacy requirements established by the 
original Basel Accord” (Marshall 2004).  
In light of Chile‟s preparedness to implement Basel II in 2004, the 
Superintendent said that “Chile‟s head start on Basel II has triggered expectations 
that it will move ahead rapidly, and adopting the more advanced approaches from 
the start and setting an example to other emerging markets” but also added that 
“[t]hat is not necessarily our intention… [because] for Chile, the benefits are clear 
and speed will be of the essence – not in the sense of simply putting our foot on the 
gas pedal, but of finding the right cruising speed that maximizes those gains, while 
minimizing the costs. That is our key challenge.” (ibid.) Despite Chile‟s readiness to 
implement Basel II, in deciding whether and at what pace to proceed with 
implementation, SBIF faced a dilemma in having to simultaneously reconcile the 
constraints imposed by industry that demanded a reduction in capital requirements 
to move onto Basel II with the preservation of external market confidence which 
required maintaining higher capital levels at par with SBIF‟s regional peers that 
were intending to remain on Basel I. On the one hand, it was essential SBIF 
obtained support from the domestic banking industry to implement Basel II because 
“[a]lthough supervisors continue to have a vital role, the implementation of Basel II 
is mainly the responsibility of banks and bankers, and they must play an active role 
in the transition. As long as supervisors are the only party committed to this project, 
progress will be limited and they should, therefore, motivate banks to assume their 
respective tasks.” (Marshall 2007:13) However, the Superintendent believed that 
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“moving to Basel II will be difficult and will not receive the necessary industry 
support if it is associated with a significant increase in capital requirements” (ibid. 
p10). Therefore, to obtain the necessary industry support to progress with the 
implementation of Basel II, SBIF would have to consider allowing banks to benefit 
from lower capital requirements that would result from implementing Basel II. 
On the other hand, satisfying the interest of the domestic banking industry 
conflicted with SBIF‟s objective to maintain the stability of the financial system. 
SBIF was concerned that reductions in capital levels following the implementation 
of Basel II relative to its peers that remained on Basel I could adversely affect 
Chile‟s country risk indicators and threaten the stability of Chile‟s financial system. 
This owed to the fact that “despite Chile‟s macroeconomic stability, country risk 
remains a concern and in this regard the solvency of the banking industry and its 
capital indicators are key issues. A significant reduction in capital allocation, even if 
it is justified on Basel II grounds, could have a negative impact on market 
perception and Chile‟s country risk indicators.” (Marshall 2004:9) Two interrelated 
factors accentuated this concern. First, although Chile maintained capital levels in 
excess of the 8% minimum prescribed by Basel I and the 10% market standard, the 
relatively low capitalization vis-à-vis its regional peers who maintained even higher 
capital levels gave the Chilean authorities less slack to risk the deterioration in 
country risk that may be induced by a relative fall in capital levels in Chile. Hence, 
there was very limited scope to accommodate industry‟s demand for lower capital 
requirements. Second, SBIF‟s Superintendent expressed a fundamental doubt about 
the efficacy of capital ratios based on Basel II, compared to Basel I, which was a 
“simple and easy-to-measure index… extensively used at the board and management 
level and for external assessment by market analysts and ratings agencies as well as 
by regulators and supervisors... These indexes lose importance under the new capital 
framework as they become much more difficult to calculate and interpret. Moreover, 
their use by regulators and supervisors may turn to be meaningless and, therefore, 
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ineffective.” (ibid. p13) Hence, a fall in the level of capitalization towards the Basel 
minimum risked being interpreted as a sign of weakness in the regional context 
where others retained the use of Basel I indicators and capital levels, rather than a 
reflection of higher risk management standards in line with Basel II.
16
 
Faced with the dilemma of having to simultaneously reconcile conflicting 
domestic interests on the one hand and sustaining external market confidence on the 
other, the Superintendent of Chile initially envisaged a solution where countries 
moved together to implement Basel II and adjusted the level of capitalization in the 
region based on “coordination and cooperation among supervisors” and claimed that 
“[i]n our continent, the Association of Bank Supervisors of the Americas (ASBA)… 
constitutes a prime vehicle for this type of collaboration” (Marshall 2004:9). Yet, 
insofar as Chile‟s supervisory peers were either not able or not willing to proceed 
with the implementation of Basel II, and with the even less likely possibility of a 
region-wide reduction in the level of capitalization across banking systems to 
compensate for the introduction of higher risk management standards per Basel II, 
Chile was left to take the prudent approach in finding “the right cruising speed” in 
line with its regional peers that were moving very slowly towards Basel II. Having 
to do so created a pullback factor that constrained SBIF in proceeding with the 
implementation of Basel II, despite the initial readiness of the Chilean banking 
sector to implement Basel II. 
 
                                                 
16
 This is a reverse formulation of Singer‟s argument (2007). Singer argues that regulators are 
incentivized to create international regulatory standards to solve the dilemma caused when the 
domestic financial sector loses international competitiveness vis-à-vis their foreign rivals and 
domestic public confidence in financial stability declines. Singer‟s argument only applies to countries 
where setting international standards is a policy option. The dilemma presented here highlights the 
policy constraints from the perspective of standard takers, who have the policy option to adopt an 
international standard conditional on whether others also adopt, and where policymakers need to 
respond to maintaining market confidence to external investors, whilst addressing competitive issues 
domestically. 
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5.3.3 Chile’s gradualism that stalled 
In January 2005, the Chilean authorities released a two-stage implementation plan 
outlining a gradual and stepwise transition towards Basel II. The first stage 
comprised of implementing the SA for credit risk and the alternative TSA for 
operational risk from 2007 in the form of management standards. Capital charges for 
market risk using the SA were to be implemented in the form of supervisory norms 
using the concept of capital limits in compliance with the 1996 Amendment. The 
second stage comprised of implementing the advanced approaches of Basel II. 
(SBIF 2005) However, in contrary to what this two-stage implementation plan may 
seem to suggest, Chile‟s progress in terms of the pace, scope and content of Basel II 
implementation does not diverge significantly relative to its inactive supervisory 
peers. Chile‟s implementation resulted in a low degree of convergence with Basel II 
for four reasons. 
Firstly, the implementation of the SA for credit risk and the alternative TSA 
for operational risk took the form of management standards, which are not legally 
binding, but instead use the SBIF‟s existing supervisory processes to guide banks. 
Similarly, supervisory norms were used to apply market risk capital requirements. 
Since management standards and supervisory norms do not have any legal basis, 
they do not require explicit capital charges for banks until corresponding 
amendments are made to the definition of minimum capital requirements in the 
General Banking Law (Ley General de Bancos, “LGB”). Only when these legal 
amendments are in force can capital requirements be deemed to be fully determined 
on the basis of Basel II. Moreover, because amending the LGB required 
congressional approval, no timeline was put forward in relation when such 
amendments would be made. Until such time, Chile‟s capital requirements are based 
on Basel I and depend solely on credit risk, without incorporating market risk or 
operational risk. Hence, SBIF‟s implementation plan can be considered as a plan to 
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prepare banks and SBIF operationally, rather than to formally implement the basic 
approaches of Basel II into its national regulatory framework. 
Secondly, regarding the substance of implementation for corporate and retail 
loans, SBIF proposed risk weights for the SA of Basel II that was effectively a 
continuation of Basel I. For corporate loans, although the Superintendant claimed 
that “[i]n principle, Chile‟s external ratings industry appears prepared to support 
implementation of the standardized approach to credit risk” (Marshall 2007:6), the 
scope of coverage in ratings was limited. Of approximately 120,000 companies that 
obtain bank loans in Chile, only 0.1% had an external rating, equivalent to under 9% 
of the corporate portfolio of Chilean banks (Portilla 2005).
17
 This meant that over 90% 
of loans (or 99% of companies including SMEs) were unrated, and thus would 
continue to receive the same treatment as under Basel I. Hence, for the corporate 
loan portfolio, the change from the transition to SA is limited, and thus the extent to 
which a more risk sensitive capital adequacy framework is introduced in Chile. In 
addition, Chile‟s proposed SA rules for retail and residential mortgage portfolios are 
consistent with Basel I, not Basel II. Basel I prescribed a 50% risk weight for 
residential mortgage loans and leasing contracts, although Chile had adopted a 60% 
risk weight for prudential reasons. Whilst the SA of Basel II proposed a 35% risk 
weight, the Chilean authorities suggested a 50% risk weight, which is the risk 
weight under Basel I. Furthermore, the risk weight applied to the retail portfolio was 
reduced from 100% in Basel I to 75% in Basel II. Chile adopted a 100% risk weight 
and proposed risk weights ranging from 90% to 100%, which is effectively a 
continuation of Basel I. Considering that loans to corporate and retail customers are 
the core of any banking business, the transition to the SA of Basel II would not 
radically change the substance of Chile‟s capital adequacy framework based on 
Basel I in any significant way. 
                                                 
17
 Betancour et al suggest that the percentage of total loans granted to rated corporates is higher at 18% 
(2006:19), which means that 80% of corporate loans are unrated. 
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Thirdly, timelines or regulatory guidelines were not issued for the second 
stage of implementation that would allow banks to use the advanced approaches of 
Basel II. This was envisaged only after the basic approaches had been formally 
implemented, but since that latter was delayed and remained uncertain, the second 
stage of Chile‟s transition onto Basel II was even more elusive. To the extent that 
the SA did not require significant changes from the status quo and the main changes 
and risk management benefits originated from the implementation of the advanced 
approaches of Basel II, Chile‟s progress with respect to Basel II was minimal. 
Finally, Chile‟s less than ambitious plan to implement Basel II in 2007 was 
pushed back to 2009, and subsequently stalled in 2009. Chile remained on Basel I in 
2012. The delay can be attributed in part to domestic factors such as the legal system 
and change in government in 2009, as well as international factors such as the global 
financial crisis and the new Basel III agreement. Owing to Chile‟s legal and 
economic legacy, the LGB is specific and detailed in almost every dimension, to the 
extent that it specifies the risk weights for credit risk. Hence, the implementation of 
Basel II requires amendment to the LGB, which requires the approval of the Chilean 
Congress. Moreover, since Basel II envisaged a greater role for supervisors, 
Congress had been reluctant to give more discretionary decision making powers to 
the SBIF (Cruz and Zurita 2008:2). The requirement for congressional approval 
contributed to delays and uncertainties in implementation. In late 2006, the 
Superintendent announced that “[t]he time has come to launch the standardized 
model for credit risk in 2007 while at the same time moving forward with other 
models related to operating and market risk” (BNA 2006). A string of proposals 
were issued for industry consultation and three quantitative impact studies were 
conducted (SBIF 2007:16). During 2008, amendments to the LGB to allow for the 
inclusion of operational and market risk capital requirements and the revised capital 
requirements for credit risk were drafted (SBIF 2008:12), and was to be submitted to 
Congress in 2009 (Cruz and Zurita 2008:2). However, following the global financial 
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crisis of 2007-8 and the subsequent revision of the Basel standards, which 
eventually culminated in Basel III in 2010, SBIF put the submission on hold after 
deciding to incorporate the Basel III standards before proposing a bill to amend the 
LGB (SBIF 2009:5). 
Although formal implementation lagged behind significantly, practices in 
banks could have been converging towards the Basel II standards. After all, SBIF 
introduced a string of reforms “inspired by the Basel II model” such as incorporating 
market risk, enhancing internal controls and strengthening disclosures (IMF 
2004:36), resulting in a capital adequacy framework that “follow Basel I standards, 
complemented with elements of Basel II and III” (IMF 2011:21).18 However, upon 
examination of Chile‟s four largest banks, although the concept of market risk was 
introduced into banks‟ operations and operational risk management models were 
established, the assessment of such risks were not used as a basis for holding 
regulatory capital. Moreover, despite having the capabilities to apply the SA, it was 
not being used except on an irregular basis, such as to participate in quantitative 
impact studies conducted by the SBIF. Disclosures to the market continued to be 
based on Basel I. Although some banks embarked on the development of internal 
systems to adopt the advanced approaches, the lack of regulatory and supervisory 
guidance significantly hindered progress in incorporating these into regulatory 
capital requirements in line with Basel II.  
 
5.4 Comparative analysis 
A comparative analysis that summarizes how policy diffusion shaped Basel II 
implementation in Malaysia and Chile is conducted in this section. The analysis is 
structured across three key questions, namely, what, how and why policies diffused 
across the two cases.  
                                                 
18
 The legal framework contained elements of Basel III, such as the leverage ratio set at 3% of total 
assets and a systemic capital surcharge. 
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What diffused? 
Different implementation policies diffused across supervisory networks in East Asia 
and the Americas. In Malaysia, policies diffused not only at the strategic level in 
terms of deciding on the speedy pace and comprehensive scope of implementation, 
but also at the more detailed tactical level in dealing with the procyclicality of Basel 
II and implementing the IRB approaches. In contrast, Chile‟s peers were not 
progressing with the implementation of Basel II as Malaysia‟s counterparts were. 
Whether supervisors should adopt Basel II at all was an open question for 
policymakers in ASBA. Hence, although both supervisory authorities said they 
adopted a gradual approach, in practice, the degree of gradualness differed 
substantially as supervisors adopted a gradual approach relative to the 
implementation policies of their foreign peers, which differed between the two inter-
supervisory authority networks. BNM considered implementing the basic 
approaches of Basel II in 2008 and the advanced approaches in 2010 to be gradual in 
the context of how its supervisory peers were implementing Basel II. In contrast, 
supervisors across ASBA emphasized the attainment of greater levels of compliance 
with BCPs before introducing various elements of Basel II over time to a capital 
adequacy regime based on Basel I. Hence, compared to BNM, SBIF adopted a much 
more gradual and layered approach, which progressively introduced elements of the 
basics approaches of Basel II in a Basel I regime over time before formally 
implementing them. Different gradual approaches meant that the scope of what 
diffused across the supervisory networks differed substantially. 
The policy emphasis on enhancing compliance with BCPs across ASBA is 
particularly interesting in light of the actual level of compliance to BCPs, as reported 
by Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2006:38). Although the regional classifications in this 
study do not correspond exactly to the supervisory networks, an aggregate index of 
compliance by region since 1999, which is the only information that is disclosed, 
suggests that the mean compliance score in both Latin America and East Asia and 
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the Pacific region was both approximately 55% (compared to 90% in industrialized 
countries). Hence, judging solely from countries‟ preparedness to implement Basel 
II as reflected by the degree of compliance with BCPs, both regions seem to be on 
par, which begs the question of why the East Asians went ahead with Basel II, and 
supervisors in the Americas decided to focus on BCPs. The distribution of 
compliance scores sheds some light. It is less dispersed in East Asia than in Latin 
America. The minimum and maximum score in the former was approximately 40% 
and 75%, and 25% and 85% in the latter (compared to 65% and 100% in 
industrialized countries). This reflects ASBA‟s diverse membership, which included 
countries that lacked capacities to implement Basel II and had only made 
preliminary progress in implementing the BCPs. In contrast, EMEAP consisted of a 
smaller group of relatively similar countries, where the pursuit of a focused strategy 
on Basel II implementation was feasible. Hence, the characteristics of the 
constituents of supervisory networks may shape which policies diffuse, leading to 
different levels of convergence with Basel II. However, in explaining the high level 
of convergence with Basel II in Malaysia and low level in Chile, it was not the case 
that channels for diffusion did not exist in the latter. Instead, one channel reinforced 
high while the other low levels of convergence with Basel II. 
How did policies diffuse? 
Both supervisory networks aimed to promote supervisory policies in line with 
international standards by strengthening ties between supervisory authorities and 
facilitating the sharing of experiences and policy thinking on various aspects of 
Basel II. There were many parallels in the functions of these supervisory networks. 
In fact, one could argue that efforts to promote convergence with international 
standards were greater in ASBA than EMEAP. Supervisory authorities in ASBA 
engaged in a more expansive, systematic and longer-term project to promote the 
implementation of international standards on a wide range of issues dealt with in 
BCPs, such as licensing, consolidated supervision and credit and operational risk 
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management, as well as issues such as bank resolution, deposit insurance and 
corporate governance. Furthermore, efforts to attain convergence went one step 
further as they also attempted to develop regional best practice standards by 
adapting international standards to national and regional conditions. As a result, 
however, progress was very sluggish as convergence required a high degree of 
coordination amongst disparate supervisory authorities.  
On the other hand, the EMEAP WGBS did not aim to achieve the same 
depth and breadth of convergence in regulatory standards as their ASBA 
counterparts. Rather than formulating and assessing countries‟ compliance against 
regional best practice standards on a wide range of supervisory issues, efforts 
focused on a narrow set of topics, namely, Basel II implementation and macro-
surveillance. Furthermore, countries focused on learning about what others were 
doing to maintain consistency with each other, rather than at achieving formal 
convergence with a set of regional standards. The lack of a systematic approach 
provided the Asian supervisory networks with greater flexibility and agility for 
Basel II policies to diffuse quickly. In addition, relationships between supervisory 
authorities were more informal and horizontal in the EMEAP WGBS. Based on 
interviews with officials, Nesaduai describes the working procedures of EMEAP 
and the working groups as being “very frank and open” and operating on the basis of 
deliberation and dialogue and the search for consensus (2008:90). Moreover, “[t]he 
role of deliberate knowledge sharing has also been instrumental as countries with 
diverse economies have been able to learn from the experiences of other countries… 
[Officials] emphasized that sharing experiences with other countries in governing 
financial markets is one of the most important functions of these networks, which 
allows members know how others deal with similar situations.” (ibid. p87-88) To 
this end, supervisory networks that consist of less disparate countries in their 
preparedness to implement Basel II, focus on a narrow range of issues, and where 
interactions between supervisors are based on sharing policy ideas and experiences, 
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may be more conducive for promoting convergence with Basel II than supervisory 
networks that do not.  
Why did policies diffuse? 
Why were supervisors motivated to look to their foreign counterparts when 
formulating their own policies? Neither supervisory authorities in Malaysia and 
Chile wanted their financial sector to be seen as the Achilles heel of the region and 
adopted policies that signalled financial strength relative to their peers. However, 
supervisory authorities in East Asia believed that markets would discriminate 
between the different approaches of Basel II because they conveyed information 
about the standard of banks‟ risk management. In contrast, supervisors in the 
Americas believed that the level of capital conveyed more important information on 
the strengths of banks rather than the methods used to compute them. Hence, BNM 
matched the implementation policies of its supervisory peers by adopting the more 
advanced approaches to show that its banking system also adopted best practice 
standards in advanced risk management. The prospects for upgrading banks‟ 
management of risk was particularly compelling for supervisory authorities in Asia 
following the Asian financial crisis, who attributed its cause in no small measure to 
the failure of domestic banks‟ inadequate risk management. In contrast, Chile faced 
a different kind of pressures. In the absence of an Asian-style financial crisis, the 
same impetus to adopt drastic reforms aimed at enhancing risk management 
standards in banks was not present across the Americas. Despite the readiness to 
implement Basel II in Chile, the authorities believed that higher levels of 
capitalization based on Basel I was a stronger signal of the strength of its banking 
system than higher risk management standards and lower capital requirements based 
on Basel II in a regional context where its peers were intending to remain on Basel I. 
This created a pullback factor that constrained SBIF in proceeding with the 
implementation of Basel II. However, in both cases, supervisors‟ concerns about the 
potential for competitive implementation strategies amongst closely interconnected 
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supervisors led them to ensure that they maintained consistency with their peers. 
The common underlying motivation to avoid disadvantaging their domestic banking 
sector led Malaysia and Chile to adopt different implementation strategies. In the 
case of Malaysia, there were implications for remaining on Basel I when its peers 
moved onto Basel II, whereas in Chile, there were implications for moving ahead 
with the implementation of Basel II when its peers remained on Basel I. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Although supervisors from different countries do not make binding collective 
decisions regarding the implementation of Basel II, they do talk and monitor each 
other extensively. Supervisory networks determined which countries Malaysia and 
Chile were closely interconnected to, which in turn shaped the type and scope of 
Basel II policies that diffused. Supervisory networks emerged as powerful channels 
of diffusion that promoted convergence in implementation policies amongst 
countries by shaping the formation of implementation norms amongst supervisors 
from very early in the implementation process, thus, changing the trajectory of how 
countries implemented Basel II. Although divergent implementation policies 
diffused across supervisory networks in East Asia and the Americas, the 
implementation of Basel II in Malaysia and Chile was strongly shaped by 
considerations of how their foreign peers were implementing Basel II as there were 
pros and cons for not moving ahead with the rest of one‟s peers in the case of 
Malaysia, and moving ahead without the rest of one‟s peers in the case of Chile. 
 An interesting counterfactual question might then be to ask whether 
Malaysia would have adopted different Basel II policies if one could hypothetically 
relocate Malaysia to Chile and vice versa. The analyses of the activities of 
supervisory networks, diffusion process and the reasoning through which BNM and 
SBIF formulated their policies suggest that geographic location does matter to the 
extent that supervisory networks are organized on a regional basis. The policy 
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implication of this is clear. In addition to shaping national capital adequacy regimes 
in Malaysia and Chile, the diffusion of Basel II policies across diffusion channels 
with a regional footprint has a profound effect on shaping the regional regulatory 
landscape. This in turn has implications on the global regulatory landscape by 
undermining the extent to which international regulatory standards are implemented 
in a globally consistent way. This is because while some supervisory networks 
promote convergence with international standards, others deter the pace and scope 
of implementation. Moreover, policies tend to diffuse only within, rather than across 
supervisory networks. 
 The underlying dynamics of policy diffusion is an ongoing and evolving 
process. Since 2007, although the way supervisory authorities are interconnected to 
one another remained stable, the content of the policies that diffused changed in two 
important ways. Firstly, the focus has shifted towards the implementation of Basel 
III, which incorporates Basel II but also introduces new standards on liquidity and 
macroprudential regulations. This in part reflects the responsiveness and flexibility 
of these networks to adapt to developments in global financial regulations. Secondly, 
as implementation progressed in Malaysia and banks started to adopt Basel II, 
supervisory interactions between home and host supervisors of international banks 
emerged as a prominent channel of policy diffusion. Home-host supervisory 
relationships tend to be more asymmetric, vertical, bound by established 
international supervisory principles set by the Basel Committee and associated with 
specific implementation steps. The examination in this chapter of how policies 
diffused horizontally amongst supervisory peers in the same inter-supervisory 
authority network is complemented by the next chapter, which explores how policies 
diffuse vertically from home to host supervisors of global banks by examining the 
diffusion of Basel II policies across the cross-border structure of international banks.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Topics of the SEACEN-FSI Regional Seminar for Bank Supervisors and Regulators
Date No. Topic
2000, November 1st Risk Management in Banking Supervision
2001, November 2nd Corporate Governance, Operational Risk and Internal Controls
2002, July 3rd Operational Risk, Corporate Governance and Problem Bank Resolution
2002, November 4th The New Capital Accord: Asset Securitisation, Risk Management and the 
New Capital Accord
2003 March 5th The New Capital Accord and its Implementation Challenges
2003, December 6th The New Capital Accord and Credit Ratings
2004, March 7th The New Basel Capital Accord and Financial Engineering
2005, December 8th International Accounting and Auditing Practices for Banks
2005, February 9th Basel II and the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) System
2005, December 10th Basel II and Operational Risk
2006, March 11th Supervisory Review Process of Basel II and its Implementation
2006, July 12th Basel II and Pillar III Market Disclosure
2007, March 13th Supervisory Review Process of Pillar II with Special Focus on Interest Rate 
Risk in Banking Books
2007, June 14th The Revised Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
2008, March 15th Current Issues and Developments in Credit Risk Management
2008, June 16th Practical Techniques for the Management and Measurement of Operational 
Risk
2009, March 17th Stress Testing Techniques
2009, September 18th Lessons From Financial Turmoil and the Repercussions in Asia Pacific 
Region
2010, March 19th Liquidity Risk Management in Bank 
(Source: www.seacen.org/programme/meeting.aspx and www.bis.org/fsi/activities.htm)
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Chapter Six 
The diffusion of Basel II across the cross-border structure of 
international banks:  
A comparative analysis of Malaysia and South Korea 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Does it matter how global banks interconnect one country to another in explaining 
the different ways Basel II was implemented across countries? Put differently, do 
national supervisors take in to account how foreign banks in their jurisdictions 
implemented Basel II? How plausible is it that policies diffused across the cross-
border structure of international banks? The results of the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter Three found that on average, foreign bank presence was positively 
correlated with higher levels of Basel II implementation in the host country if those 
foreign banks had implemented Basel II in their home countries, or otherwise 
hindered implementation. Having established a positive correlation between the 
degree of convergence with Basel II in the host country, and that of the home 
countries of foreign banks that had a presence in the host country, it was argued that 
the cross-border structure of international banks was an effective channel through 
which Basel II policies diffused.  
Indeed, driven by technological change, competition and the ongoing 
liberalization of markets, FDI in the financial sectors of emerging and developing 
countries has played a key role in accelerating the process of international economic 
integration and the trend towards the consolidation and globalization of the financial 
services industry since the mid-1990s. The value of FDI measured by cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions targeting banks in emerging economies rose by around 
twenty fold from USD2.5 billion between 1991 and 1995, to USD51.5 billion in the 
subsequent five years, and reached USD67.5 billion between 2001 and 2005 
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(Domanski 2005:70). In 2006, 897 foreign banks controlled combined assets of over 
USD1.2 trillion and accounted for more than 39% of total banking assets in 
developing countries, compared with USD157 billion ten years earlier, when they 
accounted for approximately 20% of total assets (World Bank 2008:86). This has 
resulted in the formation of global and regional banks with dense cross-border 
networks of subsidiaries and branches. The empirical literature tends to afford 
greater attention to the effects of foreign bank entry on various aspects of hosts‟ 
financial systems, such as on the productivity and profitability of banks, credit 
intermediation and financial stability.
1
 Some have anecdotally stated that growing 
foreign involvement was instrumental in aligning the financial systems of emerging 
economies more closely with international standards for capital allocation, risk 
management and corporate governance (Domanski 2005:69). However, the question 
of how and to what extent this is case has not been addressed in the literature and is 
a question that this chapter aims to shed light on. 
This chapter develops a stronger test that complements the methods and 
findings of the quantitative analysis by focusing on the process of policy diffusion in 
two specific country cases that were carefully selected in the case study design 
chapter. The case studies focus on the following two lines of inquiry. First, they 
investigate the channels of diffusion formed by networks of international banks that 
link Basel II policies in Korea and Malaysia to those of other countries. Secondly, 
the way international banks shaped various steps in the implementation process are 
examined, from the initial policy consideration of whether to implement Basel II to 
the supervisory approval process of allowing banks use the approaches of Basel II 
implemented by national regulations. By addressing these questions, the aim of this 
chapter is to uncover the process through which the presence of foreign banks define 
                                                 
1
 Empirical studies find that foreign bank entry tends to increase the efficiency and productivity of 
domestic banks (Claessens et al 2001), facilitate credit intermediation (Clarke et al 2001), contribute 
to the stability of host financial systems (Domanski 2005) and alleviate economic and fiscal costs of 
financial crises (Detragiache and Gupta 2006). 
176 
 
the way Korea and Malaysia are interconnected to the rest of the world and shape 
the way Basel II was implemented. In contrast to the previous chapter that examined 
how policy diffusion led to early-comprehensive and late-partial adopters across 
different inter-supervisory authority networks, this chapter examines two countries 
that are in the same supervisory network, leading to three benefits from an analytical 
point of view. First, it is possible to control for the effects of supervisory networks 
when investigating the diffusion of Basel II policies across the cross-border structure 
of international banks. Secondly, the analysis that follows provides continuity from 
the previous chapter by examining supervisory relationships not just amongst 
supervisory peers in the same supervisory network, but also between home and host 
supervisors of international banks. Thirdly, this chapter complements the previous 
by investigating how policies diffuse not only at the level of supervisors, but also at 
the level of banks, both of which are key actors in the process of implementation.  
 The structure of this chapter is similar to that in the previous chapter. 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 are case studies of how policies diffused across international 
banks in Korea and Malaysia respectively. To uncover the different paths through 
which Basel II policies diffused, the case studies first map out the channels of 
diffusion formed by the cross-border structure of international banks, and then 
examines how policy diffusion shaped supervisors‟ implementation policies. A 
comparative analysis of Korea and Malaysia is undertaken in section 6.4 regarding 
the three questions of what, how and why Basel II policies diffused. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the two contrasting effects of the cross-border structure of 
international banks in promoting and hindering convergence with Basel II. 
 
6.2 Policy diffusion and Basel II implementation in Korea 
6.2.1 The cross-border structure of international banks in Korea 
The presence of foreign investors in the Korean banking sector remained very 
limited until the 1997-8 Korean financial crisis. During the 70s and 80s, direct 
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foreign ownership in domestic banks was restricted and foreign banks provided 
foreign currency loans to domestic banks and firms with minimal local presence. 
Market deregulation and liberalization in the early 90s ushered in a rapid increase in 
foreign entry, whereby inward FDI through the opening of branches increased from 
USD27.1 million in 1994 to USD536.1million in 1995, and USD447.2 million in 
1996 (Yi et al 2009:131). Yet, foreign banks were relatively small and dispersed 
players that served a niche market.
2
 The tipping point that drastically changed the 
mode and scope of foreign banks‟ operations in the Korean banking sector came 
when the Korean government eased long standing legal restrictions that limited the 
foreign ownership of domestic nationwide banks in regulatory reforms following the 
Korean financial crisis. The mode and scale of foreign bank entry changed from 
opening branches to investing directly into domestic nationwide banks, paving the 
way for much greater levels of foreign bank presence in the Korean banking sector 
across two phases.  
In the first phase, from the aftermath of the Korean financial crisis to 2004, 
foreign investor participation surged to unprecedented levels as they invested 
directly into major nationwide banks. According to the Bank of Korea, in terms of 
shareholdings, “the combined foreign ownership share of Korean commercial banks 
increased from 8.5% in 1997 to 27% in 2002 and to 59% in September 2004” 
(OECD 2005:164).
3
 Of the seven nationwide banks, six were in aggregate foreign-
owned. Foreign shareholders acquired controlling stakes in three nationwide banks, 
namely, Korea First Bank (KFB), KorAm Bank and Korea Exchange Bank (KEB). 
                                                 
2
 In 2004, foreign bank branches accounted for less than 10% of domestic nationwide banks‟ assets. 
Their presence was minimal as most of the thirty-seven foreign banks operated via a single branch. 
There were only forty-nine foreign bank branches compared to over 4,000 branches of domestic 
nationwide banks. (FSS 2004b:82) 
3
 In contrast, Korean banks did not hold significant volumes (more than 3% of their total assets) of 
assets outside Korea. Korean banks‟ exposures to Asia as at September 2009 as a proportion to total 
assets was 2.5% for Hana, 1.1% for Woori, and 2.2% for Korea Exchange Bank (SEACEN 2010:24). 
Hence, the risk of reverse causation in the analysis is low. 
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These were mainly private equity investors willing to take on the high risk of 
recapitalizing crisis ridden Korean banks in the hope to turn around the ailing 
businesses and realize substantial capital gains and a premium for corporate control 
through the onward sale of their investments to buyers wanting to enter the Korean 
banking sector. Korean chaebols were restricted in their ability to purchase stakes in 
banks as the government sought to limit collusion between financial and industrial 
capital. This was partly to curtail excessive lending for the expansion of chaebols 
(Haggard 2000) and to respond to populist pressures to discipline chaebols, whose 
generally positive public image as national champions were discredited by the 
events of the crisis (Lee 2008:442).
4
 US private equity firm Newbridge Capital 
acquired 48.5% of shares in KFB in 2001, and with it, a drag-along clause that 
allowed it to sell 100% of KFB shares to a third party it designated. Carlyle 
Consortium and J.P. Morgan became the largest shareholders of KorAm Bank in 
2000 and investment fund, Lone Star, acquired a controlling stake in KEB in 2003. 
Although the crisis precipitated the entry of foreign banks in Korea, the rise in 
foreign bank presence also reflected a broader global trend. Until the global 
financial crisis in 2007-8, “the past two decades have seen an unprecedented degree 
of globalization, especially in financial services… Although there are exceptions 
and regional differences, few countries have been left out from this trend of 
increasing financial integration. As a result, foreign banks have become important in 
domestic financial intermediation.” (Claessens and van Horen 2012) 
In the second phase from 2005 onwards, the overall level of foreign investors 
in Korea remained stable at a high level, but the onward sale of Korean banks by 
foreign private equity investors to international banks resulted in a dramatic rise in 
the presence of foreign banks as can be seen in Table 14. KFB was acquired by UK-
based Standard Chartered (“SCB”) in April 2005 and rebranded as SC First Bank 
                                                 
4
 When the Banking Law was revised in April 2002 to raise the limit on individual‟s ownership of 
bank shares to 10%, restrictions on chaebols remained as their voting rights were limited to 4% (Lee 
2008a:442). 
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(SCFB), whilst KorAm Bank was acquired by US-based Citigroup in November 
2004 and rebranded as Citi Korea. 
Table 14: Foreign and government ownership of banks (end of 2005) 
 
As subsidiaries of Standard Chartered and Citigroup, KFB and KorAm Bank were 
integrated into the banking networks of these global banks. HSBC agreed to 
purchase KEB in 2007, but the acquisition was derailed by regulatory hurdles. With 
the exception of Woori Bank, Kookmin Bank (“KB”), Shinhan Bank and Hana Bank 
remained foreign-owned by aggregate share ownership. 
In assessing the effects of policy diffusion in Korea, the distinction between 
the first phase that saw the unprecedented rise in aggregate foreign ownership of 
domestic banks, especially by private equity funds (2000-2004), and the subsequent 
phase when domestic banks were acquired and integrated into global banks (2005-
2010) is important both for analytical and empirical reasons. The implementation of 
Basel II was a lengthy process encompassing both phases. The shift from the first to 
second phase, however, alters the configuration in the way policymakers in Korea 
are interconnected to their foreign counterparts, and hence, the paths through which 
policies diffuse at different steps of the Basel II implementation process. 
Preparations to implement Basel II commenced in 2001. While the Korean banking 
sector was experiencing a dramatic rise in foreign ownership in phase one, 
supervisors decided whether to implement Basel II, and if so, when and how. These 
decisions had direct effects on the preparatory stages of implementation running up 
to the announcement of the official implementation policy by the FSS in December 
2004. This is schematically summarized in the left half of Figure 5.  
Name of bank
Foreign Ownership 
(%)
Major foreign shareholder 
(%)
Government ownership 
(%)
Assets 
(KRW, tn)
Korea First Bank 100.0 Standard Chartered (100%) -                  42,321 
KorAm Bank 99.8 Citigroup (99.7%) -                  44,737 
Kookmin Bank 76.3 ING Bank NV (4.0%) -                183,634 
Korea Exchange Bank 71.7 Lone Star (50.5%), Comerz 
Bank (14.6%)
Ex-Im Bank (13.9%), Bank 
of Korea (6.1%)
                 62,858 
Hana Bank 68.3 Temasek (9.9%) -                  80,906 
Shinhan Bank 63.3 - -                135,407 
Woori Bank 11.6 - KDIC (86.8%)                104,128 
Source: FSS Banking Statistics
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Figure 5: Timeline of Basel II implementation and the cross-border structure of 
international banks in Korea 
 
The next critical implementation step, by which time international banks had 
acquired domestic nationwide banks (i.e. phase two), involved the continuation of 
preparations by banks and concurrent process of national rule making by the FSS. 
This was followed by the supervisory approval process starting in 2007 for the FIRB 
approach and 2008 for the AIRB approach and AMA, whereby the FSS granted 
approvals to banks that met their regulatory requirements to actually apply the 
advanced approaches of Basel II for regulatory purposes. The following two sections 
examine how Basel II policies diffused across these two phases. 
 
6.2.2 Post-crisis Korea and the diffusion of Basel II 
Prior to the 1997-8 crisis, risk management in banks was merely a formality and 
remained very primitive. It was generally believed that even such primitive risk 
management standards were not implemented properly, often due to frequent 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Phase One Phase Two
FSS announces 
implementation 
plan
Regulations 
effective for 
SA/FIRB and 
BIA/TSA
Regulations 
effective for
AIRB and AMA
Banks apply 
for FIRB
Response to 
CP2
Formulation of 
FSS Basel II 
Masterplan
Citi
acquires 
KorAm
SCB acquires 
KFB
JPM & 
Carlyle
acquires 
KorAm
Newbridge 
acquires KFB
FSS rule
making
Consultations and FSS 
draft rule making 
Approval 
phase
Surge in foreign
ownership
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government intervention and partly due to the lack of efficient capital markets (Lee 
2008:7). However, the Korean financial crisis created turmoil in the banking sector 
as five banks were shutdown and nine merged, reducing the number of commercial 
banks from twenty-six to nineteen (Kim et al 2006:260). The highly disruptive and 
costly market restructuring that ensued was described by one FSS official as an 
agonizing experience that triggered a strong sense of awareness amongst supervisors 
and banks that acquiring capabilities to manage credit risk was critical for the long-
term survival of banks (FSS 2005a). The FSS singled out the incompetence of 
domestic banks‟ risk management functions as a major cause of the financial crisis, 
and subsequently exerted systematic and persistent supervisory pressure to prompt 
banks to make improvements in risk management a management priority and 
undertake significant investments to build advanced state-of-the-art risk 
management systems (Lee 2008:8; FSS 2005a; Jun 2008: Moon 2007). 
As part of these efforts, the FSS announced a stepwise plan to introduce risk-
based supervision in Korea in October 2001. The FSS stated that this was because 
according to ““The New Capital Accord,” released in January 2001, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision recommended that the supervisory authority 
evaluate the adequacy of financial companies‟ capital equity in connection with the 
risk level and take appropriate actions.” (FSS 2001:24) The first step of introducing 
risk-based supervision pertained to enhancing banks‟ risk management capabilities 
through the “adoption of best practices for integrated risk management of financial 
institutions that incorporate the New Basel Accord” in 2002 (FSS 2002:6).5 The FSS 
strongly encouraged the adoption of the advanced approaches of Basel II by 
prompting domestic banks to develop Basel II-compatible internal models for the 
measurement of credit, operational and market risks by 2004 and publishing plans 
for making the early adoption of Basel II a supervisory criteria (Lee 2008:11). 
                                                 
5
 The second step involved implementing a risk information management system and developing a 
risk-based supervisory framework in 2003 (FSS 2001:25). 
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Although CP1 and CP2 published in 1999 and 2001 were two fundamentally 
incomplete proposals that were subject to extensive revisions (Tarullo 2008:104-5), 
Korean banks nonetheless used these to start building their internal risk systems 
several years before the Basel Committee finalized Basel II and before the FSS 
released any formal regulations. Korea‟s post-crisis policy rhetoric to comply with 
international standards not only made it difficult for policymakers to avoid 
committing to Basel II implementation, but also provided a kick-start to Korea‟s 
implementation by providing a strong justification for the public sector to intervene 
in mobilizing resources in the private sector.  
The FSS‟s somewhat hasty and ambitious policy response to Basel II was 
shaped by considerations of how global banks in the G10 were intending to adopt 
Basel II in the context of the following interrelated factors. On the one hand, 
following discussions with domestic banks on CP2 in early 2001, the FSS stressed 
that Korean banks would be severely disadvantaged in the following two ways if 
they were unable to match the level of implementation of global banks from the G10 
but nonetheless had to compete head-on with those banks in the domestic market. 
First, the capital incentives built into Basel II to encourage G10 banks to adopt the 
advanced approaches would play against Korean banks if they were unable to also 
implement the advanced approaches of Basel II. The FSS stated that “[w]hile the 
Basel Committee's explicit intention is to level the playing field cross the countries, 
the Accord is unlikely to achieve the level for Korean banks in general due to the 
new capital charge for operational risk. It will offset any reduction in capital under 
the standardized approach. Any resulting effects from increasing capital 
requirements would potentially disadvantage Korean banks” (FSS 2001a:1). 
Secondly, the FSS was concerned about the adverse impact Basel II could have on 
market perceptions of banks since it would be “very difficult for market participants 
to compare the relative strength of banks using different approaches; standardized 
approach vs. the foundation IRB approach vs. the advanced IRB approach” (FSS 
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2001a:1). The FSS expected that the relative strength of banks as seen by market 
participants would depend not only on their capital adequacy ratios, but more 
critically, on the Basel II approaches banks adopted. 
On the other hand, competitive pressures from global banks based in the G10 
became an increasingly compelling factor in shaping the FSS‟s Basel II policies as 
the domestic market moved away from being protected as was the case prior to the 
Korean financial crisis. The rate at which foreign investors flooded into the Korean 
banking sector immediately after the relaxation of regulations restricting their 
participation was astounding. The share of foreign share ownership of Korean 
commercial banks was rising at unprecedented rates. Compared to the pre-crisis 
level, it jumped more than threefold to 27% in 2002 and reached 60% in 2004 
(OECD 2005). The market entry of global banks was imminent as intense 
competition to enter the Korean market formed amongst international banks that 
were desperate to snap up a Korean bank and gain a foothold into the Korean 
banking sector through acquisitions.
6
  
The sudden exposure to intense competitive pressures from G10 banks, 
combined with concerns about the potential competitive disadvantages Korean 
banks could face if they could not implement the advanced approaches of Basel II 
produced a knee-jerk response that culminated in an ambitious implementation 
strategy that was in many ways more Catholic than the Pope. From as early as 2002, 
two years before the Basel II rules were agreed amongst the G10, preparations to 
implement the AIRB approach for credit risk and the AMA for operational risk 
                                                 
6
 According to news reports “HSBC has been desperate to increase its presence in South Korea and 
broaden its exposure across Asia, but failed in two previous attempts to snap up a Korean bank. The 
group has been trailing behind Standard Chartered, which two years ago outbid HSBC in the 
USD3.3bn race to acquire Korea First Bank, and Citigroup, which bought KorAm Bank. HSBC 
agreed yesterday to buy a 51% stake in KEB from the US private equity firm Lone Star. Analysts 
said the price - a premium of 22% to Friday's closing share price - was high, but HSBC insisted it 
was fair and in line with other recent deals.” (The Guardian 2007; see also The Independent 2007) 
The deal, which was HSBC‟s third attempt, was subsequently derailed by regulatory hurdles. 
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commenced in banks to minimize capital requirements as far as possible for credit 
risk and reduce the extent to which capital charges for operational risk offset the 
reduction in capital requirements from adopting the AIRB approach. Moreover, an 
implementation timetable that matched the earliest of G10 regulators and their 
global banks was pursued to minimize any adverse competitive implications due to 
timing that may unlevel the playing field between domestic and international banks. 
Although KB‟s head of Basel II implementation argued that the adoption of the 
advanced approaches was not solely aimed at reducing capital requirements but to 
improve risk management standards (IT Daily 2006), capital incentives for 
implementing the IRB approaches were also very strong as KB suggested to its 
investors.
7
 Similarly, KPMG reported that capital cost considerations were indeed 
the main concern in Korea and that “the primary purpose for banks to use the 
advanced approaches was to reduce minimum capital requirements”, although as 
implementation progressed, banks were “beginning to understand that risk 
management can add value to their institutions by mitigating risks and improving 
operating efficiency” (KPMG 2008:10).  
The FSS was ultimately dependent on domestic banks to develop reliable 
state-of-the-art risk management systems. Merely introducing regulations and 
requiring banks‟ compliance with the advanced approaches of Basel II would have 
no effect on alleviating the competitive disadvantages if banks could not implement 
the regulations. This could even be counterproductive and exacerbate the 
competitive disadvantages faced by Korean banks if foreign banks in the domestic 
market were able to implement the advanced approaches by drawing on the Basel II 
implementation capabilities and experiences of their parent banks, whilst domestic 
banks failed to develop such capabilities by the time the regulations came into force. 
                                                 
7
 In a statutory filing in 2003, KB reported that “[i]f such [IRB] approval is not obtained, we may 
have to increase our capital to support our small- and medium-sized enterprise lending” and that 
“initial quantitative impact studies show that implementation of an internal ratings-based approach 
will give rise to a modest increase in our capital adequacy” (KB 2003:22; 2005:133). 
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These concerns led to a process of implementation in Korea that was tightly 
supervised and where the pace of formal implementation was subject to the progress 
made by banks. The FSS aggressively promoted the advanced approaches of Basel 
II because it “believed that voluntary efforts by financial institutions were not 
sufficient to improve efficiency of risk management functions to international levels. 
Such approach helped to persuade CEOs of financial institutions to approve huge 
investments in risk management functions.” (Lee 2008:12) This was because 
implementing the advanced approaches entailed significant implementation burdens 
on Korean banks that lacked capabilities. Preparations by the FSS also commenced 
several years before any formal policy was announced to the public. In March 2002, 
the FSS formulated the „New Basel Accord Implementation Preparation Plan‟ and 
formed a joint taskforce with banks to examine the Basel II proposals and conduct 
quantitative impact studies of the proposed rules on the Korean banking sector 
during late-2002 and early-2003. The FSS also formed “four joint task forces with 
experts from the banking industry on the major areas of the NBA [New Basel 
Accord] to prepare for its expected adoption in 2004.” (FSS 2003:22) The first draft 
rules were issued in October 2003 and the FSS told banks to complete building their 
Basel II systems based on these draft rules by the end of 2004. Meanwhile, the FSS 
surveyed individual bank‟s Basel II adoption plans in July 2004 and field audited 
their progress (KPMG 2004:30). It was only after the accumulation of confidence 
about the capacity of banks to implement the advanced approaches of Basel II that 
the FSS formally announced its implementation policy in December 2004.  
The FSS announced year-end 2007 as the target date for the implementation 
of both the basic and advanced approaches of Basel II. This decision was based on 
three considerations, two of which pertained primarily to domestic concerns, namely, 
the impact of Basel II on banks‟ capital adequacy ratios and lending, and “the 
progress of domestic banks with preparations for the new accord. Because the use of 
internal ratings broadly in line with the minimum requirements must be satisfied for 
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at least two years – three years for advanced IRB approaches – before the new 
accord takes effect, and domestic banks are expected to complete their credit risk 
rating systems for the new accord by the end of 2004 or early 2005, it was decided 
that year-end 2007 implementation timetable was appropriate.” (FSC/FSS 2004)8 
The Basel II implementation policies of other key countries constituted the third 
factor underlying Korea‟s implementation policy. According to the FSS, 
implementation in the EU, Canada and Japan was due at year-end 2006, and year-
end 2007 for the advanced approaches of Basel II, whilst the US was to adopt a 
bifurcated approach to implementation, which mandated the implementation of only 
the advanced approaches of Basel II by year-end 2007 to banks with more than 
USD250 billion in total assets or with foreign exposures greater than USD10 billion. 
The FSS also evaluated how Korea‟s proposed implementation compared with that 
of a second group of non-Basel Committee member countries, such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Australia, Malaysia and China (ibid.).
9
 
The selection of Pillar 1 approaches was formally left to each individual 
bank, although in practice, the FSS had encouraged nationwide banks to adopt the 
advanced approaches. Following the announcement of the FSS‟s Basel II policy, 
banks were required to submit their implementation target approaches and 
corresponding step-by-step implementation plans to the FSS so that it could focus its 
supervisory activities to ensure banks progressed in line with those plans (FSS 
2005b). Unsurprisingly, all seven nationwide banks said they had decided to 
implement the IRB approaches for credit risk and the AMA for operational risk, 
except for KFB (FSS 2005). To exert continued pressure on banks, the FSS 
intensified its semi-annual examinations in 2005 to quarterly assessments from 2006 
to monitor and intervene where banks‟ implementation fell short against a detailed 
checklist devised by the FSS (FSS 2005b:1-2). 
                                                 
8
 Implementation of the AIRB and AMA was subsequently delayed to 2009 (see Chapter Seven). 
9
 See section 7.3.2 for discussions on how implementation plans in these countries were used as key 
policy inputs in formulating the FSS‟s Basel II policy. 
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6.2.3 International banks and the diffusion of Basel II in Korea 
By the end of 2006, the content of most rules implementing Basel II were 
finalized.
10
 The regulations for the SA and FIRB approach for credit risk and BIA 
and TSA for operational risk subsequently came into effect in January 2008, whilst 
the AIRB approach and AMA came into effective in 2009. The implementation of 
Basel II in Korea then progressed to the approval phase, where the supervisory 
authority‟s decision on whether to allow banks to actually implement the advanced 
approaches became the main focus of implementation. Banks that wanted to 
implement the advanced approaches were required to obtain formal approval from 
the FSS six months before the date banks wanted to start implementing those 
approaches. As the national rules implementing Basel II were being written, 
Citigroup acquired KorAm Bank in December 2004 and “[a]fter one of the world's 
largest lenders, Standard Chartered, bought Korea First Bank… the media was quick 
to foretell of the coming “bank wars”. The competition between foreign and 
domestic banks has been dreaded ever since South Korean banks sold their shares to 
outsiders to bail out of the 1997-98 financial crisis” (Asia Times 2005). The 
integration of two Korean nationwide banks into the banking networks of Standard 
Chartered and Citigroup re-configured the way policymakers in Korea were 
interconnected to their foreign counterparts, thus, reshaping the path through which 
policies diffused.  
Furthermore, the two concerns that initially motivated Korean regulators to 
adopt a very aggressive implementation strategy discussed above did not fully 
                                                 
10
 In January 2005, the FSS issued guidelines for the regulatory approval processes and operational 
requirements for the use of the IRB approaches and AMA. Guidelines on risk measurement methods 
for credit and operational risk were published in May and August of 2005 respectively. In July, 
guidelines on capital soundness were issued and proposals on the eligibility requirements for external 
credit assessment institutions for the SA were published in December 2005. During 2006, the FSS 
issued supervisory guidelines on use-requirements for the AMA, risk measurement methods for credit 
and operational risks and internal capital adequacy assessments. (FSS 2006) 
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materialize with time, and with it, the race to implement Basel II stalled. Firstly, in 
contrast to concerns that the advanced approaches of Basel II would lead to 
significant capital savings, actual capital requirements and levels in banks that 
implemented Basel II in the G10 suggested otherwise. Moreover, G10 supervisors 
increased regulatory capital buffers in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-
8, eliminating any possibility of international banks reaping the capital savings built 
into Basel II. In fact, as capital levels in Korean banks dipped following the global 
financial crisis, the FSS conducted routine comparisons of capital levels in major 
economies to ensure Korea maintained comparable levels of capital, not less (FSS 
2009a). Secondly, the concern that markets would penalize banks that did not 
sufficiently progress with the implementation of Basel II became less compelling. In 
fact, the US, where several global banks were based, had delayed implementation in 
2005, and then again in 2007. Moreover, in 2006, four core US banks that were 
mandated to implement the advanced approaches of Basel II, namely, Citigroup, 
JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia and WAMU, requested that they be given the option to 
implement the SA rather than the AIRB approach (Sloan 2006; Herring 2007:424). 
Rather than being penalized for trying to adopt the basic approaches of Basel II, this 
position was endorsed by key market actors in the US, such as the American 
Bankers Association, the Independent Community Bankers of America, America‟s 
Community Bankers, and the Financial Services Roundtable (Sivon 2006). Even the 
US banking authorities were divided on this issue. (Herring 2007:425-426).
11
 
The FSS‟s supervisory decisions to allow banks to implement the advanced 
approaches of Basel II ultimately determined the Korean banking sector‟s degree of 
convergence with Basel II. With the entrance of Standard Chartered and Citi, these 
decisions became closely interlinked to the Basel II policy decisions of their foreign 
counterparts in the UK and US. The prior adoption of Basel II in the home country 
                                                 
11
 The Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision supported these banks, whilst the Comptroller of the Currency supported the Federal 
Reserve, which had put forward the bifurcated approach. 
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of these international banks significantly altered foreign banks‟ implementation 
decisions in the host country as well as increasing the need for host supervisor to 
respond to them. The following subsections examine how inter-linkages between the 
home and host countries shaped the progress of implementation in SCFB and Citi 
Korea, before looking at how domestic banks struggled with implementation, 
highlighting the case of Korea‟s largest lender, KB. Domestic banks were unable to 
attain the level of implementation initially envisaged by themselves and the FSS, but 
nonetheless uniformly adopted the same approaches. In contrast, the two foreign 
nationwide banks implemented Basel II in divergent ways. SCFB adopted the most 
sophisticated AIRB approach and Citi the least sophisticated SA, whereas all the 
domestic banks opted for the FIRB approach for credit risk. Both foreign banks 
adopted the TSA for operational risk, whereas all domestic banks implemented the 
AMA. SCFB‟s adoption of the most advanced approach and Citi Korea‟s adoption 
of the least advanced approach for credit risk was not because the former was more 
advanced and the latter less so than domestic banks. Likewise, the adoption of the 
SA by SCFB and Citi Korea was not solely due to their lack of capabilities to adopt 
the AMA. 
SCFB and Standard Chartered 
The FSA implemented Basel II in the UK through the EU‟s CRD, which 
implemented Basel II across the EU according to the implementation timetable and 
scope agreed amongst Basel Committee members. As SCB‟s lead supervisor, the 
FSA formally approved SCB to use the AIRB approach from 2008 to calculate 
regulatory capital covering 80% of SCB‟s global RWA and the TSA to calculate 
capital for operational risk, including its Korean operations (SCB 2009:4). The 
implementation strategies pursued by SCFB and SCB, which are examined next, 
amplified the way and extent to which the host regulator, the FSS, was exposed to 
and had to take into account the Basel II implementation decisions and approvals of 
the home regulator, the FSA. Linkages created by the cross-border structure of 
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global banks had the effect of accentuating the effects of policy diffusion in the 
following ways.  
Firstly, SCFB inherited significant implementation capabilities from its 
parent bank, which implemented Basel II in line with the FSA‟s regulations. As a 
subsidiary of SCB, SCFB‟s management complied with SCB‟s internal policies and 
procedures in implementing Basel II (SCFB 2006:3). This gave SCFB a head start 
since important implementation capabilities were acquired through SCFB‟s “Basel 
Compliant Risk Model Implementation Project” in 2006 that aimed to localize 
SCB‟s Basel II-compliant global risk models, processes and standards, rather than 
developing them independently from scratch as other domestic banks had to (SCFB 
2005:47). As a result, SCFB became the first bank in Korea to apply for supervisory 
approval to implement the AIRB approach, which was based on SCB Group‟s credit 
risk assessment models at the earliest permitted date of January 2009 (FSS 2009). 
Secondly, SCB had considerable influence over which approaches SCFB 
adopted. As an international bank operating in over seventy jurisdictions, a globally 
consistent approach in implementing the various approaches for credit and 
operational risk was seen to have “natural appeal” for SCB since inconsistencies 
could lead to additional capital charges and increased compliance costs due to 
inefficient capital allocation, parallel processing burdens and multiple reporting 
requirements across countries. SCB formulated a global implementation strategy 
that applied across its global network to optimize the benefit for SCB as a group by 
specifying clear Basel II target approaches for its subsidiaries, including SCFB. The 
global implementation strategy stated that “[i]n countries where the AIRB approach 
for calculating the credit risk capital charge is allowed by host regulators, the Group 
AIRB approach is the default. For market and operational risks the default is the 
Standardised Approach.”12 For Pillar 2, SCB‟s ICAAP framework was to be used to 
the maximum extent possible, as with SCB‟s disclosure format for Pillar 3. In effect, 
                                                 
12
 Interview conducted by author (2008). 
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SCB‟s implementation of Basel II, which was implemented in line with the FSA‟s 
regulatory policies and expectations, formed the basis of what SCB sought to 
achieve across its global banking network through its global implementation strategy. 
 Thirdly, SCB adopted a regulatory engagement strategy that actively sought 
to attain its preferred target approaches across its global network. The crux of its 
home-host implementation strategy was to maximise host regulators‟ reliance on the 
FSA‟s review work and supervisory decisions. If host regulators did not allow the 
target approaches that SCB preferred, local management were expected to lobby the 
host regulators for exception or change in their plans. Otherwise, the focus was to 
roll-out SCB‟s Basel II infrastructure and “advocate an FSA-led cross-border 
implementation of the new regime, including maximum reliance on the FSA‟s 
review work by our [SCB‟s] host supervisors” for AIRB approvals, Pillar 2 ICAAP 
submissions and Pillar 3 disclosures.
13
 Engagement with host supervisors was 
undertaken both bilaterally and on a “multilateral” basis in supervisory college 
meetings.
14
 SCB‟s colleges were organized annually by the FSA and SCB since 
2005 and offered a unique forum to physically bring together different host 
supervisors into one room to address cross-border implementation issues. The 
intention was for home and host supervisors to agree on the use of SCB‟s global risk 
models in different countries and the extent of host supervisors‟ reliance on the 
FSA‟s approval of SCB‟s AIRB application. SCB expected that the FSA‟s approval 
in 2007 would set a strong precedent for obtaining approvals from supervisors 
elsewhere, including the FSS. Moreover, SCB believed its bargaining position vis-à-
vis the FSS would increase progressively due to the accumulation of approvals from 
other host supervisors across the world, such as the HKMA, Central Bank of UAE 
                                                 
13
 Interview conducted by author (2008). 
14
 Colleges are working groups for supervisors of an international banking group. They are physical 
bank-specific meetings, arranged by bank‟s home supervisor. Colleges usually involve representation 
by the bank for part of the meeting to present the bank‟s strategy and progress in implementing Basel 
II and to answer any specific questions that supervisors raised. 
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and the South Africa Reserve Bank, as this demonstrated that SCB‟s Basel II 
framework met the standards of multiple supervisors around the world, hence 
making it harder for the FSS to reject it. Indeed, since SCB‟s first college meeting in 
2005, “most supervisors who have been sufficiently advanced with their 
implementation plans to commit to an arrangement agreed to rely on the FSA‟s 
work. One key exception has been the FSS in Korea, who has so far not agreed to 
rely on the FSA‟s work”.15 
Although the FSA‟s approval and SCB‟s implementation capabilities 
covered SCB‟s global operations, as a locally incorporated entity, SCFB was 
nonetheless required to obtain supervisory approval from the FSS to adopt the AIRB 
approach for local regulatory purposes. However, when SCFB applied for 
supervisory approval, the FSS found home-host issues difficult to deal with. The 
FSS had previously “shown no indication to rely on the FSA‟s or SCB Group level 
work… in a practical sense, but partly politically, because the Koreans just could not 
and would not. They did not buy the idea of talking to the FSA. Their approach was 
more „in Korea, this is the way we do things‟… because of weariness of being 
drawn into something that they would not be in control of.” 16 Although the FSS had 
encouraged banks to implement the advanced approaches and implemented 
regulations to allow them to, the FSS was reluctant to grant approval to a foreign 
bank and rely on their internal parameters and centralized credit risk systems for 
domestic regulatory purposes. Moreover, the FSS was concerned about the potential 
lack of a level playing field caused by only one bank, especially a foreign bank, 
adopting the advanced approach whilst the others could not. As a result, the FSS 
disagreed with the FSA about when SCFB should be allowed to adopt the AIRB 
approach. 
                                                 
15
 Interview conducted by author (2008). 
16
 Interview conducted by author (2008). 
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The FSS acknowledged that it faced a challenging cross-border 
implementation issue when SCFB applied for approval to use SCB‟s group models, 
and undertook extensive assessments of the applicability of such global models in 
the context of the Korean banking system and held discussions with the FSA in 
October 2008 (FSS 2009). An onerous self-assessment of SCFB‟s Basel II 
framework prescribed by the FSS ensued and the approval process dragged on 
beyond the six months timeframe promised by the FSS. At one point, the 
relationship between the FSA and FSS was strained when the FSA indicated it 
would not recognize credit ratings issued by Korean rating agencies for Basel II 
purposes, which for the FSS was a humiliating affair. The FSS, however, came 
under increasing pressure to grant supervisory approval to SCFB as it could not 
indefinitely reject SCFB‟s AIRB application, which was based on methods approved 
by several other credible supervisors, such as those in the UK and Hong Kong, other 
than on prudential grounds. Moreover, as the FSS continued discussions with the 
FSA, by persistently withholding its decision, the FSS risked tarnishing its own 
international creditability and reputation by operating outside the perimeters of the 
international supervisory architecture that was based on established international 
standards set by the Basel Committee. Six supervisory principles were specifically 
published by the Basel Committee in tandem with Basel II to address how 
supervisory responsibilities should apply between home and host supervisors of 
international banks in implementing Basel II (BCBS 2003; FSS 2009). These 
principles, which are described in further detail in footnote 17, encouraged host 
supervisors of international banks to accept the methods and approval processes 
used by the parent bank, and in some circumstances, rely entirely on the approval 
work conducted by the home country supervisor to reduce the implementation 
burden on banks and conserve supervisory resources.
17
  
                                                 
17
 The Basel Committee formulated six principles to define the division of supervisory 
responsibilities between home and host supervisors of international banks, especially regarding when 
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It was in June 2009, that the FSS eventually granted its first and only 
approval to allow a nationwide bank to implement the AIRB approach in Korea. 
However, two major items were also agreed with the FSA. Firstly, both supervisors 
agreed that more conservative margins should be applied for credit exposure to 
corporates to reflect their credit performance history during the Korean financial 
crisis, although this would be more costly for SCFB and ultimately SCB as their 
capital cost of lending would increase. Secondly, the FSA accepted the FSS‟s policy 
to apply the SA for government and banks exposures, extending the use of IRB 
permanent exemptions beyond that stated in Basel II on grounds that it would be too 
burdensome and difficult to obtain reliable measures (as also argued by BNM in 
Chapter Five). Hence, the FSS used engagements with the FSA to obtain recognition 
of Korea-specific deviations from Basel II. Although this fell short of receiving an 
official rubber stamp, Korea-specific deviations nonetheless gained some de facto 
legitimacy because an internationally credible and sophisticated regulator as the 
FSA had recognized and accepted such practices. This set a powerful precedent. The 
FSS could now push other supervisors to rely on the precedent set between the FSA 
and FSS in the same way that SCB and the FSA pushed for maximum reliance on 
the FSA‟s approval for SCB. 
                                                                                                                                          
and how host supervisors should allow international banks to implement the advanced approaches of 
Basel II. The overarching principle is that the “implementation of the New Accord should build on 
the existing framework of the Basel Concordat to achieve effective implementation across 
jurisdictions without imposing an undue burden on banking groups”. Of the principles concerning 
host supervisors‟ behavior, Principle Six states that “[h]ost country supervisors have an interest in 
accepting the methods and approval processes that the bank uses at the consolidated level, in order to 
reduce the compliance burden and avoid regulatory arbitrage”, unless they had “other legitimate 
interests”. Moreover, Principle Five states that “supervisors should avoid performing redundant and 
uncoordinated approval and validation work in order to reduce the implementation burden on the 
banks, and conserve supervisory resources…Where „mind and management‟ are centralised in the 
banking group or where techniques are consistently applied across the group, the home country 
supervisor will probably be better placed to lead approval work. In such circumstances, the host 
country supervisor may choose to rely entirely on approval work conducted by the home country 
supervisor”. (BCBS 2003) 
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Citi Korea and Citi  
The case of Citi Korea provides a very interesting and contrasting case to that of 
SCFB as it demonstrates that the presence of international banks does not 
necessarily exert pressure on domestic supervisory authorities to implement Basel II 
fully and in a timely manner. Preparations in KorAm Bank to implement the 
advanced approaches of Basel II commenced in 2002 (KorAm 2002:23), and 
continued following its acquisition by Citigroup, but took a different turn. The Risk 
Architecture Team in Citi Korea worked closely with Citigroup to develop new risk 
rating models, loan loss reserve systems and advanced risk measurement 
frameworks that were in compliance with Basel II as part of the business integration 
process of KorAm into Citigroup. A Basel II implementation task force was set up 
in Citi Korea to work “in collaboration with the Citigroup task force and local 
regulators, to establish the bank‟s Action Plan, develop relevant systems and 
technologies, and create testing models.” (Citi Korea 2004:26) According to Citi 
Korea‟s Basel II implementation plan submitted to the FSS in April 2005, Citi Korea 
was preparing to implement the AIRB approaches for credit risk and AMA for 
operational risk (FSS 2005). However, Citi Korea‟s progress was derailed when 
Citigroup‟s implementation was delayed due to the lack of progress and uncertainty 
in implementation on the part of US banking authorities.  
The US banking authorities issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
in August 2003 and additional guidance in October 2004 to implement Basel II. To 
the surprise of the international banking community, the US adopted a bifurcated 
approach to implementation, which mandated the implementation of only the 
advanced approaches of Basel II by year-end 2007 to banks with more than USD250 
billion in total assets or with foreign exposures greater than USD10 billion (Herring 
2007:416). Banks in the US were not permitted to adopt any of the less advanced 
approaches for computing capital charges for credit and operational risk. In April 
2005, the US banking authorities announced that they would be delaying the 
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issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) pending additional analysis of a 
quantitative impact study. Then they decided to move forward with an NPR later 
that year, but planned to introduce additional prudential safeguards against declines 
in banks‟ capital levels and delayed implementation by another year so that banks 
would start parallel runs under Basel I and II in 2008 (FRB 2005). This was to be 
followed by a transition period lasting at least three years, making the US the last of 
the G10 to implement Basel II.  
The combination of prudential safeguards that introduced limits on the 
amount banks‟ risk-based capital requirements could decline and the requirement to 
implement only the operationally onerous advanced approaches was an unpalatable 
mix for core banks in the US. In 2006, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia and 
WAMU urged that all banks be given the option to implement the SA because they 
believed that the requirement to implement the advanced approaches, the leverage 
ratio and transitional floors would disadvantage US banks relative to their 
counterparts abroad and US investment banks (Sloan 2006:4 Herring 2007:423). 
“Without the prospect of lower capital requirements and with the threatened 
imposition of additional prudential safeguards, the core banks began to see the A-
IRB as simply the imposition of deadweight costs… they were reluctant to incur the 
additional costs of implementing the A-IRB if there were to be no regulatory 
benefits.” (Herring 2007:425) However, the Federal Reserve, which insisted on a 
bifurcated approach from the beginning, was unwilling to reconsider its policy. This 
led to disagreements amongst the US banking authorities. The Chairman of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision supported the banks, whilst the Comptroller of the Currency supported 
the Federal Reserve (ibid.). 
In December 2007, the US banking authorities issued rules for only the 
advanced approaches of Basel II and implementation was further delayed. A twelve-
month parallel implementation period was to start between April 2008 and 2010, 
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followed by a three-year transition period, during which US regulators reserved the 
right to change how Basel II would apply following a review at the end of the 
second year (Federal Registrar 2007). These arrangements added to the uncertainty 
as to whether Citi, which began parallel reporting in the last day banks had to start 
their parallel runs in 2010, would be allowed to fully move onto Basel II. According 
to the IMF, the overall implementation of Basel II in the US remained “somewhat in 
flux” in 2010 due to the “uncertainty in banks about the status of Basel II in the 
United States going forward. For banks, some of this relates to how the 
implementation will work in practice, whether banks will ever be permitted to exit 
parallel runs or the floors… Despite the leading role played by the United States in 
developing Basel II, considerable and protracted inter-agency disagreement delayed 
U.S. implementation, and these interagency disagreements still do not appear to be 
fully resolved.” (IMF 2010:5-7) 
The delay and uncertainty in the US, which directly affected Citigroup‟s 
implementation of Basel II, produced knock-on effects on Citi Korea‟s 
implementation. Rather than requesting regulatory approval from the FSS to 
implement the advanced approaches that Citi Korea had been preparing for since 
2001, it decided to implement the SA and TSA in line with its parent bank‟s 
implementation strategy, which applied across its global operations. Citi Korea 
claimed that it started using the AIRB approach for internal capital and risk 
management purposes since 2009 (Citi Korea 2009:45), although it did not envisage 
applying for their regulatory use until 2012 at the earliest (Citi Korea 2010:44).
 
As a 
result, Citi Korea was the only nationwide bank in Korea that adopted the most basic 
approaches of Basel II, which were adopted to meet the minimum requirements set 
by the FSS. Hence, despite initially aiding the development of Citi Korea‟s 
implementation capabilities, it was the lack of progress in implementing Basel II by 
the home jurisdiction‟s banking authorities that led Citigroup and Citi Korea to put 
their implementation on hold. 
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Domestic banks 
By 2005, domestic banks reported that they completed or were near completing the 
development of their Basel II-compliant systems and thus were on track to 
implement the advanced approaches of Basel II. KB, Korea‟s largest lender, also 
completed the development of its systems in 2005 and was able to compute capital 
requirements in accordance with the AIRB and AMA. The development of the Pillar 
3 disclosure system was also complete by November 2005 and work had 
commenced to implement Pillar 2. (KB 2005:130-4) KB announced in their 
statutory reports in 2006 that “[f]or regulatory reporting purposes… [KB was] 
planning to implement a “Foundation Internal Ratings-based Approach” for credit 
risk and a standardized approach for operational risk from January 1, 2008, with the 
“Advanced Internal Ratings-based Approach” and “Advanced Measurement 
Approach” being implemented for credit risk and operational risk, respectively, from 
January 2009.” (KB 2006:126-7). However, when the process of obtaining 
supervisory approval from the FSS to move onto the advanced approaches 
commenced in 2007, the implementation trajectory envisaged during the preparatory 
phase of implementation went off course. Obtaining supervisory approval proved to 
be a challenge for the five domestic banks, including KB. A key rationale behind the 
IRB approaches was the presumption that large international banks in the G10 that 
used sophisticated credit risk models were better placed than their supervisors to 
assess their credit risks. However, this was not the case in Korea as banks did not 
have such capabilities. The initial knee-jerk reaction to become more Catholic than 
the Pope meant that supervisors had to strongly push banks to develop such 
implementation capabilities. In response, banks, in an attempt to find a quick fix 
solution to acquire such capabilities relied heavily on internationally renowned 
consulting and IT companies for developing their advanced credit risk management 
systems. Although costly, the heavy reliance on acquiring implementation 
capabilities externally was inevitable for most banks that lacked both expertise and 
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experience to simultaneously develop advanced credit risk management systems and 
credit databases in the short period of time they were given by the FSS. Hence, it 
was “not very surprising that some of the banks later suffered from mistakes: Some 
banks realized belatedly that their new credit risk management systems were nothing 
but computerized version of the old and ineffective ad hoc screening practices, and 
hence incompatible with the new Basel requirements. They were forced to rebuild 
credit risk management systems from scratch.” (Lee 2008:17) As a result, the FSS 
also found it difficult to actually rely on banks‟ internal models and the risk 
parameters they produced for regulatory purposes. Hence, although competition-
based diffusion was effective in promoting preparations for the early and full 
implementation of Basel II, limitations in its effect became apparent when 
constraints in implementing Basel II became binding as banks attempted to move 
onto Basel II but could not. Progress in implementation was fraught with delays and 
plans to implement the AIRB approach stalled in all the domestic banks. This 
underscored the importance of capacity constraints in both public and private sectors 
in implementing Basel II, even in relatively advanced economies. 
KB was the first bank in Korea to obtain approval to implement the FIRB 
approach in December 2007. KB hailed the approval as formal recognition from the 
authorities that KB‟s risk management standards satisfied international best 
practices and argued this would increase KB‟s credibility towards its shareholders, 
investors and rating agencies and enable it to reduce funding costs in domestic and 
international capital markets and execute diverse marketing strategies based on their 
superior competitiveness in risk and capital management (KB 2007).
18
 In practice 
however, the scope of KB‟s initial supervisory approval was partial. It included 
permission to use the IRB approach only for its retail and SME loans and asset-
backed securities. It failed to obtain approval for other large segments of its credit 
                                                 
18
 Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Financial Group and Woori Financial Group are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
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portfolio such as corporate loans (KB 2007), due to difficulties in developing 
reliable models to compute PDs. KB agreed with the FSS in 2007 “to further 
implement [its] internal ratings-based approach to other classes of credit risk 
exposure on a phased rollout basis between 2008 and 2010”, but KB‟s plan to apply 
the AIRB approach in 2009 stalled altogether and was put on hold indefinitely to the 
“near future” (KB 2007; 2010). The phased rollout approach extended the FIRB 
approach to corporate loans and other retail loans in 2008, but stalled again despite 
announcing plans to the market in 2008 that it would fully migrate onto the FIRB 
approach in 2009 and 2010. It later announced in 2011 that it planned to complete 
the transition onto the FIRB approach by 2012 (KB 2010). 
In sum, motivated by competitive pressures from global banks in the G10, the 
FSS initially adopted a very ambitious strategy that aggressively promoted the 
implementation of the advanced approaches of Basel II. However, the actual level of 
implementation in banks fell short of what the supervisors envisaged as they 
struggled to acquire the necessary capabilities to implement Basel II. When foreign 
banks expanded their global banking networks into Korea, the FSS was exposed to a 
different kind of policy diffusion. The divergent decisions of the FSA and US 
banking authorities both had implications for the degree of convergence with Basel 
II attained in the Korean banking sector as foreign banks hindered as much as they 
promoted the full and timely implementation of Basel II. The case of Malaysia, 
which is examined next, provides a contrasting case to that of Korea due to the 
different ways Malaysia was interconnected to the rest of the world via the cross-
border structure of international banks. 
 
6.3 Policy diffusion and Basel II implementation in Malaysia 
6.3.1 The cross-border structure of international banks in Malaysia 
A non-negligible, well-established group of foreign banks operated in Malaysia 
owing to the legacy of its colonial past. When Malaysia became independent in 1957, 
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foreign banks represented over 90% of the banking sector, although by 1997, they 
accounted for only 16.7% of banking assets. This was due to deliberate government 
policy aimed at developing the domestic financial sector by prohibiting the 
expansion of foreign banks since 1971. (Detragiache and Gupta 2006:220-1) 
Competition from foreign banks was tightly controlled and the domestic expansion 
of foreign banks was severely constrained even during the step-wise process of 
liberalization in the 2000s. For example, the last licence to a foreign bank was 
granted in 1973 (ibid.). Between 2001 and 2005, the share of foreign-owned 
commercial banks and foreign investments via equity participation in domestically-
owned commercial banks stood at approximately 30% of total commercial bank 
assets (BNM 2005:232). In particular, four foreign banks accounted for the lion‟s 
share of foreign banks‟ assets in Malaysia during the period Basel II was 
implemented. These were two UK banks, Standard Chartered and HSBC, which had 
substantial banking networks across Asia, and two regional Singaporean banks, 
United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) and OCBC. 19 HSBC‟s presence in Malaysia dated 
back to 1884, whilst Standard Chartered established a presence in 1875 and was 
subsequently incorporated as Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad (“SCBM”) 
in 1984 (SCBM 2010:3).
20
 United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (“UOB 
Malaysia”) was incorporated in 1993 but maintained a presence in Malaysia since 
1951. Its parent bank operated across nineteen countries, mostly in the Asia Pacific 
                                                 
19
 Thirteen branch-like locally-incorporated foreign banks also operated in Malaysia. Six were a 
single-branch subsidiary and three operated via a network of about five branches each, making them 
relatively small players in the market (ABM 2008:15). Their minimal presence can be attributed to 
the restriction on foreign banks‟ branch expansion and the regulatory framework that required them 
to incorporate their Malaysian operations since 1994 to create a legal separation between the assets 
and capital of the domestic entity and their parent banks. This was to ensure that foreign banks were 
supported by permanent capital in Malaysia and subject to the same prudential requirements applied 
to domestic banks. (BNM 2008:53; San 2011:114) 
20
 HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad was a subsidiary of UK-based HSBC until 2009. It became a 
subsidiary of the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited as part of an internal re-
organisation. HSBC Holdings in the UK nonetheless remains its ultimate holding company. 
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region besides Far Eastern Bank in Singapore (UOB 2008:2). Similarly, OCBC 
Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (“OCBC Malaysia”) operated in Malaysia for more than 
seven decades and its parent bank was also a regional bank with operations in fifteen 
Asian countries. Due to their long historical presence in the Malaysian banking 
sector, “OCBC, HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, and UOB… has always been 
construed as a domestic financial institution by most consumers in Malaysia” (Lum 
and Koh 2006:293). The following analysis examines how policies diffused across 
the cross-border structure of these regionally active international banks.
21
 
 
6.3.2 Post-crisis Malaysia and the diffusion of Basel II  
Initial policy considerations to implement Basel II coincided with Malaysia‟s post-
financial crisis reforms that aimed to facilitate Malaysia‟s financial sector 
development ahead of market liberalization. BNM formulated the Financial Sector 
Master Plan (FSMP) in 2001 with the objective “to develop a more resilient, 
competitive and dynamic financial system with best practices… ready to face the 
challenges of liberalisation and globalisation” (BNM 2001:11). The FSMP was 
motivated by BNM‟s diagnosis of the Malaysian banking system, namely, that 
“foreign banking institutions as a group has generally been ahead of domestic 
players in terms of financial performance… There are therefore significant gaps 
between foreign and domestic banking institutions, which need to be narrowed to 
achieve the orderly development of a viable and effective domestic banking sector.” 
(ibid. p32) Furthermore, the banking sector was to be progressively liberalized to 
                                                 
21
 According to Rating Agency Malaysia, most Malaysian banks had very limited exposures abroad. 
Some of the bigger players have some regional presence, although acquisitions of foreign banks by 
domestic ones had been rare and mostly in developing countries in the region. Malayan Bank, the 
country‟s largest bank made one foreign acquisition in the Philippines. Bumiputra-Commerce Bank 
acquired a commercial bank in Indonesia in 2002 and Public Bank acquired Asia Commercial Bank 
in 2006. (2007:10) Although the presence of Malaysian banks abroad is small and in developing 
countries, the network of Malaysian regional banks may be a potential channel through with policies 
could start to diffuse in both directions if there foreign presence increased, especially into developed 
countries where pressures to meet higher regulatory standards may exist.  
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foreign competition across three phases over the coming ten years. With greater 
market liberalisation, the retention of domestic banks‟ market share was expected to 
be “severely tested as domestic competition intensifies”, and the survival of 
domestic banks was deemed to be dependent on them being “at par with the world 
class players… in order to compete with global players.” (ibid. p33) 
The Director of Banking Supervision in BNM, who was also involved in the 
development of the FSMP, believed that the implementation of Basel II was 
“[a]ligned with objectives of FSMP which aim[ed] to develop a strong, resilient, 
dynamic banking system able to compete regionally” (Chung 2006). Basel II was 
considered to be aligned with the regulatory environment envisaged under the FSMP 
because it advocated enhancements in risk management practices across the industry 
by introducing more sophisticated methods to identify and measure credit and 
operational risks. This was hoped to lead to more accurate pricing for the risks 
undertaken by banks and more efficient use of capital resources and thus help 
prepare Malaysian banks to compete against regionally active international banks. 
Its timely adoption was important as it was seen to “[f]acilitate preparation of 
domestic players towards Phase 3 of FSMP (2008–2010), which aims to… 
[a]ssimilate local banks into [the] global arena [by] introducing greater foreign 
competition.” (ibid.) Moreover, BNM firmly believed it was necessary for 
Malaysian banks to prepare for the implementation of Basel II because “[w]hile the 
framework is directly applicable to internationally active banks… once it comes into 
effect, it will become the new standards on banks‟ capital adequacy globally.” 
(BNM 2001a) These concerns dated back to as early as 2001, when the Basel II 
negotiations were still underway. To the extent outlined next, the implementation of 
Basel II was already incorporated into the FSMP (2001), laying the foundation and 
direction for Malaysia‟s implementation of Basel II.  
Several elements of Basel II were incorporated into policy recommendations 
of the FSMP to introduce „risk-adjusted prudential regulation and supervision‟. In 
204 
 
particular, policy recommendation 3.2 stated that a “more sophisticated and 
differentiated treatment of different risk classes shall be developed to take into 
account the risk profile of loan exposures… [T]he revised risk-weighted capital 
adequacy framework places greater reliance on the assessment of credit risk, through 
internal ratings or use of external ratings to determine risk weights.” (BNM 2001:50) 
Several other policy recommendations in the FSMP resonated directly with the key 
standards proposed in CP1 and CP2 issued in 1999 and 2001.
22 
Moreover, as a way 
of continuously driving forward the agenda on Basel II implementation, BNM 
emphasized that there were strong business cases for implementing Basel II as well 
as there being significant competitive implications for Malaysian banks. The 
Governor of BNM stressed that Basel II was “an important catalyst to accelerate the 
introduction of best risk management practices within the banking sector in the 
medium and longer term. While best practices that have been adopted by global 
banks have even surpassed the expectations of Basel II, this is not the case for most 
domestic institutions.” (Aziz 2005:2). Likewise she highlighted that “[t]he enhanced 
risk management practices required by the new accord not only can result in greater 
capital savings but becomes vital as the domestic banking system becomes 
increasingly competitive and integrated with the global marketplace. Having a 
robust risk management framework… would allow for more-informed decision-
making, thus contributing towards greater competitive advantage.” (Aziz 2004:2) 
Such policy stance helped create a momentum amongst banks, leading some to 
communicate to BNM as early as 2004 that they wanted to implement the IRB 
approaches of Basel II (Chung 2008:21).
23
  
                                                 
22
 For example, policy recommendations included benchmarking risk management processes against 
best practice templates (3.1), separating credit assessment from credit origination, conducting explicit 
customer risk-rating exercises, introducing minimum standards on credit risk management (3.3), 
setting up board-level risk management committees (3.7), giving greater attention to the development 
of ICT (3.13), which were all related to issues developed in CP2. 
23
 These commitments were made three years before formal applications to adopt the IRB approaches 
would have to be made and six years before the move to the IRB approaches was planned. 
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BNM announced Malaysia‟s plans for implementing Basel II in 2004. It 
argued that “[t]he adoption of Basel II in Malaysia [was] in tandem with the overall 
policy agenda to promote higher standards of risk management amongst Malaysian 
banking institutions as the banking sector progresses with greater competition and 
liberalisation.” (BNM 2004:116). According to the Deputy Governor of BNM, 
Malaysia‟s implementation of Basel II was “based on four key principles that 
directly support the achievement of the objectives underlined in Bank Negara 
Malaysia‟s 10-Year Financial Sector Master Plan” (Ghani 2006:2). These four 
principles referred to the following. First, Basel II implementation was to 
accommodate capacity building efforts, with strong emphasis on making gradual 
enhancements to risk management frameworks in all banking institutions. Second, a 
flexible timeframe that allowed for capacity building measures was to be adopted. 
Third, the adoption of more advanced approaches was to be based on business 
justifications instead of regulatory mandate. The fourth related to enhancing 
supervisory capacity to assess internal models and advanced risk management 
systems. (BNM 2004:116-7, Aziz 2004:4) BNM proposed a two-phase approach to 
implementation that was in line with the adoption of Basel II in regionally active 
international banks and their home supervisors‟ Basel II policies, whilst factoring in 
capacity building needs. In the first phase, banks adopting the SA for credit risk 
were required to comply with Basel II by January 2008 and had to implement the 
BIA or TSA for operational risk.
24
 In the second phase, banks adopting the IRB 
approaches had to comply by January 2010 and were required to apply any of the 
three approaches for operational risk. These banks were given the flexibility to 
migrate to the advanced approaches directly from Basel I. (BNM 2004:117)
25
 
                                                 
24
 BNM also implemented the Alternative Standardised Approach at national discretion per Basel II 
(BCBC 2006:139), but not the AMA. 
25
 Chapter Five discussed how the gradualness of BNM‟s gradual approach was very much within the 
parameters defined by how it regional peers was implementing Basel II. 
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 According to the Deputy Governor of BNM, although “Malaysia aspire[d] 
to adopt the more advanced approaches… more time would be required by our 
[Malaysian] banks to enhance their capacity as well as to address resource 
constraints” (Ghani 2006:2). The two-phase approach would “allow more time for 
banking institutions as well as supervisors to develop expertise and competencies in 
key areas related to Basel II” (ibid.). Moreover, to allow banks to focus on Pillar 1 
implementation, implementation timelines were not announced for Pillar 2 and Pillar 
3. A more lenient timeline compared to Pillar 1 was subsequently announced where 
banks were required to submit their Pillar 2 ICAAP reports to BNM by 30 June 
2011 and publish their Pillar 3 disclosures together with their annual financial 
reports for the year ending 2010.
26
 In 2005, banks were required to conduct detailed 
gap assessments so that BNM could assess banks‟ readiness to adopt Basel II. The 
assessments indicated that most banks did not foresee major problems in adopting 
the SA beyond system enhancements although implementing the more advanced 
approaches of Basel II posed a significant challenge (BNM 2005:122). 
 
6.3.3 International banks and the diffusion of Basel II in Malaysia 
Initially, it was the fear of competition from more competitive global and regional 
international banks with a strong presence in the region that motivated BNM‟s 
response to Basel II. This coincided with post-crisis domestic reforms that aimed to 
prepare the Malaysian banking sector to compete more effectively when it 
liberalized to greater foreign competition. After BNM announced its implementation 
plan in 2004 and implementation progressed in banks, the cross-border structure of 
regionally active international banks not only provided a clear reference for BNM to 
determine who Malaysian banks‟ immediate competitors were, but also provided a 
direct channel through which international banks could exert greater influence in 
driving the degree of convergence with Basel II in Malaysia. At the same time, 
                                                 
26
 Regulation BNM/RH/GL 001-33 4.1 and BNM/RH/GL 001-32 4.1. 
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BNM was very pragmatic and purposeful in using its exposure to international banks 
and their home supervisors to facilitate the acquisition of capabilities by Malaysian 
banks and supervisors. BNM‟s four implementation principles largely shaped the 
way BNM interacted with and responded to the policy decisions of their foreign 
counterparts, especially the home supervisors and parent banks of international 
banks. BNM adopted a cross-border implementation policy that aimed to leverage 
the implementation infrastructure and experience of regionally competitive 
international banks that had a presence in Malaysia. 
At the level of banks, BNM recognized that international banks based in 
Singapore and the UK preferred to use models developed centrally in Malaysia 
(Chung 2008:22). Such practice was formally recognised and supported by the 
regulations that implemented Basel II, which state the following. 
“Locally-incorporated foreign banking institutions may be intending to use 
or are currently using systems, processes or models that have been developed 
and adopted by their parent institutions… Due to the centralisation of the 
development of the global/regional IRB models, the review process could 
have already been initiated by the home regulator due to an earlier 
implementation timeframe adopted by the home regulator… Under these 
circumstances, the Bank would be supportive of coordination with the home 
regulator in the review of global/regional IRB models in the spirit of home-
host cooperation.” (BNM 2011:203)  
In practice, the use of global and regional models developed by international banks 
was conditional on host banks being able to sufficiently demonstrate that these 
models were suitable for the Malaysian banking sector, that local risk managers had 
a firm grasp of such models and that local data was used to calibrate the models 
(Chung 2008). This approach was consistent with BNM‟s first implementation 
principle to accommodate capacity building efforts in implementing Basel II as well 
as BNM‟s preference for “building talent” as opposed to “buying talent” (cf. Korean 
banks and excessive reliance of international consultants). BNM did not see buying 
talent as a sustainable cost effective strategy, emphasizing that banks “need to be 
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wary of bidding up wages without commensurate efficiency improvements or 
increases in value-add” (Aziz 2007:4). The cases of implementation in the three 
largest foreign banks operating in Malaysia, namely UOB, OCBC and SCBM, show 
how BNM aimed to leverage its connections with Singapore and the UK in raising 
the overall capacity of the Malaysian banking sector by facilitating the transfer of 
implementation capabilities from international banks and home supervisors. 
In line with the Monetary Authority of Singapore‟s (MAS) policy to 
implement Basel II in Singapore by 2008, UOB, the parent bank of UOB Malaysia, 
undertook significant “investments in human resources, IT systems, processes, and 
the development of internal models to estimate risk” to attain the “best practice in 
risk management” that was required to implement Basel II (UOB 2006:51). UOB‟s 
goal was “to reach Internal Rating Based (IRB) compliance at the earliest date” 
(UOB 2004), and by 2004, it was well advanced in developing, configuring and 
operationalizing many of its systems and processes to apply the IRB approach and 
TSA by 2008 (UOB 2005:29). Once the parent bank, UOB, had acquired the 
capabilities to implement Basel II in line with the MAS‟s requirements, it started 
“working with UOB (Malaysia) and UOB (Thai) to re-design, automate and 
streamline systems and processes for Basel II compliance” (UOB 2006:30). As a 
result of pursing a centralized and integrated approach in implementing Basel II 
across its network of subsidiaries, implementation capabilities were directly passed 
down from the parent bank to its subsidiaries, which benefited from their Basel II-
knowledgeable parent bank. As a result, by 2006, the “foundation for Basel II core 
modules such as risk-weighted assets and credit-related systems [had] been laid for 
the Singapore operations and UOB (Malaysia).” (UOB 2006:30) Hence, the 
implementation of Basel II at the parent bank level according to the requirements of 
the home supervisors had a direct impact on driving implementation capabilities in 
Malaysia. This enabled UOB (Malaysia) to obtain approval from BNM to migrate 
directly to the IRB approach for credit risk from 2010, but as a result, UOB 
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Malaysia adopted Basel II in exactly the same way as its parent, that is, the FIRB 
approach for its non-retail exposures, the AIRB approach for its retail exposures and 
the BIA for operational risk pending approval to adopt the TSA.  
Similarly, OCBC Malaysia‟s management and operations were highly 
integrated with that of its Singapore-based parent. A group-level risk committee in 
Singapore had oversight over OCBC Malaysia‟s risk governance, including the 
implementation of Basel II across the bank (OCBCM 2010:5), and “banking 
subsidiaries [were] required to implement risk management policies that conform[ed] 
to the Group‟s standards, with approving authorities and limits as determined by the 
Head Office” (OCBC 2008:39). The centralized approach to implementation, 
whereby implementation capabilities were first acquired by the parent bank and then 
passed down its corporate structure, meant that OCBC Malaysia also implemented 
Basel II in the same way as its parent bank by implementing the FIRB approach for 
major non-retail portfolios, the AIRB approach for major retail portfolios and the 
SA for other credit portfolios (OCBCM 2010:6). Regarding Pillar 2 implementation, 
OCBC Malaysia‟s statutory disclosures expressly states that the bank‟s “Pillar 2 
implementation will leverage on OCBC Group‟s processes for cost-efficiency, with 
appropriate customisation where necessary to be in accordance with BNM‟s 
guidelines” (OCBCM 2010:6). Likewise for Pillar 3, OCBC Malaysia‟s chief risk 
officer was confident that OCBC Malaysia would be able to leverage its parents 
implementation experience because “[a]lthough Pillar 3 for the credit risk timeline 
in the country [Malaysia] has yet to be determined, OCBC, at group level, has 
included Pillar 3 market disclosure in its 2008 annual report” (The Star 2009).  
SCBM‟s IRB model development and governance was also largely inherited 
from its parent bank to the extent that “[m]odels are developed by Standard 
Chartered PLC‟s Group Analytics teams within the Consumer Banking and 
Wholesale Banking risk functions and Standard Chartered PLC‟s Group Risk… All 
IRB models are validated annually by a model validation team reporting to Standard 
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Chartered PLC‟s Chief Credit Officer… [and] validation findings are presented to 
Standard Chartered PLC Group‟s MAC [Model Assessment Committee].” (SCBM 
2010:7) Whilst BNM supported the use of the parent bank‟s processes and systems, 
a person close to implementation in Malaysia emphasized how BNM “had been very 
focused on local involvement… to ensure local in-country staff understand the 
models, are engaged as much as possible in the implementation process and that 
local data is being used, so that it‟s not something that‟s developed based on data 
from outside Malaysia and then just imported into the country”.27 
BNM‟s fourth implementation principle was aimed at addressing the 
challenges supervisors faced, as stressed by the governor of BNM. 
“The rigorousness of the analytical process under Basel II will certainly be 
demanding for banking institutions. It is equally demanding from the 
supervisory perspective to develop an appropriate response and assessment 
framework on these processes… Supervisors also need to undergo early 
training to identify the relevant issues when undertaking the supervisory 
assessment. This underscores the importance of efforts to accelerate 
supervisory capacity building efforts, particularly in the development of 
specialised supervisory skills to conduct model validation.” (Aziz 2005:2-3) 
To this end, supervisors in BNM identified greater cross-border supervisory 
interactions by leveraging home-host relations an important way to build the 
capacity of supervisors (Chung 2007:29). The Deputy Governor of BNM envisaged 
home-host collaborative efforts to be most extensive in relation to “understanding 
Pillar 1 related issues that are mostly technical in nature such as model development 
and validation issues” (Ghani 2006:4). BNM was keen to draw on home-host 
connections with the MAS and FSA to learn from their Basel II implementation 
experience, which was more advanced in their progress with implementing the IRB 
approaches of Basel II. Initially, BNM “continued to participate in active dialogues 
with home supervisors of foreign banking institutions to gain greater clarity on the 
approaches undertaken by these regulators whilst forging greater cooperation with 
                                                 
27
 Author‟s interview conducted in 2008. 
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them for the implementation of Basel II.” (BNM 2005:125) As implementation 
progressed, supervisors in BNM actively engaged with the home supervisors of 
foreign banks through involvement in joint validation exercises and sought to 
achieve a common understanding of their supervisory expectations and information 
requirements in the UK and Singapore (Chung 2008:21). A person close to 
implementation in SCB stressed how “BNM had been closely following SCB 
Group‟s approval process and have been given numerous presentations on SCB‟s 
modelling approach, ICAAP and other progress… and participated in the FSA‟s 
model reviews for bank and sovereign exposures in 2006”.28 These cases show how 
host supervisors are not only compelled to accept the Basel II policy decisions of the 
home supervisors when formulating their own policies, but that they can also choose 
to actively leverage their home-host relations to foster the development of 
implementation capabilities in their own country. 
 
6.4 Comparative Analysis 
A comparative analysis of policy diffusion and Basel II implementation in Korea 
and Malaysia is conducted in this section. Like the previous chapter, the analysis is 
structured into the three key questions of what, how and why policies diffused. 
What diffused? 
Amidst growing competitive pressures from global banks based in the UK and US, 
the FSS‟s initial policy response to Basel II was an aggressive implementation 
strategy that targeted the most advanced approaches of Basel II across domestic 
nationwide banks at a timetable that matched the earliest of G10 regulators and their 
global banks. In contrast, Malaysia‟s banking sector was more protected and BNM 
had more control over the pace and scope of liberalizing its banking sector to foreign 
competition. It thus responded with a two-phased implementation policy that closely 
followed the adoption of Basel II amongst regionally active international banks, 
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 Interview, SCB (2008). 
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whilst factoring in domestic capacity building needs as part of a wider plan to 
develop the Malaysia banking sector. As implementation progressed, the FSS‟s 
decisions to approve banks to implement the advanced approaches of Basel II 
became closely interlinked to the Basel II policy decisions of their foreign 
counterparts in the UK and US. Whilst progress in implementation in the UK 
promoted greater convergence with Basel II in the Korean banking sector, the delay 
and uncertainty in the US produced the opposite effect. Likewise, because 
international banks with a presence in Malaysia pursued a centralized and integrated 
approach in implementing Basel II across their banking networks, implementation 
capabilities were directly passed down from the parent bank to their Malaysian 
subsidiaries, which adopted Basel II in the same way as their parent banks. 
The case of Korea highlighted limits to the extent policies diffused. In 
contrast to the ambitious policy response that initially kick-started preparations to 
implement Basel II, the effects of policy diffusion did not fully translate into policy 
outcomes when capacity constraints became binding as banks attempted to move 
onto the advanced approaches of Basel II but could not. This showed that policy 
diffusion was conditional on actors having the capacity to implement the policies that 
diffused domestically or when it is feasible to develop such capabilities in time. In 
Malaysia, BNM actively tried to leverage their home-host relations to foster 
implementation capabilities in their own country in order to be able to match the 
policies of regionally active international banks. 
How did policies diffuse? 
The structure of international banks produced very direct and specific linkages 
between the home and host countries of international banks. They not only provided 
information to host supervisors about who their immediate competitors were, but 
also facilitated the transfer of implementation capabilities across borders and defined 
the relationship between home and host supervisors, making the influence of foreign 
banks even more compelling. To gain a full picture of the channels through which 
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Basel II policies diffused, the two case studies demonstrated that it was necessary to 
examine not only how foreign banks and the host country supervisor implemented 
Basel II, but also how the parent bank of the foreign bank and its home supervisor 
implemented Basel II. Figure 6 maps out the different channels of diffusion formed 
by the cross-border structure of international banks that produced several paths for 
policies to diffuse from the home to the host country. When foreign banks in host 
countries are integrated into their parent‟s global banking network, Basel II 
implementation by that foreign bank (line (e)) is largely a function of how the parent 
bank at the banking group level implemented Basel II (line (c)), which in turn is a 
function how the lead regulator in the home jurisdiction implemented Basel II (line 
(d)). This effectively links the policies of the home and host supervisors (line (a)).
29
 
Figure 6: A stylized map of the cross-border structure of international banks and 
channels of policy diffusion 
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 Implementing Basel II in banking groups with significant cross-border operations in multiple 
jurisdictions can be complex for banks and supervisors. In practice, the relationship between key 
actors are likely to be more complex and resemble overlapping tiles of Figure 6 due to multiple 
subsidiaries of different international banks in a single host jurisdiction and multiple cross-border 
operations across jurisdictions for a single banking group as the case studies showed. 
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The case studies found two diffusion channels within the cross-border 
structure of international banks to be particularly important. One highlighted the role 
of international banks, and the other, that of the home and host supervisors as the 
key agents of policy diffusion. Firstly, at the level of banks, the way one country 
was interconnected to another via international banks had significant implications on 
the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II attained in the host country. 
Policies diffused across countries because the Basel II implementation decisions by 
the parent bank at the banking group level, which was a function of implementation 
decisions by the home supervisor, had direct implications for the way Basel II was 
implemented in its subsidiary in the host jurisdiction. This in turn shaped how host 
supervisors and banks responded to Basel II (i.e. (d) to (c), then (e)). In some cases, 
convergence with Basel II was facilitated as foreign banks were the first to use the 
most advanced yet onerous approaches of Basel II in Korea and Malaysia. The 
foreign banks in host countries were able to benefit from their Basel II-
knowledgeable parents, who actively sought to replicate their global models across 
their global banking networks, leading to the transfer of implementation capabilities 
across borders. In other cases, such as that of Korea, the presence of foreign banks 
hindered the full and timely implementation of Basel II. 
Secondly, at the level of supervisors, a channel of diffusion was created 
between home and host supervisors of international banks (i.e. (a) and (b)). The 
Basel Committee‟s home-host supervisory principles and colleges tended to promote 
convergence in line with the home supervisors‟ Basel II policy, whilst adding 
constraints on the policies host supervisors could pursue, leaving them with less 
room to manoeuvre. Both the FSS and BNM made policy decisions within the 
parameters set by the Basel Committee‟s principles governing cross-border 
supervisory relationships. Furthermore, although colleges are not decision making 
bodies, they are generally seen to have played a key role in facilitating “supervisory 
coordination, for example with respect to specific projects such as model approval 
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or validation work that involve the sharing of tasks and the delegation of work 
between home and host supervisors of international banking groups” according to 
the Basel Committee (BCBS 2010:9).
30
 However, supervisory interactions also 
reinforced country-specific divergences through the mutual recognition and 
acceptance of such divergences, as illustrated in the case of the FSS and FSA, 
suggesting that the diffusion channel formed by the home and host supervisors of 
international banks could promote as well as deter convergence with Basel II. 
Why did policies diffuse? 
The specific policies about when and how to implement Basel II in both countries 
were motivated by concerns that domestic banks would be disadvantaged if they 
were unable to compete on an equal footing with international banks by matching 
their implementation of Basel II. In Korea, competitive pressures and initial policy 
responses emanated from the expected market entrance of global banks based in the 
G10. Similarly, BNM adopted a policy that was in line with the adoption of Basel II 
amongst regionally active international banks to help Malaysian banks compete 
against them. In both cases, the acquisition of capabilities by domestic banks and 
supervisors was an important motivation in their response to the presence of 
international banks. The post-financial crisis context and subsequent process of 
market liberalization also shaped how the FSS and BNM responded to policy 
decisions in other countries. Although both authorities were motivated to strengthen 
the resilience of domestic banks by adopting international best practice standards in 
risk management that Basel II embodied, Korea‟s implementation policy was much 
more ambitious and the rhetorical commitment greater compared to Malaysia. As 
Korean policymakers attributed Korea‟s financial crisis in no small measure to the 
failure of domestic banks and their inadequate risk management, the post-crisis 
policy rhetoric to attain international standards provided a strong justification for the 
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 Supervisory colleges are seen to have been less effective in dealing with other issues such as crisis 
prevention, management and resolution following the global financial crisis of 2007-8.  
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public sector to pressure banks to undertake costly investments in their core credit 
infrastructure to implement Basel II, albeit somewhat hastily and inefficiently. 
During the process of implementation, whereas BNM was keen to leverage 
the Basel II implementation experience of the FSA and MAS who was more 
advanced in their progress with implementing the IRB approaches, the FSS was less 
willing to rely on the home supervisor‟s implementation at face value as they were 
wary of being drawn into something they did not have control of. The FSS wanted to 
retain greater control over the progress on banks‟ implementation to avoid distorting 
the playing field. It was particularly concerned about the lack of a level playing field 
caused by only one bank, especially a foreign bank which it did not have as much 
influence over, adopting the advanced approaches whilst the others could not. The 
process of diffusion became more coercive as the FSS had limited leeway to reject, if 
not indefinitely delay foreign bank‟s progression onto the AIRB approach if the FSS 
was to avoid tarnishing its international credibility and reputation by acting against 
established international supervisory principles. 
In understanding why policies diffused, greater market liberalization can be 
seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for policies to diffuse as it increased 
the level of exposure to competitive pressures that arose from the policy decisions of 
other countries that had implemented Basel II. However, the overall level of market 
liberalization per se was not sufficient to explain exactly how policies diffused as the 
specific interdependencies created by such market opening between the home and 
host countries of international banks shaped which policies diffused from whom. 
Supervisors were more sophisticated than merely responding to greater levels of 
competition because they also responded to where the competitive pressures 
emanated from and who their key competitors were. Interestingly, expectations that 
G10 supervisors and global banks would implement the most advanced approaches, 
perhaps because they were Basel Committee members or because they were seen to 
have the capabilities to do so, was sufficient for triggering policy change in both 
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cases. That policymakers do not wait passively until they are competitively 
disadvantaged resonates with the motivations of policymakers in other studies in the 
literature. For example, Simmons and Elkins argue that when countries compete for 
international economic activities, policies diffuse because “the government faces 
incentives to anticipate and match decisions made outside its jurisdiction, rather than 
waiting passively for these decisions to work their way through the international 
economy, the domestic economy, and the domestic electoral system.” (2004:173) 31 
Especially in Korea, when the entry of global banks was imminent, the underlying 
presumption was that global banks from the G10 would implement the most 
advanced approaches of Basel II, for which Korean banks should prepare against. 
However, it turned out that this was not the case due to the unpopularity of the AMA 
in global banks and delays in implementation in the US.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Like two sides of the same coin, the diffusion of Basel II policies across the cross-
border structure of international banks produced two contrasting effects on policy 
outcomes. At the level of banks, the way one country was interconnected to another 
via international banks had significant implications for the degree regulatory 
convergence with Basel II attained in the host country. Foreign banks that were able 
to benefit from their Basel II-knowledgeable parents were the first to use the most 
advanced yet onerous approaches of Basel II in Korea and Malaysia. However, the 
presence of foreign banks also hindered as much as it promoted the full and timely 
implementation of Basel II as delays and uncertainties in the home country‟s 
                                                 
31
 There are two versions of this theory. The case of Korea, where the FSS aggressively promoted the 
advanced approaches, and Malaysia, where Basel II was part of its financial sector development plan 
lends support to the statist versions of this theory where decision makers take such actions regardless 
of the immediate preferences of domestic political groups and gamble on an aggregate growth payoff, 
presumably, in expectation of continued political support (Krasner 1985). In contrast, pluralist 
renditions emphasize the preferences of electorally significant groups in clarifying to leaders their 
interests (Goodman and Pauly 1993). 
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implementation had repercussions in the host countries. At the level of supervisors, 
home-host supervisory principles and colleges tended to promote convergence in 
line with the home supervisors‟ policies as they fostered maximum reliance on the 
supervisory work conducted by the home supervisor and implementation by the 
parent bank. However, supervisory interactions also reinforced country-specific 
divergences through their mutual recognition and acceptance. This can be a slippery 
slope as country-specific divergences from Basel II become permanent features of 
the global regulatory framework, hampering convergence with Basel II in the long 
run. Hence, the effect of policy diffusion is not one-directional and can hinder as 
well as promote the diffusion of policies. 
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Chapter Seven 
The diffusion of Basel II across financial sectors that compete 
for capital: 
A comparative analysis of Hong Kong and Korea 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The findings of the quantitative analysis in Chapter Three provided evidence to 
support the argument that competition between financial sectors to attract 
international capital and financial business on average promoted the degree of 
regulatory convergence with Basel II at the global level. The positive and 
statistically significant policy diffusion variable indicated that similar 
implementation policies were adopted by countries that competed for the same pool 
of international capital because they were substitutable investment destinations as 
measured by their similar sovereign credit ratings. It was thus argued that the 
implementation of Basel II provided a positive competitive edge for the 
implementing country relative to their rivals. Hence, when a country‟s foreign 
competitors implement Basel II, investors would be drawn to those locations. 
Anticipating this outcome, countries may come under competitive pressures to 
match their rival‟s policies, leading to the cross-border diffusion of Basel II. Indeed, 
competition to develop international financial centres by attracting international 
capital and financial business has intensified across the world, not only between 
established international financial centres such as New York, London, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, but also between countries that aspired to become one, such as Seoul, 
Shanghai and Mumbai. The impetus for international regulatory standards such as 
Basel II to diffuse may be immense due to such competition and even more so 
because business executives and investors regard the regulatory environment as one 
of the most important factors that determine the international competitiveness of 
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financial sectors, and for policymakers, an area that they can influence.
1
 McKinsey 
& Company (“McKinsey”) conducted over 350 interviews and surveys of senior 
executives in the financial services sector, based on which it argued that “[i]f there 
are any doubts as to the importance of regulation to the business community, one 
need only look at the survey responses to dispel them.” (McKinsey 2007:79).2 Of 
the eighteen “high importance factors” that determined the international 
competitiveness of financial sectors, “an attractive regulatory environment” and 
“government and regulators who are responsive to business needs” were the third 
and fourth most important factors of competitiveness according to their senior 
executive survey, whilst “[r]espondents to the CEO survey were even more 
emphatic, ranking the attractiveness of the regulatory environment as the single most 
important issue determining the international competitiveness of a financial market.” 
(ibid.)
3
 To this end, McKinsey concluded that policymakers in the US should 
“[p]rotect US global competitiveness in implementing the Basel II Capital Accord” 
by taking a “speedy and pragmatic approach”, since “the proposed US 
implementation of Basel II… put the United States at a competitive disadvantage” 
especially vis-à-vis their European counterparts (ibid. p11-17).
4
  
                                                 
1
 According to the City of London, competition to develop financial centres had intensified. The 
financial sector has become “an attractive business sector for cities seeking to develop because it has 
been a successful, high growth, sector for the past quarter of a century, and because it is a highly 
mobile sector, which can be directly influenced by policy and planning.” (2007:10) 
2
 McKinsey conducted over 50 in-depth interviews with industry CEOs, senior executives, regulators, 
lawyers, politicians, and other interest groups, sent over 30 paper-based surveys to CEOs of leading 
financial services institutions around the world, and conducted an online survey of senior executives 
in financial services firms eliciting 275 responses globally (McKinsey 2007:62). 
3
 The first and second most important determinants were the availability of professional workers and 
a fair and predictable legal environment. Even the so-called dominant financial centres of the world 
do not seem to be able to escape competitive pressures to match the policies of their rivals, which is 
often not perceived to be the case in the literature (for example see Simmons (2001)). 
4
 The policy recommendations were put forward to policymakers in the US since this study was 
conducted at the request of the Mayor of New York City and Senator of New York. The 
implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and continued requirement for foreign companies to 
conform to US accounting standards were also deemed to put to the US at a competitive disadvantage. 
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Similarly, the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI) published semi-
annually by the City of London ranks financial centres according to five areas of 
competitiveness. Each area consists of several sub-indices suggesting that there are 
multiple ingredients that make a financial sector internationally competitive. Yet, the 
GFCI “survey poses a question about the most important competitive factors for 
financial centres and regulation was mentioned by more of our [GFCI] survey 
respondents than any other factor” (2007:11, emphasis added). In short, it is difficult 
to overstate the importance of the regulatory environment in shaping the 
international competitiveness of financial sectors, and since regulatory policies such 
as Basel II implementation are “[d]omestic drivers of competitiveness that 
policymakers can influence” (McKinsey 2007:61), policymakers around the world 
may come under immense competitive pressures to implement regulatory policies in 
ways that attract international capital and business from their competitors. This may 
provide a strong impetus that spurs the diffusion of Basel II across competing 
countries. 
In this chapter, the findings and methods of the quantitative analysis are put 
to a stronger test by examining the process of how and why policies actually diffuse 
as financial sectors compete for capital in the two specific country cases of Hong 
Kong and Korea. The case studies focus on two lines of inquiry to uncover this 
process. First, the paths through which policies diffuse across financial sectors that 
compete for capital are traced. Since the inter-linkages between countries are not 
based on pre-specified structures of interdependencies as was the case in the 
previous two chapters, the concept of competition between financial sectors to 
attract capital is operationalized in three different ways. This establishes the way 
Hong Kong and Korea are interconnected to the rest of the world. Secondly, the way 
Basel II policy choices in Hong Kong and Korea were shaped by the policy choices 
of financial sectors in other countries with which Hong Kong and Korea competed 
for capital is investigated. 
222 
 
In contrast to the examination of how policies diffused across different inter-
supervisory authority networks and the cross-border structure of international banks 
in chapters Five and Six, this chapter examines two countries that are in the same 
supervisory network and where the level of foreign bank presence is relatively high 
in both cases. This creates two benefits from an analytical point of view. First, the 
effects of supervisory networks and international banks can be controlled when 
investigating whether and how competition between financial centres to attract 
capital leads to the diffusion of Basel II policies and thus differences in the way 
Basel II was implemented in Hong Kong and Korea. Second, this chapter 
complements the previous two chapters by investigating how policies diffuse not 
only due to interdependencies formed between countries at the level of supervisors 
and banks, both of which are key actors in the process of implementation, but also 
across interdependencies at the level of financial sectors, adding another dimension 
of analysis to the thesis. 
 Unlike the channels of policy diffusion studied in the previous two chapters, 
several studies in the literature have examined how policies diffused due to 
competition for capital. Yet, behind the intuitive line of argument that competing for 
capital can lead to the diffusion of policies lies a more elusive conceptual and 
methodological foundation. Defining and measuring competitiveness is not straight 
forward, let alone identifying who one‟s competitors are. Neither are the factors that 
make a country more or less competitive easily identifiable, especially regarding the 
relationship between regulation and the competitiveness of a financial sector. 
Furthermore, according to the McKinsey survey, business executives suggested that 
“striking the right regulatory balance” was crucial for any financial centre (2007:78). 
This discredits the simplistic one-dimensional regulatory race to the bottom or top 
arguments in the literature. It may not only be whether countries have adopted Basel 
II or not that matters, but how they have implemented it that matters in competing 
for capital. Hence, studies that adopt a binary measure of implementation, or assess 
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the stringency of regulations in a linear way, may not suffice to capture how Basel II 
is implemented as a result of motives to compete for capital. This chapter aims to 
overcome such limitations and contribute to the literature by enhancing the 
measurement of Basel II implementation by extending the scope of measurement not 
only to which elements of Basel II were implemented, but also the rationale behind 
the policies implemented. Examining the policy making process also helps gauge the 
relationship between how Basel II was implemented in countries and how 
policymakers perceived such implementation to contribute to the relative 
competitiveness of their jurisdictions to attract capital. This approach enables the 
case studies to highlight how policy diffusion can promote convergence with Basel 
II in some areas of policy, whilst hindering convergence in others as countries 
compete for capital. The operationalization of the channels of policy diffusion due to 
competition for capital also constitutes a contribution to the literature.  
 This chapter is organized as follows. The case studies of how Basel II 
policies diffused due to competition for capital in Hong Kong and Korea are 
presented in sections 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. Each case study first establishes how 
financial sectors in Hong Kong and Korea are interconnected to the rest of the world 
so that the paths through which policies diffused can be traced. Then, analyses of 
how and why competing for capital promoted greater levels of convergence with 
Basel II in Hong Kong and Korea is followed by an examination of whether the 
same underlying diffusion mechanisms also led to country-specific divergences 
from Basel II. In section 7.4, a comparative analysis of what, how and why Basel II 
policies diffused in Hong Kong and Korea is undertaken before concluding. 
 
7.2 Competing for capital and the implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong 
7.2.1 Tracing the paths of policy diffusion to Hong Kong 
To trace the path through which policies diffuse across countries, this section 
operationalizes the concept of competition for capital in three ways. The same 
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analysis is conducted for Korea in section 7.3.1, but in less detail than what follows 
in explaining the methods involved. To identify where policies diffuse from, the first 
measure specifies the way and extent to which Hong Kong is interconnected to the 
rest of world as reflected by the exposure of banks from around the world to Hong 
Kong. The BIS consolidated banking statistics are used to trace the nationality of 
banks with claims in Hong Kong. Cross-border claims can be measured on an 
immediate borrower basis and ultimate risk basis. The former measures financial 
assets on the balance sheet, including, deposits and balances with other banks, loans 
and advances to banks and non-banks and holdings of debt securities, but excludes 
derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions. Claims on an ultimate risk basis 
measures where the final risk lies since claims to Hong Kong are measured inclusive 
of risk transfers in the form of derivatives and off-balance sheet positions such as 
credit commitments and guarantees. Hence, this measure provides an assessment of 
country credit risk exposures consonant with banks‟ own risk management systems. 
(BIS 2012:50) As a counterparty to financial transactions and recipient of cross-
border claims, policymakers in Hong Kong may be more sensitive to, and take into 
account to a greater extent, the policies of the countries that have greater levels of 
financial claims in Hong Kong in order to sustain Hong Kong‟s ability to attract 
financial assets from these countries since they are relatively more important than 
other countries in sustaining Hong Kong‟s ability to draw on the pool of 
international capital. In other words, if the UK has cross-border claims in Hong 
Kong that represents 50% of all countries‟ aggregate claims to Hong Kong, 
policymakers in Hong Kong may be more compelled to take into account the Basel 
II policies of the UK to a greater extent in formulating its own policies compared to 
the Basel II policies of Taiwan, which only accounts for approximately 3% of 
aggregate cross-border claims to Hong Kong from the rest of the world. 
 The analysis of the data that maps out the potential pathways policies 
diffused is presented in Table 15. The top ten countries with cross-border claims in 
225 
 
Hong Kong are presented in descending order by value of claims to Hong Kong in 
millions of US dollars.  
Table 15: Consolidated foreign claims to Hong Kong 
 
There are six panels, each corresponding to the average quarterly claims during 
different time periods. For example, Panel A summarizes the average quarterly 
claims of the top ten claimant countries during 2001 and 2004 and Panel B during 
2005 and 2008 on an immediate borrower basis.
5
 The data was sliced into different 
time periods on empirical grounds since the structure of cross-border claims could 
                                                 
5
 The corresponding tables for Panel A and C on an ultimate risk basis are not presented as data is 
available only from 2005. 
(In millions of US dollars)
Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum %
GB 133,930 54% 54% GB 165,115 52% 52% GB 149,522  53% 53%
JP 31,595 13% 67% JP 35,531 11% 63% JP 33,563    12% 65%
US 20,716 8% 76% FR 24,679 8% 71% US 22,328    8% 73%
FR 12,476 5% 81% US 23,941 8% 79% FR 18,577    7% 80%
DE 11,701 5% 86% DE 13,446 4% 83% DE 12,573    4% 84%
CH 7,308 3% 89% CH 12,993 4% 87% CH 10,151    4% 88%
TW 6,366 3% 91% NL 11,179 4% 90% TW 8,141      3% 91%
BE 6,171 3% 94% TW 9,915 3% 94% NL 7,886      3% 93%
AU 5,630 2% 96% BE 6,130 2% 96% BE 6,150      2% 96%
NL 4,594 2% 98% AU 5,026 2% 97% AU 5,170      2% 97%
Other 5,323 2% 100% Other 9,126 3% 100% Other 7,301      3% 100%
Total 245,809 100% Total 317,080 100% Total 281,363  100%
Europe 179,411 73% Europe 239,745 76% Europe 209,578  74%
Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum %
GB 150,000 54% 54% GB 133,852 55% 55% GB 146,785 53% 53%
JP 25,522 9% 64% US 22,035 9% 64% JP 24,191 9% 62%
US 23,251 8% 72% DE 18,683 8% 72% US 23,031 8% 70%
FR 20,621 7% 79% JP 18,086 7% 80% FR 21,129 8% 78%
CH 12,402 4% 84% FR 15,760 7% 86% DE 16,869 6% 84%
DE 12,293 4% 88% CH 10,650 4% 90% CH 12,722 5% 89%
NL 9,542 3% 92% NL 8,479 4% 94% NL 10,315 4% 93%
TW 7,748 3% 95% BE 4,537 2% 96% BE 6,048 2% 95%
BE 4,818 2% 96% AU 3,550 1% 97% AU 4,561 2% 97%
AU 3,903 1% 98% CA 1,872 1% 98% CA 3,198 1% 98%
Other 5,890 2% 100% Other 4,711 2% 100% Other 6,407 2% 100%
Total 275,988 100% Total 242,214 100% Total 275,255 100%
Europe 213,835 77% Europe 192,825 80% 218,379 79%
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics (http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm)
2005-8 average quarterly exposure
Notes: AT:Austria, AU:Australia, BE:Belgium, BR:Brazil, CA:Canada, CH:Switzerland, CL:Chile, DE:Germany, DK:Denmark, 
ES:Spain, FI:Finland, FR:France, GB:United Kingdom, GR:Greece, IE:Ireland, IT:Italy, JP:Japan, MX:Mexico, NL:Netherlands, 
PA:Panama, PT:Portugal, SE:Sweden, TR:Turkey, TW:Chinese Taipei, US:United States
2001-8 average quarterly exposure
F G D
Immediate borrower basis Ulitmate risk basis Ulitmate risk basis
2001-4 average quarterly exposure 2005-8 average quarterly exposure
2005 average quarterly exposure 2005 average quarterly exposure
A B C
Immediate borrower basis Immediate borrower basis Immediate borrower basis
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have changed during different steps of the implementation process which spanned 
several years. Hence, Panel A summarizes the countries that accounted for the 
largest proportion of claims in Hong Kong from the world during 2001-4, a period 
when supervisors formulated their implementation strategies and supervised banks 
to prepare for implementation accordingly, but before formal implementation 
policies were announced (Panel F and G). During 2005-8 (Panel B and D), formal 
implementation commenced and the final rules that implemented Basel II came into 
effect in 2007, and 2008 for the advanced approaches. 
Table 15 reveals a consistent picture over time in terms of which countries 
Hong Kong was most closely interconnected to. Hong Kong is far more 
interconnected to the UK than any other country, as highlighted by the shaded rows 
that indicate that over half of aggregate cross-border financial claims in Hong Kong 
originated from the UK alone. This is followed by Japan and the US, which each 
had claims in Hong Kong of on average 12% and 8% of Hong Kong‟s total claims 
from the world on an immediate risk basis during 2001-8. Three European countries, 
namely France, Germany and Switzerland, accounted for between 4% and 8% of 
aggregate foreign claims, putting them in the top six countries. However, when 
exposures are measured on an ultimate risk basis, Hong Kong‟s exposure to France 
and Germany are similar to that of Japan. This highlights the greater role of German 
and French banks as guarantors of claims or the country in which the head office of 
a legally dependent branch is located. Thus, together with the UK, European banks, 
which were early-comprehensive adopters of Basel II, dominated the extent to which 
Hong Kong was interconnected to other countries. This is indicated in the bottom 
row of each panel which shows that European banks collectively accounted for 
approximately 75% of all financial claims from the world to Hong Kong on an 
immediate risk basis and 80% on an ultimate risk basis. Based on this analysis, 
Hong Kong is expected to be most responsive to policy changes in the UK and the 
EU, followed by Japan and the US to lesser degrees. Despite common perceptions 
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that the US is the dominant financial centre of the world, perhaps due to its large and 
deep domestic financial markets and handful of global US banks, European banks 
tend to be more international and thus significantly more interconnected to Hong 
Kong according to this measure. From the perspective of specifying the pathways 
policies diffused, European influences, in particular that of the UK, may 
considerably dominate that of the US or Japan. 
In the second measure, Hong Kong‟s relative position as a leading 
international financial centre may shape which financial centres Hong Kong 
competes with to attract capital. Policymakers in Hong Kong may try to match or 
out-compete the Basel II policies adopted by other leading international financial 
centres, resulting in the diffusion of Basel II. According to the GFCI published 
semi-annually by the City of London, Hong Kong consistently ranked amongst the 
most successful global financial centres along with London, New York, Singapore 
and Zurich as shown in Table 16.  
Table 16: Global Financial Centres Index rankings and Hong Kong’s rank 
 
The top ten international financial centres are located in countries that are early-
comprehensive adopters of Basel II, except the US, which is a late-partial adopter, 
suggesting that Hong Kong could be subject to mixed influences emanating from the 
two types of implementers. 
The third measure of defining which countries Hong Kong competes with to 
attract capital is based on the method used in the quantitative study in Chapter Three, 
Rank Mar-07 Rank Sep-07 Rank Mar-08 Rank Sep-08 Rank Mar-09
1 London 1 London 1 London 1 London 1 London
2 New York 2 New York 2 New York 2 New York 2 New York
3 Hong Kong 3 Hong Kong 3 Hong Kong 3 Singapore 3 Singapore
4 Singapore 4 Singapore 4 Singapore 4 Hong Kong 4 Hong Kong
5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich
6 Frankfurt 6 Frankfurt 6 Frankfurt 6 Geneva 6 Geneva
7 Sydney 7 Geneva 7 Geneva 7 Tokyo 7 Chicago
8 Chicago 8 Chicago 8 Chicago 8 Chicago 8 Frankfurt
9 Tokyo 9 Sydney 9 Tokyo 9 Frankfurt 9 Boston
10 Geneva 10 Tokyo 10 Sydney 10 Sydney 10 Dublin
Source: Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), City of London
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which followed that of Simmons and Elkins (2004:179). Countries in the same risk 
category measured by their sovereign credit ratings are seen as rivals that compete 
for the same pool of international capital from the perspective of potential investors. 
Sovereign risk ratings provide a good measure because the solvency of the banking 
sector and capital indicators, both of which may be shaped by the implementation of 
Basel II, are key determinants of sovereign risk. Moreover, sovereign risk ratings are 
the most widely used proxy for country risk by market analysts. Hence, sovereign 
risk ratings provide a succinct measure of countries that are close substitutes from 
investors‟ point of view whilst also preserving the causal connection that the 
implementation of Basel II may have on the solvency of the banking sector, and in 
turn on the level of sovereign risk. Finally, in trying to measure how policymakers 
might try to match the policies of other financial sectors, measuring competitors at 
the level of financial sectors may be more suitable than assessing the credit ratings 
of individual banks even though the latter may provide more accurate measures of 
how the implementation of Basel II might affect banks individually.
6
 According to 
this measure, Hong Kong competes with the countries shown in Table 17. 
Table 17: Countries with similar credit ratings as Hong Kong as of year-end 2005 
 
                                                 
6
 Note how in Chapter Five section 5.3.2, the Superintendent of SBIF in Chile also argued that 
“country risk remains a concern and… the solvency of the banking industry and its capital indicators 
are key issues. A significant reduction in capital allocation, even if it is justified on Basel II grounds, 
could have a negative impact on market perception and Chile‟s country risk indicators.” (Marshall 
2004:9) 
Credit rating Country Basel II Score
Belgium 40
New Zealand 34
Bermuda 15
Iceland 40
EU Member states: Italy, Portugal, Slovenia 40
Japan 40
Hong Kong 35
Kuwait 20
Qatar 15
Source: Standard and Poor's
A+
AA-
AA+/AA
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Hong Kong competes with the likes of Japan, Iceland and several EU member states 
such as Italy and Portugal, all of which are early-comprehensive adopters of Basel II. 
Policymakers in Hong Kong are expected to match the policies of these countries, 
since they are potentially substitutable investment destinations from investors‟ point 
of view regarding their sovereign risk. Hong Kong is expected to compete to a less 
degree with countries such as Belgium and New Zealand, which are also early-
comprehensive adopters and several Middle Eastern countries, which are mainly 
early-partial adopters, and even less so with countries that have higher or lower 
sovereign credit risk ratings than these countries. 
Three measures were devised since a single method of operationalization was 
unlikely to fully capture the paths through which policies diffused due to 
competition for capital. However, there are similarities as well as differences 
between these measures, four of which are worth noting. First, the most competitive 
global financial centres Hong Kong competes with measured by the GFCI are also 
the countries that account for the largest proportions of aggregate foreign claims to 
Hong Kong. The overlap in the countries Hong Kong is interconnected to across the 
measures is not surprising as the most competitive financial centres are often hosts 
to the most active international banks. However, this is not necessarily the case for 
non-leading financial centres that attract capital from leading international financial 
centres with whom they do not directly compete for capital. Secondly, the type of 
competition differs conceptually across the three measures. The structure of cross-
border claims provides a measure of diffusion due to vertical competition from the 
claimant countries to the recipient country. The measure using the GFCI may reflect 
vertical competition if non-leading countries‟ aspirations of becoming leading 
financial centres are driving policy diffusion or horizontal competition if countries 
are matching the policies of their similarly ranked peers. Likewise, credit ratings 
may provide a measure of horizontal competition between similarly rated countries 
or a measure of vertical competition if policymakers look to the policies of highly 
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rated countries. Thirdly, competition is conceptualized from different points of 
views as the first measure examines motivations that lead to policy diffusion as 
consumers of international financial assets, the second, from the perspective of 
being international financial centres, and the third, as potentially substitutable 
destinations for investments. Fourthly, although different measures may point to the 
same source of diffusion resulting in an identical diffusion path, the underlying 
cause of policy diffusion could differ, if for example, cross-border claims based on 
actual economic relations trigger competition-based diffusion while the measure of 
international financial centres stimulates emulation-based diffusion.  
As a caveat, none of these measures are free from limitations in the 
underlying data, although they utilize the best available. The BIS consolidated 
banking statistics provide data on bilateral exposures for thirty BIS reporting banks 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. BIS reporting banks include all major financial 
centres, but not all countries of interest to this study, such as China. Hence, the 
scope of data coverage is limited. The GFCI is a composite index combining several 
existing surveys from other data sources, which can make the composite index 
arbitrary, as well as its own survey of industry participants‟ assessments, where 
measurements can suffer from subjectivity. Finally sovereign credit ratings may be 
affected by a myriad of factors not directly related to the implementation of Basel II 
and investors may evaluate factors other than ratings in making investment decisions. 
With the above points in mind, the next section examines how Basel II policies 
diffused in the case of Hong Kong. 
 
7.2.2 The diffusion of policies that converged with Basel II 
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is responsible for conducting 
monetary policy, regulating and supervising banks, helping to maintain Hong 
Kong‟s status as an international financial centre, and managing the Exchange Fund. 
Within its capacity as the authority responsible for banking supervision as well as 
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maintaining Hong Kong‟s status as an international financial centre, the HKMA was 
an avid follower of the Basel standards because it believed that “[a]dopting 
international standards such as Basel I has played an important role in establishing 
Hong Kong as an international financial centre with best practice regulation and 
supervision” (HKMA 2004b:4). In fact, the HKMA specifically states that “[o]ne of 
the aims of the HKMA is to ensure that Hong Kong‟s banking and monetary 
systems comply with international codes and standards” (HKMA 2003:8). Thus, 
when the Basel Committee published CP2 in 2001, the HKMA was one of the first 
non-Basel Committee countries to indicate that it would “aim to implement the New 
Accord in Hong Kong according to the timetable set by the Committee” (HKMA 
2001:26). Hence, “the groundwork continued in 2003 for implementing the New 
Basel Capital Accord, which [was] targeted for implementation in late 2006” 
(HKMA 2003:8). Even before Basel II was finalized, the HKMA was of the view 
that Basel II had already “gained widespread support by countries with active 
international banks” (HKMA 2004:2). According to the HKMA‟s Executive 
Director of Banking Policy, Simon Topping, Basel II was “here to stay” and from 
the HKMA‟s point of view, it was “not a question of whether to implement it, but 
how [and] when” that mattered (Topping 2004:2). These are the two central policy 
variables investigated in this case study. 
Following the publication of Basel II in 2004, the HKMA argued in a letter 
to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs that there was “a very 
persuasive case for implementing Basel II in Hong Kong” for the following reasons 
(HKMA 2004).
7
 First, the HKMA argued that “[a]s a major IFC [international 
financial centre] which prides itself on adopting the latest best practices, it is natural 
                                                 
7
 The Panel on Financial Affairs formulates views on major legislative proposals prior to their formal 
introduction to the Council or Finance Committee. The Finance Committee is a standing committee 
of the Legislative Council, which is the unicameral legislature of Hong Kong. According to the 
minutes of a meeting in 2005, members of the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs lent 
their support for the implementation of Basel II. Some members even “urged HKMA to expedite its 
work for the early implementation of Basel II” (Hong Kong Legislative Council 2005:7). 
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for Hong Kong to implement Basel II at the same time as the Basel Committee 
members.” It further noted that “implementation will enhance the reputation and 
standing of Hong Kong – and of our banks – in the international arena, including in 
the context of external ratings, in line with market expectations.” Second, the 
HKMA argued that “[m]ajor international banking groups with a presence here [in 
Hong Kong] will implement Basel II, the more advanced approaches specifically, 
globally in 2006” and that “[t]hey naturally expect to adopt the same implementation 
approach and timetable in their operations in Hong Kong”. Hence, the full and 
timely implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong was thought to help create an 
attractive regulatory environment for international banks. Third, “the improvements 
in risk management required under Basel II” was deemed “a necessary business 
requirement for the Hong Kong banking sector” since a better understanding and 
management of risk was essential in maximizing risk-adjusted returns. The greater 
risk sensitivity of Basel II and the inclusion of a wider range of risks were expected 
to further enhance the safety and stability of the banking sector. (HKMA 2004:4)  
These reasons underscore how Basel II implementation decisions in Hong 
Kong were considered in a very international context. The first and second factors 
relate specifically to the international repercussions of implementing Basel II due to 
Hong Kong‟s position as an international financial centre and as home and host to 
international banks. The second factor is closely interrelated to the first to the extent 
that Hong Kong‟s position as an international financial centre in part depends on its 
ability to maintain an attractive regulatory environment for international banks to 
conduct their businesses. The third factor too has international repercussions in so 
far as Hong Kong‟s reputation as a well regulated, safe and stable banking system 
underpins its international competitiveness. It is against this backdrop that the next 
two sub-sections examine how policies diffused from countries Hong Kong 
competed with for capital due to the HKMA‟s efforts to first, strengthen Hong 
Kong‟s reputation and international standing vis-à-vis other leading financial centres, 
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and second, create an attractive regulatory environment for international banks to 
conduct their businesses in Hong Kong. 
The HKMA aimed to implement Basel II in ways that would enhance Hong 
Kong‟s reputation and international standing in line with other leading financial 
centres. The Chief Executive of the HKMA, Joseph Yam, sheds light on this policy 
stance.  
“Theoretically we could choose not to implement certain new standards, or at 
least spread their implementation over a longer period. However, this might 
be damaging to Hong Kong‟s position as an international financial centre. 
Our reputation might be tarnished if we were slow to adopt the international 
standards and best practices, which are being, and in some cases already 
have been, adopted in other major international financial centres… I am sure 
the banking industry would agree that it is important for Hong Kong to be in 
the initial wave of jurisdictions implementing Basel II, alongside other major 
international financial centres such as London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo.” 
(Yam 2006) 
Evaluating how Hong Kong‟s implementation of Basel II “compare[d] with other 
major financial centres” thus constituted an integral part of the HKMA‟s policy 
making process as they provided critical policy inputs in formulating Hong Kong‟s 
Basel II policy (HKMA 2005:12), although it is interesting to note that Yam does 
not mention New York as a major international financial centre. In the first instance, 
the HKMA benchmarked its Basel II implementation policy, especially the overall 
timing and scope of implementation, to that of leading global financial centres 
located in the UK, France, Germany and Japan. The HKMA argued that “given 
Hong Kong‟s position as an international finance centre, it should be in the first 
wave of jurisdictions (alongside other major international financial centres such as 
London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo) to establish a legal and regulatory framework 
broadly in line with the international standards in Basel II” (HKMA 2006a:1-2; 
HKMA 2005:12).
8
 This is consistent with the first, but more specifically, the second 
                                                 
8
 New York is not mentioned here either. 
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measure of competition since implementation in countries that ranked amongst the 
top ten global financial centres such as London, Frankfurt and Tokyo, namely, those 
which Hong Kong‟s financial sector directly competed with for business, were the 
main targets the HKMA benchmarked its policy on. Nonetheless, also consistent 
with this measure were the implementation policies in Australia and Singapore, the 
only two non-G10 countries in the region that ranked amongst the top ten leading 
international financial centres. These countries provided policy benchmarks that 
were of a second order to the HKMA, to the extent that the HKMA ensured that 
“[f]rom a regional perspective, the implementation timetable in Hong Kong [was] 
broadly similar to that of Australia and Singapore” (HKMA 2005:12; HKMA 
2004).
9
 Insofar as the most competitive financial centres are usually hosts to the 
most active international banks, overlaps in the paths of policy diffusion between 
measures of competition for capital is expected. The most competitive financial 
centres were also highly interconnected to Hong Kong in terms of their claims in 
Hong Kong. The UK accounted for over half of total foreign claims from the world 
to Hong Kong, which together with Germany, France and Japan constituted over 
three quarters of total foreign claims.  
The limited progress in implementation in the US, the only other country that 
measures of competition for capital would suggest policies would diffuse from, did 
not go unnoticed when the HKMA formulated its implementation policy. The 
HKMA pointed out that “[b]ecause the US banking regulators have announced their 
intention to offer only the most advanced approaches, Basel II will take effect in the 
                                                 
9
 The regional diffusion of Basel II was reinforced by the HKMA‟s active participation in the 
EMEAP WGBS, especially as the chair since mid-2006 (HKMA 2006:68). HKMA played an active 
role in facilitating the diffusion of policies by encouraging implementation amongst the EMAEP 
WGBS supervisors via the supervisory network‟s outreach activities. In one meeting, the Deputy 
Chief Executive of the HKMA stated that it was “a good opportunity for representatives of 
jurisdictions which have yet to adopt Basel II to hear from jurisdictions already implementing the 
framework about the emerging issues, and to facilitate future communications on this topic among 
participants. As Chairman of the EMEAP Working Group on Banking Supervision, the HKMA 
certainly welcomes the opportunity to host this outreach event” (Choi 2007). 
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US only in 2008” (HKMA 20005:12). The US‟s approach to implementation did 
shape more detailed aspects of Hong Kong‟s implementation, which are discussed 
later. However, in formulating Hong Kong‟s overall implementation strategy, the 
HKMA was less receptive to the Basel II policies of the US than to their European 
counterparts. Although the US played a pivotal role in creating Basel II, the global 
standards for bank capital regulation as adopted by supervisory authorities and 
banks was being set by the Europeans, who led the implementation of Basel II. 
The HKMA sought to enhance two aspects of Hong Kong‟s reputation vis-à-
vis its rivals by matching the policies of other leading financial centres with which it 
competed. The first related to the reputation of Hong Kong as being at the forefront 
of adopting best practices in banking regulation. This reputation accrued from how 
the HKMA implemented Basel II. Hence, the HKMA argued that “[t]he fact that 
Hong Kong plans to be one of the first non-Basel jurisdiction to implement Basel II 
is positive for Hong Kong. It keeps us at the forefront regionally and internationally, 
reinforcing that we are on a par with the world‟s top international financial centres.” 
(HKMA 2004:6) Similarly, senior officials responsible for implementing Basel II 
emphasized that “Hong Kong‟s leadership” in implementing Basel II was “widely 
acknowledged” as “Hong Kong was one of the first jurisdictions globally to publish 
draft implementation guidelines for Basel II” and “[o]ther regulators have since 
followed our [HKMA‟s] lead, and [were] adopting similar approaches” (Topping 
2004b:30). When the final rules came into force in 2007, the HKMA emphasized 
again that “Hong Kong [was] among the first jurisdictions in the world to implement 
Basel II and this makes us very much a leader in the region” (HKMA 2006:6). The 
HKMA ultimately believed that “[b]eing among the first banking centres to 
implement Basel II will help maintain Hong Kong‟s position as an international 
financial centre” (HKMA 2004c:7). 
Secondly, the HKMA tried to reinforce Hong Kong‟s reputation as a well 
regulated banking system by implementing Basel II. According to Topping, 
236 
 
Executive Director of Banking Policy, “Hong Kong‟s reputation as one of the 
world‟s leading international financial centres derives from a number of factors, one 
of which is the good reputation of its regulatory systems” and to maintain this 
reputation, he believed that “Hong Kong need[ed] to keep up with global trends in 
regulation – such as the policies on bank regulation formulated by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision” (Topping 2001:1). Referring to Basel II 
implementation, his view was that the “adoption of international standards [and] best 
practices is necessary in order to maintain Hong Kong‟s reputation as a well-
regulated IFC [international financial centre]” (Topping 2005:14, emphasis added). 
Basel II was particularly seen to be attractive in this respect since the HKMA 
believed that Basel II was more risk-sensitive, inclusive of a wider range of risks, 
designed to strengthen market discipline and provided incentives for banks to adopt 
the latest advances in risk management (HKMA 2004b:3-4). “How could anyone 
possibly disagree with this?” were the exact words of Topping (2004:3) The HKMA 
reaffirmed this view stating that “[g]iven the potential benefits of Basel II to the 
safety and stability of the banking system and to the reputation of Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre, Hong Kong has been at the forefront of jurisdictions 
globally taking active steps to incorporate the requirements of the revised 
framework into their regulatory regimes” (HKMA 2005:5). 
That said, the implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong was not only shaped 
by the HKMA‟s efforts to strengthen Hong Kong‟s reputation and international 
standing vis-à-vis other leading financial centres, but also by very practical and 
tangible constraints owing to its position as a financial centre where international 
banks had a very strong presence. Investors and fund raisers from outside Hong 
Kong used financial intermediation channels in Hong Kong provided by 
international banks, and it was this role in the process of credit intermediation, 
which Yam considered “the minimum requirement” for Hong Kong to qualify as an 
international financial centre (Yam 2006a). According to Yam, “establishing an 
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international market in a particular financial product in Hong Kong, which is clearly 
desirable for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international 
financial centre… is not easy because we are talking about doing so possibly at the 
expense of established markets elsewhere” (Yam 2006b). He argued that the 
regulatory framework constituted an integral part of market infrastructure, which, 
together with supply, demand and price discovery mechanisms, determined where a 
market is located in or re-located. To this end, it was important that the 
implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong created a regulatory environment that was 
attractive for international banks to conduct their businesses, which in turn affected 
how Basel II was implemented in Hong Kong in the following two ways.  
First, the HKMA ensured that Hong Kong was in the initial wave of 
jurisdictions to implement Basel II along with countries with active international 
banks, enabling international banking groups to adopt their preferred approach to 
implementation in Hong Kong. In 2004, the HKMA believed that Basel II had 
“gained widespread support by countries with active international banks” (HKMA 
2004:2). The HKMA expected “[m]ajor international banking groups with a 
presence here [in Hong Kong] will implement Basel II, the more advanced 
approaches specifically, globally in 2006” and that “[t]hey naturally expect to adopt 
the same implementation approach and timetable in their operations in Hong Kong” 
(ibid. p4). To this end, because “[d]ivergences in how different jurisdictions 
implement Basel II are inevitable” across countries implementing Basel II, 
according to the Chief Executive of the HKMA, it was “all the more important that 
there should be a high degree of alignment in the interpretation and application of 
the rules and, not least, in the timing of implementation. This [was] essential to 
avoid legal uncertainties for cross-border banking groups and any unnecessary 
implementation costs or competitive disadvantage during the transition period.” 
(Yam 2005) Hence, the HKMA said that they “see value in being among the first in 
adopting Basel II, not only because of its intrinsic merits, but also because Hong 
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Kong has one of the highest concentrations of banking institutions in the world, with 
a strong presence of international banking groups.” (HKMA 2004c:7) It was 
“therefore important that Hong Kong implement[ed] Basel II at the same time as the 
BCBS members” according to the Deputy Chief Executive of the HKMA, as this 
would “help maintain Hong Kong‟s position as a leading international financial 
centre.” (Ryback 2006:3)10 
 Secondly, it was not only in the timing and overall scope of implementation, 
but also in the implementation of the three pillars of Basel II that the HKMA tried to 
make the regulatory environment more attractive for international banks. According 
to Yam, the HKMA liaised closely with major international banks in Hong Kong “in 
an effort to build sufficient flexibility into our [HKMA‟s] rules to allow them as 
much as possible to follow the rules set by their home supervisors, to the extent that 
this can be done without compromising the level playing field within Hong Kong 
itself.” (Yam 2005) Thus, in implementing Pillar 1, since the majority of authorized 
institutions (“AIs”) planning to adopt the IRB approaches were subsidiaries of 
foreign banking groups (HKMA 2005:67), the HKMA said that it “relied on the 
home supervisors‟ reviews of the group-developed internal rating systems that are 
used by the subsidiaries in Hong Kong mainly for nonretail exposures.
 
This was 
done to avoid supervisory overlap and reduce the regulatory burden on banks.” 
(HKMA 2007:68)
11
 This approach was also consistent with the HKMA‟s “hopes to 
reduce the burden on AIs and their parent banks in satisfying the validation 
requirements of various supervisors” where all or part of their rating systems were 
centrally developed and monitored on a banking group basis (HKMA 2005a:13). For 
Pillar 2 implementation, foreign bank subsidiaries were permitted to adopt their 
                                                 
10
 Ryback essentially makes the same argument that “[m]any international banking groups [were] 
expected to implement Basel II globally with effect from 1 January 2007. Those banks with a 
presence in Hong Kong will naturally expect to be able to use the Basel II approaches in their 
operations in Hong Kong.” (Ryback 2006:3) 
11
 In Hong Kong, AIs are banks that are authorized under the Banking Ordinance to carry on banking 
business or the business of taking deposits. 
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parent bank‟s group-wide ICAAP as long as the home supervisors applied standards 
comparable to those adopted by the HKMA (Luk 2006). Likewise, for Pillar 3, the 
rules that implemented the disclosure recruitments allowed subsidiaries of foreign 
banks to draw extensively on group disclosures for local reporting purposes. Such 
measures facilitated the full and timely implementation of Basel II by foreign banks, 
which constituted the majority of banks that implemented the advanced approaches 
of Basel II in Hong Kong. 
In sum, efforts to strengthen Hong Kong‟s reputation and position as a leading 
international financial centre by creating a correspondingly fitting regulatory 
environment relative to its competitors culminated in an implementation policy that 
promoted a high level of convergence with Basel II. However, although the formal 
regulatory regime was Basel II-ready by 2006, divergences from Basel II and lax 
transitional arrangements were also strategically built into the HKMA‟s 
implementation policy, limiting the overall degree of convergence with Basel II. 
 
7.2.3 The diffusion of policies that diverged from Basel II 
All AIs incorporated in Hong Kong were required to comply with Basel II from 
2007. For Pillar 1, banks had a choice from three options for credit risk, namely the 
SA, FIRB approach and the “Basic Approach” from 2007, and the AIRB approach 
from 2008. For operational risk, the HKMA implemented the BIA and TSA from 
2007 and Pillars 2 and 3 were also implemented concurrently with Pillar 1.
12
 As can 
be seen from the way the HKMA implemented Basel II, two notable divergences 
from Basel II can be observed, namely, the implementation of an extra fourth 
approach for credit risk unique to Hong Kong and the non-implementation of the 
most advanced approach for operational risk. In addition, the HKMA allowed banks 
to gradually transition onto Basel II after the regulations implementing Basel II 
                                                 
12
 The SA and TSA were designated as the default options that banks were required to apply unless 
approved by the HKMA to use a different approach. The HKMA also allowed the alternative TSA, 
which is an option under Basel II that utilizes different indicators to calculate operational risk charges. 
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came into force. These country-specific divergences could undermine the argument 
that Hong Kong‟s efforts to compete for capital led to the diffusion of policies that 
promoted convergence with Basel II, or suggest that policy diffusion was also a 
cause of such divergences, if not due to factors unrelated to policy diffusion. The 
analyses that follow suggest that Hong Kong‟s divergences from Basel II were 
consistent with the operation of policy diffusion that resulted from Hong Kong 
competing for capital with other financial sectors. Not only were such decisions 
based on careful consideration of how Hong Kong‟s competitive peers were 
implementing Basel II, but the divergent ways in which Hong Kong implemented 
Basel II provided an outlet to accommodate domestic opposition and constraints, 
which in part emanated directly from the HKMA‟s efforts to match the policies of 
its competitive peers in the first place. Key divergences from Basel II unique to 
Hong Kong, which are examined next, were strategically planned from the start and 
incorporated into the HKMA‟s original implementation policy. 
Hong Kong’s Basic Approach 
In addition to the three approaches set out in Basel II for calculating regulatory 
capital requirements for credit risk, the HKMA created and implemented a fourth 
“Basic Approach” in Hong Kong. Faced with domestic opposition from small banks, 
this fourth approach incorporated elements of how the EU implemented Basel II on 
the one hand and the US on the other, resulting in an approach that was neither one 
nor the other, but unique to Hong Kong. Opposition against Basel II emerged from a 
segment of Hong Kong‟s banking sector that consisted of many smaller banks, in 
particular, restricted licence banks and deposit-taking companies, which accounted 
for around 35% of total AIs, but originated only 5% of total loans in Hong Kong in 
2004 (HKMA 2004c:156).
13
 These banks were concerned that Basel II was 
operationally too burdensome and costly to implement given the straightforward 
                                                 
13
 There are three tiers of AIs, licensed banks, restricted licence banks and deposit-taking companies. 
In 2004, there were forty restricted licence banks and thirty-five deposit-taking companies, compared 
to 133 licensed banks that provided 95% of loans in Hong Kong (HKMA 2004:148). 
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nature of their banking operations even if they adopted the most basic approaches of 
Basel II. However, the HKMA did not want to put itself in a position similar to that 
of the US by requiring some banks to implement Basel II whilst allowing the rest to 
remain on Basel I. Such approach had been heavily criticized by the Europeans who 
fiercely and publically rejected the US‟s selective approach to implementation. In 
response, senior US bank regulators also seemed “to be losing patience with 
European objections to a decision by US regulators to only apply the Basel rules to 
10 leading US banks” (FT 2003a).14  
Unwilling to go down the same path as the US, but wanting to enjoy the 
flexibility and cost savings that the US approach offered, the HKMA developed the 
Basic Approach, and explained its rationale as the following: 
“There is some variation among countries concerning Basel II‟s scope of 
application. European Union countries will apply it to all “credit institutions”, 
irrespective of size, whereas in Japan and the United States, the new 
framework will be applied primarily to the large internationally active banks, 
with alternative arrangements made available for smaller institutions. Hong 
Kong has elected to follow the first approach meaning that Basel II will be 
applied to all AIs incorporated in Hong Kong and they will be subject to all 
three Pillars of the revised framework. However, to enjoy some of the 
flexibility of the second approach and to reduce the implementation cost, 
Hong Kong also intends to make available the Basic Approach for smaller 
institutions as an alternative to the IRB and the Standardised Approaches for 
the calculation of credit risk capital requirement.” (HKMA 2005:12) 
Thus, the Basic Approach was introduced “to ensure that there [was] an approach to 
Basel II tailored to the needs of every authorized institution, large or small” (Yam 
2005). The Basic Approach was essentially a modified version of Basel I with slight 
definitional changes and one which incorporated operational risk charges and 
elements of Pillars 2 and 3. It was made available to banks with small (total assets 
                                                 
14
 John Hawke, the Treasury official who headed the supervision of US national banks, expressed his 
frustration stating that “[i]t is time for people to get over the fact that the US has made a decision to 
apply this only to the 10 largest US banks” (FT 2003a). Hawke claimed that those ten banks 
accounted for about 99 percent of foreign exposures in the banking system. 
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not more than HKD10 billion), simple, and straightforward operations, and as an 
interim approach for banks approved by the HKMA to adopt the IRB approaches by 
the end of 2009. (HKMA 2004:20) This included nearly all restricted licence banks 
and deposit-taking companies, thus addressing concerns from that segment of the 
industry over the costs and complexity of implementing Basel II (HKMA 
2004a:5).
15
 By 2005, forty AIs that were mainly restricted licence banks and 
deposit-taking companies obtained approval to use the Basic Approach (HKMA 
2005:6). The HKMA expected around fifty banks to be permanent users of the Basic 
Approach, in contrast to around twenty small and medium sized AIs that were 
expecting to use the SA in 2007 (Luk 2006). 
According to Yam, “[t]his [was] significant, because it means that in Hong 
Kong, as for example in the EU, all authorized institutions will migrate to Basel II, 
and so we [Hong Kong] will not have a situation where some institutions are 
operating under Basel II and some under Basel I, which could reflect unfavourably 
on the latter, and possibly affect their standing and competitive position.” (Yam 
2005) Although these banks were relatively insignificant compared to the 142 
licensed banks that originated 97% of loans to customers in Hong Kong in 2006 
(HKMA 2006:241), this segment of Hong Kong‟s banking sector effectively 
remained on Basel I. However, the HKMA nonetheless claimed that it had fully 
transitioned onto Basel II like the EU, which had implemented all the approaches of 
Basel II according to the timetable agreed in Basel II, as opposed to the US, where 
implementation was delayed and bifurcated as only the largest international banks 
were required to implement the advanced approaches of Basel II while the rest 
remained on Basel I. In addition, as will be examined later, a greater proportion of 
banking assets were on the Basic Approach until 2009, when the largest banks 
                                                 
15
 When Basel II came into force, there were thirty-one restricted licence banks, all of which were 
either subsidiaries of licensed banks incorporated outside Hong Kong or subsidiaries or branches of 
foreign banks with no licence in Hong Kong, and thirty-three deposit-taking companies, most of 
which were subsidiaries of foreign banks at the end of 2006 (HKMA 2006:198) 
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planning to adopt the IRB approaches were allowed to use the Basic Approach as a 
transitional stepping stone for several years. 
Non-implementation of AMA for operational risk 
The HKMA did not implement the AMA, which is the most sophisticated approach 
for calculating capital requirements for operational risk, and offered only the BIA 
and TSA in 2007. According to Topping, this was the “only thing in Basel II” the 
HKMA was not going to allow and was controversial since the HKMA did not 
believe that building up elaborate systems for operational risk helped banks manage 
risks (ORR 2004). Although Hong Kong had a relatively developed banking sector, 
the HKMA said that the time was “not yet ripe to introduce the AMA in Hong 
Kong”, especially for Hong Kong banks (HKMA 2004b:9).16 Instead, the HKMA 
was “expecting banks to focus their dollars on the management of operational risk… 
rather than building up systems to calculate an AMA capital charge” by focusing on 
the implementation of the Basel Committee‟s principles on Sound Practices for the 
Management and Supervision of Operational Risk (ORR 2004). Another reason why 
the HKMA did not implement the AMA was that it was seen to be “still evolving in 
terms of techniques for quantitative capital measurement, and AIs [did] not 
generally have the systems to accumulate operational loss data required for the 
Approaches” (HKMA 2004b:9). This was the case not only in Hong Kong, however, 
but also elsewhere, such as in the UK and Singapore, where the AMA was not the 
preferred approach for most international banks (as the Korean supervisors 
somewhat belatedly found out), despite them being the most sophisticated and 
advanced banks. In fact, the HKMA specifically stated that in Hong Kong “[m]ost 
AIs have indicated their preference to use either the BIA or SA for calculation of 
operational risk capital charge, even those planning to adopt IRB approaches to 
credit risk. Therefore, the implementation of AMA in Hong Kong is not a priority 
for the time being.” (HKMA 2004b:168; see also HKMA 2005:6). Since banks 
                                                 
16
 Note how this policy stance contrasts with that of the FSS in Korea. 
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implementing the IRB approaches were mostly foreign banks implementing the TSA 
across their banking groups, the HKMA‟s policy did not adversely affect foreign 
banks‟ operations from a regulatory perspective. Furthermore, not implementing the 
AMA did not make Hong Kong‟s regulatory environment any less attractive for 
international banks that had already implemented the AMA at the banking group 
level. This was because the HKMA said that “[i]n the case where some international 
banks may want to extend the application of AMA to their subsidiary AIs in Hong 
Kong, the HKMA may consider the feasibility of allowing those foreign bank 
subsidiaries to use AMA on a case by case basis.” (HKMA 2004b:168)17 
A gradual transition to Basel II 
Although the regulatory regime was “Basel II-ready” by the end of 2006, making 
Hong Kong one of the first jurisdictions in the world to formally implement Basel II, 
this did not mean that all banks in Hong Kong were required to complete their 
implementation by that date. Banks‟ convergence with Basel II was more gradual 
than meets the eye as the HKMA allowed banks to gradually transition onto the 
three pillars of Basel II. For banks implementing the IRB approaches, the HKMA 
allowed a three-year implementation transition period from year-end 2006 to year-
end 2009 instead of one year envisaged in Basel II.
18
 According to Topping, a longer 
implementation transition period was adopted “partly to allow banks to build up 
their data and use of the models, but also to account for the fact that they are not 
going to be putting all their efforts into IRB and frontloading it the way banks may 
be elsewhere. They may be working on other areas in the meantime.” (ORR 2004) 
These banks were permitted to use the Basic Approach or the SA if they could 
demonstrate to the HKMA that they had an adequate plan for implementing the IRB 
                                                 
17
 Basel II also allows banks adopting the AMA to use an allocation mechanism for determining 
regulatory capital requirements of subsidiaries that are not significant relative to the overall banking 
group with approval of its host supervisors and support of its home supervisor (Para. 656). 
18
 During this period, transitional arrangements such as concessionary IRB rollout requirements in the 
form of lower coverage ratios and relaxed data requirements also applied. 
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approaches by the end of the implementation transition period. Such arrangements 
effectively provided a grace period for Hong Kong banks to delay the full 
implementation of the IRB approaches until 2010 and use the Basic Approach 
instead. This relieved them from the pressure of having to comply by 2007, which 
may have been the preferred date for foreign banks in Hong Kong that implemented 
the IRB approaches across their banking groups in 2007, but not for domestic banks. 
As a result, although the HKMA claimed that fourteen AIs representing 80% 
of total assets of all AIs “have expressed an interest in using the IRB Approaches” in 
2005 (HKMA 2005:6), only one or two banks were planning to implement the FIRB 
approach in 2007 and seven or eight banks planned to implement the IRB 
approaches after 2008 (Luk 2006:8). In practice, only four AIs obtained approval in 
2007 to adopt the IRB approaches from January 2008 (HKMA 2007:67). In 2008, 
the HKMA granted approval for three AIs to adopt the IRB approaches (HKMA 
2008:68), but none in 2009.
19
 Moreover, the majority of AIs adopting the IRB 
approaches were subsidiaries of foreign banking groups (HKMA 2006:67), reducing 
the extent to which Basel II induced significant improvements in risk management 
standards across the banking sector in Hong Kong. To this end, Hong Kong‟s early 
and full convergence with Basel II was more rhetoric than reality. 
The extent to which the implementation of Pillar 2 and 3 led to substantive 
changes was also limited. The implementation of Pillar 2 was gradual. Instead of 
requiring drastic changes to existing practices, implementation focused on 
“elaboration and refinement” as the HKMA deemed the main elements of Pillar 2 
were already embedded in the HKMA‟s existing supervisory approach (HKMA 
2005:65). Moreover, according to the Head of Banking Policy at the HKMA, “[i]n 
view of AIs‟ general level of readiness for CAAP, the HKMA would not expect all 
AIs necessarily to have a well-developed CAAP by 1 Jan 2007” (Luk 2006). 
Furthermore, AIs that were part of foreign banking groups, which accounted for 
                                                 
19
 In 2009, one approval was granted for the use of internal models for market risk (HKMA 2009:60) 
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over 80% of licensed banks in Hong Kong, were allowed to draw extensively on 
their parents‟ ICAAP instead of developing their own.20 In addition, the ICAAP 
requirements did not apply to banks on the Basic Approach on cost-effective 
grounds. Similarly, a menu-based approach was adopted for the implementation of 
Pillar 3, whereby requirements for the extent of disclosures were dependent on the 
approach for credit risk banks adopted. Since most Hong Kong banks adopted the 
basic approaches and the banks adopting the IRB approaches were predominantly 
foreign banks that were permitted to draw extensively on their parents‟ disclosure 
framework, significant increases in the level of disclosures across banks in Hong 
Kong was not expected with the implementation of Pillar 3. 
 In sum, the effects of policy diffusion had both positive and negative effects 
on Hong Kong‟s degree of convergence with Basel II. The HKMA aimed to match 
the policies of other leading global financial centres to ensure that Hong Kong was 
at par with their main competitive peers. However, being one of the first countries in 
the world to implement Basel II produced challenges domestically, which the 
HKMA addressed by adopting policies that diverged from Basel II. Korea provides 
a contrasting case to that of Hong Kong due to the different ways it is interconnected 
to the rest of the world. Whereas policies primarily diffused horizontally amongst 
Hong Kong‟s competitive peers, albeit imperfectly due to the divergences from 
Basel II, the next case study examines how Korea‟s implementation of Basel II was 
shaped by both the horizontal and vertical diffusion of policies. 
 
7.3 Competing for capital and the implementation of Basel II in Korea 
7.3.1 Tracing the paths of policy diffusion to Korea 
To trace the paths through which policies diffused due to competition between 
financial sectors to attract capital, three measures are applied to Korea as was done 
                                                 
20
 There were 114 licensed banks incorporated outside of Hong Kong and twenty-four incorporated in 
Hong Kong at the end of 2006 (HKMA 2006:198)  
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in the case of Hong Kong. The first measure identifies the countries that account for 
the largest shares of cross-border financial claims to Korea using the BIS 
consolidated banking statistics. Table 18 present the analysis that maps out the 
pathways policies may have diffused. The top ten countries that account for the 
largest cross-border claims in Korea are presented in descending order.  
Table 18: Consolidated foreign claims to Korea 
 
The six panels correspond to average quarterly claims during different time periods. 
Panel A corresponds to when the FSS formulated its implementation policy and 
(In millions of US dollars)
Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum %
US 24,107 28% 28% GB 76,139 29% 29% US 44,564   25% 25%
JP 11,600 14% 42% US 65,020 25% 53% GB 43,056   24% 50%
GB 9,973 12% 53% FR 26,508 10% 63% FR 18,092   10% 60%
FR 9,675 11% 64% JP 23,300 9% 72% JP 17,450   10% 70%
CH 8,046 9% 74% CH 20,618 8% 80% CH 14,332   8% 78%
DE 8,030 9% 83% DE 20,471 8% 87% DE 14,250   8% 86%
NL 5,389 6% 89% NL 15,436 6% 93% NL 10,413   6% 92%
AU 2,450 3% 92% TW 3,703 1% 95% TW 2,790      2% 94%
CA 2,007 2% 95% BE 3,551 1% 96% AU 2,573      1% 95%
TW 1,878 2% 97% CA 3,194 1% 97% CA 2,561      1% 97%
Other 2,755 3% 100% Other 7,353 3% 100% Other 5,812      3% 100%
Total 85,909 100% Total 265,293 100% Total 175,892 100%
Europe 44,068 51% Europe 168,730 64% Europe 106,399 60%
Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum % Country Claim % Cum %
US 55,635 30% 30% US 54,836 31% 31% GB 73,379 30% 30%
GB 53,355 29% 59% GB 53,305 30% 61% US 64,172 26% 56%
JP 16,651 9% 67% CH 15,092 8% 69% FR 26,320 11% 66%
CH 15,901 9% 76% JP 14,928 8% 78% JP 21,072 9% 75%
FR 13,809 7% 83% FR 13,283 7% 85% CH 20,037 8% 83%
NL 10,343 6% 89% NL 10,357 6% 91% NL 14,921 6% 89%
DE 9,763 5% 94% DE 7,751 4% 95% DE 13,956 6% 95%
CA 2,515 1% 96% CA 2,548 1% 97% CA 3,412 1% 96%
AU 2,423 1% 97% AU 1,955 1% 98% BE 3,410 1% 97%
TW 2,236 1% 98% BE 1,393 1% 99% AU 2,353 1% 98%
Other 3,518 2% 100% Other 2,596 1% 100% Other 4,150 2% 100%
Total 186,148 100% Total 178,042 100% Total 247,180 100%
Europe 107,100 58% Europe 99,981 56% 156,427 63%
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics (http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm)
A B C
D
Ulitmate risk basis Ulitmate risk basis
Immediate borrower basis Immediate borrower basis Immediate borrower basis
2001-8 average quarterly exposure
G
2001-4 average quarterly exposure 2005-8 average quarterly exposure
F
Immediate borrower basis
Notes: AT:Austria, AU:Australia, BE:Belgium, BR:Brazil, CA:Canada, CH:Switzerland, CL:Chile, DE:Germany, 
DK:Denmark, ES:Spain, FI:Finland, FR:France, GB:United Kingdom, GR:Greece, IE:Ireland, IT:Italy, JP:Japan, 
MX:Mexico, NL:Netherlands, PA:Panama, PT:Portugal, SE:Sweden, TR:Turkey, TW:Chinese Taipei, US:United 
States
2005 average quarterly exposure 2005 average quarterly exposure 2005-8 average quarterly exposure
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supervised banks to prepare for the implementation of Basel II, before announcing 
its formal implementation policy in December 2004 (Panels F and G). Formal 
implementation commenced in 2005 and is represented by Panels B and D.  
The US and UK are the most important counterparts to Korea as they 
account for more than half the total claims from the world to Korea. Policymakers in 
Korea are thus expected to be more sensitive to the Basel II policies of the UK and 
US than that of other countries. However, there are several notable changes in the 
way Korea was interconnected to the rest of the world according to this measure, 
one being the increase in the share of the UK, which surpassed the value of claims 
from the US during 2005-8 compared to the period during 2001-4, making the UK 
equally important as the US on average during 2001-8. The increase in the share of 
the UK‟s financial claims in Korea provides a dimension to policy diffusion that is 
distinct to the cross-border structure of international banks examined in Chapter Six. 
This is because intergroup positions are netted out in the BIS consolidated banking 
statistics, which aim to look through inter-office positions to capture exposures to 
unaffiliated counterparties (McGuire and Wooldridge 2005:74). In addition to the 
relative decline of the US, the relative decline of Japanese banks‟ share of foreign 
claims in Korea can also be observed, although the absolute value of their claims 
increased, but at a slower pace than the UK. Claims from the UK, US and Japan are 
followed by those from several European countries, namely, France, Switzerland 
and Germany, which account for between 5% and 10% of aggregate foreign claims 
in Korea. As indicated in the bottom row of each panel, European banks, which are 
early-comprehensive adopters of Basel II, collectively account for approximately 60% 
of all financial claims from the world to Korea on an immediate and ultimate risk 
basis, and appear to be on the rise. Combined with the US, they dominate the extent 
to which Korea was interconnected to the rest of the world, as they collectively 
accounted for over 80% of claims from the world to Korea. Hence, in specifying the 
paths policies diffused, influences from the US, an early-partial adopter turned late-
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partial adopter of Basel II, and increasingly the UK, an early-comprehensive adopter, 
are expected to be most important to policymakers in Korea, although collectively, 
influences from the EU is expected to be dominate that from the US. 
Secondly, Korea‟s relative position amongst other financial centres around 
the world may shape which financial sectors policies diffuse from. On the one hand, 
policymakers may aim to emulate the policies that the most successful global 
financial centres have implemented due to their aspiration to also develop one 
domestically, resulting in the vertical diffusion of Basel II. To this end, London, 
New York, Hong Kong and Singapore are consistently ranked as the most successful 
global financial centres according to the GFCI shown in Table 19. Basel II policies 
in these financial centres may become the targets for policy emulation by 
policymakers in Korea, which ranks considerably lower in the GFCI rankings.  
Table 19: Global Financial Centres Index rankings and Seoul’s rank 
 
On the other hand, policies may diffuse horizontally amongst financial sectors that 
are rivals as policymakers try to match the Basel II policies of their competitive 
peers with which they directly compete for capital. In this case, policies are expected 
to diffuse from the likes of late-partial adopters such as Beijing, gradual-
comprehensive adopters such as Mumbai, and early-comprehensive adopters such as 
Rome, Prague and Wellington. Whether vertical or horizontal diffusion shaped the 
implementation of Basel II in Korea is an empirical question that is examined in this 
case study. 
Rank Mar-07 Rank Sep-07 Rank Mar-08 Rank Sep-08 Rank Mar-09
1 London 1 London 1 London 1 London 1 London
2 New York 2 New York 2 New York 2 New York 2 New York
3 Hong Kong 3 Hong Kong 3 Hong Kong 3 Singapore 3 Singapore
4 Singapore 4 Singapore 4 Singapore 4 Hong Kong 4 Hong Kong
5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich 5 Zurich
:      : :      : :      : :      : :      :
40 Warsaw 39 Beijing 48 Mumbai 45 Qatar 50 Bangkok
41 Prague 40 Rome 49 Rome 46 Madrid 51 Beijing
42 Lisbon 41 Mumbai 50 Osaka 47 Beijing 52 Osaka
43 Seoul 42 Seoul 51 Seoul 48 Seoul 53 Seoul
44 Budapest 43 Johannesburg 52 Wellington 49 Mumbai 54 Sao Paulo
45 Moscow 44 Bahrain 53 Sao Paulo 50 Osaka 55 Rome
46 Athens 45 Prague 54 Prague 51 Wellington 56 Wellington
Source: Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), City of London
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According to the third measure, policies may diffuse horizontally as Korea 
competes with the likes of Malaysia, Chile, China and several other countries in the 
Middle East and the EU that have similar sovereign credit risk ratings as Korea as 
shown in Table 20. Policies may also diffuse vertically if policymakers look to the 
policies of highly rated countries, such as the AAA-rated EU member states or the 
G10.
21
 
Table 20: Countries with similar credit ratings as Korea as of year-end 2005 
 
Bearing in mind that the same caveats and limitations discussed in the context of 
operationalizing these channels of diffusion in Hong Kong also apply here, the 
process of policy diffusion between financial sectors that compete for capital in the 
case of Korea is examined next. 
 
7.3.2 The diffusion of policies that converged with Basel II 
As examined in Chapter Six, the FSS adopted an aggressive implementation plan, 
whereby domestic banks were directed to prepare for the implementation of the most 
advanced approaches of Basel II at a timetable that matched the earliest of G10 
                                                 
21
 Eleven EU member states and the G10 (except Belgium, Italy and Japan) were AAA-rated in 2005. 
Credit rating Country Basel II Score
Kuwait 20
Qatar 15
EU member states: Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Lithuania, Malta
40
Korea 31
Saudi Arabia 23
Chile 4
Botswana 0
EU member states: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Slovak Republic
40
Bahrain 22
Malaysia 20
China 16
Israel 13
Aruba 2
Bahamas, The 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0
Source: Standard and Poor's
A-
A
A+
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regulators and their global banks in response to growing competitive pressures from 
international banks based in the G10. The pressure exerted by the FSS on banks was 
geared up a notch when the publication of Basel II was imminent. In a public 
statement, the Governor of the FSS criticized Korean banks for failing to fully 
recognize the importance and urgency of adopting Basel II and strongly urged banks 
to step-up their preparations (FSS 2004a). He stated that although Korea was not 
formally obliged to implement Basel II, achieving consistency with Basel II in line 
with the G10 was not a matter of choice, but a necessity for Korea‟s financial sector 
to operate successfully in a liberalized economy and for Korea to develop into a 
financial hub of north-east Asia. When the FSS subsequently announced its 
implementation policy in December 2004, it stated that the decision of when and 
how to implement Basel II was based on three factors (FSS 2004). Two factors 
pertained primarily to domestic considerations, namely, the preparedness of 
domestic banks to implement Basel II and the impact of Basel II on banks‟ capital 
adequacy ratios and lending. The Basel II implementation policies of other key 
countries constituted the third factor underlying Korea‟s implementation policy. The 
process of evaluating how implementation in Korea compared with that of other 
countries was systematically embedded into the way the FSS formulated its 
implementation policy. In the FSS‟s policy document, the FSS examined the 
implementation policies of two groups of countries. The first were members of the 
Basel Committee, in particular the US and UK. The second group consisted of non-
Basel Committee countries, which included countries the FSS considered Korea was 
in direct competition with, namely, Hong Kong and Singapore, and countries that 
the FSS considered relevant from a regional perspective, such as Australia, Malaysia 
and China (ibid.). 
Both groups of countries provided important policy benchmarks that 
provided key inputs in formulating the FSS‟s Basel II policy, although they played 
different roles. Matching the early implementation of the advanced approaches of 
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Basel II in the UK and US provided the gold standard that the FSS aimed to meet. 
Before implementation was delayed in the US, the Federal Reserve adopted a 
bifurcated approach that mandated the implementation of the advanced approaches 
of Basel II to the largest of US banks and those with significant foreign exposures 
by year-end of 2007.
22
 Since the FSS was concerned about the competitive 
implications of large global banks based in the US, the limited application of Basel 
II to only these banks and not the rest did not influence the formulation of the FSS‟s 
policy. The FSS was less concerned about how small banks in the US were going to 
implement Basel II as they were not the primary targets for benchmarking the FSS‟s 
policy, although, as discussed later, subsequent delays in implementation in the core 
global banks were matters of concern to the FSS. Furthermore, although the 
European Commission‟s proposed CRD set out staggered start dates in accordance 
with Basel II, banks in the UK were planning to implement Basel II from 2008. The 
FSA, HM Treasury and the UK industry strongly argued for a single start date 
(Sants 2004), and such option was incorporated into the CRD. Banks could elect to 
remain on Basel 1 until end-2007 per the option given in CRD Article 152.7, and 
indeed, most banks in the UK opted to stay on Basel I during 2007 (Linklaters 
2008:2). The FSS also noted in its policy statement that implementation in the EU, 
Canada and Japan was due at year-end of 2006, and 2007 for the advanced 
approaches of Basel II (FSS 2004). However, it did not opt to follow the 
implementation policies of Canada, Japan or the rest of the EU, which adopted the 
staggered start dates per Basel II. Instead, Korea‟s implementation specifically 
followed that of the UK as the FSS announced that it would implement all the 
approaches for credit and operational risk in Pillar 1 and Pillars 2 and 3 from the end 
                                                 
22
 The year-end 2007 deadline was the initial date announced by the Fed in 2003 and one which was 
least divergent from the rest of the G10. The US banking authorities subsequently announced plans to 
delay implementation from 2005, making the US no longer an early-partial adopter, but a late-partial 
adopter of Basel II. 
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of 2007 (FSS 2004). This implementation for the advanced approaches of Basel II in 
Korea was also in line with that in the US. 
The FSS also evaluated how Korea‟s proposed implementation compared 
with that of a second group of non-Basel Committee countries. The FSS‟s policy 
statement specifically pointed out that implementation plans in Hong Kong and 
Singapore was due at the end of 2006 for the basic approaches and 2007 for the 
advanced approaches, that Australia was due to implement all the approaches of 
Basel II by the end of 2007 and that Malaysia and China planned to implement 
Basel II on or after 2008 (FSS 2004). According to a senior official at the FSS, 
because the main financial sectors that competed with Korea, that is, Singapore and 
Hong Kong, were implementing Basel II in line with the Basel Committee‟s 
timetable, implementing Basel II at a later date than countries that were not 
members of the Basel Committee could damage the reputation of the Korean 
banking sector and potentially weaken market confidence in Korean banks (Ahn 
2004:127). Although the early implementation of the advanced approaches of Basel 
II in the UK and the US (before implementation was delayed) provided the gold 
standard for implementation that the FSS aspired to meet, these non-Basel 
Committee countries, in particular those that the FSS considered Korea‟s financial 
sector to be in direct competition with, provided the backstop beyond which the FSS 
did not want to lag behind. However, implementing Basel II along the lines of the 
leading financial centres in Asia that were not members of the Basel Committee did 
not leave much leeway for the FSS to spread Korea‟s implementation over a longer 
time period or selectively implement Basel II as these countries planned to 
implement Basel II in line with the early-comprehensive implementers of the Basel 
Committee. 
The FSS argued that it was necessary to implement Basel II according to the 
scope and timetable in the most advanced economies in the G10 to enhance the 
international standing of the Korean banking sector and to be able to compete at the 
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international level (FSS 2004). The following three reasons underpinned why the 
FSS thought that it is was important to purposefully and systematically look to the 
Basel II implementation policies of other countries, in particular, those of the UK 
and US, in formulating its own implementation policy. Firstly, the FSS wanted to 
enhance the international standing of domestic banks by improving their 
competitiveness through the implementation of Basel II so that they could compete 
on an equal footing with global banks from the G10. When the FSS announced its 
implementation policy, the director of the New Basel Accord Office at the FSS 
stressed that the Korean banking system had “to go the extra mile to satisfy 
international standards… [because] entering the accord along with the advanced 
countries will reinforce [South Korea‟s] competitiveness” (GRR 2005). Similarly, 
another senior supervisory official at the New Basel Accord Office stated that “[t]his 
is our destiny… to see South Korea‟s top banks fully adopting the new Basel capital 
accord, and meeting the same standards as the better banks in Europe and the US” 
(GRR 2004a). He argued that Korean banks would be “at a competitive 
disadvantage if they do not adopt the new risk-based international accord” (ibid.). 
The governor of the FSS also made a similar point, stating that developing the 
banking sector and enhancing the competitiveness of domestic banks in line with 
those in advanced economies was what the FSS was trying to achieve through the 
implementation of Basel II (Kim 2007:7). To this end, it was the regulatory 
standards in the UK and US that were the most relevant policy benchmarks for the 
FSS and those that had the greatest influence on how Basel II was implemented in 
Korea. 
The FSS argued that implementing Basel II in line with these leading global 
financial centres was also consistent with its objective to aid the development of the 
Korean banking sector into a leading financial hub in north-east Asia (FSS 2004). In 
2003, the new incoming administration designated the financial services industry a 
high value-added growth industry and “embarked on a mission to transform Korea 
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as the leading financial hub of Northeast Asia” (FSS 2004b). According to the 
Chairman of the FSC and Governor of the FSS, a growing number of countries had 
joined the competition to become international financial centres and “Korean 
policymakers [were] aggressively engaged in this enterprise as well” (Jun 2008:5-6). 
The FSS set an ambitious institutional reform agenda that included regulatory 
reform as a key component. Hence, “from Basel II for banking and net capital ratio 
for securities firms to risk-based capital for insurers” the FSS was “aggressively 
implementing risk-based prudential controls and weaving them into a tightly-knit 
supervision system” (ibid.). Although Korea was not in direct competition with the 
leading global financial centres in the region, aspirations to develop one by adopting 
the same policies was a key motivation in driving the FSS‟s implementation policy. 
Secondly, according the Governor of the FSS, the FSS sought to enhance the 
credit ratings of Korean banks to the level of banks in developed economies by 
implementing Basel II in full on January 2008 (Yoon 2006:7). Indeed, ratings 
agency Standard & Poor‟s (S&P) pointed out that the inferior capital adequacy of 
Korean banks compared with their international peers had been one of the factors 
constraining their credit ratings (S&P 2005). S&P suggested that Basel II “provides 
an opportunity for South Korea‟s banks to improve their risk-management systems 
and enhance their profitability. Inadequate risk management and mismatches 
between prices and risks were among the underlying causes of the repeated damage 
to the credit profile of the sector in the past several years. To take advantage of the 
new accord, structural changes will be required to deepen the understanding of risk 
management and increase its importance in the strategic planning of South Korean 
banks.” (ibid.)23 By matching the Basel II policies of the most advanced economies, 
the FSS hoped to improve Korean banks‟ depressed credit ratings. 
                                                 
23
 S&P expected the transition to Basel II to lead to a drop in capital adequacy ratios of banks by over 
2.5% on average in the short term. This could adversely affect credit ratings, although countervailing 
measures such as earnings retention, new capital issuances and restructuring of banks‟ balance sheet 
was expected to alleviate such pressures. (S&P 2005) 
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Thirdly, the FSS believed that implementing Basel II would contribute to 
improving Korea‟s international status in economic affairs at a more general level. 
For example, the Governor of the FSC wrote to the Chairman of the Basel 
Committee, Nout Wellink, in 2009 citing Korea‟s “aggressive embrace of banking 
standards espoused by the Basel Committee” as one of the key reasons why “Korea, 
more than other emerging countries, merits a priority consideration for full 
membership in the Basel Committee” (FSC/FSS 2009). The letter, which followed 
private conversations between the two heads of supervisory authorities, highlighted 
how the FSS diligently and fully implemented Basel II, by suggesting that “Korea 
implemented Basel II, the Revised International Capital Framework, at the 
beginning of 2008, which require all banking institutions operating in Korea to 
comply with the capital adequacy requirements as set forth by the Basel Committee” 
(ibid.). That this was considered among factors such as Korea‟s “sizable GDP… its 
free, open, and globalized economy” is reflective of how the FSS considered the 
implementation of Basel II to contribute to enhancing Korea‟s international standing. 
The above reasons underpinned why the FSS purposefully and 
systematically looked to the Basel II implementation policies of other countries, in 
particular, those of the UK and US in formulating its own implementation policy. In 
addition to how other countries were implementing Basel II, the preparedness of 
domestic banks and the effects of Basel II on banks‟ capital adequacy ratios and 
lending were among the three factors that the FSS considered in deciding when and 
how to implement Basel II (FSS 2004). Between the time Korea‟s implementation 
policy was first announced in 2004 and the time the first banks implemented Basel II 
in 2008, none of these three factors remained static. As the supervisory authority‟s 
implementation target date approached, banks were not fully prepared to implement 
the advanced approaches of Basel II despite starting preparations since 2001. The 
potential impact of Basel II on banks‟ capital adequacy ratios and lending also 
deteriorated with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007. Moreover, delays in 
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implementation occurred in other countries, particularly the US. These factors 
produced significant shifts in the way Basel II was implemented in Korea as they 
resulted in implementation delays and grace periods that reduced Korea‟s degree of 
convergence with Basel II. 
 
7.3.3 The diffusion of policies that diverged from Basel II 
In Korea, delays in implementation and grace-periods were successively introduced 
on an ad hoc basis, but even these subsequent policy changes were not free from the 
effects of policy diffusion. Shortly after the FSS announced it implementation policy 
in 2004, the head of the New Basel Accord Office at the FSS, Moon, called for a 
reformulation of the FSS‟s implementation strategy. In stark contrast to the policy 
that the FSS had previously pursued, Moon argued for an implementation strategy 
that was “cautious and gradual” because Korea was set to become one of the first 
country in the world to implement the AIRB approach for credit risk. (Moon 
2005:10) Implementation of the advanced approaches of Basel II was due by the end 
of 2007, which meant that in practice, banks would have to complete their 
preparations and start using the AIRB approaches by the fourth quarter of 2007. In 
arguing for a shift in Korea‟s approach to implementation, the FSS official cited two 
developments. First, in contrast to Basel II, which stated that the advanced 
approaches “will be available for implementation as of year-end 2007” amongst 
Basel Committee countries (BCBS 2004:1), delays were occurring among Basel 
Committee members. The US banking authorities delayed implementation by one 
year in September 2005 and the EU consultations on the CRD proposed 
implementing the advanced approaches of Basel II from 2008. Furthermore, Korea‟s 
main competitors, Singapore and Hong Kong, were also implementing Basel II from 
2008 rather than by the end of 2007.  
Secondly, supervisors at the FSS had previously taken for granted that global 
banks from the G10 would implement the most advanced approaches of Basel II. 
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However, in practice, this was only the case for a handful of very large international 
banks based in the EU regarding the implementation of the AIRB approach for 
credit risk only, because for operational risk, the TSA was being adopted instead of 
the AMA even in these global banks due to the high costs of data management and 
model construction relative to the proportion of risks against which capital was held 
(Moon 2005:10). Moreover, in the US, the four core banks that were mandated to 
implement the advanced approaches of Basel II, namely, Citigroup, JPMorgan 
Chase, Wachovia and WAMU, requested that they be given the option to implement 
the SA rather than the AIRB approach as they were reluctant to incur the additional 
costs of implementing the AIRB approach if there were no regulatory benefits in 
terms of lower capital requirements (Herring 2007:424-425; Sloan 2006:4).
24
 
 These concerns soon took hold in the highest echelons of the FSS. The 
Chairman of the FSC and Governor of FSS specifically pointed out that whilst 
Korea endeavoured to implement Basel II by year-end of 2007 in order to enhance 
the international standing of Korean banks in line with those in advanced economies, 
countries such as the US and Singapore that previously said would implement Basel 
II before Korea have started to take a more cautious approach and have delayed their 
implementation of Basel II (Yoon 2006:7-9). The Governor then argued that Korea 
should no longer be too obsessed with sticking to its implementation timetable, but 
instead should concentrate on preparations to implement the advanced approaches of 
Basel II by addressing the difficulties domestic banks faced due to the lack of data 
and challenges in validating the models (ibid.). A string of delays in implementing 
Basel II were subsequently announced by the FSS, some more significant than 
others, but all of which made specific references to the implementation policies in 
the UK and US. In some cases, the policy decisions in the US and UK were simply 
used as benchmarks to justify the FSS‟s own policy decisions, but in other cases, 
they were used as benchmarks for more deep rooted reasons, for example, to 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter 6 section 6.2.3 for discussion of Basel II policy debate in the US. 
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underplay the cause of delays being attributed to the lack of preparedness to 
implement Basel II in the domestic banking sector in order to limit the potential 
reputational damage. 
 The first change to the FSS‟s original implementation policy, although 
minor in substance but interesting in its rationale, was made immediately following 
the EU‟s adoption of the CRD in June 2006. The FSS stated that although it had 
previously followed the recommendations of the Basel Committee in requiring all 
banks in Korea to implement Basel II by the fourth quarter of 2007, “[t]he 
implementation date is being changed from the previously announced December 31, 
2007 as full implementation of the new international capital standard was 
rescheduled for January 1, 2008 in other major countries such as the European 
Union countries, Australia, and Canada” (FSS 2006:239-240). The FSS specifically 
pointed out that these countries had also previously planned to adopt Basel II by the 
end of 2007, but had adjusted their implementation dates and Korea was following 
suit to remain consistent with key countries in the EU and US. Accordingly, all 
domestic banks were required to implement Basel II from January 2008. (FSS 2006) 
Six months later in December 2006, the FSS postponed the implementation 
of the advanced approaches of Basel II by one year to January 2009. The 
implementation date was delayed after the FSS assessed banks‟ preparedness and 
found that it was unsatisfactory. As examined in detail in Chapter Six, domestic 
banks faced considerable challenges in developing their internal models, which the 
FSS found difficult to rely on for regulatory purposes. The FSS claimed that “[w]ith 
the postponement, banks will have more time to prepare at least five years of data to 
estimate the probability of default and other risk components” and added that 
“[o]ther major countries such as the United States have also rescheduled the 
implementation date for similar reasons.” (FSS 2006:246-247) Furthermore, 
although the implementation of the SA was to go ahead in January 2008, the FSS 
provided the option for banks to remain on Basel I during 2008, which effectively 
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pushed back the implementation date to 2009. According to the FSS, this decision 
was made because the UK had adopted a similar approach that allowed banks to 
remain of Basel I until January 2008 (although the FSS was allowing banks to 
remain on Basel I until January 2009). At this point, although the FSS was no longer 
able to match the implementation timetable of the UK due to the lack of 
preparedness of domestic banks, it still insisted that its approach was internationally 
consistent, and emphasized their consistency with the ways the UK and US had 
implemented Basel II where there were parallels despite the fact that these parallels 
were no more than at a superficial level and due to different reasons.  
Further delays were announced in November 2008, when the full transition 
onto Basel II was effectively postponed due to the introduction of a two-year grace 
period (FSS 2008; 2008a). The basic approaches of Basel II had come into force in 
January 2008, but regulations were subsequently revised to extend the parallel 
calculation period from one year starting in January 2008 to two years, effectively 
making Basel II binding from 2010 for supervisory purposes. During this period, 
banks were allowed to use the higher of their Basel I or Basel II capital adequacy 
ratios. This resulted in a form of regulatory forbearance because banks could select 
the capital adequacy ratio that gave them the most favourable ratio for the FSS‟s 
prompt corrective actions and CAMEL-based management evaluations.
25
 Even if the 
underlying riskiness of banks‟ assets was the same or had increased, banks could 
make themselves appear better capitalized purely based on the use of different 
measures of capital adequacy. In explaining this decision, the FSS stated that 
“[r]ecently BIS capital ratios have been falling due to the global financial crisis, and 
if this is the case when Basel II is fully implemented next year, than banks may 
become hesitant to offer loans to small and medium sized companies (2008:248). 
                                                 
25
 The CAMELs evaluation is a risk-based supervisory framework that assesses banks‟ risk in terms 
of capital, asset quality, marker risk, earnings and liabilities, whilst the prompt corrective action 
framework defines threshold conditions that trigger intervention from the supervisory authorities. 
Capital adequacy ratios are key indicators in both supervisory frameworks. 
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The FSS specifically insisted that the extension of parallel reporting periods did not 
undermine the international consistency of supervisory standards in Korea and 
argued that this decision was made with specific reference to implementation in the 
EU, in particular the UK, which allowed banks to use capital adequacy ratios based 
on Basel I during the initial phases after Basel II had been implemented (FSS 2008a). 
This statement was made despite the fact the FSA‟s decision to allow banks to 
remain on Basel I during 2007 was based on practical considerations, and that the 
rationale for having parallel calculation periods in Basel II was for prudential 
reasons and not for window dressing.
26
 In the case of the FSS, banks implementing 
the IRB approaches in 2009 were nevertheless required to implement the SA in 2008, 
and the extension of parallel reporting periods was introduced to give banks leeway 
in meeting capital adequacy ratio targets. The FSS argued that “with the extension, 
the BIS capital ratio is expected to stabilize allowing banks to have the ability to 
offer loans to small and medium sized companies. Also investor sentiment should 
return with the decreasing anxiety over cases involving Prompt Corrective Actions 
and management evaluations.” (FSS 2008:149)  
As shown in the above cases, when faced with domestic and international 
challenges in implementing Basel II due to the lack of preparedness of domestic 
banks or the adverse effects of the global financial crisis on Korean banks‟ capital 
adequacy ratios and lending, the FSS successively delayed the implementation of 
Basel II, and when doing so, insisted that such delays did not undermine the 
international consistency of Korea‟s implementation of Basel II by suggesting that 
the US and UK authorities had also adopted similar policies in order to reduce any 
reputational damage that could occur. This argument was invoked every time the 
FSS changed its policy, despite the fact that other than at a very superficial level, the 
                                                 
26
 It would be impractical for banks implementing the IRB approaches to comply with the SA, and 
then switch to the IRB approach the following year. The FSA did however note that “[t]o the extent 
that firms opt to stay on Basel 1 for credit risk, they may have a corresponding reduction in their 
Pillar 1 charge for operational risk” (FSA 2005:14). 
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reasons behind the implementation decisions of supervisory authorities in the UK 
and US were often different to why the FSS were introducing successive changes to 
its policy. Nevertheless, the FSS went to great lengths to ensure its implementation 
looked consistent internationally, albeit at the formal level. 
The case of Korea amply demonstrated that the policies of one‟s competitors 
not only motivates positive policy changes, but are also used to justify delays and 
divergences from Basel II. This is because diffusion mechanisms are not one-off 
drivers of policy change that affects whether a country implements a policy or not, 
but instead a process that persists over time affecting various aspects of Basel II 
implementation in a non-unidirectional way. Policymakers seem to have scope for 
framing and interpreting the importance and relevance of which financial sectors 
they are in competition with and how they should respond to the policy changes in 
these financial sectors, not least because the process of policy diffusion is complex 
and multidirectional. 
 
7.4 Comparative analysis 
A comparative analysis in relation to the three key questions of what, how and why 
policies diffused in Hong Kong and Korea is conducted in this section like the 
previous two chapters. 
What diffused? 
The HKMA aimed to match the policies of London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo, to 
ensure that Hong Kong was at par with other leading global financial centres it 
competed with, as well as countries that were home to global banks that had a strong 
presence in Hong Kong. This made Hong Kong one of the first jurisdictions in the 
world to implement Basel II, alongside other major international financial centres 
except the US. Although there were no subsequent ad hoc delays or changes in the 
way the HKMA implemented Basel II, which was the case in Korea, key 
divergences from Basel II unique to Hong Kong were strategically incorporated into 
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the HKMA‟s implementation policy from the beginning. These included the 
implementation of a fourth approach for credit risk, non-implementation of the 
AMA for operational risk and a gradual transition onto Basel II for banks after the 
formal regulatory regime came into effect. Such measures reduced the degree of 
convergence with Basel II in Hong Kong. In Korea, the FSS initially benchmarked 
the policies of the EU, in particular the UK, and the US, and announced the full 
implementation of Basel II by the end of 2007. However, as implementation 
progressed, delays and grace-periods were successively introduced. These included 
delays in the implementation of the advanced approaches to give domestic banks 
more time to prepare, a grace period that extended the parallel calculation period to 
provide leeway for banks in meeting capital adequacy ratio targets and adjustments 
to the FSS‟s implementation dates. In both Hong Kong and Korea, divergences from 
Basel II and delays in implementation were not only based on careful evaluation of 
what their main competitors were doing, but also provided an outlet to accommodate 
domestic opposition and constraints in implementation, which in part emanated 
directly from the supervisory authorities‟ efforts to match the policies of the their 
competitors in the first place. Thus, policy divergence and convergence can be seen 
as two sides of the same coin due the same underlying diffusion mechanism that 
drives convergence with policies as well as leading to divergent policy responses 
across countries. 
How did policies diffuse? 
The practice of evaluating how implementation in Hong Kong and Korea compared 
with that of their competitors was systematically embedded into the policy making 
process of the HKMA and FSS. These policy benchmarks provided important policy 
inputs for the FSS and HKMA. However, differences in the countries with which 
Hong Kong and Korea competed, created distinct channels through which policies 
diffused, leading to differences in the way Hong Kong and Korea implemented 
Basel II. Hong Kong was most closely interconnected to the UK as the UK alone 
264 
 
accounted for over half of the foreign claims from the world to Hong Kong and 
hosted one of the world‟s leading international financial centres that directly 
competed with Hong Kong. In contrast, the UK and US were the most important 
sources of policy diffusion in Korea as they accounted for the majority of claims 
from the world to Korea as well as hosting leading international financial centres 
that Korea aspired to develop domestically. Consequently, delays in implementation 
in the US had a larger impact on policies in Korea than in Hong Kong as Korean 
policymakers looked to justify their policy moves in the context of policy 
developments in the US, especially when meeting the UK‟s standard of 
implementation became difficult.  
The cases studies also demonstrated how competition between financial 
sectors created both vertical and horizontal channels of diffusion where the two did 
not coincide, and that there was a pecking-order within and between these modes of 
diffusion. In the first instance, Korea initially aspired to match the policies of 
countries that were setting the gold standard for the implementation of the advanced 
approaches of Basel II, namely the UK and the US before it delayed its 
implementation. This created a process of vertical diffusion. The vertical diffusion 
of policies from the UK and US to Korea dominated the horizontal diffusion of 
policies amongst competitive peers as the FSS looked to the UK and US rather than 
Mumbai or Beijing which were ranked similarly in the GFCI, or countries with 
similar credit rating as Korea such as Chile and Malaysia. This was partly due to 
policymakers‟ aspirations to develop a competitive domestic banking sector that 
could compete on equal terms with the most advanced financial centres. But on the 
other hand, despite the delays in implementation in the US, which eventually fell 
behind that of the likes of Malaysia and China, the FSS continued to link its 
domestic policies to that of the US. Thus, implementation delays in leading financial 
centres such as the US was also subject to diffusion, especially when it was 
politically convenient for the FSS to do so, that is, to justify delays by benchmarking 
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the US rather than attributing them to the lack of preparedness to implement Basel II 
in the domestic banking sector. In the case of Hong Kong, the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical diffusion was less meaningful as the former dominated the 
latter. Policies diffused horizontally from other leading international financial 
centres that set the highest standards, but not vertically from non-leading financial 
sectors to Hong Kong. Thus, the two cases showed the existence of a direction and 
pecking order in the way policies diffused. These case studies also underscored the 
importance of policymakers‟ perceptions in shaping how and which policies 
diffused, suggesting that emulation, rather than rational learning to maximize the 
outcome of policies, was driving the diffusion of policies. Moreover, policymakers 
seem to have leeway in defining which financial sectors they were competing with 
and how they should respond to the policy changes in these financial sectors. 
Why did policies diffuse? 
As a leading international financial centre with one of the highest concentrations of 
banking institutions in the world, the implementation of Basel II in Hong Kong was 
shaped by efforts to compete for international capital and business by reinforcing its 
reputation and international standing in line with other leading global financial 
centres and to create a correspondingly fitting regulatory environment that was 
attractive for international banks. Policymakers in Korea argued that it was 
necessary to implement Basel II according to financial sectors in the most advanced 
economies in order to enhance the international standing of the Korean banking 
sector and develop into a leading financial centre in north-east Asia. Thus, in Hong 
Kong, efforts to sustain the leading position of Hong Kong‟s financial sector relative 
to other financial centres Hong Kong was directly in competition with spurred the 
diffusion of policies. In Korea by contrast, competitive pressures to upgrade the 
domestic banking sector to internationally competitive levels underpinned the 
motivation to emulate the policies of other leading financial centres. Although the 
former was a response to direct competition between existing competitors, and the 
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latter, based on ambitions to become as competitive as one‟s self-identified 
competitors, both forms of competition provided a strong impetus for policies to 
diffuse and is reflective of two countries that are at different stages of financial 
sector development and different degrees of internationalization, but nonetheless 
have to co-exist in a globalized world economy. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
There is strong evidence to suggest that policies diffused at the level of financial 
sectors as they competed to attract international capital. Furthermore, the cases of 
Hong Kong and Korea lent support to the argument that policy diffusion not only 
promoted convergence with Basel II, but also explained divergences from Basel II 
and delays in its implementation. The underlying cause of these divergences and 
delays were not only consistent with the operation of policy diffusion, but also 
provided an outlet to accommodate domestic constraints and challenges in 
implementation, which in part emanated directly from supervisory authorities‟ 
efforts to match the policies of the their competitors in the first place. This makes 
both divergences from and convergences with policies inseparable consequences of 
policy diffusion. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Why do countries implement Basel II? In order to answer this research question, this 
thesis addressed the following two sub-questions. First, what is the state of Basel II 
implementation across the world? Second, what explains the degree of convergence 
with Basel II, in particular, how does policy diffusion shape the implementation of 
Basel II? To answer the first question, a new global dataset of Basel II 
implementation across 150 countries was compiled by the author in order to evaluate 
the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II at the global level. This data was 
then utilized to undertake regression analysis in Chapter Three to test whether 
policy diffusion was a significant driver of Basel II implementation. To develop a 
strong empirical test of the effects of policy diffusion on Basel II implementation, 
several economic and political variables were incorporated into the quantitative 
analysis, thereby shedding light onto a number of significant explanatory variables. 
The findings and methods of the quantitative analysis were put to an even stronger 
test in the subsequent four chapters.  
A mixed-method approach was adopted in this thesis based on the 
recognition that certain aspects of the research question were more adequately 
addressed by statistical methods and others by the case study method. The overall 
design of the case studies conducted in this thesis was outlined in Chapter Four. The 
process of policy diffusion across three channels of diffusion formed by inter-
supervisory authority networks, the cross-border structure of international banks and 
competition between financial sectors to attract international capital, were 
investigated in three pairs of case studies from Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Hong 
Kong. These six case studies were selected according to a rigorous three-step case 
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selection procedure that reduced the total number of potential cases from a 
population of 600 cases across 150 countries to six cases across four countries so 
that the most theoretically, empirically and methodologically relevant cases were 
selected for the case studies. Chapter Five examined how the implementation of 
Basel II in Malaysia and Chile was shaped by the diffusion of Basel II policies 
across different inter-supervisory authority networks in East Asia and the Americas 
respectively. Chapter Six investigated the diffusion of Basel II policies across the 
cross-border structure of international banks in Korea and Malaysia. In Chapter 
Seven, the process of policy diffusion across financial sectors that competed for 
international capital and financial business was investigated in the cases of Hong 
Kong and Korea. For each pair of case studies, comparative analyses with respect to 
what, how and why policies diffused was undertaken. The case study chapters on the 
three channels of diffusion complemented one another by providing three distinct 
dimensions of analyses in terms of how policies diffused not only due to 
interdependencies formed between financial sectors, but also between bank 
supervisors and banks, both of whom are key actors in the process of 
implementation. 
The current chapter draws together the main findings from the preceding 
chapters. It is organized into three sections. The main empirical findings are 
summarized in section 8.2. The main contributions of this thesis to two sub-fields in 
the IPE literature, namely, the political economy of international financial regulation 
and the policy diffusion literature, and to the IPE debate on power is outlined in 
section 8.3. Then, three key policy implications that follow from the main research 
findings are discussed in section 8.4. Discussions in each section are structured to 
reflect the central research questions addressed in this thesis, that is, analyses of the 
state of Basel II implementation across the world and the factors that explain the 
degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II. 
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8.2 Summary of the main empirical findings 
The main empirical findings in relation to the state of Basel II implementation 
across 150 countries is discussed first, followed by a summary of the findings from 
the quantitative analysis and the three comparative case studies that investigated 
why countries implemented Basel II. 
8.2.1 A highly uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape 
Basel II has profoundly shaped bank capital adequacy regimes across the world. Yet, 
the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II at the global level was limited by 
considerable cross-national variations in implementation. Overall, the state of 
convergence with Basel II was highly uneven and clustered at the global level, 
where convergence and divergence coexisted. There was a high degree of 
convergence amongst certain groups of countries that adopted similar 
implementation policies. However, different groups of countries exhibited different 
levels of convergence with Basel II. Whilst around thirty countries fully transitioned 
onto Basel II according to the timeline and scope set out in Basel II for members of 
the Basel Committee, around half the world made minimal progress in implementing 
Basel II. In between these extremes, however, were considerable cross-national 
variations in the degree of regulatory convergence with Basel II, from early-
comprehensive adopters that fully implemented all the key components of Basel II at 
a timetable comparable with most Basel Committee member countries to late-partial 
adopters that gradually and selectively implemented elements of Basel II and non-
implementers. The uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape was more 
permanent than transitional for a large proportion of developing countries that were 
either non-implementers or late-partial adopters. The process of convergence at the 
global level was by no means automatic, and neither was it a seamlessly continuous 
process over time. 
The state of Basel II implementation across the world was as follows. 
Countries in Africa made the least progress in implementing Basel II. Although 
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many countries had announced plans to implement Basel II, the degree of 
convergence with Basel II remained very low. All countries except two were late-
partial adopters because implementation was significantly back-loaded and less than 
half the countries planning to implement the basic approaches intended to 
implement the advanced approaches. Countries in the Caribbean have not 
implemented Basel II, some having suspended implementation following the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8. Similarly, the degree of convergence with Basel II in 
Europe outside the EU was also very limited, although preparations were underway. 
Interestingly, most countries indicated plans to base their implementation on the 
EU‟s CRD, thus, distinguishing this group of non-implementing EU neighbours to 
the rest of the world. The majority of Middle Eastern countries were early-partial 
implementers of Basel II. Despite the swift move to implement the basic approaches 
of Basel II during 2006-8, implementation stalled and remained partial because 
supervisors in this region decided not to implement the advanced approaches of 
Basel II. The degree of regulatory convergence amongst South Asian countries was 
high as countries similarly adopted a gradual yet comprehensive approach to 
implementation. The basic approaches of Pillar 1 were implemented very early and 
were followed by the gradual implementation of the advanced approaches, thereby 
distinguishing implementation in South Asian countries to that in the Middle East.  
In the Americas, Latin American countries moved towards full 
implementation, but very gradually. Although Canada implemented Basel II in 2007, 
implementation in the US was delayed and partial since only the most advanced 
approaches of Basel II were gradually implemented for the largest international 
banks while the rest remained on Basel I. The level of Basel II implementation in the 
East Asia Pacific region was generally high, as the region consisted mainly of early-
comprehensive adopters. Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia led the way and were 
closely followed by Korea, and subsequently, by the likes of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand. The latter countries adopted a more gradual approach in 
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implementing the advanced approaches of Basel II, but nevertheless at a timeframe 
comparable to most Basel Committee countries. The highest levels of convergence 
with Basel II were attained in the EU. The CRD implemented Basel II across the 
EU27 in two stages, the first in 2007 for banks applying the basic approaches and 
the second in 2008 for banks applying the advanced approaches. To investigate the 
cause of the uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape and the considerable 
variations in the way countries implemented Basel II, both quantitative and 
qualitative methods of research were utilized. The main findings from the 
quantitative analysis and case studies are presented next. 
 
8.2.2 Explaining the implementation of Basel II at the global level 
The quantitative analysis tested whether on average policy diffusion promoted the 
degree of Basel II implementation across the world. To test the effects of policy 
diffusion, four distinct policy diffusion variables were constructed to describe how 
and to what extent each and every country in the world were interconnected to all 
other countries across inter-supervisory authority networks, the cross-border 
structure of international banks, financial sectors that competed for capital and the 
nexus of international economic exchange. These channels of diffusion modelled 
how countries were interconnected to one another at the level of banks, bank 
supervisors, financial sectors and economies. The statistical results provided strong 
and consistent evidence to support the argument that policy diffusion was an 
important driver of Basel II implementation across the world. The spatial lag 
variables are all statistically significant, three at the 1% level and one at the 5% level, 
and positively associated with Basel II implementation. The magnitude of these 
effects were moderate at the global level as countries on average did not over-react 
to policy changes in other countries by responding disproportionately more to such 
policy changes, but instead matched their policies at most. The diffusion of Basel II 
across the cross-border structure of international banks had the strongest average 
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effects on Basel II implementation across the world. Of the four channels of 
diffusion, the results indicated that the diffusion of Basel II at the level of actors, 
namely, the way bank supervisors and banks were interconnected with their foreign 
counterparts, were more effective drivers of regulatory convergence than diffusion 
at the level of financial sectors or economies. Policy diffusion at the level of the 
industry and economy, although statistically significant, may be too blunt to fully 
capture the way countries were interconnected with each other compared to the 
actor-level of analyses in explaining the timing and scope of Basel II 
implementation across countries. 
The quantitative analysis also incorporated several economic and political 
variables in order to provide a stronger empirical test of policy diffusion. As 
expected, EU membership was highly significant. However, even when EU member 
states were treated as a single observation, the results underscored the importance of 
policy diffusion and several other economic and political variables in driving or 
hindering the degree of Basel II implementation across the world. That low income 
countries tended to be associated with low levels of Basel II implementation 
highlighted the real practical capacity constraints developing countries faced in 
implementing Basel II. In countries where bank credit intermediation was important 
for the economy and the credit market more developed, the pace and scope of 
convergence with Basel II was greater. Several measures of banking sector 
infrastructure were also significant, such as adopting internationally accepted 
accounting standards. The average level of regulatory capital in the banking system 
based on Basel I prior to the implementation of Basel II was negatively associated 
with the level of Basel II implementation countries subsequently attained. This 
disconfirmed the expectation that potential capital incentives arising from lower 
capital requirements following the implementation of the advanced approaches of 
Basel II motivated implementation across countries. In the face of high upfront 
implementation costs, it is highly likely that developed banking systems, which also 
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tend to maintain lower capital levels than those in emerging and developing 
countries, implemented Basel II earlier and fully.  
The common thread running across these variables underscored the 
importance of economic and financial sector development in explaining whether and 
how countries implemented Basel II. A closer examination of implementation across 
countries suggested that the capacity to implement Basel II was a necessary but 
insufficient condition for Basel II policies to diffuse. No matter how strong the 
effects of policy diffusion in encouraging high levels of implementation, policy 
diffusion mechanisms were unable to overcome low capacity constraints. Moreover, 
less developed countries were rarely exposed to the effects of policy diffusion that 
encouraged convergence with Basel II in the first place due to the countries they 
were most closely interconnected to across the channels of diffusion. Thus, when the 
level of development was low, the prospects for converging with international 
financial standards were even poorer as policy diffusion tended to reinforce only low 
levels of implementation. This in turn tended to reinforce the permanent nature of 
the uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape. 
The results also lent support to the argument that experiencing a systemic 
banking crisis promoted greater levels of convergence with international standards. 
Conversely, countries that did not experience systemic banking crises were likely to 
adopt a more protracted implementation timetable. Of the political variables, right of 
centre governments tended to disfavour introducing more extensive regulations by 
implementing Basel II, which could be seen as overly burdensome for banks, 
whereas leftist governments seemed more willing to regulate private enterprise by 
implementing Basel II. Also, that democracy was not statistically significant in 
explaining the implementation of Basel II contradicted claims made in the literature 
that democracies were more likely to comply with the Basel standards. Coercion via 
IMF conditionality did not have any systematic effect on Basel II implementation 
either. In sum, countries that were not developing countries, had a sizeable and 
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developed banking sector, maintained lower capital levels in the banking system, 
experienced a systemic banking crisis and had adopted international accounting 
standards before Basel II was implemented were on average associated with higher 
levels of Basel II implementation compared to those that did not. Although the 
quantitative analysis was highly informative in terms of assessing the average 
effects of variables on the degree of convergence with Basel II across the world, it 
provided very limited insight into the process through which policies diffused across 
the various channels of diffusion modelled in the analysis. This limitation was 
addressed by adopting the case study method, the aim of which was to build on the 
results of the quantitative study by unpacking the causal process of policy diffusion. 
The key findings from the case studies are summarized next. 
 
8.2.3 The diffusion of Basel II across inter-supervisory authority networks  
The analysis of the diffusion of Basel II across inter-supervisory authority networks 
in the case of Malaysia and Chile provided strong evidence in support of the policy 
diffusion argument. Inter-supervisory authority networks defined which countries 
Malaysia and Chile were closely interconnected to, which in turn shaped the type 
and scope of Basel II policies that diffused. They emerged as effective self-help 
networks that helped officials understand and grapple with Basel II implementation 
issues from very early in the implementation process, thus, changing the trajectory 
of how countries implemented Basel II. Furthermore, supervisory networks fostered 
the diffusion of policies by providing a stable and on-going channel of diffusion 
across which both BNM and SBIF extensively shared experiences and policy ideas 
on various aspects of Basel II with their foreign counterparts and monitored each 
other‟s progress when formulating their own Basel II implementation policies. 
Although both supervisory networks created powerful channels of diffusion that 
reinforced the degree of policy convergence amongst countries in the same network, 
different policies about when and how to implement Basel II diffused across 
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supervisory networks in East Asia and the Americas. BNM and SBIF adopted 
different implementation policies because there were pros and cons for not moving 
ahead with the rest of one‟s peers in the case of Malaysia, as well as moving ahead 
without the rest of one‟s peers in the case of Chile.  
The case of Malaysia showed how BNM‟s implementation of Basel II was 
shaped by how its foreign counterparts were implementing Basel II not only at the 
strategic level in terms of deciding on the speedy pace and comprehensive scope of 
implementation, but also at the tactical level in dealing with the procyclicality of 
Basel II and implementing the IRB approaches. Hence, while both BNM and SBIF 
claimed to have adopted a gradual approach to implementation, the degree of 
gradualness differed substantially in practice as supervisors adopted a gradual 
approach relative to the implementation policies of their foreign peers, which 
differed considerably between the two inter-supervisory authority networks. 
Whether supervisors should adopt Basel II at all was an open question for 
policymakers in ASBA. Supervisors instead focused on attaining greater levels of 
compliance with BCPs before gradually implementing various elements of Basel II 
to a capital adequacy regime based on Basel I. Hence, SBIF adopted a piecemeal 
and layered approach that gradually implemented various elements of the basic 
approaches of Basel II whilst remaining on Basel I. This was to be followed by the 
formal implementation of the basic approaches of Basel II before embarking on the 
implementation of the advanced approaches. Although convergence with Basel II 
was promoted in one supervisory network and deterred in the other, the findings in 
both case studies gave credence to the policy diffusion argument because these 
divergent outcomes resulted from incorporating the policy decisions of their 
supervisory peers when formulating their own Basel II implementation policies. 
The case studies also identified several characteristics of supervisory 
networks that shaped the process of policy diffusion, which ultimately led to 
different levels of convergence with Basel II. The type of members and modus 
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operandi of supervisory networks were particularly relevant. Supervisory networks 
that consisted of less disparate countries in their preparedness to implement Basel II 
tended to be more conducive for promoting higher levels of convergence with Basel 
II as did networks that focused on a narrow range of supervisory issues and where 
interactions between supervisors in the network were more horizontal and based on 
sharing policy ideas and experiences. It was not that the channels of diffusion did 
not exist or was weaker across ASBA, but rather that the EMEAP WGBS network 
reinforced high and ASBA low levels of convergence with Basel II. In fact, efforts 
among supervisors to promote convergence in supervisory policies were arguably 
stronger in ASBA than EMEAP as supervisory authorities across ASBA engaged in 
a more expansive and longer-term project to promote the implementation of 
international and regional standards on a wide range of supervisory issues.  
These findings underscored the importance of regionalism in the global 
financial system to the extent that supervisory networks were organized on a 
regional basis. This created two implications for the regional and global regulatory 
landscape for bank capital regulation. Firstly, in addition to shaping national capital 
adequacy regimes, as was the case in Malaysia and Chile, the diffusion of Basel II 
across channels of diffusion with a regional footprint had a profound effect on 
shaping the regional regulatory landscape. Secondly, channels of diffusion with a 
regional footprint have implications for the global regulatory landscape by 
undermining the extent to which international regulatory standards are implemented 
in a globally consistent way. This is because policies tend to diffuse only within 
supervisory networks rather than across networks, and while some supervisory 
networks promote convergence with international standards, others deter the pace 
and scope of implementation. Consequently, since the road to convergence is a long 
process, the global financial system can be expected to remain uneven and clustered 
along the lines of different regions. 
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8.2.4 The diffusion of Basel II across the cross-border structure of 
international banks  
The case studies of Korea and Malaysia found that the cross-border structure of 
international banks created powerful channels of diffusion by producing very 
specific and direct linkages between the policies of the home and host countries of 
international banks. They not only provided information to host supervisors about 
who their immediate competitors were, but also facilitated the cross-border transfer 
of implementation capabilities. Aided by the wider international supervisory 
architecture, the influence of foreign banks and their home supervisors was even 
more compelling in host countries. The case studies found two channels within the 
cross-border structure of international banks to be particularly important in shaping 
the diffusion of Basel II. One highlights the role of international banks, while the 
other that of the home and host supervisors as the key agents of policy diffusion. 
Through these two channels of diffusion, the empirical findings showed that the 
diffusion of Basel II across the structure of global banks produced two contrasting 
effects on the degree of Basel II implementation in Korea and Malaysia. Firstly, at 
the level of banks, the way one country was interconnected to another via 
international banks had significant implications on the degree of convergence with 
Basel II attained in the host country. In some cases, convergence with Basel II was 
facilitated as foreign banks were the first to use the most advanced yet operationally 
onerous approaches of Basel II in Korea and Malaysia. Foreign banks in host 
countries were able to benefit from their Basel II-knowledgeable parents, who 
actively sought to replicate their global models across their global banking networks, 
leading to the transfer of implementation capabilities across borders. In other cases, 
however, the presence of global banks hindered the full and timely implementation 
of Basel II. The case study of Korea showed that while progress in implementing 
Basel II in the EU promoted greater convergence with Basel II in the Korean 
banking sector, the delay and uncertainty in the US produced the opposite effect. 
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Secondly, at the level of supervisors, the Basel Committee‟s home-host supervisory 
principles and supervisory colleges tended to promote convergence in line with the 
home supervisors‟ Basel II policy. However, supervisory interactions also reinforced 
country-specific divergences through the mutual recognition and acceptance of such 
practices as shown in the case of the FSA‟s acknowledgment of the FSS‟s 
divergences from Basel II, suggesting that the channel of diffusion formed by the 
home and host supervisors of international banks could promote as well as deter the 
level of convergence with Basel II. 
 The case studies identified several conditions that limited the extent to which 
policies diffused across the cross-border structure of international banks. First, 
domestic capacities to implement the policies that diffused were a necessary 
condition for policy diffusion to take full effect and translate into actual policy 
outcomes. Otherwise, as the case of Korea demonstrated, the discrepancy between 
the level of implementation in policies that initially diffused and a country‟s 
implementation capabilities manifested itself in delays and backtrackings of national 
policies and the lack of progress in banks‟ implementation after regulations that 
implemented Basel II came into force. To this end, policy diffusion is conditional on 
relevant actors, banks and supervisors, having or being able to acquire the capacity 
to implement the policies that diffuse. Secondly, greater market liberalization was 
another necessary condition for policies to diffuse as it increased the level of 
exposure to competitive pressures from the policy decisions of other countries. 
Greater levels of market liberalization in Korea following the Korean financial crisis 
created conditions conducive for policies to diffuse compared to Malaysia, where 
the domestic market was more protected from foreign competition and BNM had 
more control over the pace and scope of liberalizing its banking sector. However, 
the overall level of market liberalization per se was not sufficient to explain exactly 
how policies diffused as the specific interdependencies created by such market 
opening between the home and host countries of international banks shaped which 
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policies diffused and from whom. Supervisors were more sophisticated than merely 
responding to greater levels of competition because they also responded to where the 
competitive pressures emanated from and who their key competitors were when 
formulating their Basel II policies. 
 
8.2.5 The diffusion of Basel II across financial sectors that compete for capital  
There was strong evidence that Basel II policy choices in Hong Kong and Korea 
were made in consideration of the policy choices of other financial centres they 
directly competed with, or aspired to compete with in the case of Korea. Senior 
officials at the HKMA believed that it was not a question of whether to implement 
Basel II, but how and when that mattered, and to this end thought that the financial 
sector‟s reputation and international standing would be tarnished if the HKMA was 
slow to adopt Basel II relative to other leading international financial centres. Thus, 
efforts to strengthen Hong Kong‟s reputation and international position as a leading 
international financial centre and create a correspondingly fitting regulatory 
environment relative to other financial centres Hong Kong competed with led the 
HKMA to adopt an implementation policy that promoted a high level of 
convergence with Basel II. In Korea, the implementation policies of the UK and US 
were important policy benchmarks that provided key inputs into the FSS‟s Basel II 
policy. The FSS argued that it was necessary to implement Basel II in ways that 
were consistent with these countries in order to enhance the international standing of 
the Korean banking sector and become a leading financial centre in north-east Asia. 
In both cases, the policy making process of evaluating how implementation in Hong 
Kong and Korea compared with that in other financial sectors they competed with 
was purposefully and systematically embedded into the way supervisors formulated 
their own Basel II implementation policies. 
However, it was not always the case that policy diffusion promoted 
convergence with Basel II. The same underlying process of diffusion also led to 
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policies that diverged from Basel II in the two cases, making both divergences from 
and convergences with Basel II inseparable consequences of policy diffusion. 
Although Hong Kong‟s formal capital adequacy framework was Basel II-ready by 
2007, policies that diverged from Basel II, such as the implementation of a fourth 
approach for credit risk and the non-implementation of the AMA, were strategically 
built into the HKMA‟s implementation policy. Likewise, in the case of Korea, 
delays in implementation and grace-periods were successively introduced as 
implementation progressed. Policy implementation delays in leading financial 
centres such as the US was also subject to diffusion, especially when it became 
politically convenient for the FSS to do so, that is, to justify delays by benchmarking 
the US rather than attributing them to the lack of preparedness to implement Basel II 
in the domestic banking sector in order to limit any reputational damage. In both 
Hong Kong and Korea, divergences from Basel II were not only based on careful 
consideration of how Hong Kong and Korea‟s competitive counterparts were 
implementing Basel II, but also provided an outlet to accommodate domestic 
constraints, which in part emanated directly from supervisory authorities‟ efforts to 
match the policies of other financial sectors in the first place.  
The cases studies also demonstrated how competing for capital created both 
vertical and horizontal channels of diffusion where the two did not coincide, and that 
there was a direction in how policies diffused and a pecking-order within and 
between these modes of policy diffusion. Countries that were setting the gold 
standard for implementation became the initial targets for benchmarking policies 
within the process of vertical diffusion. Then, the vertical diffusion of policies 
tended to dominate the horizontal diffusion of policies. For example, the FSS looked 
to the UK first, and then the US, but less so to the policies of Malaysia or Chile that 
measures of horizontal diffusion suggested. In the case of Hong Kong, the 
distinction between vertical and horizontal diffusion was less meaningful as policies 
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diffused from other leading financial centres Hong Kong competed with rather than 
diffusing vertically from non-leading financial sectors to Hong Kong. 
In sum, by adopting a mixed-method research design, this thesis contributed to 
understanding both the effects of policy diffusion at the global level as well as the 
underlying process of policy diffusion in specific country cases, which combined, 
provided a rich yet comprehensive account of how Basel II policies diffused and 
shaped national capital adequacy regimes. In both the quantitative analysis and three 
pairs of case studies, strong support was found in favour of policy diffusion, leading 
one to conclude that Basel II policy decisions in countries are highly interdependent 
on the policy decisions of other countries with which those countries are closely 
interconnected. The main contributions of these empirical findings to the IPE 
literature are discussed next. 
 
8.3 Contributions to the IPE literature 
This thesis contributes to two sub-fields in the IPE literature, first, on the political 
economy of international finance and money, in particular, on the topic of 
international financial regulation, and second, on the policy diffusion literature. The 
findings also have several bearings on the wider age-old debate in IPE about the role 
of power in the world economy.  
8.3.1 Contributions to the literature on the political economy of international 
financial regulation 
Despite the importance of the Basel standards in profoundly shaping bank capital 
adequacy regimes across the world, empirical research on the state of Basel II 
implementation across developed and developing countries was scarce and patchy 
and the factors that promoted or hindered the implementation of these voluntary 
standards were particularly under-researched. The aim of this thesis was to address 
these major gaps in the IPE literature. To this end, this thesis makes two distinct 
contributions to knowledge on the political economy of international financial 
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regulation, firstly by measuring and assessing the state of regulatory convergence 
with Basel II at the global level, and secondly by explaining the factors that drive 
Basel II implementation. These contributions are discussed in turn next. 
The measurement and assessment of the state of regulatory convergence with 
Basel II at the global level using a new dataset of Basel II implementation compiled 
by the author contributes to the literature in an original way through the exploration 
of new facts. Three contributions are made in this respect. Firstly, the Basel II 
implementation dataset is the first large-N dataset to measure Basel II 
implementation in a comprehensive and systematic way in the academic literature, 
and thus contributes to the state of knowledge in the literature. The Basel II 
implementation dataset is superior in terms of the coverage of countries and level of 
detail measured compared to other datasets on implementation that have come to 
exist recently, namely, the Basel Committee‟s dataset of members‟ Basel II 
implementation published in October 2011, the FSI‟s Survey on Basel II, 2.5 and III 
implementation published in July 2012, and the World Bank‟s research dataset on 
Bank Regulation and Supervision revised in July 2008. At the time the author 
completed the compilation of the dataset, the first two of these datasets were not in 
existence in the public domain let alone in academia. It was only after the global 
financial crisis of 2007-8 and the reform of global financial regulations that the 
international regulatory debate shifted its focus to the issue of implementation, in 
response to which the Basel Committee, at the behest of the G20, started to monitor 
the implementation of the Basel standards in 2011.  
Secondly, this thesis enhances the quality of measurement by improving the 
method for measuring the implementation of the Basel standards compared to 
studies in the literature. The study of Basel I implementation by Ho (2001) measured 
implementation in a binary way. This method failed to capture the extent and timing 
of implementation and would not have distinguished early-comprehensive adopters 
of Basel II such as the UK from gradual-comprehensive adopters such as India, or 
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late-partial adopters such as the Cayman Islands. There are several medium-N 
studies that look at the substance of Basel I implementation, but at a cost that they 
do not codify implementation across countries in a comparable way (Chey 2006). 
Others that codified implementation (Quillin 2008), did so in a subjective way that 
introduced risks of judgement error in interpreting national regulations that 
supposedly implemented Basel I. 
Thirdly, the measurement of Basel II implementation in this thesis 
contributes to the literature by providing a solid building block for making further 
enhancements in measuring the implementation of the Basel standards. Based on 
what has been measured in the dataset, a more detailed and nuanced measure of the 
degree of regulatory convergence with the Basel standards may be achieved by 
measuring other relevant aspects of Basel II and extending the measurement to Basel 
III. Further areas of implementation that may be measured to expand the Basel II 
implementation dataset include the following. The codification of the use of key 
national discretions provided in Basel II, in particular those that afford preferential 
treatment to certain classes of assets or borrowers, the discretionary use of super-
equivalent and sub-equivalent standards not recognized in Basel II and validation 
standards for IRB banks will help gauge the stringency of the standards 
implemented. Enhancements in measuring the scope of implementation may be 
achieved through the codification of how Basel II is applied in the banking sector, 
including approaches actually applied by banks and the proportion of banks‟ assets 
that are subject to the various approaches of Basel II. Examination of the level and 
consistency of Pillar 3 disclosures and supervisory review processes across banks 
and banking sectors will also enhance the measurement of Basel II. Moreover, the 
Basel II implementation dataset can be easily extended to construct a dataset of 
Basel III implementation. This is because Basel II constitutes a core component of 
Basel III, which is additive to Basel II. Moreover, the capital requirements, liquidity 
standards and macroprudential measures in Basel III are relatively more 
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straightforward to measure than Basel II, which is more technical and complex in 
depth and breadth. However, achieving the above is likely to be a life-long project as 
countries in the first wave of implementation, such as the G20, are expected to 
complete their transition onto Basel III by 2019, after which many other countries 
are expected to follow eventually. As implementation progresses over such time 
span, it is not impossible that a future financial crisis may trigger another round of 
reforms in global financial regulatory standards, making the measurement of 
convergence with global regulatory standards an on-going task. In this context, this 
research project achieves the first step in measuring the degree of convergence with 
Basel II, and to this end, represents a major contribution to the literature and a strong 
foundation for future academic studies to build on.  
Explaining why countries implemented Basel II constitutes the second major 
contribution to the IPE literature. The literature had yet to specifically investigate 
the implementation of Basel II, in particular, the empirical question of why countries 
implemented Basel II. As discussed in the literature review chapter, considerable 
advances were made in explaining why countries created and complied with Basel I 
(Oatley and Nabors 1998, Kapstein 1989, Simmons 2001, Ho 2002, Singer 2007, 
Quillin 2008 and Goodhart 2011). Others took the concept of compliance one step 
further by distinguishing substantive compliance from formal compliance (Walter 
2008, Chey 2006). The negotiations that led to Basel II have also been documented 
in the literature (Claessens et al 2008a, Wood 2005 and Tarullo 2008). However, 
there has been no attempt in the literature to explain why countries implemented 
Basel II. This thesis is the first systematic study of Basel II implementation that 
addresses this question across developed and developing countries and to this end 
represents an original contribution to the literature. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature on the political economy of 
international financial regulation by testing a theory that had not been tested before 
to explain why and how countries implemented the Basel standards, or more broadly, 
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international financial standards. In contrast to existing empirical studies that test 
various economic and political variables, this study adopted policy diffusion as the 
main theoretical framework to explain why countries implemented Basel II. This 
thesis demonstrated that countries were highly interdependent on each other‟s Basel 
II policies when formulating their own policy on when and how to implement Basel 
II in the increasingly globalized and interconnected world that they operated in. 
Moreover, the mixed-method research design helped to test both the effects of 
policy diffusion at the global level as well as the underlying process of policy 
diffusion in specific country cases, which together, provided a rich yet 
comprehensive explanation of how policy diffusion shaped the national 
implementation of Basel II. The main empirical findings from the quantitative study 
and case studies are not repeated here, although their specific contribution to the 
policy diffusion literature is discussed next. 
 
8.3.2 Contributions to the policy diffusion literature 
This thesis contributes to the policy diffusion literature in the following five ways. 
In particular, increased interests in policy diffusion has developed alongside 
growing criticisms of the weak empirical basis of the diffusion process as most 
existing studies have left unidentified and underspecified the channels and key 
agents through which policies diffused. The second and third points discussed below 
specifically contribute to the literature by addressing these limitations.  
The first and most significant contribution is that this thesis expands the 
scope of the policy diffusion literature to international financial standards for bank 
capital regulation. Previous studies have examined the diffusion of various financial 
policies such as capital account and interest rate policies, and the diffusion of 
various standards such as environmental and labour standards. This left a clear gap 
in the literature. By studying the diffusion of bank capital standards, namely Basel II, 
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this thesis makes an original contribution to the portfolio of policies investigated in 
the policy diffusion literature. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the policy diffusion literature by 
strengthening the empirical underpinnings in relation to the channels of diffusion. 
The imprecise specification of the channels of diffusion in the literature, which are 
often only vaguely related to the policies that are hypothesized to diffuse, produced 
very generic channels of diffusion that made the tests of policy diffusion less 
convincing. In this thesis, three novel channels of policy diffusion formed across 
supervisory authorities, global banks and financial sectors were specifically 
constructed to study the diffusion of Basel II policies. In particular, inter-supervisory 
authority networks and the cross-border structure of international banks are 
innovative channels of diffusion that highlight the role of key actors in 
implementing Basel II, namely, banks and supervisors, and their interdependent 
relationships with their foreign counterparts in forming the paths through which 
policies diffuse. These tailored channels of diffusion make original contributions to 
the literature as they have not been studied elsewhere. Research on international 
supervisory networks is very scarce in the IPE literature, and non-existent in terms 
of how they act as a channel through which policies diffuse. Like the Basel 
Committee, which until recently “has frequently been idealized as a purely technical, 
as an esoteric body of specialist engaging in technocratic deliberations… in a 
political vacuum” (Wood 2005:21), and thus, insulated from public and private 
institutions of government and markets (Claessens et al 2008a:319), the activities of 
inter-supervisory authority networks are not well known and have not received 
much academic attention. This may be due to the lack of public awareness about 
their existence, lack of formal institutionalization and decision-making powers, or 
because they have only recently become more prominent with the emergence of 
international financial regulatory standards and the globalization of finance, despite 
that some have existed for over fifty years. Whatever the reason, inter-supervisory 
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authority networks can easily be overlooked as an esoteric group of apolitical 
technocrats notwithstanding their significant role in shaping the national 
implementation of international standards, which in turn has shaped the international, 
if not regional financial regulatory landscape. To this end, Chapter Three and Five in 
particular contributed to understanding how inter-supervisory authority networks 
functioned as effective channels of policy diffusion.  
Similarly, highlighting the impact of the cross-border structure of global 
banks also marks an original contribution to the literature. Empirical research has 
generally focused on the effects of foreign bank entry on various aspects of the 
host‟s financial systems, such as on the productivity and profitability of banks, credit 
intermediation and financial stability.
1
 Others have suggested that growing foreign 
bank presence was instrumental in aligning developing countries‟ financial systems 
more closely with international standards for capital allocation, risk management 
and corporate governance (Domanski 2005:69), but have not investigated how and 
to what extent this was the case. The case studies in Chapter Six specifically 
investigated how the presence of foreign banks and their wider global presence 
provided a channel through which policies diffused and thus shaped the national 
implementation of Basel II across host countries. 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the policy diffusion literature by 
highlighting the role of key agents involved in the process of diffusion. All three 
case studies investigated the international activities of bank supervisors and banks 
and the interdependencies formed between them and their foreign counterparts, and 
by doing so, underlined their importance as political actors that shaped the process 
of diffusion and the implementation of international financial standards. In analysing 
how supervisors acted as catalysts of policy diffusion, Chapter Six provided 
analytical continuity from Chapter Five by examining vertical relationships between 
home and host supervisors of international banks, in addition to horizontal 
                                                 
1
 See footnote 1 in Chapter Six for references to relevant studies. 
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relationships amongst supervisory peers in the same supervisory network. Chapter 
Seven added another dimension to this analysis by investigating how supervisors in 
different financial sectors competed for capital as they implemented Basel II. 
Fourthly, this thesis contributes to the policy diffusion literature by 
highlighting the double-edged power of policy diffusion, namely, how policy 
diffusion can promote as well as deter the implementation of Basel II. The literature 
generally attempts to explain how policy diffusion drives positive policy outcomes 
across countries. Negative outcomes rarely receive the same attention despite their 
importance for drawing causal inferences and being highly relevant from a public 
policy point of view. The case studies in this thesis examined whether policy 
diffusion not only promoted, but also deterred the diffusion of Basel II. The absence 
of a positive outcome, in this context, a low level of convergence with Basel II, may 
have resulted either from the effects of policy diffusion that deterred Basel II 
implementation or from the absence of these effects. The findings from the three 
pairs of cross-country comparative studies provided strong and consistent evidence 
suggesting that policy diffusion worked both ways to spread as well as to contain the 
spread of policies across the same channel of diffusion. Thus, the effect of policy 
diffusion is not unidirectional as it can reinforce both convergences with and 
divergences from international regulatory standards. 
Finally, this thesis makes theoretical contributions to the policy diffusion 
literature by identifying conditions that were necessary for policies to diffuse. On 
average, the capacity to implement the policies that diffused domestically was a 
necessary but insufficient condition for diffusion to take full effect and translate into 
policy outcomes.
2
 Otherwise, the discrepancy between the policies that initially 
                                                 
2
 Implementation capacity is a necessary but insufficient condition since it does not fully explain 
implementation in countries that posses the capacity to implement Basel II. A good example is the 
delayed and partial implementation of Basel II in the US (Herring 2007). Capacity constraints faced 
by banks and supervisors played a limited role in shaping the Basel II policies of US banking 
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diffused and a country‟s implementation capabilities manifested itself in delays and 
backtracking of national policies and the lack of progress in banks‟ implementation 
after Basel II regulations came into force, making certain elements of national 
implementation white elephants that were not adopted by banks. The case studies 
that examined how policies diffused across international banks showed that market 
liberalization was another necessary but insufficient condition for policies to diffuse. 
Greater market liberalization increased the level and intensity of exposures to 
competitive pressures that arose from the Basel II policy decisions of other countries. 
However, the overall level of market liberalization per se was not sufficient to 
explain exactly how policies diffused as the specific interdependencies created by 
such market opening between the home and host countries of international banks 
shaped which policies diffused from whom.  
In sum, this thesis makes several empirical contributions by extending the 
policy diffusion literature to Basel II and investigating novel channels of diffusion 
that highlighted the role of key agents involved in the process of diffusion. Several 
theoretical contributions are also made by showing how policy diffusion spreads as 
well as contains the spread of policies and identifying conditions that affected the 
diffusion of policies.  
 
8.3.3 Contributions to the debate on power in the world economy 
The question of power and its distribution in the world economy has been at the 
heart of IPE since its inception (Strange 1970; 1996, Krasner 1976, Gilpin 1987).
3
 
                                                                                                                                          
authorities, other than indirectly by affecting the ability of small US banks to compete with large 
international US banks domestically.  
3
 In its most general sense, power can be defined as “the aggregate of political resources available to 
an actor” and can, but not necessarily be converted into influence, which refers to the “modification 
of one actor‟s behavior by that of another” (Cox and Jacobson 1974:3-4). Different forms of power 
can also be distinguished. Hard power is generally associated with military and economic might, 
whereas soft power refers to “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country‟s culture, political ideals, and policies.” 
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The findings of this thesis have several bearings on this wider debate on power, in 
particular, regarding whose policies diffuse and how. Despite Basel II being a 
technical voluntary standard without any “teeth” and the Basel Committee not 
possessing any supranational authority to coerce other countries, that Basel II, rather 
than any other regulatory framework, diffused across the world is one manifestation 
of the dominant soft power and influence of the G10, in particular, the supervisory 
authorities in the US and the EU and their private sector interlocutors, to set global 
rules governing bank capital. Although Basel II came under severe criticism 
following the 2007-8 global financial crisis, it remained the undisputed global 
regulatory standard for bank capital as did the Basel Committee as the locus of 
regulatory reform efforts.
4
 Whist compiling the Basel II implementation dataset, 
there was not a single case where supervisors in non-G10 countries overtly 
implemented or said they would implement a regulatory framework that was not 
based on the Basel standards. To this end, non-G10 countries are mostly “voluntary” 
standard-takers. Moreover, the case studies showed that implementation in the EU 
and US had repercussions on how other countries implemented Basel II around the 
world because both the EU‟s full and timely implementation and the US‟s delayed 
and partial implementation diffused. Thus, not only are the EU and US “great 
powers” in setting international standards (Drezner 2007:5), they are also leading 
powers in shaping the implementation of those standards around the world. 
At first glance, one could question the dominant influence of G10 
supervisors in light of the considerable cross-national variations in implementation 
across the world. Also, although the results did suggest that at the global level, the 
lack of implementation in many countries may be involuntary, that is, due to factors 
such as the lack of implementation capabilities, country-specific divergences from 
                                                                                                                                          
(Nye 2004:x) Although hard and soft power are related, soft power tends to be associated with “co-
optive power - the ability to shape what others want” and hard power with “command power - the 
ability to change what other do” (ibid. p7) 
4
 See footnote 12 in this chapter for a detailed discussion on this point. 
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Basel II and the considerable leeway national supervisors enjoyed in implementing 
Basel II could be seen as evidence of the G10‟s limited influence over the rest of the 
world. However, even this may not so much be evidence of limitations in the G10‟s 
power as it is evidence of their deliberate choice to limit how much influence they 
wished to exercise over others. The G10 deliberately chose to formulate voluntary 
standards instead of using legally binding instruments. As a result, non-G10 
countries were afforded leeway to adopt the Basel standards when they saw fit and 
implementation was not formally monitored or enforced (BCBS 2004:1).
5
 Until 
recently, most financial sectors in non-G10 countries were peripheral to those in the 
G10 and were not significant sources of global systemic risk or hosts to many global 
banks. It was thus, arguably less of a policy priority for the standard setters to 
expend large sums of political capital and supervisory resources to require non-G10 
countries to abide by the same set of rules as the G10.  
 Following the global financial crisis of 2007-8, the Basel Committee 
expanded its membership to include major financial centres outside the G10 and 
other members of the G20. Whether this membership expansion reflected the 
declining power of a G10 that was previously very reluctant to share its standard-
setting powers with non-G10 countries is debateable, although it is much more 
likely that the crisis had diminished the G10‟s power. Whichever the case may be, 
although the new Basel Committee members have gained a voice over standard-
setting and the monitoring of implementation, the G10 is able to exert greater 
influence on these new member countries, who are now explicitly expected to 
implement Basel III, which is a regulatory framework formulated primarily to 
                                                 
5
 One could argue that as a result of setting international standards instead of binding agreements, the 
G10 has in effect increased its de facto influence on the rest of the world. Had the Basel standards 
been binding, non-G10 countries may have been much more resistant to implementation due higher 
sovereignty costs. Abbott and Snidal argue that “[a]ccepting a binding legal obligation, especially 
when it entails delegating authority to a supranational body, is costly to states” (2000:436), in which 
case, “[s]tates can limit sovereignty costs through arrangements that are nonbinding or imprecise or 
do not delegate extensive powers” (ibid. p439). 
292 
 
address problems that led to the financial crises in the US and UK. The role of 
monitoring implementation has also been added to the Basel Committee‟s main 
activities in its new Charter, which was created in January 2013. As several non-
G10 countries have become major players in the world economy and increasingly 
significant players in the global financial system, the need to exert greater influence 
to induce their compliance with the Basel standards has arguably increased for the 
G10. This is more so the case as a considerable amount of political capital and 
supervisory resources was expended to reform global financial regulations and 
because the effective implementation of the Basel standards in the G10 has become 
increasingly dependent politically and economically on implementation in a wider 
set of countries than was the case for Basel I or II. To this end, the Basel Committee 
is being redefined according to what Susan Strange referred to as a strategic 
institution “serving as instruments of the structural strategy and foreign policy of the 
dominant state or states” as well as an adaptive institution “providing the necessary 
multilateral agreement on whatever arrangements are necessary to allow states to 
enjoy the political luxury of national autonomy without sacrificing the economic 
dividends of world markets and production structures” (1982:484).  
 As for the question of how policies diffused, although Basel II are voluntary 
standards and the conceptualization of policy diffusion as a process of 
uncoordinated interdependence appears seemingly detached from the realms of 
power and coercion exercised by dominant states, the structure of power in the 
world economy is nonetheless reflected in the channels of diffusion. Although inter-
supervisory authority networks are formally autonomous and independent, the Basel 
Committee can potentially exert considerable influence over their activities at the 
strategic level. For example, the biennial International Conference of Banking 
Supervisors (ICBS) held since 1979 brings together in one place more than 260 
senior representatives of supervisory authorities from over 120 countries to discuss 
supervisory issues such as Basel II, which was the main conference theme since the 
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Basel Committee announced the revision of Basel I in 1999 until recently (BIS 2004; 
2006). Moreover, the FSI, which was jointly created by the Basel Committee and the 
BIS in 1999, is closely intertwined in the provision of training activities across 
supervisory networks, providing considerable scope for G10 supervisors to influence 
other supervisors around the world (FSI 2004a; 2005; 2006a; 2007).  
The diffusion of Basel II across global banks also provides an example of 
how G10 policies diffused across the world because most global banks were either 
based in Europe or the US. Moreover, the Basel Committee‟s home-host supervisory 
principles and colleges tended to promote convergence with the home supervisors‟ 
Basel II policy and the way Basel II was implemented at the banking group-level of 
global banks in the home country, whilst adding constraints on the policies host 
supervisors could pursue, leaving them with less room to manoeuvre. This reflects 
two dimensions of power. Firstly, the rules governing home-host relations and 
supervisory colleges were written by the “great powers” to govern how Basel II is 
implemented across the world, thus, giving credence to Drezner‟s argument about 
the central role of the EU and US as global standard setters (2007). Secondly, the 
compelling influence of global banks on non-G10 host supervisors reflect the 
diffusion of power from states to market actors as Strange had argued (1996). 
However, that the rules governing home-host relations were initially written by G10 
supervisors in response to demands from global banks based in the G10 seems to 
lend support to Strange‟s argument about the diffusion of power to market actors 
within the G10 and across non-G10 countries.  
In short, although national supervisors had some leeway in responding to 
policy changes in other countries when implementing Basel II, the influence of the 
G10 permeated through the process of diffusion at a deeper level by shaping the 
channels of diffusions, and in doing so had indirectly, but profoundly shaped the 
global regulatory landscape for bank capital regulation. As long as countries remain 
interconnected to one another and the channels of diffusion persist over time, the 
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influences of the global standard setters and their private sector interlocutors are 
likely to persist through the process of policy diffusion. 
 
8.4 Three key policy implications 
In addition to making unique contributions to the IPE literature and informing the 
debate on power, the findings of this thesis also provide valuable insights for policy. 
The policy implications that follow from the findings are very pertinent to the 
contemporary international policy debate on international financial regulation 
following the global financial crisis of 2007-8. This is more so the case as policy 
priorities at the international level shifted from reforming the global financial system 
to implementing the agreed reforms.
6
 The G20 Leaders committed to implement the 
Basel standards in the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010, when they “endorsed 
the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS on the new bank capital and liquidity 
framework” and committed “to take action at the national and international level to 
raise standards, and ensure that… national authorities implement global standards 
developed to date, consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to 
the top and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage” 
(G20 2010:2). This commitment was subsequently reaffirmed at the G20 Cannes 
Summit in November 2011. The declaration “call[ed] on jurisdictions to meet their 
commitment to implement fully and consistently the Basel II risk-based framework 
as well as the Basel II-5 additional requirements on market activities and 
securitisation by end 2011 and the Basel III capital and liquidity standards… starting 
in 2013” (G20 2011). 7  As the regulatory debate in the G20, FSB and Basel 
                                                 
6
 The global financial crisis triggered a sting of financial sector reforms across areas as diverse as 
banks, OTC derivatives, compensation practices and credit rating agencies. Of the banking sector 
reforms, Basel III is the most significant along with initiatives to address systemic risk. 
7
 So far, it is unclear how effective these G20‟s commitments are. According to the Basel Committee, 
“[a]s of end-May 2012 [after the deadline set by the G20], 21 of 27 Basel member countries have 
implemented Basel II, which had been due to come into force from end-2006. In addition, Indonesia 
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Committee shifted from reforming regulations to the implementation of those 
reforms, several frameworks have also been devised to monitor the implementation 
of financial reforms.
8
 In order to contribute to the international debate on the 
implementation of international financial standards and derive policy implications 
and priorities that are firmly grounded in the real world, the following three policy 
implications have been drawn from the empirical findings of this thesis. 
 
8.4.1 Shifting risks: From the risk of premature implementation to the risk of 
a globally uneven regulatory landscape 
Following the publication of Basel II in 2004, the Basel Committee, IMF and World 
Bank warned non-Basel Committee member countries against the risks of premature 
implementation (BCBS 2004a, IMF 2005, 2006). This cautious policy position was 
warranted in light of almost 100 non-Basel Committee countries that indicated their 
somewhat overly eager intentions to implement Basel II (FSI 2004, 2006, 2008). In 
particular, there were concerns that “many countries will begin to adopt the 
advanced IRB approach, because they think this is the global standard to which they 
must aspire, when it may not be appropriate for their banks at their current stage of 
development” (Davies 2005:249). The risks of premature implementation persist to 
this day, especially in least developed banking systems, although the risks are very 
low. Policy priorities based on the risks of premature implementation has become 
outdated and less relevant. The state of regulatory convergence with Basel II at the 
global level is highly uneven and fragmented into clusters. This regulatory landscape 
is more permanent than transitional. The ambitious implementation plans of many 
countries were not realized, partly because of real practical constraints in 
                                                                                                                                          
and Russia have implemented Basel II‟s Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements). Argentina, China, 
Turkey and the United States are in the process of implementing Basel II.” (BCBS 2011:2) 
8
 The FSB was tasked by the G20 to coordinate, monitor and report to the G20 the implementation of 
financial reforms agreed by the G20/FSB (FSB 2011:4). The FSB established the Coordination 
Framework for Implementation Monitoring in October 2011, whereby the Basel Committee retained 
primary responsibility for monitoring the implementation of Basel II, 2.5 and III. 
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implementing Basel II.
9
 Much of the caravan is falling behind, and the majority of 
developing countries are in the non-catch up category. The Basel Committee‟s 
intention to incentivize countries to improve risk management standards as they 
progress onto the more advanced approaches of Basel II is not being realized in 
these countries. 
Policy priorities at the global level for international financial regulation must 
therefore be revised to reflect the shift in risks from the premature implementation 
of Basel II to the growing risks arising from a globally uneven and clustered 
regulatory landscape due to the non-implementation, partial and inconsistent 
implementation of Basel II, especially in countries that are becoming major players 
in the world economy and increasingly significant players in the global financial 
system. This is a particularly pressing issue in light of the flurry of international 
financial standards following the 2007-8 global financial crisis that build on the 
robust implementation of Basel II.
 
According to the Basel Committee, the full, 
timely and consistent implementation of Basel II/III is fundamental to raising the 
resilience of the global banking system, in maintaining market confidence in 
regulatory ratios, and in providing a level playing field (BCBS 2011:1). The stakes 
are potentially high because financial markets and actors are global in scope and the 
uneven and inconsistent implementation of regulatory standards at the national level 
could be a potential source of risk not only to the stability of national financial 
systems, but also across the global financial system due to large, global financial 
institutions (G-SIBs) that can transmit shocks across financial systems.
10
 For this 
reason, robust implementation in the G20, in particular the US and EU, is crucial as 
                                                 
9
 As examined in the quantitative analysis, capacity constraints are one reason why this is the case, 
but based on numerous conversations with senior bankers at the management level, the lack of 
interest on the part of banks and dwindling domestic political impetus to implement Basel II is 
another growing concern in many developing countries that have not implemented Basel II. 
10
 The interconnectedness of G-SIBs is one of the key features in addition to their size, complexity 
and lack of substitutability that creates negative externalities across borders, making them 
systemically important (BCBS 2011a:1).  
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they are home to most G-SIBs.
11
 Implementation in countries that are becoming 
increasingly significant players in the global financial system is also important, not 
least because the implementation of Basel III in the G10 has become increasingly 
dependent politically and economically on implementation in a wider set of such 
countries than was the case for Basel I and II. Insofar as countries have announced 
policies to implement Basel II, the inadequate implementation of Basel II across 
countries can create a false sense of security that masks significant inconsistencies in 
national implementation.  
That said, although the issue of implementing internationally agreed rules is 
important, it is not assumed that Basel III is a silver bullet in terms of its 
effectiveness for protecting banking systems against future financial shocks and 
crises. Basel III and its Basel II component came under criticisms from 
policymakers at the center of the standard setting process.
12
 Andrew Haldane, 
Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, argued that Basel 
III was “almost certainly too complex” and the configuration of complex modern 
finance and regulation “spells trouble… [b]ecause complexity generates uncertainty, 
not risk” in addition to making “risk more difficult to monitor and manage, not less.” 
(Haldane 2012:22-24)
13
 Similarly, the Chairman of the FSA, Adair Turner argued 
                                                 
11
 As of November 2012, the fourteen most systemically important banking groups designated as G-
SIBs by the FSB using a methodology developed by the Basel Committee are from the US (6 banking 
groups), EU (5) Switzerland (2) and Japan (1) (FSB:2012:3). 
12
 Although the ink was barely dry on Basel II when the 2007-8 global financial crises struck, Basel II 
was severely criticised. Stiglitz declared the death of Basel II when he said “[a]fter the current crisis, 
it is clear that Basel II is dead” (2008:21). Similarly, a think tank claimed that “it is apparent that the 
Basle approach to regulatory capital is fundamentally flawed… and hence cannot adequately protect 
depositors and systemic financial stability” and proposed that “Basle II rules should be scrapped” 
altogether (Di Noia and Micossi 2009:57). Even the de Larosière report, prepared by a working group 
under the auspices of the EU, which had been institutionally committed to Basel II, advocated a 
“fundamental review”, although they did maintain that “[i]t is wrong to blame the Basel 2 rules per se 
for being one of the major causes of the crisis” (The de Larosière Group 2009:15-16). 
13
 Citing that the documents making up Basel III added up to 616 pages (i.e. Basel II/2.5/III), Haldane 
called for regulators to simplify the way banks calculated their capital requirements as a first step. 
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that the move “from the crude category risk weights of Basel I to the complex risk 
sensitive weights produced by Basel II models… created new risks” and was “a 
mistake”, suggesting that “the same asset might be rated significantly differently by 
different banks, even in one jurisdiction, let alone across the world” (Turner 2012).14 
Nevertheless, to the extent that a new global financial regulatory framework has 
been agreed and countries have committed to implement Basel III until 2019, 
addressing the risks arising from the partial, inconsistent and non-implementation of 
Basel II and by extension Basel III is the more pressing policy priority than that of 
premature implementation. Moreover, with the introduction of Basel III, the 
regulatory gap between developed and developing countries is set to widen further, 
exacerbating any risks arising from partial, inconsistent and non-implementation. To 
this end, although Basel III represents a significant step forward in fundamentally 
strengthening the regulatory framework, it is a step backwards in achieving 
international regulatory convergence. The next policy implication discusses what 
may be done to address the globally uneven and clustered regulatory landscape. 
 
8.4.2 Exploiting the dynamics of policy diffusion for policy 
The dynamics of policy diffusion may be exploited in designing policies to attain 
greater levels of convergence with Basel II around the world by maximizing the 
effects of policy diffusion. This policy implication is most relevant to the FSB and 
Basel Committee, which have been tasked by the G20 to monitor and promote the 
implementation of regulatory reforms agreed by the G20 following the 2007-8 
                                                 
14
 It is worth noting however, that the reverse position was taken by Turner in the Turner Review, 
which was much less critical of Basel II, suggesting that “[s]ome commentators have argued for 
abandoning it, citing both its procyclicality and its complexity. A strategy of adapting its 
implementation to avoid unnecessary procyclicality, while introducing separate measures to achieve 
overt counter-cyclicality, is preferable… Basel II aims to introduce a more risk-sensitive approach, 
building on banks‟ detailed analysis of the risk characteristics… In theory this new approach has 
advantages: indeed if it had been in place over the last ten years, it might have helped avoid some of 
the problems which contributed to the current crisis.” (FSA 2009:59) 
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global financial crisis. Understanding how policies diffuse is critical from a policy 
design and implementation point of view due to the double-edged power of policy 
diffusion. The research findings highlighted that policy diffusion could promote as 
well as hinder the implementation of Basel II, which as a result, contributed to the 
formation of an uneven and clustered state of convergence with Basel II at the global 
level. Hence, left to their own devices, the dynamics of policy diffusion can 
reinforce the uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape and policies designed 
to attain greater levels of convergence may have unintended consequences and be 
counterproductive if divergences in policy implementation diffuse across countries 
instead. Policies that purposefully and effectively incorporate the dynamics of policy 
diffusion may prove to be powerful tools to achieve convergence with international 
regulatory standards. Moreover, such policies should be tailored to reflect the 
distinct properties of different policy diffusion channels to maximize policy 
effectiveness even further. The specific policy implications from the three channels 
of diffusion are discussed next. 
Firstly, supervisory networks created powerful channels of diffusion that 
promoted convergence in implementation policies amongst countries, especially by 
shaping the formation of implementation norms amongst supervisory authorities 
from very early in the implementation process, thus, changing the trajectory of how 
countries implemented Basel II going forward. The diffusion of policies across 
supervisory networks can be exploited to facilitate convergence with Basel II across 
the world by creating an additional layer of vertical policy diffusion, whereby Basel 
II implementation policies first diffuse vertically from the Basel Committee to 
multiple inter-supervisory authority networks, before policies diffuse horizontally 
amongst national supervisors within their respective networks. Creating dynamics 
that lead to the vertical diffusion of Basel II may allow the Basel Committee to have 
greater scope in streamlining the policies that diffuse across different supervisory 
networks, which otherwise would have contributed to reinforcing the unevenly 
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clustered international regulatory landscape if left alone. The role of the Basel 
Committee as a focal point in promoting the timely and consistent implementation 
of Basel II is paramount in creating a new layer of vertical policy diffusion that 
sequentially ranks higher in this pecking order of policy diffusion. Most supervisory 
networks feed into the Basel Committee via the Committee‟s outreach activities and 
biennial ICBS‟s that brings together supervisors from over 120 countries. To 
facilitate convergence with Basel II, the Basel Committee should systematically 
expand and strengthen its outreach activities to non-members and provide the 
feedback that will sustain the impetus for non-members to prepare for the 
implementation of Basel II. In terms of timing, the dynamics of vertical diffusion 
should be created from the beginning of the standard setting process and before 
policies diffuse horizontally across supervisory networks. Creating the dynamics of 
vertical diffusion is more compelling as a policy proposition considering the 
evidence that less developed countries are rarely exposed to strong policy diffusion 
effects that encourage convergence with international regulatory standards in the 
first place. Hence, issues related to implementation should constitute a critical 
component of the standard setting process at the Basel Committee rather than being 
addressed after financial standards are agreed.
15
 In short, by being the first in the 
sequence of policy diffusion, the Basel Committee can promote the consistent 
implementation of Basel II across countries by shaping the policies that diffuse 
horizontally across supervisory peers within supervisory networks.
16
 
                                                 
15
 This is because by the time Basel II was agreed, most countries had already formed their initial 
implementation plans via interactions in supervisory networks that functioned as effective self-help 
networks that helped supervisors understand and respond to policy challenges in relation to Basel II. 
16
 To this end, the FSB‟s initiative to establish regional groups in 2012 and attach a formal condition 
of compliance with FSB standards to their membership as part of its effort to promote the adoption of 
international standards may be effective to the extent that supervisory networks have the potential to 
act as powerful structures through which policies can diffuse. As of March 2012, despite significant 
efforts on the part of the FSB secretariat, these arrangements for regional groups, which were likely 
to take the form of consultation groups for non-FSB members, had not been formalized yet as they 
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The role of the Basel Committee in maximising the efficiency of diffusion by 
promoting the timely and consistent implementation of Basel II may require further 
governance and membership reforms since its enhanced role raises questions of its 
legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Basel Committee as the apex authority for setting 
standards for regulating banking systems around the world has been questioned due 
to the non-representation and non-participation of non-G10 countries on the input 
side, lack of transparency in the standard setting process, lack of accountability and 
the democratic deficit created within and outside the membership of the Basel 
Committee (Davies 2005:249; Claessens et al 2008a:314; Underhill and Zhang 
2010). Hence, for some time, there have been calls that “it is time for a rethink on 
the membership of the committee and indeed on the international organization of 
banking supervision generally” (Davies 2005:248). The G20 reforms partially 
responded to the legitimacy problems of the Basel Committee by expanding its 
membership to the G20, thereby expanding the representation and potential role of 
major developing countries in the international standard setting process. Although 
“the relationship between input and output legitimacy in global financial governance 
is more complex than is sometimes supposed” (Walter 2010a:96), further 
governance and membership reforms may nonetheless be required for the Basel 
Committee to play an effective role in maximizing the efficiency of diffusion.
17
 
Greater participation from non-members of the Basel Committee through the 
strengthening the Basel Committee‟s outreach activities, and ultimately an 
                                                                                                                                          
were deemed to be too politically controversial, according to conversation with David Green (Bank 
of Ireland), who was closely involved with the FSB secretariat on this issue. 
17
 Walter argues that “[w]hile developing countries had little input into the standards and codes, there 
has been less resistance to formal adoption than might have been expected from the low degree of 
input legitimacy” (Walter 2010a:96, italics added). Furthermore, in the case of China, “[w]hen China 
was offered membership in the BCBS, it accepted, which in itself indicates a degree of acceptance of 
the Committee‟s continuing legitimacy as the key locus of global standard setting in this area in spite 
of its past mistakes. The BCBS is, for China and other G20 members, simply indispensable” (Walter 
2010b:160-161). Likewise, in the case study of Korea (Chapter 7), the Governor of the FSS lobbied 
the Chairman of the Basel Committee for Korea to join the Basel Committee. 
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expansion in its membership may be required. Moreover, it is important that the new 
members of the Basel Committee, which includes developing countries with 
relatively less developed banking systems such as China, India, Russia, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey, play a greater and active role in the standard setting 
process to enhance the legitimacy of the Basel Committee and the Basel standards.  
As a second-best solution to the above, inter-network cooperation and 
competition could be encouraged so that regulatory policies diffuse across 
supervisory networks, from countries in supervisory networks that have attained 
high levels of convergence with Basel II to those that have attained lower levels. 
This may be encouraged as best practice or by providing routine forums for 
supervisors to exchange policy ideas on Basel II and monitor each other‟s 
implementation. Such inter-network interactions will be effective as long as there is 
a willingness to implement Basel II amongst countries and when the lack of progress 
is due to capacity constraints or the lack of implementation know-how. Otherwise, 
policies may converge to the lowest common denominator as coalitions of 
supervisory networks against Basel II spread from one supervisory network to 
another. Such unintended policy outcomes, however, may be avoided if the Basel 
Committee effectively coordinates the activities between supervisory networks by 
fostering the vertical diffusion of policies as mentioned above. 
Secondly, the research findings suggested that Basel II policies diffused 
across countries that were interconnected via the cross-border structure of 
international banks. The implementation of Basel II by a foreign bank in the host 
country was a function of how its parent bank at the banking group level 
implemented Basel II. This in turn was a function of how the home regulator of that 
international bank implemented Basel II in the home country. Thus, the full and 
timely implementation of Basel II by the home supervisors of international banks 
was crucial as it produced positive and negative knock-on effects across host 
countries. For example, the delayed implementation in the US not only delayed large 
303 
 
international US banks from implementing Basel II in the US, but also across their 
banking networks outside the US. To this end, the full and timely implementation of 
Basel II could be made compulsory for jurisdictions home to banks with material 
cross-border operations. In particular, G-SIFIs should take on greater responsibilities 
in raising standards across the markets in which they operate and act as catalysts in 
promoting convergence with sound regulatory standards since they have the ability 
to transfer implementation capabilities across borders. If need be, G-SIFIs could be 
incentivised to act as effective channels of diffusion through a reduction in G-SIFI 
surcharges. From the perspective of host countries, these considerations increase the 
complexity of national decisions about the desirability of financial sector FDI and 
suggest that regulatory convergence issues should be part of the decision process. 
The existing international supervisory architecture that defined the rules of 
the game between home and host supervisors of international banks, and supervisory 
practices such as colleges were only partially conducive for promoting the consistent 
implementation of Basel II across countries and convergence at the global level. 
They promoted convergence across countries in some areas where home and host 
supervisors agreed to rely on each other‟s supervisory work, whilst reinforcing 
country-specific divergences in others. Being aware of national differences and 
divergences from Basel II is important for home and host supervisors, but the mutual 
recognition and acceptance of country-specific divergences in an uncoordinated way 
can be a slippery slope as country-specific divergences from Basel II become 
permanent features of the regulatory framework, hampering convergence with Basel 
II in the long run and reinforcing the uneven and clustered global regulatory 
landscape. Furthermore, supervisory principles and practices were not effective 
when interests conflicted and supervisors were not willing to trust each other, 
leading to a deadlock between home and host supervisors without any obvious ways 
of resolution. Home-host supervisory principles need to be more specific by not only 
defining broad responsibilities between home and host supervisors, but also the 
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specific areas of Basel II they apply to and the extent to which they apply. Colleges 
need to be streamlined such that there is consistency across decisions made in 
colleges to facilitate the consistent implementation of Basel II across countries. 
Whether supervisory colleges should be given greater decision-making powers that 
are binding across jurisdictions, or remain primarily as a forum for information 
exchange is a policy issue that also needs addressing.  
Thirdly, the research findings demonstrated how policies diffused as 
financial sectors competed to attract international capital. Policies essentially 
diffused because investors and banks perceived Basel II implementation as 
contributing to more risk sensitive regulations, advancements in risk management in 
banks and theoretically, greater financial stability. This in turn incentivized national 
regulators to respond to investors‟ preferences by implementing Basel II as a way of 
competing with other financial sectors. To this end, it is important that investors and 
national policymakers have confidence in first, the Basel standards by understanding 
the positive payoffs for implementing Basel II, and second, the adequacy of their 
national implementation. In addition to being a prudential tool for supervisors, 
emphasizing the implementation of Basel II as a means to raise risk management 
standards in banks and foster financial sector development may ignite competitive 
pressures to implement Basel II, as was the case amongst many supervisors in East 
Asia following the Asian financial crisis. To ensure that the implementation of Basel 
II does not merely create white elephants that are not applied by banks or end up 
merely as a compliance exercise to satisfy supervisors, banks need to be driving 
implementation and reaping the benefits of higher risk management standards.
18
 
                                                 
18
 Banks may have incentives to game the system. This cuts to the core of the moral hazard problem 
intrinsic between the regulator and the regulated, and is also a manifestation of regulatory capture, 
which is particularly pertinent to Basel II where “a regulatory rubicon had been crossed. This was not 
so much the use of risk models as the blurring of the distinction between commercial and regulatory 
risk judgements. The acceptance of banks‟ own models meant the baton had been passed. The 
regulatory backstop had been lifted, replaced by a complex, commercial judgement.” (Haldane 
2012:8) This underscores the importance of enhancing the sophistication and capacity of supervisors 
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Once expectations about the positive relationship between Basel II implementation 
and improved risk management standards or financial stability are established, 
competitive pressures for policies to diffuse may increase further. Secondly, greater 
confidence in the adequacy of national implementation may foster the diffusion of 
Basel II. More transparency in national implementation can spur competitive 
pressures across countries in this respect. For example, the FSI started to provide 
more information on the implementation of Basel II across non-member countries in 
2012. This is expected to promote implementation amongst non-implementing 
countries. Regulators and banks that have not implemented Basel II or have done so 
in an inconsistent way may come under competitive pressures to raise their 
standards if there are greater levels of comparable information at hand on how 
national supervisors and banks have implemented Basel II. This could be achieved 
by requiring greater standardization of Pillar 3 disclosures across countries. 
In sum, the process of regulatory convergence is not automatic, neither is it a 
seamlessly continuous process over time. Managing this process by exploiting the 
dynamics of policy diffusion may allow greater convergence with the Basel 
standards to be achieved without resorting to a multilateral institution or by creating 
legally binding obligations, which may not be politically feasible in the short run 
and take much longer and more resources to implement. Having said this, this latter 
policy option should not be ruled out completely in the long run. This is because in 
addition to policy diffusion, factors such as economic development and EU 
membership were also significant drivers of Basel II implementation across the 
world. These variables envisage a possible future role for multilateral institutions 
and the creation of formal obligations to implement Basel II as discussed next. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
to supervise the implementation of the advanced approaches of Basel II and ensuring that sound legal 
and regulatory conditions are in place “as set out in the BCP numbers 1, 6, 8, 21 and 22, relating to 
operational autonomy, adequate resources, appropriate regulatory and remedial powers, and a 
suitable legal framework including protection for supervisors.” (BCBS 2004:6) 
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8.4.3 Alternative modes of promoting convergence: From voluntary standards 
towards hard law and the role of multilateral economic institutions 
The policy option of converting the Basel standards into formal obligations through 
an international agreement, binding conditionality to access finance from 
international financial institutions or as a condition for membership to the G20 or 
possibly the FSB‟s regional groups should not be dismissed from policy 
considerations going forward. Whichever the form, the hardening of soft law, in 
particular, that of voluntary best practice standards, which are one of the softest of 
laws, is the crux of this policy implication. This is because of the variables that 
explained Basel II implementation, the exceptional case of the EU was one of the 
most important, since outside the EU, the degree of convergence with Basel II was 
limited. Although it is not possible to replicate the EU across the world, that the EU 
explained a significant proportion of the degree of international regulatory 
convergence with Basel II points to a possible role that formal institutions and 
explicit policy coordination could play in promoting international, if not regional 
regulatory convergence. This in turn underscores the limitations of the existing 
international regulatory framework, which consists of voluntary financial standards, 
in producing convergence at the global level. Policy diffusion is an important driver 
of regulatory convergence, but with limitations in achieving convergence that 
legally binding arrangements are able to attain. Rather than letting the regulatory 
gap widen between the most developed countries and the rest of the world, the 
implementation of Basel II/III could be formally promoted. Doing so, however, may 
have the disadvantages of further politicizing the Basel negotiation process, 
producing lower common denominator standards and reducing the agility of the 
Basel Committee to respond to rapid changes in global financial markets in a timely 
manner.  
These potential disadvantages underscore the importance of complementing 
the transition towards more binding forms of governance with the institutional 
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strengthening of the Basel Committee, especially regarding its legal status, mandate, 
accountability, decision making processes and rules concerning membership.
19
 
Multilateral governance for managing the implementation of Basel II/III and for 
promoting consistency in their implementation across countries does not exist. To 
address the highly uneven and clustered international regulatory landscape, the 
adoption of a multilateral approach to coordinate implementation may be warranted. 
At the very minimum, the Basel Committee should monitor and publically disclose 
information on the implementation of Basel II/III in non-Basel Committee countries 
on a regular basis and in some detail so that progress in countries‟ implementation 
can be tracked over time. The scope of review should encompass not only the formal 
aspects of national implementation, such as countries‟ domestic implementation 
timelines for legislative or regulatory implementation, but also the consistency in 
domestic regulations with Basel II and banks‟ compliance with those regulations. 
The IMF should extend its financial sector surveillance on assessments of the 
adequacy of Basel II implementation from not only the economically advanced 
countries that have implemented the advanced approaches, but also to countries that 
have implemented the basic approaches. For countries that have not implemented 
Basel II, the IMF and World Bank should assess countries‟ readiness to implement 
Basel II as part of their Financial Sector Assessment Program.  
In addition, the findings on the drivers of Basel II implementation 
underscored the importance of development and implementation capacities. Many 
emerging and developing countries faced real practical constraints that hindered 
their level of convergence with international standards. For countries that lack 
capacities, intentions to implement Basel II are necessary but insufficient, and a 
prolonged implementation timetable is not a solution in itself. In order to encourage 
the implementation of Basel II, it is not only imperative to gain political buy-in from 
                                                 
19
 Until January 2013, the Basel Committee did not have a Charter for almost 40 years of its 
operation. The Charter primarily sets out the Basel Committee‟s existing objectives and key 
operating modalities. (BCBS 2013) 
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developing countries, but capacity building mechanisms and financial resources 
need to be made available to support the efforts of low and medium-capacity 
jurisdictions to implement Basel II. More work may also need to be done to 
demonstrate that the Basel standards are relevant and of value for developing 
countries. This is critical if developing and emerging countries are to have equal 
opportunities to implement the Basel standards that constitute the international 
regulatory framework for bank capital, and conversely, for the Basel standards to 
retain their relevancy as international financial standards. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Why do countries implement Basel II? There was strong and consistent evidence to 
suggest that Basel II policy decisions in countries were highly interdependent on the 
policy decisions of other countries with which those countries were closely 
interconnected, even after taking into account important economic and political 
variables that shaped how countries implemented Basel II. Inter-supervisory 
authority networks, the cross-border structure of global banks and competition for 
capital proved to be effective channels of diffusion that promoted convergence in 
implementation policies across countries. In these channels of diffusion, national 
supervisors and banks acted as key agents of diffusion. The way one country is 
interconnected to another may change over time as countries reconfigure the way 
they integrate into the global economy. However, the dynamics of policy diffusion 
that underlie these channels of diffusion are expected to persist over time and shape 
the international regulatory landscape on an on-going basis as long as we live in a 
globalized economy where one country is interconnected to another economically, 
politically or socially. To this end, the diffusion of policies constitutes the very 
fabric of the globalized world economy. This can be a curse and a blessing for the 
future of Basel II/III and the broader international financial regulatory architecture. 
On the one hand, it can be a curse because policy diffusion left to their own devices 
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may persistently reinforce the uneven and clustered global regulatory landscape as 
divergences in policy implementation diffuse across countries over time. On the 
other hand, policy diffusion can be a blessing by providing a powerful tool to attain 
greater levels of global regulatory convergence with international financial standards. 
The dynamics of policy diffusion potentially offer policymakers the opportunity to 
manage the implementation of financial standards in their current form, that is, as 
voluntary standards of international best practice, until it becomes politically and 
practically feasible to resort to harder laws or the creation of a formal multilateral 
institution to promote their consistent implementation in the longer run. To ensure 
that the latter outcome prevails, understanding the double-edged power of policy 
diffusion and the wider question of why and how countries implement Basel II is 
critical, and to this end, it is hoped that this thesis has helped deepen our 
understanding of these important questions. As the Basel Committee pointed out, the 
stakes are high since the full, timely and consistent implementation of the Basel 
standards is fundamental to raising the resilience of the global banking system, in 
maintaining market confidence in regulatory ratios and in creating an internationally 
level playing field. The benefits of the recent round of regulatory reforms will not be 
realized without effective implementation.  
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